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Introduction 
 
 Agricultural biotechnology refers to a diverse set of industrial 
techniques used to produce genetically modified foods. Genetically modified 
(GM) foods are foods manipulated at the molecular level to enhance their 
value to farmers and consumers. This book is a collection of essays on the 
ethical dimensions of ag biotech.  The essays were written over a dozen 
years, beginning in 1988. 
 When I began to reflect on the subject, ag biotech was an exotic, 
untested, technology.  Today, in the first year of the millenium, the vast 
majority of consumers in the United States have taken a bite of the apple. 
Milk produced by cows injected with a GM protein called recombinant 
bovine growth hormone (bGH), is found, unlabelled, on grocery shelves 
throughout the US. In 1999, half of the soybeans and cotton harvested in the 
US were GM varieties. Billions of dollars of public and private monies are 
being invested annually in biotech research, and commercial sales now reach 
into the tens of billions of dollars each year.1 Whereas ag biotech once 
promised to change American agriculture, it now is in the process of doing 
so. 
 The ethical issues associated with ag biotech are diverse and 
complex. Many worry that genetic engineering might produce unanticipated 
allergens in previously safe foods; or unexpectedly toxic health supplements; 
or novel GM diseases.  Or environmental catastrophe. Or bizarre new lines of 
animals possessing genes taken from humans. Or exceedingly wealthy 
corporations more powerful than the nations trying to regulate them. Or 
bankrupted family farmers in the US and Europe.  Or exploited peasant 
farmers in developing countries. Or inhumanely treated animals in our labs 
and on our farms. Or corrupted attitudes to nature among our children. 
 The book begins with one of the first articles to oppose ag biotech on 
explicitly philosophical grounds, “The Case Against bGH.” Also known as 
bovine somatotropin (or, BST) and recombinant BST (rBST), bGH is a serum 
containing a genetically modified protein that farmers inject into dairy cattle 
to increase milk production by as much as fifteen percent. The first ag biotech 
product to hit the market, bGH seemed to me in the late 1980s as the most 
suspect of the early GM products. It seemed destined to single-handedly 
bankrupt large numbers of family dairy farmers and indirectly to cause 
various other disruptions in the social fabric of rural communities. Believing 
that we should be saving small and medium sized farmers rather than driving 
them out of business, I argued that bGH was a premature technology foisted 
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onto the public by the well-heeled advertising departments of a handful of 
multinational corporations. 
 
Ethical concerns:  Family farms 
 
 When I began to write, stories were appearing regularly in Iowa’s 
main newspaper, The Des Moines Register, about depressed farmers, stress in 
rural areas, and suicide. Farm ledger sheets showed high debt loads and low 
profit margins, and rural businesses faced record rates of foreclosure. It was a 
time labeled by the media as “the farm crisis,” and families throughout the 
region were palpably strained by economic pressures. 
 Believing that moral philosophers should address the concerns of 
those around them I, an assistant professor at Iowa State University, edited a 
book on ethical issues involved in the farm crisis. The book appeared in 1987 
and was titled Is There a Moral Obligation to Save the Family Farm?2 The 
conclusion to the book argues that there is no direct moral obligation to 
“save” any particular family farmer, but there are good reasons to try to 
preserve our system of medium-sized, owner-operated, farms. The system 
represents a politically and economically viable structure by which we can 
meet our social obligations to distribute resources equitably, to treat animals 
humanely, to care for land properly, to nurture mature citizens, and to sustain 
vibrant rural communities. Whereas there is no direct duty to save this or that 
farm, a strong case can be made that there is an indirect duty to pursue 
policies likely to have the effect of saving something like the present system 
of family farms. 
 When I had finished writing, my brother-in-law Rich, ever the 
skeptic, quizzed me about my picture of the ideal farm. 
 “Just what would a farm look like, if it were philosophically and 
morally justifiable?” he asked, suppressing a cynical grin. 
 Unable to resist a good question no matter how impertinently put, I 
began to think more broadly. What larger vision ought to guide us in shaping 
agricultural policy? And how ought we to regard ag biotech, if we want 
farming to be “morally justifiable?” The questions are not easy, but I came to 
believe that they have a relatively simple answer, once we find the right place 
to begin. 
The right place to begin is with the question, What is a good farm? and 
the answer comes from one of America’s most prophetic writers. A good 
farm, argues Wendell Berry, is a farm that does not destroy either farmland or 
farm people.3   It  is one thing to farm merely to earn cash income, another 
to  farm  well.  To  farm well, in accordance with the appropriate standards of 
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excellence, is to produce food and fiber without harming the land or its 
inhabitants. But just what would it mean to farm in this way? and, What 
would be the implications of this dictum for agricultural biotechnology? 
 Neither a farmer nor a political scientist, I had no good answers when 
my brother-in-law wanted more details. I referred him to Berry’s writings and 
the writings of Wes Jackson, Marty Strange, Gene Logsdon, and Donald 
Worster, who outline policies they believe would help us to instantiate 
Berry’s vision.4 Worster, for example, defines good farming as farming that 
makes people healthier, that promotes a more just society, and that preserves 
the earth and its network of life. Strange offers specific policy 
recommendations, suggesting revisions to the tax code and inheritance laws. 
But in the end, I knew that my brother-in-law, a business executive and 
former economics professor, could figure out the policy implications on his 
own. Meanwhile, I had become fascinated by the new biotechnologies being 
developed for agriculture. I wondered whether the greatest obstacle to Berry’s 
ideal might come from the development of these tools. 
 In the 1940s and 50s, tractors, fertilizers, and high yielding seed 
varieties transformed agriculture in the United States. Now, the technologies 
of genetic engineering were on the verge of dramatically reshaping it again. 
Would the vaunted new products of ag biotech help to reform agriculture in 
the direction of Berry’s ideal? It hardly seemed so. 
 
Genetically modified plants 
 
 Since bGH seems to put dairy cows under additional physiological 
stresses, I began to consider a broader question, How ought we to treat farm 
animals? I made a note that I needed to attend more carefully to the issue of 
animal welfare and rights, but an appointment to the National Rural Studies 
Committee in 1989 gave me the opportunity to immerse myself in the details 
of one of the first plant biotechnologies: genetically engineered herbicide 
resistant crops (GEHR). GEHR crops are genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) with new genes inserted to help crops survive the application of 
herbicides. Chapter 2, “Against Herbicide Resistance” presents the results of 
that study, defending a position of “qualified opposition” to GEHR crops. 
 
Genetically modified animals 
 
Returning to the animal issue, I discovered that researchers had 
successfully injected human genes into a pig in 1985. There are reasons to 
worry about the insertion of pig genes into humans, but I was interested in the 
animals. I wondered whether biotech should be constrained by considerations 
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of animal welfare. Berry’s vision of good farming requires respect for land 
along with people, but if we include soils, plants and ecosystems as fit objects 
of moral concern, should we not also include individual sheep, cows, 
chickens, and hogs? If we embrace the idea that farmers should adopt 
sustainable ecological practices and should not destroy their land, should we 
not also expect farmers to respect the interests of particular animals?5 
 I realized that attributing moral rights to animals was a radical 
position, and I did not want to defend a view that entails, as animal rights 
defenders repeatedly point out, that farmers eschew the slaughter of animals. 
The practice of raising and slaughtering animals is the backbone of the family 
farm economy. 
 I faced a personal moral dilemma. I ate meat and defended the farms 
on which meat animals were raised. But to respond adequately to my brother-
in-law’s request for a morally defensible vision of farming I felt I needed an 
answer for those who defend the rights of animals. What is the relative value 
of animal and human life? I wished increasingly that I could put this question 
behind me, focus solely on questions about the broader institution of ag 
biotech, and move on with my customary mores, diet, and agricultural ideals 
intact. I learned that I could not do so. Chapter 3, “Against Transgenic 
Animals” explains why. 
 bGH, herbicide resistant crops, transgenic animals. Three of the best-
known products of ag biotech, and I was opposed to all of them.6  Was there 
anything virtuous about GM foods? 
 
Global opposition to GMOs 
 
 I found myself attracted to those we may call the global critics of ag 
biotech.7 These are people who, in addition to opposing individual products 
of ag biotech, oppose the entire institution. 
 I was inspired to write against ag biotech not so much by its best-
known critic, Jeremy Rifkin, who seems to oppose all technological change, 
but rather by two thoughtful biologists, Wes Jackson and Martha Crouch.  
They have arguments one must reckon with, believing high tech gene splicing 
is the wrong way to try to feed present and future generations and, more than 
that, that ag biotech is a symptom of a sick society. When we crave silver-
bullet technological solutions to complex systemic problems, we are fooling 
ourselves into thinking that our problems are simple, shallow. Crouch 
and Jackson  are  not  the  only  global  critics,  and  Vandana  Shiva,  Mae-
Wan  Ho, Margaret Mellon, John Fagan, Michael W. Fox, Jack Kloppenburg, 
Jack Doyle, and the investigative writers at the Rural Advancement 
Foundation International have all argued in complementary ways. They want 
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to correct the underlying general causes of chronic hunger and environmental 
degradation before we look for overly simple technological solutions.8 
 After thinking carefully about the global case, I slowly drafted the 
essay that appears here as chapter 4, “Against Ag Biotech.” As the article 
suggests, I was very nearly a true believer. Rather than confining our 
opposition to this or that specific product of ag biotech, it seemed that we 
ought to oppose ag biotech itself along with the modern agricultural paradigm 
it requires. As Crouch puts it in the title of one of her most influential pieces, 
the very structure of scientific research in agriculture militates against 
developing products to help the environment, the poor, and the hungry.9 Or, 
as Jackson puts it in one of his titles, our vision for the agricultural sciences 
need not include biotech.10 
 GMOs may help to solve some problems in agriculture, but will it 
help to solve what Jackson calls the problem of agriculture? For Jackson, as 
for Berry, conventional modern agriculture is an outgrowth of a materialistic 
culture moving toward a fragmented future in which most people will be 
utterly alienated from nature. Not thinking this direction the right direction I, 
somewhat uneasily, joined the global critics and, in my own way, began as 
active a campaign against the evils of ag biotech as a schoolteacher from 
Iowa could muster. 
 
Ethics and stories 
 
I was not originally motivated by professional considerations alone to 
defend family farms. I teach at a land-grant university in Iowa dedicated in 
part to helping farmers, and I believe that the institution ought to have 
someone doing research on the ethical dimensions of family farming. But I 
took up the issue as much out of personal conviction as professional duty. 
For, while I was not raised on a farm, I come from a long line of Iowa 
farmers. 
My great great grand -father and -mother, J. H. and Elizabeth Brown 
Pippert, came here from Prussia in the 1860s. At least one of their children, 
grandchildren, great-grandchildren, or great-great-grandchildren, has farmed 
ever since in Cerro Gordo county, a short two-hour drive up I-35. The 
unbroken chain of Pippert farmers in north central Iowa that stretches back 
more than a century was sorely tested in the mid-1980s when uncle Harold 
and aunt Sandy faced potential foreclosure on part of their farm. As readers 
of Moral Obligation? are told in its Introduction, my aunt and uncle farm 
their own 160 acres plus 240 at the old home place. My relatives survived the 
crisis of the 1980s, and son Jason now rents ground and raises corn and beans 
alongside his father. 
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 My wife, Karen, an actor from suburban Washington, D. C., and our 
children, Krista, Ben, and Drew, also grew attached to the land. Our favorite 
weekend activity a few autumns back was to drive to Nora Springs on Friday 
night to watch the high school football game. Jason captained the team and 
starred at fullback while Jenny led cheers from the sideline. We all sipped hot 
chocolate and talked politics in the stands before stopping at Casey’s for 
pizza. We never said this explicitly, Iowans don’t talk this way, but we love 
grandma and grandpa’s place on the north side of the rise in Highway 18 
halfway to Mason City. Although Karen and I own none of it, we nonetheless 
like to consider the land and buildings and communities ours. Or at least, as 
aunt Sandy reminds, ours on loan from the Creator. 
For me, the continued existence of family farms is not an abstract 
problem in applied ethics. I cannot approach it only with disembodied 
principles and a utilitarian risk/benefit calculus. I care about the Pippert farm, 
and like the idea of my relatives making a living on it. 
Along with ethical analysis, this book contains stories: Wendell 
Berry’s story about the loss of American culture and agriculture; the Pippert’s 
story about the pressures medium-sized farm families face. The book itself 
has a narrative structure, presenting my own story about the route by which I 
came to write these essays. What role should such stories play in discussions 
of ethics and public policy? 
Very little, according to many scholars in the Anglo-American 
tradition, who typically assume that ethical issues should be treated 
abstractly. An individual’s memories, subjective experiences, attachments to 
place, desires and dreams should have little weight in the objective work of 
impartial normative assessment.  The defining characteristics of individual 
persons--their preferences, race, gender, social location--should not interfere 
with discussions about how various public policies might affect them. 
According to the reigning orthodoxy, persons are to be treated as generic and 
interchangeable. Therefore, explorations of ethical issues should be logical 
and universalistic rather than narrative and particularistic. 
 Or so contends the reigning orthodoxy. In the last two decades, 
however, a number of schools of thought have challenged this view, turning 
instead to what is called the agent’s perspective. Communitarian philosophers 
such as Alasdair MacIntyre, and virtue theorists such as Michael Slote, take 
care to look at moral issues from the vantage point of particular moral agents. 
Ethical problems look different from within different narrative traditions, 
MacIntyre’s phrase for the beliefs, values, ideals, hopes, institutions and 
practices that define communities.11 
 American pragmatists such as Paul Thompson and Eric Katz sound 
similar themes, insisting on the importance of discussing particular moral 
issues not in abstraction but with eyes fixed on how they might be 
Introduction                                                                                                    7    
  
resolved.12 Feminist philosophers such as Carol Gilligan and Karen J. Warren 
argue powerfully that all persons are different, and that our differences make 
a difference.13 And “narrativists” similarly insist on the centrality of stories, 
virtues, and local resources. Those we might call narrative environmentalists, 
like Aldo Leopold, have famously shown the importance of a sense of one’s 
geographical place in thinking through these issues.14 
 To approach problems in applied ethics in an abstract, impartial, way, 
armed only with high-level principles of justice, beneficence, and autonomy, 
or utilitarian calculations of costs and benefits, is to run the risk of ignoring 
the rich social contexts in which our problems arise.15 It is also potentially to 
overlook the greatest ally we have for solving our problems: the ideals and 
aspirations of particular individuals. Resolution of moral problems depends 
on accurate depiction of the range of solutions actually open to moral agents, 
and without narratives to fill in the complex particulars, the warp and woof of 
our everyday lives, we cannot expect to see the full range of options 
available. 
 As with individuals, so with societies. Studies of social issues are a 
form of natural history, but they often tell us little about the specific context 
within which our society must solve our problems. Ethicists are learning to 
develop schematic, simplified, medical case studies into full-bodied historical 
narratives, and to analyze stories and rhetoric along with arguments and 
policies. 
 We should not simply trust our emotions; without reasoned critical 
analysis, unconsidered intuitions can be dangerous. Some tell stories simply 
to stimulate passions or solicit obedience, and they do so without doing 
justice to the other side of the story. We must approach applied ethics 
empathetically, yes, in close contact with narratives and emotions. But we 
must also reason rigorously, subjecting the moral implications of our 
narratives and emotions to philosophical criticism. 
 Unlike some anti-theorists in ethics, I do not believe that the so-called 
narrative, or virtue, approach to ethics is antithetical to the so-called 
principled, or theoretical, approach. Narratives and principles go together, in 
the classroom as in the courtroom, where jurists pledged to fair-mindedness 
try to draw casuistical guidance from older, settled, cases. As in law, so in 
morality; we draw on prior considered judgments which have withstood the 
test of time to help us reason analogically about difficult new cases. Narrative 
reasoning is essential in ethics, with equal emphasis on narrative and 
reasoning. 
 I come to write about ag biotech from a specific historical and social 
perspective, and my motives and ideals for writing are relevant. I care about 
the farms in Cerro Gordo county; worry about my cousins not having the 
option of continuing in a line of work that has defined the Pippert family for 
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generations; mourn the declining health of the small towns--Hampton, 
Greene, Rockwell--around Nora Springs. My personal history, emotions, and 
desires are the background from which my opinions and judgments emerge. 
And my philosophical opposition to ag biotech springs from the fear that its 
products will strain my extended family’s way of life, a good way of life, 
honed and perfected over generations of practice and refinement. 
I realized early on that there was very little of a practical sort that I 
could do to help rural Iowa families and communities to survive. I had no 
experience planting corn; no spare time during fall semester to help with 
harvest; no deep pockets. I resolved to do what I knew how to do, write 
essays, hoping thereby to lend support to public policies designed to help 
families stay on their farms. Given the strength of my emotions and my belief 
that ag biotech would vex nature--farmers, animals, ecosystems--I saw my 
attempts to present the ugly side of ag biotech as acts of resistance. 
 
Changing stories 
 
 I floated the global argument in oral presentations to students in my 
classrooms at Iowa State, in lectures to various audiences at other 
universities, and even to the occasional radio interviewer. However, I never 
felt comfortable putting it into print. Will all GMOs be unsafe?  Will none of 
them move us toward our best ideals of farming? Will ag biotech inevitably 
lead to fewer and larger farms? Should all GM foods be rejected? As I 
worked on successive drafts of what appears here as “Against Ag Biotech,” I 
thought I knew the answer. Yes, we should oppose ag biotech 
unconditionally, and that is the answer I defend in the essay published in 
chapter 4. That answer, however, is not my final word on the subject. I ask 
the reader to approach chapter 4 as an historical rather than definitive 
document, the momentary culmination of a certain thread of my thoughts. 
 In the years since developing  my version of the global argument, I 
have continued to mull over the literature in agricultural economics, ethical 
theory, political philosophy, ecology, agroecology, environmental ethics, 
animal rights, entomology, microbiology, weed science, and ethology. Alas, 
my views have evolved. I no longer believe in the global case. 
 Why have I changed my mind? The reasons are complex.  Briefly, 
they have to do with my sense of resignation before the fact  that  government  
 
interventions in the market probably cannot save family farms. That 
genetically modified crops probably are and will be safer for people and the 
environment than the current crops and pesticides now in use.  That nature 
probably is not properly construed as an individual and, therefore, not a 
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subject with the capacity to be helped or harmed, benefitted or vexed.  That 
many animals lack feelings and a future and, therefore, are eligible for 
transgenic experimentation, all other things being equal.  That some ag 
biotech products may indeed help us to meet obligations we have to assist 
those less fortunate than ourselves. 
 The last two chapters explain these reasons in some detail. Chapters 5 
and 6 outline the arguments that led me, an early and somewhat vocal critic 
of ag biotech, to change horses. I have come to believe, on ethical grounds, 
that we ought to endorse many GM crops and foods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Case Against bGH (1988) 
 
 
       There are times when the drive [for technological 
progress] needs moral encouragement, when hope and 
daring rather than fear and caution should lead. 
       Ours is not one of them. 
      - Hans Jonas 1 
 
Bovine growth hormone is a protein that occurs naturally in cattle. A 
chain of 190 amino acids, bGH is produced by the pituitary gland and helps 
to regulate a cow’s lactational cycle; generally speaking and up to a certain 
point, the more bGH a cow has, the more milk she gives. Using the 
techniques of genetic engineering, researchers at Monsanto Company have 
isolated the gene that produces the protein and devised low-cost techniques to 
manufacture it. Bacteria are placed into fermentation chambers where they 
multiply rapidly; lab technicians then extract and purify the final product, 
which is identical to the naturally occurring protein in 189 of the 190 amino 
acids; and the product is then injected into cows. 
Industry’s plan is to sell the product to farmers who will administer it 
in daily doses to their animals. Monsanto’s motivation is not hard to discern: 
a single dose of bGH may cost them ten cents to make and yet be sold to 
farmers for fifty cents; a worldwide market of $1 billion a year is predicted 
by Monsanto’s Vice-President, Lee Miller; and a profit ratio of $2 returned 
for every dollar invested is foreseen.2 The first agricultural biotechnology to 
hit the market, it will be commercially available as soon as the Food and 
Drug Administration finds it safe for consumers. Approval is expected before 
the end of 1990; the FDA has already concluded that neither natural bGH nor 
rbGH (recombinant bGH) is biologically active in humans who drink cow’s 
milk. 
The product works. Daily injections cause dairy cows to increase 
production of milk from 10 to 15 percent.3 And the social benefits seem clear; 
some farmers will be able to produce more milk from fewer cows using less 
labor. Dairy operations with large herds are expected to cull their less 
productive cows, put more feed into the remaining ones, and get the same 
amount of milk. All this, presumably, while farmers reduce their working 
hours. As the senior vice president for research and development at Monsanto 
exclaims, “In the future, a farmer using BST will be able to produce as much 
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milk with 70 or 80 cows as can be produced with 100 cows today, use 15 
percent less feed to produce that milk, and finally have a chance to be more 
profitable!”4 Consumers are also supposed to benefit; as dairy farmers save 
money, their decreased costs will be passed along to shoppers in the form of 
lower milk prices.  
With so many benefits promised, why has bGH become anathema to 
some farm and consumer groups? The farmers’ opposition is based on three 
claims: that bGH is harmful to the environment, constitutes inhumane 
treatment of cows, and will displace farmers from already-distressed rural 
communities.5 Predicting that the use of bGH will drive as many as 30% of 
all dairy farmers out of business, Jeremy Rifkin has claimed that bGH usage 
would lead to “the single most devastating economic dislocation in US 
agricultural history.”6  
I consider the farmers’ two claims below. 
 
1. Humane treatment of cows 
 
Several contemporary philosophers have argued that higher mammals 
such as cows possess all of the characteristics needed to be bearers of moral 
rights; sentience, purpose, social life, intelligence, emotions, etc.7 To possess 
moral rights is just to be entitled to fully equal treatment; we do not 
countenance discrimination against children with Down syndrome even 
though they are not as sentient, purposive, or rational as we are. Since they 
have moral value, they have it fully, and are entitled to equal treatment. 
If adult higher mammals possess moral rights, then we must treat 
them the same way we treat humans who, like animals, lack certain 
characteristics of normal humans. It is permissible for us to act 
paternalistically toward them insofar as they need extra care. But we may not 
exploit those beings who lack a certain measure of linguistic ability or 
emotional security or physical autonomy. If Tom Regan and Ned Hettinger 
are right, we ought not to do to cows anything that we would not do to 
mentally enfeebled human beings; the differences between cows and the 
“marginal human” cases are morally irrelevant.8  
On the animal rights view, allowing scientists to administer bGH to 
cows simply to observe its effects would be similar to allowing scientists to 
administer it to brain-damaged adults for the same purpose. We would not 
allow this to be done to any human who was not capable of giving (or 
withholding) informed consent; consequently, we ought not to allow it to be 
done to other beings in the identical position. 
The strictness of the animal rights view has been criticized  as  failing  
to make relevant moral discriminations. For example, moral value is not like 
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a light switch that is either off or on. It comes in gradations, as our ability to 
acquire more of it (through education) and to lose some of it (by entering an 
irreversibly comatose state) shows. The quality, intensity, and complexity of 
different animals’ mental and social lives makes them bearers of different 
gradations of moral value. In addition, it is sometimes appropriate to use an 
other as a means to our own ends even if the other possesses the full 
complement of moral value. We do this often, as when we allow attendants to 
fill our gas tanks, or when we ask our hosts to provide us with a glass of 
seltzer. 
It is not always morally objectionable to use another as a means to 
our own ends even if that other is the possessor of supreme moral worth. 
Each of these considerations points to a morally relevant distinction that 
Regan fails to make in his either/or case (either adult mammals have moral 
rights in the same sense that humans do or they do not). 
A less controversial stance is that animals have gradations of inherent 
value determined in part by the complexity and intensity of their social and 
mental life, and that we must act toward them in ways that respect this value.9 
Supposing that we could successfully defend the “humane treatment” of 
animals view, would the use of bGH be acceptable? 
An answer to this question relies on our being able to assess the 
degree to which bGH-use diminishes the quality of the animals’ physical and 
psychological health and, if it does, whether this harm is justified by the 
benefits it confers. Accurate data about the long-term effects of bGH are not 
available, but studies have been completed of the effects of using bGH during 
one lactational cycle. 
bGH works by stimulating the division of muscle and liver cells and, 
apparently, inhibiting the growth of fat cells. (This is the reason for its 
attractiveness beyond the dairy industry; beef and swine producers expect it 
to lead to leaner meat.) Evaluations of the effect of the drug on the overall 
health of the animal are divided between those who see few if any adverse 
effects and those who are more skeptical. Don Beitz, animal scientist at Iowa 
State University, notes that while use of bGH leads to increased feed 
consumption, bone growth (in young animals), muscle growth (in adults), and 
milk production, the efficiency of the digestive tract and reproductive system 
seems to be unaffected; the birth rate of calves is the same for treated and 
untreated mothers.10 Beitz acknowledges that treated animals do require more 
intensive management since their nutrient requirements are greater, but he 
does not anticipate deleterious effects from proper usage of the protein. 
Others are more concerned. bGH will put the cows’ body metabolism 
under greater physiological stress. David Kronfeld of University of 
Pennsylvania claims that high levels of bGH result in “subclinical hyper-
metabolic ketosis, a condition associated with reduced reproductive 
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efficiency, mastitis, decreased immune function and `the full gamut of other 
diseases typical of early lactation.’“11 Research at the University of Missouri, 
according to Kronfeld, also supports the view that the drug negatively effects 
many animals’ reproductive efficiency and health. It is worth pointing out, 
however, that mastitis--a painful infection of the udder--is a very common 
problem for dairy cows even without bGH, and that the dangers associated 
with decreased immune function--lowered resistance to infectious and 
contagious diseases--may be minimized with good veterinary care. 
Both the proponents and critics of bGH are relying on scientific data 
taken from experiments lasting only a short term. Until we have studies that 
look at the longer-term effects of bGH, studies covering several lactations, we 
will not be able to say with much confidence whether the drug seriously 
impoverishes the lives of the cows or not. But on the basis of what we do 
know, it seems reasonable to conclude that bGH is relatively safe for the 
cows if carefully administered: that is, given for one lactational cycle and 
then in low doses. Under such conditions, the treatment seems no more 
inhumane than many other practices typical of modern dairy operations. 
The objection from humane treatment might lose force if other 
considerations outweighed it. Do current economic conditions justify the 
risks associated with bGH usage? If we were at war and milk supplies were 
endangered, if extreme shortages were anticipated in the short- or long-term, 
if our children were calcium-deficient because our cows were such poor 
milkers, then our need to exploit the cows’ ability to produce might outweigh 
the risks to the animals’ health. Few would argue, however, that this is the 
case. In developed countries, there is too much milk, not too little; the United 
States’ Congress is trying to decrease milk production by 8.7 percent by 
paying producers $1.2 billion to get out of dairy production. Human need for 
more cow milk does not outweigh the risks associated with the drug’s use. 
One might argue that bGH is needed in developing countries. Here 
we would want to look at the broader problems of hunger and poverty in 
nations such as Guatemala, Ethiopia, and Bangladesh. Do such countries need 
more milk? In tropical climates, milk production from cows is at a minimum; 
the weather, for one thing, mitigates against the practice, making the growing 
of hay and forage, for example, almost impossible. Moreover, many of the 
people in such cultures would not consume more milk even if it were 
abundant since they have a natural biological intolerance for it. And finally, 
infants in these countries ought not to be nourished on cows’ milk at all, but 
on their mothers’ milk. So even in the Third World--where one might think 
that milk production needs a boost--bGH turns out to be a bad answer to an 
irrelevant question. 
We ought also to consider the wider economic dimensions of 
agriculture in developing countries. Is a capital- and management-
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intensive technology an appropriate solution to these countries’ complex food 
problems? The style of farming associated with bGH-usage is more adaptable 
by latifundios, large plantation-like farms, than by smaller independent farms. 
Yet the smaller independently-owned farms hold the most hope for relieving 
widespread hunger and poverty in the long run. So, even if more milk were 
needed in the Third World, the system of large-scale dairying likely to be 
required (or induced) by bovine somatotropin is not the answer. 
If other considerations justify the risks to dairy cattle associated with 
intense bGH usage, we have not been shown what they are. The conclusion 
suggested by this discussion is not one favorable to the marketing and use of 
bGH. The drug itself is a potential threat to the well-being of the animals as it 
is likely to be administered to them in doses whose effects are deleterious or 
unknown. It is also likely to exacerbate the problems involved in the 
treatment of animals on factory farms. The Wisconsin farmers’ first claim--
that bGH represents an inhumane method of treating animals--is not without 
merit for anyone taking seriously the inherent value of animals.12 
 
2. Social and Economic Effects 
 
The Wisconsin farmers also called for a boycott against the use of 
bGH on the grounds that it would dislocate too many producers. The 
argument here cannot be that the technology will put some workers out of 
business; if we were to object to inventions on those grounds we would have 
had to oppose railroads, electricity, and electronic printing presses.  
Our concerns are raised not when new inventions displace labor, but 
when new inventions displace labor in ways that seem unnecessary, unfair, 
arbitrary, or completely unaccompanied by redemptive benefits. People are 
not infinitely plastic: attachment to place, profession, and way of life is part 
of human nature. So, even in a market economy in which inventiveness and 
entrepreneurial independence is valued, it is rational to try to minimize the 
pain associated with rapid social change, and actively to oppose those 
changes that benefit only those already most advantaged. Is the new invention 
needed? If so, how can it be introduced with the least amount of suffering? If 
not, why is it being promoted and who stands to gain from it? These 
questions force us to look more carefully at the data about bGH’s predicted 
effects. 
Robert Kalter himself has taken pains to point out that his study has 
been misused by Rifkin. He does not predict that bGH will drive 30 percent 
of all dairy farmers out of business.13 He claims that many “technical 
changes”--including bGH, but not limited to it--combined with the removal of 
dairy price supports, could cause a 25 to 30 percent increase in the nation’s 
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milk supply. Since the demand for milk is relatively static, however, this 
extra milk would not be consumed. Market equilibrium, then would require a 
25 to 30 percent reduction in the number of cows and farms in order to bring 
supply in line with demand. Since not all farms going out of dairy production 
would go out of farming, and since bGH is only part of the broader technical 
change expected in the future dairy industry, Kalter expects that the above 
scenario might send between 23.3 and 46.0 percent of dairy farmers out of 
milking.14 
But this decrease must be compared to what we can expect for 
dairying without bGH in its future. If the drug is kept off the market, not all 
dairy farmers will stay in operation; between 17.2 and 20.4 percent of them 
are expected to go out of business even if there is no technical change. So the 
technology itself cannot be held responsible for all of the 23 to 36 percent 
reduction foreseeen by Kalter. How much could be blamed on bGH? If my 
reckoning is correct, the figures would be between 15.9 and 25.6 percent.15 
In New York, there were 17,500 dairy farms in 1984. If price 
supports are removed, Kalter predicts that the number will fall to somewhere 
between 12,600 and 15,800 over a three year period, depending on the rate of 
adoption. This decline of 2200 to 4900 is too conservative by the estimates of 
Magrath and Tauer (1986: 12). They predict that as many as 5400 farms will 
fail in New York in that period. But they also point out that over the last 10 
years, “conventional technological changes and ongoing structural change has 
resulted in the exit of 4000 dairy farms.” Of course, this still means that bGH 
would take down more dairy operations in three years than had occurred in 
the last ten years. 
We must also put this reduction in the broader history of declining 
farm numbers. In the years between 1964 and 1984, the United States saw a 
decrease of 77 percent of dairy farms and, Kalter points out, “this happened 
without hormone technology.”16 The decrease is due to a number of factors, 
but the improved efficiency brought about by artificial insemination, embryo 
transfer and computerized record keeping play a large role. Since the current 
“farm crisis” has between 9 and 24 percent of all dairy farmers getting out of 
the business over three year periods, bGH will only add on to the total. This 
leads Kalter to conclude that bGH will simply “speed up the process a little.” 
While Kalter’s estimates are more conservative than Rifkin’s 
rhetoric, the figures command attention. Technical change (of which bGH 
will be a part) will be responsible for increasing the expected rate of farmers 
leaving dairying. Without bGH we can expect at least 17.2 of farmers to go 
out of business. With it, that figures rises to at least 23.3 percent. Notice, 
however, that this is an increase of some 33 percent in the number of farm 
failures. (The number could go as high as 120 percent. Using Kalter’s figures 
for a low inelasticity of demand and a high rate of technical change, farm 
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failures could go from 20.4 to 46.0 percent, an increase of over 100 percent.) 
If Kalter’s numbers seem reliable, then, we might wonder at his judgment. Is 
a 33 percent increase in the number of dairy farmers forced out of dairying to 
be interpreted simply as “speeding up the process a little?” Is it fair to ask a 
very small percentage of society to bear all of the costs for a marginal 
increase in the efficiency of milk production? 
Part of the problem with bGH is that it discriminates against small 
and medium-sized farmers, the same farmers who helped to pay for research 
on it. The genetic engineering techniques that industry will use in making the 
protein were perfected at universities like Cornell using public monies. And, 
in research funded jointly by Monsanto, dairy scientists at that land-grant 
school tested the validity of the drug while agricultural economists at the 
same university devised econometric models to gauge its market viability and 
impact. In both indirect and direct fashion, the potentially displaced farmers 
paid monies for public research which, in turn, led to private sector 
developments that promise to put the farmers out of business. Many of these 
farmers have families that have been in the dairy business for generations. 
Prima facie, then, they are justified in believing they have been treated 
unfairly. 
Assessing the deeper merits of this belief, however, is no simple 
matter. There are several problems here, touching on issues of fundamental 
disagreement between social philosophers. What is distributive justice in 
economic matters? What does it require in this case? Don’t the greater 
benefits brought by the free operation of markets outweigh the social costs 
incurred in the constant shifting of labor resources in capitalism? If so, isn’t 
bGH really in our common good, even if it displaces one fifth of all our dairy 
farmers? 
Before taking up these questions I want to lay my cards on the table. 
It is my intuition that the Wisconsin farmers are right; something about 
bGH’s social and economic effects is objectionable. On examination, 
however, I have found it very difficult to say exactly what that is. No laws 
have been broken, no contracts circumvented, no federal regulations ignored. 
Not even Jeremy Rifkin claims that any legal damages have yet been done to 
any party. So the “injustice”--if we are to call it that--is taking a very strange 
form. None of it has happened: the 3.2 to 37 percent of dairy failures-due-to-
bGH are hypothetical (even if probable) future events. 
If the oddness of this case tempts us to throw up our hands we will 
have to resist; if we ever needed a language in which to discuss “potential 
future injustices” it is now. The skill of social scientists to make sensitive ex-
ante studies about the likelihood of various consequences of new 
technologies grows. As it does, their sophistication in predicting the future 
quickly surpasses our ability to assess the results of their studies morally. 
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And yet--if it is in our power to do so--it is surely better to prevent an 
injustice before the fact than to try to remedy one after. So the urgency of 
trying to assess the farmers’ second charge is as great as the conceptual 
difficulties involved in doing it. 
If bGH is unfair to farmers, it is not yet clear how or why. We might 
begin by specifying the group that, at some future point, is supposed to be the 
one offended. According to Kalter, bGH is size-neutral; it can be used by 
farmers whether they have “ten cows or a thousand.”17 Contrary to the claims 
of bGH’s proponents, however, many studies have contested the claim that 
bGH is size-neutral; the winners and losers will not be evenly distributed 
throughout the farming population. 
Even though bGH may be marketed at a low cost per dosage, 
successful use of the product will require significant managerial expertise and 
access to capital. “These constraints,” write Barnes and Nowak, “will be most 
problematic for smaller and less efficient farms that have operators that are 
less knowledgeable and older.”18 A new technology is not size neutral when 
its cost-effectiveness improves as the number of cows and the quality of 
managerial skills increases. And yet, even if individual doses are priced low, 
larger and younger and better educated farmers will reap disproportionately 
greater benefits than older, less “aggressive” farmers.  
Traditional patterns of technology adoption suggest that larger, more 
“progressive,” producers take earlier advantage of innovations, reaping 
whatever rewards there might be in increased efficiency.19 When the rest of 
the group catches on, these comparative advantages fade. In the case of bGH, 
early adopters will probably be those dairy farmers with large pedigreed 
herds, with significant investments in management and labor, access to 
capital, and low debt-loads. They will be the winners. The losers will be those 
with high debt-loads or poor soils or small herds or so-called bad 
management techniques, the producers that the agricultural establishment 
sometimes calls “inefficient.” These are likely to be subsistence farmers in 
Appalachia, black farmers in the South, and medium-sized farms with high 
debt throughout the country. 
Have the losers been treated unjustly by the agricultural research 
establishment? An answer to this question requires us to define justice, no 
easy task. Many definitions have enjoyed favor throughout the centuries of 
reflection on the matter, but three considerations seem to recur in all of the 
discussions: equality, contribution, and need. Following contemporary 
philosophical practice, I will discuss these issues under the headings of 
distributive justice and the common good. 
 
2.1 Distributive Justice and bGH 
 
Against bGH                                                                                                    21                                                                                    
  
The argument from unequal treatment assumes that there is an unwritten 
contract between agricultural research institutions and the farmers who 
support them. The farmers pay taxes which go for salaries and equipment; the 
institutions are supposed to deliver seeds, machines, and techniques that will 
make farming more productive and profitable for all kinds of farmers. Now, if 
institutions do research that speaks only to the needs of a certain class of 
farmers and thereby gives them a comparative advantage over others, then the 
contract has been broken. The institutions have unfairly privileged one class, 
and put another at a disadvantage. 
There is strong evidence for thinking that smaller and larger-sized 
farmers have been treated differently. Jim Hightower’s book Hard Tomatoes, 
Hard Times popularized the case of the mechanical tomato harvester in 
California, and the ongoing California court case that resulted from it is 
adding the weight of legal opinion to Hightower’s charge.20 Of course, some 
benefits have accrued to small and medium-sized farmers from the university 
research in question, and these need to be added into the calculus. 
Nonetheless, when one considers the kinds of technologies that have 
come out of agricultural research institutions since the second World War--
including, but not limited to, chemical herbicides and pesticides, large 
tractors and implements, automated milking parlors, artificial insemination, 
petroleum fueled machines, embryo transfer, and hybrid seeds--a presumption 
in favor of Hightower’s charge appears. Even farmers themselves tend to 
think that their own farms always need to be a little bigger; there is an 
ideology of growth in farming that has been caused by, and in turn helps to 
fuel, institutional research biased toward large-scale, capital-intensive, 
mechanized agriculture. So the ball is in the opponent’s court; the burden of 
proof is on those who believe that small and medium-sized farmers have not 
been discriminated against.21 
One might argue that the skewing of research was justified because large 
farmers assumed a larger share of the tax burden. If the more aggressive 
operators had paid substantially larger sums, wouldn’t they be entitled to the 
increased attention they received? Even if it were true that big farmers had 
shouldered most of the burden, this would not justify an unbroken legacy of 
hard tomatoes and hard tomato harvesters. Which innovations favored smaller 
producers? Which hybrid seeds, which machines, which chemicals gave 
assurance that farmers could remain competitive while retaining their present 
size? 
The severity of this research bias would be of one magnitude if small 
and medium-sized farmers had simply not been able to increase their profits. 
But the situation is much worse; these farmers have not remained where they 
were; they have gone through years of financial and emotional upheaval. 
Many have ended in bankruptcy. As the farm crisis drags on, successive 
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groups of farmers are moved toward the end of a conveyor belt, and dumped 
over the edge. With each new jerk of the belt, the status quo is changed. No 
wonder that the US Office of Technology Assessment predicts that medium-
sized farms will have completely disappeared by the year 2000.22 
The extent of the unfairness cannot be seen if one takes a snapshot of the 
conveyor. The belt is turning, and with each turn, a new group of farmers is 
dumped off the end. When, as David Braybrooke puts it, “the game begins 
again,” the terms are different. If the results of the last exchange “were 
unjust, enriching some people at the expense of others, and there are no 
compensating changes, they bring about a distribution of resources (in private 
property and in other resources like influence) that raises the prospects of 
injustice” in the next round of exchanges.23 As large farmers increase and 
consolidate their hold on the industry, the universities become even more 
responsive to their needs, and to the needs of the private sector food 
processors who prefer to deal with a few large producers. Meanwhile, 
governmental programs also become increasingly biased toward the larger 
producers: the amount of governmental assistance provided to large farms 
increased tenfold between 1980 and 1985, while the assistance given to 
medium farms increased only fivefold.24 
The consequences of such unfair exchanges may be even more troubling 
than the initial injustices. Not only have the medium-sized farmers lost the 
value of their tax dollars, but they have also given up what Braybrooke calls 
“increments of power and advantage”25 that they would have had if the first 
round had been fair. Their ability to educate themselves about new farming 
methods, their incentive to organize into effective political units, their skill in 
bargaining collectively, their capacity to market their goods strategically--all 
of these skills may suffer serious erosion as a result of the group’s having 
been mistreated in earlier stages. 
Whether my theoretical analysis offers a sufficiently nuanced 
explanation of the history of America’s medium-sized farms is arguable. It is 
admittedly schematic and general. But studies have given us good reasons to 
believe, more specifically, that 1) prices received by hog and beef farmers in 
certain portions of the country are artificially lowered because of lack of 
competition among meat packers in those regions,26 2) a concentration in the 
number of firms in breakfast cereals has artificially inflated prices paid by 
consumers,27 3) that tax laws like rapid depreciation schedules and investment 
tax credits have favored large producers over small producers,28 and 4) that 
the land-grant university system has not taken care to make sure its research 
is equally beneficial for all sizes of farms.29 
This list may or may not add up to a longstanding pattern of 
discrimination by powerful, tax-funded, organizations against the majority of 
farmers. But the case against bGH does not stand or fall with the answer 
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to that question. Suppose that the process of allocating tax monies for 
research is judged, as Luther Tweeten argues, not to have been biased against 
family producers. We must still ask ourselves whether the general pattern of 
the demise of moderately sized farms is socially desirable. In 1986, six 
percent of all farmers went out of business; one farm every four minutes. In 
1985, the figure was five percent. If those figures seem small compared to the 
general rate of failures of small businesses, consider that most small 
businesses have only very recently started-up; the farms in question often go 
back generations. These farms do represent, in the often maligned rhetoric of 
farm activists, a “way of life” whose value is not measurable in economic 
terms.30 
The loss of farmland owned by minorities plays a disproportionately 
large role in this story. Half a million acres of farmland per year are currently 
being lost by black owners. The story started, of course, with blacks clearly 
behind the eight ball; while they constituted approximately 15 percent of the 
U. S. population, blacks owned almost no farmland at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Currently they own 1.4 percent of the farms. Whatever 
progress black farmers have made, however, is being rapidly eroded. At the 
current rate, these farmers will be completely landless again by the end of the 
century. 
What is happening to the land? Patterns of land-use vary across the 
country, but in places where conversion to nonagricultural uses is least 
problematic, the number of absentee landowners is increasing dramatically. 
In 1981, the number of acres managed by professional farm management 
companies was 48 million; in 1986, it was 59 million, an area the size of 
Colorado.31 While it is not clear from the data which farms in particular are 
under the most pressure, it is clear that 66 percent of total farm debt was held 
in 1986 by medium-sized farms, those usually owned and operated by 
families who are dependent on them as their major source of income. These 
are the farms currently closest to the end of the conveyor belt.32 
What does this story about publicly funded agricultural research and its 
effects on rural America have to do with bGH? It helps us to see the broader 
pattern of which bGH is a continuation. If hardships were distributed evenly, 
if large and small and medium-sized farms--those owned or worked primarily 
by blacks, whites, and hispanics--had all suffered equally in this tale, then we 
would have little basis for talking about injustice. But gross discrepancies 
have been with us for a long time, through several turnings of the belt, and 
those dumped off the end have not been compensated. 
In terms of disparity in income levels and access to power, the situation 
in agriculture is little different from the wider pattern in the United States. In 
1970, the top 20 percent of Americans made 41.6 percent of total family 
income; the bottom 20 percent made 5.5 percent.33 By 1985, the top 20 
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percent were capturing an additional 5.5 percent--up to 47 percent of all 
earned income--while those on the bottom had dropped to 4.7 percent. Of 
those working for a living, the most successful in our culture make 
somewhere in the range of 100 to 200 times the amount of the least 
successful.34 
If the discrepancies were temporary abnormalities, we might be able to 
overlook them. But to the extent that the inequities are deeply entrenched in 
our history, are likely to persist indefinitely, and are growing worse, they 
indicate a troubling problem in our agricultural market system. For it is, in 
Braybrooke’s words, “the continual repetition of the discrepancies, with one 
set of people always faring well, and another always faring badly” that fixes 
our attention. “Some people, and their children, [are] living their lives out--
very possibly shortened lives--without having any chance to live decently; 
others [are] surfeited with pleasures.”35 
We might defend the agricultural market system by arguing that 
discrepancies of some magnitude are inevitable in any system of allocating 
resources, and that the agricultural market system could alleviate gross 
discrepancies by redistributing resources downward--toward those on the 
bottom--through political measures such as progressive income taxes. In this 
case, income transfers (for example, via a truly progressive income tax 
system) from rich CEOs and agribusiness corporations to seasonally 
employed migrants and poverty-level farmers would be justified on the 
grounds of equality and need. 
This would be a step in the right direction, but the poor need more than 
income; they need autonomy, meaningful employment, jobs in which their 
skills can be used and honed and which help to give them control of their 
lives. The poor need jobs and education through which to be able to meet 
their own needs for food, shelter, clothing, and companionship. Farming in 
the traditional sense has offered that sort of employment. The farmers being 
put out of business by technological advances do not need income 
enhancements in the long run. They need secure employment. Thus the 
answer suggested by Michael Novak--to give farmers cash--may show 
compassion, but it is not directed toward establishing an agricultural economy 
that plans rationally and deliberately for just compensation of its members.36 
It may be objected here that my analysis assumes too much control over 
the inventive process. How can we plan to come up with innovations that 
would help smaller full-time farmers? 
Research on bGH may have begun, in part, because scientists were 
interested in the molecular structure of a specific protein, but it has been 
pushed through to the marketing stage only by corporations anticipating 
significant profits. Expensive biotechnologies do not blossom from people’s 
heads as if they were fresh flowers seeking spring air; they are 
Against bGH                                                                                                    25                                                                                    
  
consciously pursued by powerful organizations with specific plans and needs. 
Those who say that “the development of technology” is primarily 
responsible for the decreasing number of dairy farmers may not intend to 
mislead us, but they do so when they allow their audiences to infer that 
history could have followed no other course. In fact, we could have pursued 
other economic, monetary, and fiscal policies; we could have encouraged 
farm organizations and cooperatives instead of subsidizing production of 
targeted crops; we could have concentrated on diversifying our own farms 
instead of concentrating production on a few export crops; we could have 
invested in other sorts of research in agriculture--perennial crops, sustainable 
farming methods, small-scale, non-chemically driven planters and reapers. 
Those who have the most to gain from large, intensively-managed, petro-
chemically dependent methods in farming have played a substantial role in 
the displacement of farmers. 
 
2.2 bGH and the Difference Principle 
 
How should we go about distributing the benefits of technology? John 
Rawls suggests that social goods should be distributed fairly, and that 
inequities in distribution should be accepted only when such inequities will 
enable those on the bottom to be better off than they would have been if the 
inequities were disallowed.37 This is the difference principle: unequal 
distribution of material goods and social status is fair if and only if it 
improves the lot of those on the bottom. Poor farmers in the South might be 
denied certain tax breaks given to bigger farmers if and only if the poorer 
farmers would come out ahead in the long run. Black farmers might be denied 
Extension Service attention if and only if this would result in their farm 
operations improving over the long haul. A progressive tax system would be 
justified, even though it appears to treat the wealthy unfairly, if and only if it 
improves the condition of the worst off. 
Knowing what we now know about bGH, could we justify denying 
industry and large farmers profits on the grounds of distributive justice to 
smaller farmers? Advocates would say no; keeping bGH off the market is 
unfair to some farmers because it denies them the choice of using it. But, 
according to the difference principle, this could be justified if it would 
improve the lives of agriculture’s most disadvantaged. 
Would a boycott of bGH improve the lot of the worst-off dairy farmers? 
There are at least two questions here. The first is: Would banning bGH really 
be good for the marginal farmers? Lester Thurow argues that while there is an 
excess of farmers, there are plenty of good jobs into which they may move.38 
Rather than artificially trying to save farmers’ jobs, society would be better 
off retraining the farmers, helping them to make the transition into other lines 
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of work. This argument might make sense if we decided not to try to count 
the psychological costs involved in moving farmers, farm families, and 
associated rural workers out of their way of life. It might make sense, too, if 
we looked at the history of farming through deterministic glasses, for if the 
labor requirements of agriculture have been reduced by inevitable, 
inexorable, economic forces, then it would be foolish to try to retain workers 
in farming today. Too many inefficiencies in the allocation of resources are 
promoted by trying to keep farmers employed.39 
Laying aside for the moment questions about the validity of this view of 
history we may still ask whether the argument above takes into account all of 
the external economic costs involved in moving labor out of agriculture.40 
How much does it cost taxpayers when a displaced farmer moves into an 
urban area, fails to find a job, goes on unemployment, and eventually loses 
incentive to look for work? How many tax dollars are spent on Medicare, 
public nursing, pharmaceutical products, and federal programs in order to 
care for that farmer? What social costs are incurred by the depopulation of 
rural areas, the overcrowding of cities, and the malaise and disruption that 
accompany both? 
The fact is that we do not have any idea about the extent of the external 
costs involved in moving labor out of agriculture. We lack accurate 
accounting methods “that begin from the assumption that social costs are to 
be computed so that the public has a far more exact understanding of what 
any particular item or process costs the society as a whole.”41 So I would not 
presume to be able confidently to assert that the costs of moving farmers out 
of their way of life outweighs the benefits of doing so; I have no more 
privileged way of judging this matter at present than anyone else. What can 
be asserted, however, is that those who think that they can boldly claim that 
“retraining farmers” is the only sensible answer to the farm crisis are either 
naive or privy to divine revelation. 
The second question is whether “banning” bGH would be good for the 
urban poor, many of them grandsons or granddaughters of farmers. A 
successful boycott against bGH might prevent the lowering of milk prices, or 
even slightly inflate them and, moreover, have a chilling effect on other 
avenues of research in industry and university, avenues that might lead to 
cheaper food for the poor. Advocates of bGH claim that the new 
biotechnologies will cut costs for farmers, and that these will be passed on to 
consumers. History, again, is a good antidote for such rhetoric. In recent years 
farmers have been pressed to cut their input costs while the prices they 
received on the market for their wheat, corn, and beans dropped steadily. Did 
the price of corn flakes to consumers drop? During the summer of 1988, 
many food manufacturers raised prices at the first media stories of the 
drought. Their costs, of course, had not gone up; they simply used news 
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reports as cover for increasing profits. The facts are that intermediate markets 
seem to have a way of absorbing whatever profits are made when farmers’ 
prices go down. There is no reason to think that bGH usage would lower milk 
prices for the urban poor, or any consumers. 
 
2.3 bGH and the Common Good 
 
These considerations compel us to think not simply about distributive 
justice, but about wider considerations such as the sort of people we are and 
want to be, the qualities of character we want to encourage in our young, and 
the type of concerns we wish to pursue together. Our society should be one in 
which no person goes hungry, in which all who wish to work are employed--
in jobs promoting individual autonomy and social cooperation--and in which 
human flourishing in its moral and spiritual sense is possible. We should 
pursue objectives that are good, in an objective, substantial, sense; objectives 
that allow us “to experience the fullness of human life, as opposed to merely 
existing.”42 
From the perspective of the common good, bGH appears as a technology 
that not only will fail to promote the common good, but will actively 
undermine it. It will only add to a decline in the number of dairy farmers, 
exacerbating the crisis currently affecting rural America. It will degrade 
rather than enhance the internal goods pursued in the practice of farming 
since it encourages farmers to treat animals as production machines rather 
than co-inhabitants.43 It promises to assimilate dairy farming fully into an 
impersonal, industrialized culture that farmers have long resisted. In short, 
bGH threatens to undermine the common good not simply of the dairy 
farmers it will displace, but of us all. It promises, in a small way, to 
undermine our general well-being. 
That conclusion is worth pondering, and its qualifications worth 
repeating. bGH promises (we should not forget that we are dealing with 
potential injustices, not yet realized) in a small way (it is by no means the 
most pressing problem in America, though it may be for the less than 1 
percent of Americans who are small dairy farmers) to undermine (not simply 
fail to promote) our general well-being (it is not simply dairy farmers who 
are affected, but all of us). 
After all of this, defenders of the technology would still have the 
following response open to them. If we prevent bGH from reaching the 
marketplace, we may be sending a signal to farmers that inefficient farming is 
acceptable, and that society will always protect them from innovations that 
might displace them. This would be counterproductive for society as a whole, 
making farming a less attractive line of work for farmers, and driving up the 
cost of food for consumers. 
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The objection has merit, and it forces us to admit that we walk a fine 
line when we get in the business of trying to pick and choose between new 
technologies. We do not want to stifle the imaginative spirit of public or 
private scientists, nor the independence of farmers for whom farming is 
attractive precisely because it allows them freedom to try new things. But 
while bGH is the first agricultural biotechnology, it will not be the last. And 
discouraging its use in no way commits us to oppose all technologies. We 
should oppose only those technologies that unfairly advantage one social 
group over another, that displace workers at unacceptably high costs, or that 
threaten the stability, beauty, or integrity of the plant or animal kingdom.44 
 
3. Policy Recommendations 
 
In the interests of the common good, we ought to pursue at least two 
goals in agriculture. One is to keep farming open to a wide number of people. 
The second is to allow innovations that will contribute to the number of 
meaningful jobs. Accomplishing this goal means matching supply with 
demand. The free market has not demonstrated the ability to do this in the 
dairy industry. When left to market forces, dairy farmers--like all farmers--
have, in the words of John Kenneth Galbraith,  
a relentless and wholly normal tendency to overproduce, because of 
extraordinary productivity gains and because farmers, being 
powerless to influence or control supply and price, harvest more and 
more as a way of trying to stay financially afloat.45  
As Galbraith argues, the answer is a system of supply management, 
something that is “taken for granted in all large-scale industry.” We need a 
way to organize dairy farmers so that each can make a decent living in a 
relatively stable business atmosphere without relying on government 
subsidies or having to try to outproduce one’s neighbors. That is a tall 
political order. My contribution here is only to suggest that the sort of 
technological direction represented by bGH is of no help in trying to fill it. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
To the extent that potentially displaced dairy farmers have done nothing 
for which they ought to be punished; to the extent that the research 
establishment has clearly favored large producers in its development of 
techniques and technologies; to the extent that fiscal, monetary and economic 
policies have disadvantaged small dairy producers; and to the extent that bGH 
will only exacerbate the unjust consequences of the past; to that extent we 
ought to oppose this particular biotechnology. Language about “banning” 
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bGH, of course, is just that: a slogan intended to summarize the case against 
bGH. There is no governmental body with the authority to ban bGH on the 
grounds of humane treatment of animals. Nor is there any government agency 
charged with the task of overseeing--much less regulating--technologies by 
the criteria of their anticipated socio-economic effects. This shows the need 
for legislative attention to this matter. But in the meantime, opposition to the 
marketing of bGH sends a signal to those in public and private decision-
making positions. 
Not all biotechnologies are acceptable. We do not want those that are 
destabilizing, inhumane, or ugly; we want those that will preserve the beauty, 
integrity, and diversity of the Creation. 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
Jewish folklore tells of the town of Chelm, whose inhabitants engaged in 
curious behavior. Knowing full well that rainy season was upon them and that 
the prayer hall desperately needed a new roof, they spent their time putting 
new carpet on the floor. The next fall, when their schoolchildren had no 
papers, pencils, or workbooks, they spent their fortune on another first edition 
for the rabbi’s library. Chelmians always did the opposite of what was in their 
own interests. 
However entertaining fiction may be, contemporary agricultural history 
is more so. Awash in excess dairy products, our government dumps milk in 
the ocean, hands out surplus cheese to farmers, and pays operators $1.2 
billion to slaughter their cows: all of this while publicly funded institutions 
quietly spend taxpayers’ monies on schemes to increase milk production.  
There are daring scientific projects that are in our interests and that need 
our moral encouragement. bGH is not one of them. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Against Herbicide Resistance (1990) 
 
 
 There’s corn in the bean field, 
 Persnickety wants it clean. 
 I got these blisters on my fingers, 
 I got these cockleburs in my dreams. . . . 
 I been walkin’ the beans, in the burnin’ sun, 
 And it looks like I ain’t ever ever gonna get done. 
 
     - Greg Brown 1 
 
 I pulled weeds out of half-mile rows of soybeans on grandma and 
grandpa’s farm long before I heard of the controversy surrounding herbicide 
resistance and genetic engineering. Twenty years ago, Gordie, Richard, Greg, 
and I “walked beans,” not knowing that our fists and scythes were not the 
only means available to Grandpa for killing weeds. We knew little then about 
uprooting thistles with tractors and discs or about spraying chemicals onto 
mustard. We knew only that a cool thermos of lemonade and some stern 
looks from Mom would motivate our troop into action because every good 
Iowan hated volunteer corn and sunflower shoots. The hatred stemmed as 
much from the fact that the weeds made a field “look messy from the 
highway” as from the fact that they cut down yields; Grandma had aesthetic 
sensibilities as highly developed as any character in Greg Brown’s song. 
 The chore of weeding has fallen squarely into uncle Harold’s hands 
for the last two decades. He understands that shelling out money in February 
to buy soybean seeds with a strong tolerance for (“resistance to”) the 
presence of herbicides will cut his weeding costs in July. By applying 
chemical weed killers from his tractor, he saves the cost of hiring high 
schoolers to walk the beans. 
 In 1990, Iowa farmers have safer toxins and more discriminating 
spray equipment available than they did in 1970. But they still attack weeds 
the way farmers have done for thousands of years: They plant their crop, see 
what weeds come up, and then try to kill the weeds with chemicals, rotary 
hoes, and high school kids. For millennia, farmers have started with seeds, 
selected those they believe will be most productive, hardy, or drought-
resistant, planted them, and then tried to devise means to eliminate their 
competitors. “Pre-emergent” herbicides, applied to the soil at planting, allow 
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farmers to prevent weeds from coming up, but this is just a variation on the 
theme. The tune stays the same: You start with seeds that have traits you 
desire and then you find chemicals or cultural practices to get rid of 
everything else. 
The time-honored technique is about to be reversed. Scientific 
developments have made it possible to start with chemicals rather than seeds. 
Having identified the genes that allow certain herbicide resistant weeds to 
survive in the presence of specific toxins, scientists have successfully 
transferred the genes from the weedy species in which they naturally occur to 
tomatoes, tobacco, and petunias. Soon, genetically engineered soybean and 
corn plants may be commercially available, crops designed to flourish in the 
presence of synthetic compounds. Glyphosate is a weed killer known by the 
trade name Roundup, assigned it by its parent company Monsanto. 
Glyphosate kills virtually every plant it touches. Starting with Roundup, 
scientists designed seeds to grow in the presence of the chemical.  
Genetically engineered herbicide resistant (GEHR) crops reverse the 
order of weeding. Where our great great grandparents started with seeds and 
then hunted for chemicals, scientists now hunt for a chemical and then look 
for seeds. The reason is that a new generation of poisons has been discovered 
which seem to be far safer for humans and the environment than older 
poisons. If the new generation of broad-spectrum chemicals truly is safe, if 
you can drink glyphosate from a glass as proponents have done at press 
conferences, then seeds genetically engineered to grow in the presence of 
such benign chemicals would be welcome developments indeed.  
That is the promise of GEHR research. Farmers, seeing ever tougher 
species of mutant weeds appearing in their beans, will have more efficacious 
and safer chemicals.  Consumers, worried about pesticide residues on and in 
their vegetables, fruit, and meat, will have produce grown with less dangerous 
herbicides. Despite the excitement, however, there are problems associated 
with the technology. Leaving aside for the moment agronomic questions like 
whether GEHR crops will actually work in the field or how long it will be 
before weeds resistant to the new chemicals appear, consider the ethical 
questions. 
Some critics have expressed reservations about the moral propriety of 
crossing unrelated plant species. Jeremy Rifkin, for example, has argued that 
it offends God to cross plants with weeds when the two species cannot be 
crossed by natural means of reproduction.2 Is it right to violate species 
boundaries set up by “natural law”? This question may appear extreme to 
some plant geneticists and breeders, but it deserves the attention of moral 
philosophers interested in agriculture. 
Others have expressed concerned that new labor-saving technologies 
may displace farmers. GEHR crops might increase the productivity and 
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efficiency of an hour of a farmer’s time, but what would that mean for farm 
and rural economies that are already unstable?  
Some have worried about the medical and environmental safety of 
the final product. Will GEHR potatoes really be safe for humans, or will 
toxic residues remain in or on the vegetables? Will toxic compounds 
accumulate in the tissues of fish in streams collecting GEHR runoff?  
Another worry concerns the economic power of the large chemical 
firms investing in GEHR crops, powerful multinational companies like 
Monsanto and du Pont. Will this technology allow a few chemical companies 
to strengthen their hold over an industry that is already oligopolistic, forcing 
American farmers to pay inflated prices for seeds and chemicals?  
Finally, some are worried about who we are as a people, our 
communal identity. GEHR crops might make American agriculture more 
dependent on chemical-intensive and capital-intensive practices. Do we want 
to encourage exploitive attitudes to nature? 
Ethical questions cannot be answered by scientific analysis alone. 
Ethics requires facts, and no one who closes their eyes to the science involved 
in agricultural biotechnology will be able to make justifiable moral decisions 
about it. But scientists can at best give us accurate descriptions of problems. 
Ethical judgments require philosophical reflection having to do with 
prescriptive analysis. Where scientists ask “What is going on?” and “What 
can be done?” philosophers ask “What ought to go on?” and “What should be 
done?”  
My discussion has three parts. First, I introduce the difference 
between science and morality in general, and between natural laws and 
ethical laws in particular. This section is followed by a brief history of weeds 
and the techniques traditionally used to fight them.  
In the third and longest part of the chapter I describe possible 
responses to the question of whether we ought to use public funds to do the 
research necessary to produce GEHR crops.  There are four possible 
responses to this question. The first is unqualified endorsement, the view that 
GEHR research should proceed unimpeded if only because it is promising 
science. I analyze arguments that might be offered in support of this position 
and conclude that it is not defensible. 
A second response is unqualified opposition, the view that GEHR 
research is not morally permissible under any circumstances. After analyzing 
arguments that might be offered in support of this view, I conclude that it is 
no more defensible than unchecked endorsement. In the last section, I offer 
assessments of two final views, qualified endorsement and qualified 
opposition. I conclude by arguing for the last position. 
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1. On science and ethics 
 
Weeds may seem the stuff boring summers are made of, but 
reflection upon them uncovers a large and intriguing web of philosophical 
relationships. Consider the following epistemological principle: There is no 
such thing as a weed-in-itself. A virgin prairie does not in itself contain 
desirable and undesirable species; it merely presents diverse broadleaf plants 
and grasses competing and cooperating for nutrients. Not until an enterprising 
farmer or gardener or homeowner arrives are some plants suddenly 
transformed into “weeds” while others are turned into “turf,” “crops,” or 
“flowers.” Weeds exist as much in the eye of persnickety beholders as they 
do “in nature.”  
Nature, for instance, does not call the dandelion undesirable (and 
neither does the farmer who grows it commercially for sale to wine makers). 
Those of us with a particular, historically-conditioned, landscape aesthetic 
select the dandelion for condemnation. According to another not implausible 
philosophical metaphor, then, Nature is a passive observer of the prairie, 
content to watch as the more fit outlast the less.  
We are the ones to interfere, coming to the rescue of those plants that 
have garnered our favor. Rising above Nature, as it were, we insistently seek 
to bend her rules to our purposes. We intervene, saving the weak tomato 
seedling, pulling quackgrass, over and over again if need be, from a spot it 
may have occupied for centuries. 
Seen in this light, weeding is more than a farm chore; it is an 
analogue of moral activity. For we are self-moving beings, possessed of a free 
will.  We can move ourselves in directions contrary to our instincts. This 
difference between the active choosing self and the more passive dimensions 
of Nature identifies the difference between science, which studies the laws 
we call “natural laws,” and ethics, which studies the laws we call “moral 
laws.” Natural laws simply describe what happens. The law of gravity tells us 
about the relationship between two bodies, enabling us to explain what 
happens when a plant dies and to predict what will happen to its petals once 
they lack support. They will, of course, fall, inevitably, because of the laws 
Sir Isaac Newton discovered. However, as C. S. Lewis helpfully puts it, the 
dead petals are under no orders to fall, they feel no compunction to head 
downward.3 They simply fall, time and time again, because of the attraction 
between physical bodies.  The  law  of  gravity describes this regularity, but it 
 
does not tell dead petals what to do next. Science describes. 
Ethics prescribes. Where science explains and predicts, ethics 
compels and justifies, telling us not what is done but prescribing what ought 
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to be done. When Mom asks me to walk beans, I can choose not to do what 
she has requested.  If I refuse, I may feel that I have failed in my duties, that I 
ought to have obeyed. Unlike true natural laws, which cannot be broken, 
moral laws can be disobeyed. True moral laws, if there are any, are different 
from apparent moral laws, of which there are many.  True moral laws over 
ride all other inclinations, binding us.4 
When things are not the way they should be, we should intervene, 
trying to make things right, fair, just. In the 1980s, foxtail, quackgrass, 
cocklebur, velvetleaf, pigweed and other plant nuisances cost Iowa farmers 
approximately four percent of their potential corn harvest. In areas like the 
Mississippi Delta, where agricultural income is pinched at least as much as it 
is in the Cornbelt, losses from weeds were five times as great, averaging 20 
percent of the possible yield. During times of great stress owing to unstable 
farm income, high input and capital costs, low commodity prices, and narrow 
profit margins--when the health of farm families as well as the diets of 
children around the world fare badly--the needs of humans clearly outweigh 
any alleged right to life plants may have. From an anthropocentric 
perspective, one that puts the needs of human beings above all others, weeds 
may be evil both in an agronomic and an ethical sense. To the extent that they 
are yield-reducing, they deprive children of food and farmers of profits. From 
this perspective, farmers are morally justified in trying to eradicate them. 
But all of them? Some “weeds” may be useful because they prevent 
the growth of more harmful weeds, or because they contribute biomass to the 
field. As Levins and Lewontin explain, 
By using broad spectrum herbicides, beneficial weeds, those 
that compete with harmful weeds, are destroyed along with 
the harmful weeds they displace, so the weed problem is 
partly created by the very operation that is supposed to cope 
with it . . . The greater the cure, the greater the problem.5 
Beneficial weeds are not thieves from an economic or horticultural 
perspective, stealing sunlight, water, and nutrients from desirable species. 
Ought they then to be regarded as ugly blots on a bean field? Concern for the 
“looks” of a field shows that considerations of form are sometimes as 
powerful in determining farm practices as considerations of function. Anyone 
interested in changing farm practices must therefore pay attention not simply 
to the science and economics of agriculture, but to its aesthetics as well. 
The complicated web of weeds requires that a truly objective view of 
the subject take up issues relating to the anthropology of food, the sociology 
of scientific research, and the ideology of technological progress. Because 
food is such a constant part of our lives, cultures throughout history have 
expressed concern for its purity, going as far as to attach religious 
proscriptions against the eating of certain kinds of foods, or foods prepared or 
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ingested a certain way.6 To put those problems in proper context we need 
some historical perspective. 
 
2.  A brief history of weeds 
 
Before the advent of modern herbicides farmers used organic 
techniques to control weeds. Thousands of years ago, in the first century of 
the common era, Pliny observed that the leaves of some plants could be used 
to discourage the growth of weeds.7   
When hand hoes were supplemented with oxen and plows sometime 
after 1000 B.C.E., sound ecological principles were not abandoned. In Japan, 
traditional farmers grew rice in flooded river plains for centuries without 
depleting the soil. Sowing rice seed onto a bed of composted material, 
transplanting the seedlings into a field, and then lightly cultivating, hand 
weeding, and mulching, these farmers kept weed outbreaks to a minimum.  
In the United States, farmers brought rotation schemes with them 
from Europe. Wheat, oats, and barley were often rotated over a five or six 
year period with corn and beans interspersed with years when the land would 
lay fallow or be used for pasture.8  
Combined with mechanical cultivation, cultural practices were 
successful in keeping growers ahead of problem weeds. But insects were 
another problem; they cannot be controlled as well by cultural or mechanical 
means, and a single infestation of persistent worms or moths may devastate 
an entire field. Farmers waited until the late nineteenth century for chemicals 
that could deal effectively with insects and be produced on a large scale. 
New machines, improved roads and railroads, and the adoption of 
“the revolutionized agriculture of England, with its scientific crop rotation 
schemes and conscientious application of fertilizers” induced farmers to 
specialize and intensify their cropping methods.9 The best way to increase 
profits seemed to be to mass produce that one crop in which one had a 
competitive advantage. So tobacco farmers grew more and more tobacco and 
less and less wheat and beans while wheat and beans farmers concentrated on 
their specialties without much attempt to break into the tobacco market. 
Intensive monocultural cropping practices led to profitable operations 
for many farmers, and they in turn came to depend on cash crops. Their 
dependency only deepened as the chemical industry discovered new 
compounds to battle new infestations of new grasshoppers, bugs, moths, 
worms, beetles. And weeds. 
Arsenic was first used by an American farmer in the summer of 1867 
to kill the Colorado potato beetle, which found ample and rich feeding across 
the Midwest and into the East. Farmers bought hundreds of reputed 
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“solutions,” but only one seemed to work both cheaply and easily: Paris 
green, a copper acetoarsenite. Within years the heavy metal was dusted not 
only on potatoes, but on “melons, squash, cabbage, a few other vegetables, 
most fruits and cotton.”10  
The results, as many writers then and now put it, were astonishing. 
The chemical industry had helped farmers take much of the risk out of 
farming and they in turn became remarkably productive. Using animal-
powered implements in the early nineteenth century, American farmers could 
feed their own family of, say, six people. Using tractors in 1947, the same 
farmer could feed sixteen people.11 The bugs, it seemed, had been beaten, and 
twentieth century farmers were hooked on toxins. 
The chemical weed killers used in the late nineteenth century were 
inorganic compounds such as salts, oils, and chlorates.12 When these caused 
visible harm to crop plants and, more infrequently, to farm animals and 
humans, the poisonings were taken as evidence that the compounds were 
efficacious. They were taken only secondarily as evidence that the product 
had an upper limit of safety to humans, and then farmers seemed to think only 
that the product had to be handled carefully. The high incidence of reactions 
to chemicals during the early period did not drive numbers of farmers to 
reject them; it seemed rather to reinforce the message sent by scientists and 
industry officials. Normal use of the chemicals posed no danger; it was only 
misuse that constituted a threat. 
The chronic effects on humans of long term exposure to arsenical 
insecticides was of little concern, as was the accumulation of salts in the soil 
or the potentially toxic effects of compounds like PCBs (which were added to 
the oils to make them less flammable).13 The desire for effective, easy to 
apply, chemicals motivated industrial research and development into cheaper, 
nonoil-based, compounds.14 
Nonetheless, a grain of uncertainty about the agricultural 
establishment had been planted in the collective farm consciousness. This can 
be seen by considering another episode from the beginnings of the pesticide 
industry. 
In the teens and twenties, farmers welcomed lead arsenate as a 
replacement for the old copper arsenite (Paris green) and calcium arsenite 
(London purple). The “new generation” chemical proved extremely effective 
against the gypsy moth, and was applied to celery in Florida in 1925 when 
growers there faced a plague of yellow-green caterpillars, on strawberries and 
pears and apples from Washington to Maine, and on grapes in New York. 
Farmers would not learn how dangerous these chemicals were for 
many years. Arsenic and lead in small doses can cause symptoms such as 
“gastroenteritis, chiefly in the form of vomiting, diarrhea, and abdominal 
cramps” and, in only slightly larger exposures, neuritis, kidney and liver 
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damage, “bloody urine, stools, and/or vomitus, cold sweats, thready pulse, 
and great prostration,” even death.15 Arsenic and lead are two of the most 
toxic compounds known, are virtually nondegradable, and are not soluble in 
water.16 
Neither scientists nor farmers knew of these unintended effects when 
the arsenicals and metals were first introduced. But had researchers been 
more careful in their early work, they might have identified some of these 
effects. Fifty years before the introduction of the arsenicals, Townend Glover 
had reported retarded growth for plants grown in arsenic treated soil. Puzzled 
by his findings, he referred his 1870 study to the chemist William McMurtrie. 
Five years later McMurtrie reported little cause for alarm: plant growth was 
inhibited only after the amount of poison in the soil reached 500 milligrams, 
an extraordinarily large amount. Translated into field practices, this meant 
that it would take more than 906.4 pounds per acre of arsenic before soils 
would be damaged. Such a level of application, McMurtrie rightly pointed 
out, “would never be approached in practice.”17 The obvious conclusion was 
that farmers had no cause to worry about the safety of Paris green. 
Even after farmers had stopped using London purple after seeing it 
damage their crops they stepped up their use of other arsenic based 
compounds. They were obviously prepared to avoid only those chemicals that 
did not work, not insecticides in general. And even farmers skeptical of the 
new compounds saw neighbors substituting the chemicals for expensive costs 
associated with farm labor, land, and management and were not blind to the 
economic advantages they offered. If resisting the “modern” way was not 
already nearly impossible, it was made even more difficult by the fact that 
few Ph.D.s in the research establishment had any use for the old ways. To 
argue against chemicals and for rotations in the 1930s was unheard of; who 
wanted their ideas labeled as attempts “to turn the clock back”? 
There were, however, minority voices from time to time. As early as 
1865 a journal called the Practical Entomologist dissented from the majority 
view, claiming that 
if the work of destroying insects is to be accomplished 
satisfactorily, we feel confident that it will have to be the 
result of no chemical preparations, but of simple means, 
directed by a knowledge of the history and habits of the 
depredators.18 
Similarly, editors at the British Medical Journal wrote in 1892 that 
The use of poisons for the treatment of food is a matter which 
calls for the closest attention and the strictest control, where 
it is not absolutely prohibited under severe penalties. As in 
the case of food adulteration, the public cannot be left to the 
tender mercies of the interested or the ignorant.19 
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Such views did not carry the day, and the British Medical Journal 
was out of business within a few years. Instead, journals carrying accounts of 
miracle chemicals like those written about by McMurtrie proliferated. In one, 
A. J. Cook, a Michigan entomologist, reported in 1889 that he had sprayed 
one of his own fruit trees with double strength London purple until the liquid, 
Cook wrote, dripped onto the grass. In a remarkable move obviously intended 
to impress his audience, Cook then “cut the grass and fed it to his own horse. 
As presumably expected, the animal survived in good health, as did the sheep 
on whom the experiment was repeated.”20 
Once farmers had gotten used to dusting first arsenic and then DDT 
on their crops to protect them from insects, it was a short step to spraying 
them with herbicides to kill weeds.21 This step occurred in the 1940s and 50s, 
and it was a revolutionary change. It is important not to overestimate the 
importance of synthetic agricultural chemicals before the mid-1940s. In 1876 
there were only a half dozen herbicides in use; that number was almost 
unchanged in 1936.22 Petroleum oils and salt products were in use before 
World War II, but mechanical means of cultivation were still the primary tool 
as late as 1939, when 
only about 30 [pesticides] were registered for use in the 
United States. Application techniques were limited largely to 
small sprayers and dusters, and applying pesticides was time 
consuming and the acreage of crops treated relatively small.23 
But it is difficult to overestimate the importance of synthetic chemicals by 
1950. More than one farm boy was surprised to return from the War to find 
his father’s new sprayer behind the shed. How was such a rapid change 
possible? History again gives the answer. 
While weeding has long meant stoop labor and drudgery, the 
expenditure of human energy on the control of weeds in chemical agriculture 
amounts to no more than 5 percent. Mechanical energy accounts for about 40 
percent, while chemical herbicides take care of over half of all the energy 
needed to control weeds.24 Herbicides replace not only human labor but the 
costs associated with mechanical tillage, fertilizer use (“without weed 
control, farmers would be fertilizing the crop and the weeds”), irrigation, crop 
yield losses, harvest costs (weeds clog equipment), grain drying (green weeds 
are high in moisture content and prolong the period required for drying the 
crop), transportation, storage, and land (herbicides reduce the number of 
acres needed for crop production).25 
In 1945, the US already had at least fifty years of experience in 
dealing with and regulating agricultural chemicals. The first generation of 
chemicals were not widely used in the late nineteenth century. But the next 
generation (sodium arsenite and carbon disulfide, for example) attracted 
much wider attention from early twentieth century farmers. By 1914, 
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petroleum oils were widely used to control weeds in irrigation ditches and in 
carrots.26 So if industrially produced fertilizers and insecticides were not used 
on a large scale in 1939, cultural mechanisms and attitudes that would lead to 
eventual adoption were firmly in place. Traditional methods would prove to 
have little hold on farmers wanting to upgrade their operations to match the 
modern farms pictured in the magazines. 
When synthetic herbicides came to market in the 1940s, American 
farmers were well acquainted with the use of chemicals. “Spray . . . spray . . . 
spray” wrote E. G. Packard in the Entomological News, and spray they did, 
since spraying relieved them of much of the worry and complexity previously 
associated with controlling pests.  As Whorton puts it, “Once converted to 
arsenicals, farmers devoted themselves to the cultivation of ever better 
gardens with a Panglossian optimism that assumed that spraying could bring 
only good.”27 A cheap supply of sprays was assured because of the rapid 
development of the chemical industry during the war. Assisted with 
government loans, the industry had built massive production plants which 
were turned, after the war effort, to producing a cheap supply of pesticides 
and nitrogen fertilizers. Farmers found that spraying increased yields 
dramatically, thereby justifying the cost of the expenditure. 
With the introduction of hybrid seed corn in the 1930s, pesticides 
induced farmers to plant more acres in monocultures. As mixed farms became 
rarer, grain farms became more specialized, and animals slowly came to be 
concentrated on feedlots. Consequently, less manure was available for 
fertilizing the grains. A twin set of problems arose. With fewer and fewer 
nutrients naturally present in the soil, more and more undesirable plants 
popped up. Farmers needed more nitrogen and more herbicides. 
Answers to both problems came, once again, from the chemical 
industry. Fertilizer production was expanded. Between 1949 and 1968, food 
production increased by roughly 45 percent in the US while use of nitrogen 
fertilizer increased more than 600 percent.28 Another “new generation” of 
herbicides was introduced: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T and the rest of the 
phenoxyacetics hit the market in 1945.29 These chemicals were used to 
control broad-leaved grasses on vacant lots, rangelands, and airports in 
addition to cropland.  As the sheer quantity of chemicals produced grew, the 
prices to the farmer fell. Farmers responded by buying even more; a period of 
“acute food shortage” caused them to expand their productivity “as rapidly as 
possible at almost any price.”30 An expanding domestic demand for food and 
an ever growing export market to Europe encouraged farmers to produce as 
much as possible. They found that the “fastest, cheapest, way” was to 
increase their use of chemical inputs.31 
By 1949 farmers were using 25 different herbicides on 23 million 
acres of corn, wheat, and turf. By 1959, one year after the introduction of 
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atrazine, the number of chemicals had quadrupled, and the number of acres 
treated had doubled. Still, the 52 million acres receiving herbicides in 1959 
represented less than 15 percent of total cropland in the US. The explosion 
occurred in the 1960s. Alachlor was introduced in 1969, and by 1974 over 
half of all crop acreage was receiving herbicides, a total of more than 160 
million acres. The percentage of money spent on herbicides has also 
constantly increased. Whereas nitrogen and insecticide costs were dominant 
in 1951, 58 percent of a farmer’s expenditures on chemicals went to 
herbicides in 1974.32 By 1978, the tonnage volume of herbicides sold by the 
agrichemicals industry was second only to that of fertilizer.33 
As herbicide use has gone up, so have total yields of crops and total 
values of crops lost to weeds. According to one estimate, 100 million bushels 
of soybeans were lost in 1970, a typical year, because of competition from 
weeds. This was the equivalent of what would have grown on 4 million 
acres.34 As the value of crops lost to weeds went up, so did farm purchases of 
herbicides. By 1974, farmers were spending over one billion dollars each year 
on different chemicals designed to kill weeds.35 
Why does herbicide use keep increasing? One reason is selective 
pressure. Herbicides wipe out a large percentage of targeted species of weeds, 
but they do not kill all of the individuals in any species. Some biotypes within 
the targeted species have a higher tolerance to the chemical. They survive the 
application, and reproduce quickly in fields where more fit competitors have 
been removed by the herbicide. Together with the fact that there are likely to 
be some weed species that are not killed by the herbicide, the fact of 
differential tolerance within species makes it necessary for the farmer to 
begin using more and different herbicides in succeeding years.36 Each “new 
generation” of chemicals is soon met by species of chemical-resistant weeds, 
much as each new generation of insecticides is eventually confronted with 
mutant bugs that can tolerate the bug killer.  
History shows that modern chemical agriculture is not a random 
system in which you can choose to adopt certain strategies and ignore others. 
The rapid expansion in the use of herbicides after World War II went hand in 
hand with the use of industrially produced pesticides to control insects. 
Synthetic anhydrous ammonia--and now ureas--are used to supply nitrogen.  
Manufactured super-phosphates provide phosphate. And the system requires 
large amounts of capital to purchase the inputs, and large tracts of land over 
which to spread the costs.  
Modern agriculture is an example of what Charles Perrow calls a 
complex, tightly linked, system.37 As commercial nitrogen is used to stimulate 
the growth of high yielding varieties, it stimulates the growth of weeds as 
well. In 1965, corn farmers applied 75 pounds of nitrogen per acre. In 1987, 
they were using over 130 pounds per acre.38 Herbicides are needed to control 
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the weeds, and insecticides are needed to control pests introduced from 
abroad through internationally connected markets. The technologies used are 
increasingly expensive (a pound of atrazine sells for about $2.40, the newer 
alachlor for about $4.50, and glyphosate for approximately $22.00), so that 
farmers must have access to increasing amounts of capital for operating 
expenses.39 And the farm input industries must make increasing expenditures 
to find new chemicals to deal with new pests. 
You cannot play just one part of this game; if you use 2,4-D to 
control weeds, sooner or later you will need insecticides to control corn-leaf 
aphids stimulated by the herbicide.40 Sooner or later, chances are that you will 
also need fungicides to control smut and Southern corn-leaf blight that also 
seem to accompany 2,4-D use. 
Between 1951 and 1960, US farmers playing this increasingly close 
knit game lost an estimated $4 billion dollars per year to plant pathogens of 
one type or another. For all farmers, losses averaged 14 percent of the 
potential crop yield each season.41 Farmers might have resorted to mechanical 
methods to deal with these losses but for the fact that expanded farm sizes 
mitigated against this choice as early as 1960. The invention of larger and 
more powerful machinery induced farmers to buy larger tracts of land so as to 
operate big tractors more efficiently. But once a farm had reached a certain 
size it became virtually impossible for the owner to substitute cultural means 
of weed control for herbicides. Given the sheer expanse of the fields, walking 
or cultivating the beans would prove to be prohibitively expensive when 
compared to chemical means of control. While we should not discount 
explanations that would focus on the natural tendency to choose a method 
that involves less physical labor, many farmers may have been using 
chemicals less by choice than necessity. 
And they were not always using them wisely. In order to maximize 
yields and decrease risks, farmers tend to put on a little extra when a little 
less may be called for. Current levels of chemical use are not only “greater 
than the private optimum levels for plant nutrition and protection,” but they 
are also in excess of what producers would choose to use if they were to 
maximize profits instead of yields.42  The modern agricultural system depends 
on the pesticide industry and, in such a tightly linked system, farmers ignore 
chemical means of controlling pests at great peril. 
In addition to showing why our modern farm system has become 
troublingly dependent on herbicides, the history of weeds suggests other 
lessons. First, the chemicals now in use in developed countries seem to have 
grown progressively safer for humans. Governmental regulations have 
tightened, and the arsenicals, the DDTs, and the oil based organochlorine 
pesticides have been banned for use in the United States. Second, as new 
chemicals come along, invariably accompanied by rhetoric about how 
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“remarkable” the “new generation” is, our concern gradually shifts from the 
safety of consumers to the safety of farmers, farmworkers, their families, and 
workers in chemical manufacturing plants. That this is a smaller group than 
“consumers” in general is a welcome development, and we should not ignore 
the advances of the chemical industry in identifying newer and safer 
chemicals. But neither should our concern for the individuals affected 
decline. The individuals affected worldwide are not a small group since 
chemicals banned in the US are still made here and sold to developing 
countries. Third, as our concern shifts from ourselves to others, our 
environmental consciousness also expands, extending to ever larger portions 
of the animal and plant kingdoms. 
The chemicals now in use in the developed countries are safer for 
mammals and humans than arsenic. As I just suggested, too many of us 
underestimate the moral achievement represented by the chemical industry’s 
progress in the area of safety. But if new chemicals mean that many of us are 
increasingly safer and better fed, it also means that we are freed to consider 
our responsibilities toward less advantaged peoples, toward future 
generations, toward the environment, and toward the sort of people we want 
to become in the future. As we take up the new technology of genetically 
engineered herbicide resistant crops, these are the issues most needing 
attention. 
 
3.  Genetically engineered herbicide resistant crops 
 
The idea of selecting for herbicide resistance is not new. Even before 
gene-splicing, researchers used traditional breeding techniques and 
mutogenesis to create new varieties of wheat with increased resistance to an 
s-triazine herbicide, terbutryn. In mutagenesis, wheat seeds are soaked in 
ethyl methanesulfonate and then grown in soil treated with the herbicide.43  
The herbicide kills most of the seeds planted.  But, on occasion, a very few 
mutant individuals survive; they become the basis for the herbicide-tolerant 
variety.  
Genetic engineering speeds up this process. Researchers in Canada 
took weeds most resistant to the herbicide atrazine and genetically transferred 
their resistance to rapeseed and rutabaga plants.44 DuPont has bred tobacco 
plants resistant to its sulfonylurea compounds, and Calgene has bred tobacco 
and tomato plants,45 resistant to Monsanto’s glyphosate, while Monsanto also 
has petunia and tobacco plants ready to go with its popular chemical.46 
Forestry and chemical lawn industries are watching with great interest as 
private labs and public universities apply more and more sophisticated 
genetic engineering techniques in herbicide resistance research. Much of the 
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research is funded with public tax dollars, and much of it is going on at land 
grant universities whose charge is, in part, to educate and help to improve the 
well being of “the industrial classes.” 
Ought we to use taxpayers’ monies to fund this research? To answer 
such ethical questions, we must have ethical principles to guide us. 
 
4.  An environmental perspective: Three principles 
 
Moral questions call for public debate in which neither scientific 
expertise nor philosophical acumen necessarily constitutes authority. Because 
these are communal issues regarding how we ought to relate to each other 
politically and socially, authority in the debate does not come from technical 
competence. It comes from practical wisdom, what Aristotle called phronesis, 
the ability to see which response fits the occasion. But which response to 
publicly funded GEHR research “fits the occasion?” 
When we encounter disagreements over morality, it helps to begin 
with judgments about which we have a firm consensus. We agree, for 
example, that it would be wrong to genetically engineer children to live lives 
of unrelieved, purposeless suffering. We have a firm consensus that it would 
be wrong for a company consciously to genetically engineer seeds that would 
produce crops with high levels of undetectable carcinogens. 
In those areas where we have firm moral concensus, we erect laws 
and make it illegal to do what we think plainly immoral. It is important that 
we agree on fundamental values such as the worth of human life and the 
importance of freedom of expression and inquiry. If we truly lacked a 
consensus on such basic matters, conversation and communal life would be 
impossible. So, even when different moral traditions clash over particular 
issues,  there  is  almost  always  a  residual  overlap of what John Rawls calls 
 
considered convictions.47 
GEHR crops bring up moral issues in three areas: our duties toward 
the natural environment; our political and economic responsibilities; and our 
ideals and attitudes as a community. I do not propose the following principles 
as moral truisms, but rather as principles that seem, from my perspective, the 
most defensible in each area. 
Regarding the environment, I believe that Aldo Leopold’s basic 
principle of the Land Ethic is apt, that “a thing is right when it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community [and] 
wrong when it tends otherwise.”48 The way we might put this principle is as 
follows: 
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1. A principle concerning the environment: We ought to show respect 
for different values of different things. 
 
This principle enjoins us to treat beings in ways appropriate to each species’ 
ecological niche and each human’s individual rights. Rational agents and 
patients are entitled to be treated as ends-in-themselves. This means that they 
have basic rights to life, food, shelter, and autonomy. Respect here means 
doing no harm to individuals, making efforts to secure their well-being, and 
maximizing possible benefits and minimizing possible injuries to them. 
Sentient animals are not autonomous agents, but their ability to experience 
emotions, memories, and desires, and to form intentions, families, and 
societies entitles them to be spared unjustifiable pain and to be left alone to 
flourish or die according to laws operating in their ecosystems. Nonsentient 
animals, plants, and organisms have a lower level of conscious awareness, if 
any, but their importance to the ecosystem entitles them to be treated in ways 
that will preserve nature’s beauty, integrity, and diversity. 
My environmental principle endorses a hierarchical view of moral 
value, and seeks to establish value distinctions on the basis of the complexity 
and intensity of experience. Mine is not a strongly anthropocentric theory in 
which the value of any particular thing is tied to its value for humans. On my 
view, plants, organisms, and animals have value in themselves. This 
environmentalist view is not anti-anthropocentric. It is an environmental ethic 
in which the basic rights of individual humans (see below) takes precedence 
over the good of individual animals.49 
Regarding the political economy, I believe that efficiency and 
economic growth are defensible values. Our particular history of prejudice 
and discrimination in the United States, however, requires that we put equity 
and equality of opportunity at the top of the agenda, above efficiency or 
growth. Thus: 
 
2. A principle concerning the political economy: We ought to pursue 
economic justice and equity first, and economic efficiency, 
productivity, growth, and entrepreunership second. 
 
This principle enjoins us to put first the need for economic opportunity by 
society’s worst-off. An economic system coherent with this principle places 
priority on redressing persistent inequities resulting from discrimination on 
the basis of class, race, and sex. It also insists that external environmental 
costs, which may harm future generations of society’s worst-off, be included 
in the cost of production. The principle enjoins us to maximize efficiency and 
productivity in the workplace while encouraging imaginative and fair 
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competition among individuals and corporations only after attending to 
concerns relating to equitable opportunity. 
Regarding our communal identity, I believe that we must take into 
consideration the wisdom of past generations and the needs of future 
generations. Thus: 
 
3. A principle concerning our community: We ought to form and 
maintain diverse, just, and beneficent, communities. 
 
This principle enjoins us not to pursue public policies likely to have the effect 
of standardizing society or benefiting certain politically powerful 
communities at the expense of marginal or sectarian groups. Rather, we 
should try to form diverse international communities in which the basic rights 
of all individuals and groups are met. This means paying attention not only to 
the development of social policy, but to the development of spiritual 
character. We ought to help our children, for example, to develop dispositions 
of proper humility before God, appropriate respect for Nature, appreciation 
for the wisdom of ancestors, and consideration of the needs of future 
generations.50 
Not everyone will agree with these principles, and I state them not 
because I think they are noncontroversial but only so that my starting point is 
clear. Readers who already find themselves in agreement with my principles 
may want to see whether the conclusions I reach about GEHR research 
cohere with our shared principles. Those who disagree with my principles 
may wish to articulate their own moral foundations and then see what policy 
implications follow from them. 
 
 
 
 
5.  Four ethical responses to GEHR crops 
 
 5.1.  Unqualified endorsement (E) 
 
What should we say about the morality of using public monies to 
fund research on GEHR crops? The first position I want to consider is that 
GEHR research should be endorsed without reservation. Let us explore such 
a position. 
Some think that all scientific research is morally justified insofar as it 
may lead to new knowledge. Indeed, the potential benefits of any scientific 
research project are huge. Potential spin-off products and discoveries from 
Against Herbicide Resistance                                                                                      51                                                          
  
basic research are almost always unpredictable and are sometimes almost 
unfathomable. Think of the unforeseen benefits that came from research on 
penicillin. For this reason, it would be difficult to make the case that any 
scientific research program had a negative benefit/risk potential. In fact, few 
if any governmentally-sponsored projects have ever been thwarted on these 
grounds.51 
The problem, of course, is that we do not know what knowledge may 
result from research. If we knew ahead of time which projects would make 
important advances and which would not, we could easily decide which ones 
to fund. Unfortunately, this kind of prediction is precisely what we cannot do. 
Consequently, we fund a variety of projects, not all of which give us as many 
desirable results as others. But this leads those in E to give unqualified 
endorsement to GEHR research simply because it seems as likely, if not more 
likely, to result in beneficial agricultural products. 
Insofar as research is being funded privately, there is little one can 
say in rebuttal. Privately held corporations ought to be good stewards of their 
shareholders’ monies, and so they should pursue those lines of research that 
they think may prove profitable provided, of course, that in doing so they do 
not break relevant moral principles. Because I value economic efficiency and 
productivity, I believe that if GEHR research has no other morally 
objectionable features, then the simple fact that private corporations may 
make a profit by researching it is not a reason for opposing it. It is a reason 
for endorsing it. 
The question, of course, is whether there are other moral grounds on 
which to object to GEHR research. In order to pursue that question, I propose 
to bracket the issue of privately funded GEHR research, and to confine my 
attention to research being conducted with public funds.52 This means 
research at land-grant and other public universities, at governmental agencies 
like the USDA, and at private corporations receiving federal or state research 
monies. 
Those in E believe that GEHR research is defensible in part because 
scientists think it may advance scientific knowledge. But there is another 
defense: The world’s population is growing dramatically while environmental 
conditions in many traditionally high-producing agricultural areas are 
becoming less hospitable to agriculture. If we are to meet the growing 
demand for food we will need new crops and new chemicals suited to 
growing conditions in new geographical locations, and soil and climactic 
conditions. 
This defense of GEHR research contains two claims about the 
potential economic and environmental benefits of that research.53 Those 
arguments must be individually assessed. 
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A. GEHR research will lead to economic benefits for 
manufacturers, consumers, and farmers. 
 
There are obvious pecuniary benefits to be made by the agricultural 
biotechnology firms that successfully market GEHR seed and chemical 
packages. Monsanto, American Cyanamid, Calgene, FMC Corporation, and 
E. I. du Pont are the five major players, and each anticipates healthy returns 
on their research and development expenditures. The values of economic 
efficiency and productivity are genuine values, but do they justify GEHR 
research? The only way to answer the question is through ex-ante economic 
impact analysis, trying to determine whom the technology is likely to benefit 
and whom it is likely to hurt. 
Multinational corporations stand to be the biggest winners, of course, 
but risks are attached. Research and development of any new chemical is very 
expensive, and the major players could stand to lose money if they encounter 
problems such as corporate mismanagement, product failure, stringent 
environmental regulations regarding field-testing or marketing of GEHR 
seeds, or inability to compete with other manufacturers. 
Will a handful of companies establish monopoly-like control? By the 
estimates of Charles Benbrook and Phyllis Moses, there are more than two 
dozen “agrochemical and biotechnology companies” in the race to produce 
GEHR seed and chemical packages. This competitive atmosphere makes it 
likely that “the companies’ prospects for [overall] sales increases [resulting 
from GEHR technology] are modest compared with the total volume of 
business conducted by them.”54 Moreover, competition from old as well as 
new compounds combined with farmers’ natural tendencies to switch 
methods slowly makes it “not likely that the structure of agribusiness will 
change dramatically simply because of herbicide resistant plants.”55 There are 
grounds for thinking, then, that GEHR research will benefit manufacturers 
without substantially changing the current structure of the industry. 
Will consumers join multinational corporations as beneficiaries? 
Slightly higher yields and slightly lower input costs for the farmer should 
lead to larger corn surpluses, and this will mean corn prices as much as 30 
cents per bushel lower than they would be otherwise. Lower corn prices 
should translate into lower beef prices at the supermarket, and that would be 
good for domestic, and probably foreign, consumers. 
In the short run, some farmers may also benefit financially from 
GEHR crops. If early adopters cut weed losses and improved the efficiency of 
pest control by substituting GEHR seed and chemical packages for existing 
weed control measures, they might capture competitive advantages lost by 
late adopters. GEHR crops should help these operators to reduce outlays not 
only for herbicides but for fungicides and insecticides as well, since 
Against Herbicide Resistance                                                                                      53                                                          
  
weed-free fields might cut insect and disease problems.56 It would also help to 
cut harvest expenses related to weed clogged machines and postharvest 
drying costs inflated by crops infested with moist green weeds.57 In the short 
run, a small group of farmers may join multinationals and consumers as 
beneficiaries of GEHR research. 
In the long run, however, all corn and livestock farmers who use 
chemicals seem likely to be financial losers as corn and beef prices decline. 
Farmers in different regions of the country and with different modes of 
operation will suffer to different degrees. On the one hand, the growing 
number of organic and natural farmers who eschew the use of synthesized 
chemicals will not be directly affected by GEHR crops because they will not 
purchase the herbicides. (But even they will be affected indirectly by falling 
farm gate prices.) On the other hand, corn growers in the Delta who use 
herbicides already suffer most from weed problems, and they may benefit in 
the long run as GEHR research products enable them to grow more corn. 
Finally, corn growers in the corn belt whose incomes derive substantially 
from this one commodity will probably suffer most from lower prices induced 
by GEHR technology.58 
As the world marketplace shrinks, our farmers face increasing 
competition from foreign producers. Agricultural biotech products like 
GEHR crops could help our industry remain at the forefront: 
As the future wave of agricultural innovation, biotechnology 
promises to decrease the need for expensive agricultural 
inputs, increase production efficiency . . . and create new 
crops and livestock species as well as new products from 
current surplus commodities. . . . The United States can 
reinforce its world commercial position.59 
For anyone concerned with the survival of family farms, these benefits should 
not be weighed lightly.60 For anyone holding my political and economic 
views, the promise of an increased efficiency in the use of agricultural 
resources is a genuine advance. 
On the basis of potential economic benefits and risks to those in 
developed countries, the only apparent reason not to endorse publicly funded 
GEHR research is the long range effect on farmers. But even that economic 
adjustment is one that I would be willing to accept as fair because it seems to 
be consistent with adjustments required of all sectors in competitive 
economic systems. 
 
B. GEHR research will lead to seed-and-chemical packages that are 
safe for humans, animals, and the environment. 
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This claim needs to be carefully considered because increasing use of 
herbicides has already led to the detection of contaminants in surface and 
groundwater in rural areas. Alachlor and atrazine, for example, make up 36 
percent of all the chemical weed killers presently used in the United States. 
They are known to cause cancer in animals when administered in high doses. 
And they are being detected in wells and surface water in rural areas of Iowa 
and other parts of the United States.61 
The possibility is real that alachlor and atrazine are adversely 
affecting rural residents in agricultural areas. A study conducted in 1989, for 
example, concluded that there is a statistically significant increase in the 
number of underweight babies born to mothers in rural Iowa where drinking 
water comes from surface sources containing herbicides such as atrazine.62 
GEHR crops might help to alleviate these problems insofar as many 
of the crops being designed are intended to be grown with the new, safer, 
herbicides. In addition to Monsanto’s glyphosate, these herbicides include du 
Pont’s sulfonylureas (trade name “Classic”) and American Cyanamid’s 
imidazolinones (“Scepter”).  
The sulfonylureas, imidazolinones, and triazoloprimidines kill weeds 
by inhibiting the formation of the acetolactate synthase enzyme (ALSase), a 
biochemical pathway in plants that does not exist in insects and mammals. 
Consequently, the chemicals appear to have few adverse side-effects on 
animals, and many scientists believe that they are far safer for humans, 
mammals, insects, and birds than the old halogenated herbicides, chemicals 
which have chlorine, fluorine, or bromine added to them in the 
manufacturating process. The new herbicides are composed solely of carbon, 
hydrogen, oxygen, and sometimes nitrogen, simple compounds that appear 
abundantly in nature. 
In addition to being safer for humans, the new herbicides may be 
safer for the environment because, as Benbrook and Moses write, “the 
herbicides either break down rapidly into carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen in the 
environment, or they do not leach appreciably into water.”63 Further, “no 
unique environmental or ecological concerns have been associated with 
resistant cultivated plant lines, regardless of fears about genetic 
engineering.”64 Benbrook and Moses claim that the new chemicals do not 
move into water because the herbicides are rapidly degraded by plants, air, 
sunlight and soil. If all of these claims prove to be correct, the new generation 
might be far safer for farmers who must handle chemicals, and health 
problems related to herbicide use might decline.  
If GEHR crops help us to lessen our reliance on old herbicides, this 
might be a distinct advantage. But we often do not know the dangers that 
come with longterm use of herbicides, as the history of 2,4,5-T use illustrates. 
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2,4,5-T was introduced in the 1940s. Unfortunately, it was not known 
then that the process of manufacturing 2,4,5-T can produce a contaminant 
called TCDD, one of the most toxic chemicals known. According to one 
estimate, TCDD is “150,000 times more toxic than organic arsenic,” in 
addition to being teratogenic, the cause of birth defects.65  
The tragic side-effects of 2,4,5-T may not have been known in 1958 
when the US Defense Department purchased 5.8 million pounds from 
chemical companies. And they may not have been known ten years later, by 
which point the Department had increased its purchases more than 500 
percent.66 But we now know what TCDD is and does. A decade after the war 
in Vietnam, dioxin was still found contaminating the ground. The main 
hospital in the Tay Ninh region, northwest of Saigon, reported after the war 
that one out of four pregnant women seen in the hospital miscarried. During 
the period of 1968 to 1970, when huge amounts of 2,4,5-T were being used 
by the US to defoliate the forest in Tay Ninh, stillbirths were twice the rate of 
nonsprayed areas of Vietnam. There were other problems. In Saigon’s 
Children’s Hospital, the incidence of spina bifida and puracleft palate was 
three times higher during spraying than at other times, an estimate confirmed 
independently by the US Defense Department.67 Wives of US soldiers also 
reported birth deformities in infants.68 
2,4,5-T has been banned or restricted for use in the US since the mid-
1970s. But it was still being manufactured and exported to developing 
countries as recently as 1978.69 So concerns about its effects on those who 
handle and manufacture it, in addition to concerns about potential military 
uses, are not irrelevant for those interested in the moral dimensions of 
herbicide research, manufacturing, and use. 
In the face of the toxins present in some of the older herbicides and 
nitrates deposited in water from synthesized fertilizers, the new generation of 
environmentally safer herbicides is a welcome development. The herbicidal 
action of the new generation apparently work by blocking the production of 
specific enzymes that make amino acids essential for the regulation of a 
weed’s growth.70 While some of the older herbicides also work on biological 
pathways not found in rodents and higher animals, the new herbicides 
continue this research trajectory. 
The new compounds, for example, are only half as toxic to mammals 
as alachlor; whereas it would take only 1600 mg. of alachlor per kg. of body 
weight to kill 50 percent of a group of rats, it would take almost three times 
that amount of Roundup to kill the same percentage.71 Not only safer for 
farmworkers to handle, they are also much more potent for plants, and in 
significantly smaller dosages. Glyphosate goes on at one fifth the rate (0.5 
pounds per acre) of alachlor (Lasso requires 2.5 pounds per acre to get the 
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same control), Scepter at one fortieth the rate (0.125 pounds per acre), and 
Classic at one eightieth the rate (0.03 pounds per acre). 
Moreover, the new compounds are applied at greatly reduced rates. 
While alachlor (“Lasso”) must be applied at 2.5 pounds per acre to be 
effective, and atrazine (“AAtrex”) at 1.8 pounds, glyphosate goes on at 0.5, 
imidazolinone (in the form of imazaquin) at 0.125, and sulfonylurea (in the 
form of chlorimuron ethyl) at 003.72  
These are the arguments of those who would give unqualified 
endorsement to GEHR research. But there are problems with the arguments. 
First, the new herbicides are not the only ones that work on biological 
pathways absent in humans and animals. Atrazine works by inhibiting 
photosynthesis, so the way in which it actually kills plants is not harmful to 
humans. Nonetheless, atrazine presents some potentially severe problems for 
us. 
Second, it is a very difficult task to ascertain just how synthetic 
chemicals behave in farm fields. There are very few field studies of how 
herbicides, old or new, move through the rural environment. In part, this is 
because it is such a complex matter to identify the by-products of 
degradation. While carbon and nitrogen dioxide may constitute the majority 
of end-products, there are probably lots of intermediate products along the 
way. So to imply that the new herbicides immediately break down into three 
simple compounds, is to imply that we know more than we do know.73 
Defenders of GEHR crops are not unaware of criticisms. To the 
worry that gene-splicing represents a new and strange historical epoch, they 
might reply that herbicide resistant crops are nothing new. Varieties have 
long been selected for their resistance to herbicide and insecticides; even 
before genetic engineering came along we have been identifying and 
marketing seeds that could grow in the presence of chemicals used to kill 
competitors. Genetic engineering only speeds up the process by cutting down 
on the length of time needed to come up with new varieties; what moral 
questions does it raise that could not be raised about traditional plant 
breeding techniques? 
The environmental safety of deliberately releasing genetically 
engineered organisms and crop plants into the environment is also debated. 
Few, however, have argued as forcefully as Winston Brill that we have little 
to worry about in this regard. Confining his attention to genetically 
engineered organisms without saying much about plants, Brill argues that the 
changes being made are virtually negligible from either a genetic or an 
environmental perspective.74 The reason is that 
the best a genetic engineer can do is add one gene, or at most 
a few genes, to the tens of thousands of genes in an 
organism’s chromosome . . . A useful organism, 
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therefore will not inadvertently be converted into a pest, 
pathogen, or entirely new species.75 
Brill’s point is that new organisms undergo such minor changes in their 
genome that they are not sufficiently different from naturally occurring 
organisms to constitute a threat. Indeed, Brill argues, these organisms are so 
fragile that they can barely exist outside of the laboratory, and in over fifteen 
years of lab experiments, not one example of a mutant organism-out-of-
control is known.76  
GEHR tobacco and tomatoes, or even soybeans and corn, would not 
be hardy enough to predominate in the wild. So Brill argues with regard to 
organisms. “I think it’s going to be extremely difficult to [use genetic 
engineering to] make an organism worse than any organism we now have,” he 
adds. Then he extends his argument about organisms to crops, concluding 
that 
absolutely no scientific basis exists to believe that by 
genetically engineering corn, wheat, or rice one could 
inadvertently produce a serious problem weed. Serious 
problem weeds are not the result of a change in a single gene. 
They must in general terms meet a variety of criteria. The 
seed, for instance, would need to survive for a long time; it 
might have to be dispersed over a great distance; the plant 
would have to grow faster and be more vigorous than the 
plants around it. These properties are not produced by one 
gene, but by hundreds if not thousands of genes. . . . How 
could one imagine that by engineering one or even several 
genes in an organism, corn might be converted into a problem 
weed? The chance of producing a problem weed through this 
technique is less than the chance of producing one through a 
traditional cross of corn and teosinte. And no one is 
concerned about the latter.77 
If Brill is right, the deliberate release of genetically engineered crop plants 
need not concern us. The germplasm of the new varieties will be virtually 
indistinguishable from the crops and weeds currently found in farm fields. 
Brill makes much of the scientific community’s clean history of 
environmental releases, in which the past decade of experiments have placed 
billions of microorganisms into the environment without producing a single 
pathogen. Why concern ourselves with such a safe practice when traditional 
breeding methods have produced novel species for thousands of years without 
arousing moral indignation? 
The case of corn crossed [through traditional means] with 
teosinte . . . [resulting in the mixing of] tens of thousands of 
genes from each plant . . . [has not led anyone to take] special 
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precautions because of the vast and safe experience with such 
crosses.78 
While traditional breeding methods are safe, genetic engineering is safer 
because it is a rational procedure, “a far more precise and much more 
predictable process.” Only one or two genes are exchanged, not tens of 
thousands. Moreover, such exchanges occur quite naturally, “between 
unrelated bacteria . . . between bacteria and plants . . . between animals and 
plants . . . and between animals and bacteria.” And yet only the most fit of 
these mutants survive; “new dominant species” do not arise “routinely.” So 
even though “millions of acres are treated with chemical herbicides . . . no 
health or environmental problems have occurred from the large numbers of . . 
. uncharacterized microorganisms, with unnatural and uncharacterized genetic 
alterations [induced by widespread herbicide use on] farms, golf courses, and 
gardens.” Finally: 
even though these microorganisms can persist, transfer to 
distant sites, and exchange their new genes with other 
microorganisms, no agency has demanded tests for health or 
environmental problems from such organisms.79 
Brill argues that the huge number of uncontrolled genetic mutations 
in nature dwarfs the controlled mutations engineered in the laboratory. 
History shows that the vast majority of natural mutations do not survive, and 
that those that do rarely succeed in disrupting the environment. The 
environment simply adapts to them and goes on. 
One must agree that the history of deliberate releases, so far, has not 
yet produced virulent pathogens. But we have only been releasing genetically 
engineered organisms for a decade or so, and with extremely tight (some 
would say excessive) government regulation. Should we be so confident that 
in the future, when government supervision relaxes and the number of 
releases takes a sharp turn upward, that the safety record will remain 
unblemished? The problem is that deliberate release is a low probability but 
high risk enterprise; one mistake could have potentially disastrous 
consequences. 
There are other problems with Brill’s argument. How consistent is it 
to argue, on the one hand, that genetically engineered organisms are not hardy 
enough to predominate in the wild while arguing, on the other hand, that 
modified organisms are barely any different than their natural cousins? If the 
natural forms are hardy, and if the mutants have had only one gene replaced, 
then the fragility of the mutant shows how dramatic a single gene change can 
be. Why should we think that single gene replacements will make organisms 
less competitive? The point of deliberately releasing new varieties of plants, 
at least, is to demonstrate the opposite point: that the new variety is hardy 
enough to be grown by farmers “in the wild,” as it were. If we knew 
Against Herbicide Resistance                                                                                      59                                                          
  
ahead of time that the variety was so fragile that it would not be able to grow 
in the field, why would anyone want to test it?  
Applied to GEHR crops, an argument about plants analogous to 
Brill’s argument about organisms would have us believe that genetic 
engineering can produce good hardy crops but not good hardy weeds. 
Benbrook and Moses make this argument, claiming that resistance will not 
spread from crops to weeds and, if it does, farmers will just have to change 
management practices.80 But, since we already know that a crop in one field is 
a weed in another, the argument that herbicide-resistant crops cannot result in 
a new generation of herbicide-resistant weeds is self-contradictory. 
There is another way to read Brill’s argument, and that is as an 
argument from evolutionary genetics and mathematical probabilities. In its 
millions of years of evolution, one might argue, nature has produced so many 
genetic mutations that all mutations adaptive enough to persist are already 
present in the environment and any novel genetic modification must 
necessarily be ill-adapted. If this is what Brill has in mind, then there are a 
different set of problems with the argument because, according to Philip 
Regal, mathematical genetics has disproven the idea that every genetic 
possibility with adaptive traits has already occurred.81 Nature is not a closed 
system, and the past million years of evolution have not necessarily produced 
every viable organism, plant, or animal possible. So interpreting Brill to claim 
that no new hardy genetic mutations are possible is not an interpretation that 
will save his position. 
Phyllis Moses and Charles Hess have asserted, like Brill, that the 
products of rDNA research are “no more likely to have suddenly acquired 
unknown and dangerous attributes than if created by breeding or cell culture, 
which, similarly, yield genetically altered organisms.”82 But given the 
sensitive and congenial laboratory conditions which welcome rDNA 
organisms into the world, one wonders how Moses and Hess can be so certain 
about this. After all, we have only been experimenting with these altered 
organisms for a decade or so. Indeed, after boldly asserting their claim in one 
sentence, the very next sentence implies that theirs is a hypothesis, not a 
proven fact: “Adequate testing of products derived by recombinant DNA 
methods should proceed swiftly to gain sound scientific evidence for this 
proposition.” Does the second claim indicate that their prior assertion is not, 
contrary to the way it is couched, a statement of fact? Or are they simply 
impatient with the speed of scientific testing, which has not yet proved what 
they know to be the case? In calling for testing to “proceed swiftly to gain 
sound scientific evidence” are they announcing the silliness of such research, 
since they already know that the evidence is there? Or are these public 
officials trying to tell scientists what they ought to find? The precise meaning 
60                                                                           Gary L. Comstock  
  
of their argument for the safety of genetically engineered field releases is as 
difficult to discern as Brill’s. 
In addition to the fact that it rests on an arguable claim for the utter 
safety of genetic engineering, another problem with E is its assertion that the 
new biology will usher in a new era of agriculture in which only the newest, 
lowest dose, safest, herbicides will be used. At this point I want to draw 
attention to the rhetorical techniques some scientists have used to argue their 
views. Science, of course, does not occur in a vacuum, and much depends on 
the ability of the scientific community to mobilize political support and 
financial backing for their projects. So an analysis of the ethical dimensions 
of scientific research is naturally drawn to the scientists’ concern not only to 
inform but to persuade. 
In this light, consider Benbrook and Moses’ argumentative technique 
of listing propositions that appear to be true but, according to them, are in 
fact “myths:” 
 
 Myth 2 [their emphasis]: Progress in developing herbicide resistant 
cultivars will increase the use of chemical pesticides. 
 
This myth is false, the authors claim, because “the whole thrust of resistance 
R&D propels US agriculture toward products effective at one-half to one-
tenth or less the current rate of application of older products on a per acre-
treated basis.”83 
We recall, however, that the authors have already informed us that 
roughly 75 percent of all GEHR research is directed toward finding crop 
varieties tolerant to the new chemicals. But that, of course, means that 
roughly twenty five percent of all GEHR research is directed toward finding 
crop varieties tolerant of the old chemicals.84 Is it accurate, then, that “the 
whole thrust of resistance R&D propels U. S. agriculture toward” the new 
chemicals? Work is being done, for example, to manufacture soybeans with 
resistance to atrazine, which would allow farmers growing corn and beans in 
rotation to use stronger doses of atrazine on their corn without having to fear 
carry-over into next year’s bean crop. One estimate has it that such a strain of 
soybeans would increase sales of atrazine by $200 million a year.85 Does this 
justify the claim that GEHR research is likely to introduce a new era of 
agriculture in which only “safe” chemicals are used? 
Another hidden economic cost is the likely appearance of herbicide-
resistant weeds. Consider the number of dormant weed seeds already in the 
soil that already possess the ability to grow in the presence of some of the 
new herbicides. 
Inhibitors of the ALSase enzyme are predicted to occur 
in natural weed populations at a rate of . . . 1 in a million. 
Against Herbicide Resistance                                                                                      61                                                          
  
Considering the vast numbers of dormant weed seed in 
agricultural soils, this is a relatively high rate of occurrence. 
Triazine resistant weeds occur much less frequently, about 1 
x 10-18. 2,4-D resistant weeds are probably even less likely to 
occur possibly due to the complexity of its action. The recent 
introduction of many ALSase inhibiting herbicides from 
several different chemical families could lead to a herbicide 
rotation with only one target site in plants . . 86 
The high rate of dormant weeds with potential resistance to the new 
chemicals leads Dekker to conclude that herbicide resistant weeds are 
“inevitable.” 
Here, then, are several hidden economic costs that need to be 
explored before concluding that the potential economic benefits of GEHR 
crops outweigh their costs. To assert that worries about the hidden costs of 
GEHR crops are “simplistic” is itself simplistic. 
But suppose we grant the claim that GEHR crops will reduce external 
environmental and health costs. This still does not justify the assertion that 
genetically engineered plants are “safe.” Like the meaning of the concept 
“weed,” the meaning of “safe” is context dependent. Its meaning depends on 
a wide web of relationships which need to be specified each time it is used. 
Safe for whom, and under what circumstances? Safe with what probability of 
error, and with what safeguards? Safe for how long, and with what risks of 
subclinical health problems? Is what is safe for a forty-year old woman in 
good health also safe for a sixty-year old man with an immune deficiency? 
We have seen more than one instance of the scientific community 
declaring a new synthetically manufactured chemical to be “safe” only to 
learn later of unanticipated deleterious side-effects. One lesson of the history 
of weeds was that scientists should exercise great restraint in claims about the 
safety of new technologies. We must be more modest than Brill, Benbrook 
and Moses, claiming not that genetically engineered organisms or GEHR 
crops are safe but rather that they appear to be unlikely to disrupt the rural 
landscape much more than the crops and chemicals currently in use. We 
might conclude that some of the chemicals likely to be used with GEHR 
crops appear to be safer than the old chemicals insofar as their carcinogenic, 
mutagenic, and teratogenic effects on fish and mammals are concerned. And 
we might say that GEHR crops are, given what we now know, “safe enough” 
for this or that purpose, given these and those ends of modern agriculture. 
What we should not say is that GEHR crops are safe.87 
Might the argument for unqualified support of GEHR crops be put in 
more defensible, contingent, terms? Might we say that GEHR crops should 
make it possible to promote a style of farming that uses safer chemicals that 
are less toxic and more compatible with the environment? We might, but we 
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would no longer have the unqualified assertion of Brill’s title, nor an 
endorsement of GEHR crops without reservation. For once appropriate 
relativizing clauses are inserted, E is no longer E. 
Unqualified endorsement of GEHR research and crops collapses from 
internal problems. Key questions are begged, like those relating to the 
meaning of the concept “safe;” contentious claims are asserted, like those 
relating to the ability of the new herbicides to replace the old; and hasty 
judgments are paraded as arguments, as when legitimate concerns about 
hidden costs are dismissed as “simplistic.” 
There is little justification to endorse GEHR research without 
reservation. Ought we then to oppose it? 
 
5.2.  Unqualified opposition (O) 
 
Judged by economic standards like efficiency and profitability of 
industries, farmers, and consumers in developed countries, publicly funded 
GEHR research has much going for it. But there are problems associated with 
the fit between GEHR technologies, the environment, and our communal 
identity, problems that are not obviously outweighed by the potential 
economic gains. Some critics have responded to GEHR research by 
uncategorically opposing it. Those like Jeremy Rifkin who have biases 
against genetic engineering, think that any kind of manipulation of life at the 
genetic level is impermissible. Others, including Jack Doyle, are concerned 
about the effects of a concentrated agribusiness industry on concerns related 
to equity and distribution of wealth. Others see danger in continuing to allow 
the chemical industry to locate its manufacturing plants in places such as 
Bhopal, India, where 2,000 people were killed in an explosion in December, 
1984. Indeed, one estimate puts the number of pesticide poisonings at 
“between 400,000 and 2 million . . . worldwide each year, most of them 
among farmers in developing countries.”88 Others estimate that there are 
between ten and forty thousand deaths resulting from these poisonings each 
year. In light of the ethical directive to do no harm, should we continue to 
pursue technologies that will perpetuate pesticide production and use? 
Those who think that we should stop research on GEHR crops do so 
for at least four different reasons. First, they argue, the research will lead to 
an increased use of chemical pesticides, and more farmworkers and 
consumers will be injured or killed as herbicide use escalates. Second, mutant 
organisms may develop in GEHR crop fields and devastate vast areas of vital 
crops. This would put the food supply of the entire world at risk. Third, a 
small handful of companies may exploit farmers and consumers by exercising 
monopolistic control over the seed and chemical industries. Fourth, some are 
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convinced that GEHR research is intrinsically immoral because it crosses 
species boundaries placed in nature by God. 
The first two arguments that might be offered by those in O can 
easily be shown to suffer from the same problems encountered by arguments 
offered by those in E. Consider that there is an active debate about whether 
GEHR crops will actually lead to an increase in the use of the old 
herbicides.89 According to Benbrook and Moses’ estimate, three quarters of 
current expenditures on GEHR research involve the use of low-dose 
herbicides like Scepter and Classic, chemicals applied at rates that are a 
fraction, one fifth, one tenth, one hundredth, of current rates.90 If these 
become the chemicals of the future, then the rates of herbicide use may 
indeed fall. In fact, that would only continue the pattern that has prevailed 
recently. Application of insecticides in general, and of herbicides for dicot 
control in cereals in particular, have declined steadily since 1940.91 At best it 
is unclear whether herbicide use will escalate, and it is possible that use will 
level off or decline with the advent of GEHR crops. To oppose GEHR 
research on the basis that GEHR crops will increase herbicide use is to argue 
on shaky grounds. 
The safety of the technology for farmworkers, manufacturing 
employees, consumers, wildlife, and the environment is also debated. Just as 
those in E ought not to assert that GEHR crops will be “safe,” so those in O 
ought not to assert that they will be “unsafe.” The problem here is not that we 
cannot predict the future, a problem that plagues anyone trying to anticipate 
the likely effects of a new technology. The problem is rather that the new 
generation of herbicides has proven to be far less toxic not only than the old 
organochlorine insecticides like DDT and paraquat, but less toxic than the 
most popular herbicides now in use, alachlor and atrazine. It is as difficult to 
defend the claim that GEHR chemicals and crops are unsafe, or that they will 
lead to more health, environmental, and manufacturing accidents, as to claim 
that they are safe and will solve all of our problems. Our judgments must be 
more qualified and specific, taking comparative forms like “safe enough for 
muskrats but not for human babies,” “riskier than what we now have for 
worms, but much less worrisome for field workers.” 
Regarding the potential impact of GEHR crops on the appearance of 
the rural landscape we must say that it is possible, although probably not 
likely, that GEHR plants may cross-breed with wild weed species. But even if 
this occurs, grand ecological disaster will not necessarily follow. As 
Benbrook and Moses suggest, farmers will adapt once again, inventing new 
strategies for dealing with new weeds. 
These considerations cast doubt on the first two arguments above. 
The last two arguments deserve closer examination. Again, they are 
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arguments meant to persuade as well as inform, and so we must pay particular 
attention to their rhetorical strategies. 
The first argument concerns the power of the chemical industry, an 
issue that Doyle has raised in his book, Altered Harvest. In the chapter titled 
“Magic Molecules, Clever Chemistry,” Doyle recounts the history of the 
development of E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company, one of the world’s 
larger multinational corporations and a leader in the race for GEHR crops.92 
Why have large conglomerate chemical companies suddenly become so 
enamored of seed companies? What will the giants do next?  
They may want to extend the life of the chemical division’s old 
agricultural chemicals. Industry seems as interested in creating needs for its 
chemicals as it is in meeting already existing needs. Du Pont, for example, 
will use herbicide resistance crops not only as a way to sell its new 
sulfonylurea herbicides, but as a way to breathe new life into its older 
compounds. It need only genetically engineer tomatoes and beans resistant to 
the old standbys to make them profitable once again. 
In a footnote, Doyle expresses the objection in his own voice: 
Although a chemical or pharmaceutical corporation may spend 
as much as $50 million . . . developing a new pesticide [or 
herbicide] . . . a popular patented substance, in a few years time, 
will produce annual revenues that may run as high as $500 
million to $1 billion. Eli Lilly’s herbicide Treflan, reaping $350 
to $400 million annually between 1979 and 1981, has accounted 
for at least 10 percent of the company’s total corporate income 
since 1978. Eli Lilly’s herbicide Treflan, reaping $350 to $400 
million annually . . . has held as much as 70 percent of the 
dinitroaniline herbicide market in recent years. 
And how many competitors does Lilly have? Apparently, only two: “Similar 
herbicides from American Cyanamid and BASF hold the other 30 percent. . .” 
The footnote ends with the author summarizing the case by again quoting 
from a magazine: “‘Products like Aatrex, Treflan and Roundup,’ says 
Chemical Week, ‘guarantee years of high earnings.’” 
Markets in which a half dozen companies or less control 55 percent 
or more of the business are called shared monopolies. Many economists think 
shared monopolies are problematic because they allow companies to collude 
with one another, fixing prices at higher levels than the prices would be if 
there were true competition in the industry. In the dinitroaniline herbicide 
market, for example, three companies control the entire market. Is this good 
for those who need to buy dinitroaniline chemicals? Is it good for the 
economy generally? 
If readers are to be convinced to oppose GEHR research on the 
grounds that shared monopolies in the chemical industry represent a 
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threat to moral principles, however, we need a more subtle economic analysis 
than is provided in Altered Harvest.93  Consider that another vocal critic of 
pesticides has complained that there is too much competition in the industry: 
The problem today [in 1978] is that there are too many 
companies with too many products battling for the swag; 
fourteen hundred pesticides and thirty thousand labels. What 
a joke! This forces the chemical companies into a 
merchandising dogfight and into continuously seeking 
another DDT or parathion; that is, a low-cost biocide 
designed more to capture markets than to fit into 
scientifically conceived, integrated pest-management 
systems.94 
Before leaving the issue of industry power, let me summarize the 
case against O on this point. It is an open question whether GEHR crops will 
encourage a more concentrated biotech industry. Many startup biotech 
companies went out of business in the mid-1980s. This happened more 
because of internal business problems, like the failure to produce a money 
making discovery, or a lack of managerial expertise, than because of 
collusion among the giants. Even the giants have found that a strategy of joint 
research ventures and reciprocal licensing arrangements may prove in the 
long run to be a more advantageous strategy than leveraged buyouts aimed at 
monopolistic control of markets. This is evidence that stabilization and 
cooperation may explain more of what is happening in the industry than 
cutthroat competition and concentration. 
Of course, one may reply that cooperation between companies serves 
concentration, and is bad for the efficiency and competitiveness of the 
industry. But this reply must take account of the international character of the 
biotech industry where companies of one country are competing against those 
of another. For example, seven U. S. companies in the superconductivity race 
announced a joint venture in June of 1989 in order to try to compete against 
the Japanese, who hold a clear lead in this capital-intensive research and 
development field. Ag biotech companies in the U. S. may be coming to see 
the wisdom of such an approach, an approach that serves the interests of 
international competition by encouraging intranational cooperation. Doyle’s 
concerns about the power of the chemical industry in the United States are 
not wholly unjustified, but further evidence is needed to justify the claim that 
we should oppose GEHR research on these grounds. 
The last O argument that I want to consider was the first one raised in 
this article, that genetic engineering of plant varieties is wrong because it 
crosses species boundaries placed in nature by God. If God made boundaries 
in the plant and animal kingdoms, who are we to violate them in our 
laboratories? 
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The problem with this argument is that it begs the question about 
what a “species” is. Like “weeds” and “safe,” “species” is a context-specific 
concept. Its meaning depends on how it is being used. Viewed from the 
perspective of animal breeding, species are not fixed because normal 
members of two different species (horses and asses) can give rise to members 
of a different species altogether (mules). Viewed from the perspective of 
evolutionary genetics, species are not fixed because species can give rise to 
mutations which become the parents of a novel species, and because the 
differences between members of one species (e.g., the Norwegian elkhound 
and the chihuahua, both dogs) can be greater than the differences between 
members of two different species (e.g., the Norwegian elkhound and the 
wolfhound).95 Viewed from the perspective of biology, species are not fixed 
because nature gives ample evidence of fluctuations, transformations, and 
generally fluid boundaries between species. 
Proscribing the crossing of species borders seems to depend on the 
denial of all of these perspectives, a denial which is usually accompanied by 
particular religious beliefs. The bald assertion “species boundaries ought not 
to be crossed” begs the question of what “species” means. Without telling us 
exactly how a species is constituted in the broader pattern of relations 
between organisms, we have no way to tell whether rigid species borders 
actually exist, much less whether they should or should not be crossed. 
Further, the proscription seems to rest on a great deal more than scientific 
principles and, without sharing the religious convictions that support O, it is 
difficult to see how one could think it binding on others. 
Whether we are morally justified in crossing plant species seems to 
me no more debatable in the 1990s than whether we are justified in killing 
weeds. Few in this country could hold to such a view without having to alter 
their diet dramatically. But if the question does not seem compelling in the 
arena of plant life, it becomes a different matter when we cross into the 
animal kingdom. Sentient beings who can experience pain and emotion have 
interests that may well be thwarted if they are the product of two species 
unrelated in nature. We will consider the matter of crossing species in the 
next chapter when we take up the issue of transgenic animals. But when it 
comes to nonsentient plants, there is little room for moral concern about 
mixing varieties. 
Like E, O is based on dubious assertions, attacks on straw men, and 
circular argumentation. Those trying to develop an environmental perspective 
on the morality of agricultural biotechnology research may rest no easier with 
O’s blanket condemnation of publicly funded GEHR research than with E’s 
carte blanche endorsement of it. 
 
5.3.  Qualified Endorsement (QE) 
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Consider first the view that GEHR research using public funds is 
prima facie permissible, that is, permissible unless and until it is shown that 
the research leads to products, practices, or attitudes that conflict with the 
environmental, economic, and communal principles stated earlier. 
Those who would hold to a position of qualified endorsement might 
argue that the research is important in order to meet food demands and to 
promote a greater balance of good over evil, but would also acknowledge the 
validity of the questions I have raised about the technology.  
Those in QE are likely to be most concerned with the rights of 
individuals, autonomy, reciprocity, and the likelihood of agricultural research 
to lead to a greater ratio of good over bad consequences. Someone with this 
view would like to know how GEHR research products will actually measure 
up to ethical principles before rendering a final judgment about it. In the 
meantime, they feel comfortable enough with the research to presume it 
innocent until proven guilty. 
Those in QE would claim not that GEHR crops are safe, but that the 
crops are safe enough for this or that purpose given the current agricultural 
system and world food needs and the current implied or explicit social 
contracts on which that system is based. An environmentalist might hold to 
QE on the basis not only of the economic benefits already acknowledged but 
on the basis of potential ecological advantages; the new chemicals appear to 
be safer for us and the environment.96 They do not leach into groundwater the 
way alachlor and atrazine do because they adhere tightly to the soil. In the 
soil, the chemicals may be broken down into harmless molecules such as 
carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen. In some soils, the half-life of glyphosate is less 
than a week and in most soils not longer than five or six months.97 And by 
making land currently in production even more productive, GEHR 
technologies might allow some agricultural acres to be returned to wildlife 
habitat or even wilderness. 
If we carefully hedge our claim with all of the qualifications 
introduced earlier, we may assert that the new chemicals--the glyphosates, the 
imidazolinones, the sulfonylureas--are safer, simpler, and more effective than 
the old chemicals. The research has other features to recommend it. It 
contributes to our knowledge of basic subcellular plant structures, plant 
metabolism, and the role of genetic information in plant growth regulation; 
advances in basic scientific understanding of these biochemical mechanisms 
might enable us to design crops in the future that would not need herbicide 
applications at all. In theory, one can envision tomato and corn plants so 
hardy that they could grow in the presence of weeds, or send out their own 
environmentally benign chemicals to kill just those weeds that actually 
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compete with them. In such an ideal world, farmers would be freed altogether 
from their dependency on herbicidal chemicals. 
What we need, those in QE might argue, is a balanced view of 
agricultural chemicals. So argues the president of the Connecticut Farm 
Bureau, Mary Potter: 
We have lost our national sense of balance when, because of 
faddist acceptance, toxic, dangerous, raw plant compounds 
[such as the abortion agent pennyroyal, the potentially fatal 
poke plant, and chamomile tea, which “can cause severe 
reaction in people who suffer from certain allergies”] can be 
offered to the public under the guise of health foods, while 
highly tested chemicals are branded as potentially unsafe. 
 The suspension of the chemical weed killer 2,4,5,-T -
- because of . . . potential involvement in miscarriages--
ironically now allows the unchecked growth of hundreds of 
poisonous plant species with proven abortive abilities. Nettle 
. . . the root of a water hemlock plant . . . lupine . . . bracken 
fern . . . [can all result in abortion or] glaring birth defects in 
cattle [that feed on them].98 
Potter seems to think that mere common sense will lead all of us to the same 
conclusion about herbicides. With the restoration of “a national sense of 
balance” we would all agree, she asserts, to repeal the Delaney provisions of 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, requiring the banning of any chemical in 
which any detectable level of toxic materials is found. Adopting “the 
scientific approach” to “economics and the long-term public good” would 
cause us to bring back DDT, Mirex, cyclamates, DES, Red Dye Number 2, 
and saccharin, along with 2,4,5-T. Or so Potter’s intuitions tell her. 
Homer LeBaron, vice president of Ciba-Geigy Corporation, may not 
share Potter’s particular judgments about the need for specific compounds, 
but in a speech given at Brigham Young University in 1988, “Ethics in the 
Agricultural Chemical Industry,” he argued for a similarly “balanced” view of 
agricultural chemicals, a view based on what he called “reason, logic, 
objectivity and ethics.”99 Such a view stresses the fact that our food supply is 
much safer than most people think. 
Let us consider a few of the slides LeBaron’s used in his 
presentation.  The first slide presents the conclusions of a study by Bruce 
Ames published in the journal Science.100 
 
Slide 1 
 
1. The incidence of specific kinds of cancer differs markedly in 
different societies. 
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2. Dietary factors are implicated to play a significant role in the 
incidence of some types. 
 
3. No epidemiological evidence to suggest pesticide residues in food 
have contributed to increased cancer in U.S. 
 
- Ames, Bruce N., et. al. 1987. Ranking Possible Carcinogenic 
Hazards. Science 236: 271-279. 
 
Notice claim 3, concerning the lack of evidence linking pesticides to cancer. 
Does this claim contradict those cited above about nitrates in the groundwater 
and cancers in farmers? It is important to keep distinctions clear here. The 
problem with cancer among farmers stems, allegedly, from use of nitrogen 
fertilizers, not chemical herbicides. Nitrates in groundwater are a different 
problem from pesticide residues in or on food. 
Notice, too, claim 4 from the same study, highlighted in the next 
slide: 
 
 Slide 2 
 
4. Threat posed by natural “toxins” in plants is estimated to be at least 
10,000 times greater than pesticides residues. 
 
5. Cancer rates in US have remained relatively constant for the last 50 
years, except lung cancer from smoking and melanomas from UV light. 
 
Some foods grown organically present more of a cancer risk than 
foods grown with pesticides. Peanut butter, Ames points out, is one of these 
foods. If I feed my son Benjamin four tablespoons of peanut butter a day for 
the rest of his life, I will expose him to a not insignificant carcinogenic risk 
because peanut butter contains aflatoxin. It is several times more dangerous 
to eat a tablespoon of peanut butter than an apple grown with Alar, and there 
is a far greater carcinogenic hazard from drinking two cans of beer. But most 
of us would not consider the risk from peanut butter significant, nor deem it a 
threat to our children’s well-being.  
But considerations of risk need to be supplemented by considerations 
of informed consent. Risks we have freely assumed (such as an adult’s 
choosing to eat peanut butter) are different from those imposed on us (such as 
a child’s being given nothing but peanut butter to eat). The difference is 
important because many people do not know the risks associated with eating 
certain foods and might not choose to assume those risks if they knew what 
the risks were. 
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In order to protect the innocent, we authorize political and regulatory 
agencies to prohibit the sale of certain kinds of risky foods. If it seems silly to 
consider outlawing peanut butter because of what seem to be minute risks 
from aflatoxin, consider the fact that we currently prohibit the use of 
compounds that have any probability of causing cancer. Commenting on this 
rule, Henry Shue writes that 
Under current U. S. law . . . a substantial probability of harm 
is not now considered necessary to the case for regulation, 
and therefore a low probability is not sufficient to weaken the 
case [for regulation], when the degree of seriousness is 
maximal (as it is taken to be when the harm at risk is in fact 
cancer) and the risk is being inflicted upon some people by 
others coercively.101 
So, while it would appear to be unjustified to worry about the natural 
carcinogens in the two tablespoons of peanut butter Benjamin eats each day, 
it would not be unjustified to worry about other sons whose families are 
constrained by tight budgets and who may be eating five or six tablespoons of 
peanut butter a day. If Ames’ worries are scientifically justified, regulation of 
the sale of peanut butter on Shue’s moral grounds could be defended. 
 LeBaron did not discuss these issues. Consider another slide: 
 
Slide 3 
 
Carcinogenic risks are very difficult to assess because: 
 
1. Time delay between exposure and response. 
 
2. Differential response of different species. 
 
3. Little evidence to support the assumption that carcinogenic tests 
with other species are good indicators of effects on people. 
 
Wilson, R., et. al. 1987. Risk Assessment and Comparisons. 
Science 236: 267-270. 
 
Notice the last claim. Most of the chemicals banned in the US have 
never been proven to be carcinogenic to humans.
102
 They have been proven to 
cause cancer to lab animals when administered in large doses over a long 
period. Whether the chemicals actually constitute a threat to humans is 
another matter. 
 LeBaron also projected this image on the screen: 
 
Slide 4 
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                  HOW EXTRAORDINARY! 
 
The richest, longest lived, best protected, most resourceful 
civilization with the highest degree of insight into its own technology 
is on its way to becoming the most frightened! 
                                          - A. Wildavsky, 1979 
 
The rhetorical and political use of science in our society is an 
intriguing phenomenon. But how unobjective, emotional, and unbalanced is it 
to worry that your children might suffer from decreased immune function or 
develop serious allergy problems after forty years of being exposed to the 
synergistic and antagonistic effects of pesticide residues on beef, tomatoes, 
potatoes, oranges, and lettuce?103 And how many people could articulate their 
fear in this way, so as to distinguish for an interviewer the difference between 
their fear of the chronic and the acute effects? 
What is the actual level of risk from chronic exposure to pesticide 
residues on food? We do not know. In acknowledgment of this fact, a survey 
of top US scientists in 1987 caused the Environmental Protection Agency to 
rank this problem as one of the four most important issues it faces.104 The four 
issues of “overall medium/high risk” identified in the report were: 
 
 1. “Criteria” air pollution from mobile and stationary 
sources (includes acid precipitation). 
 2. Stratospheric ozone depletion. 
 3. Pesticide residues in or on foods. 
 4. Run-off and air deposition of pesticides.105 
 
Two of the EPA’s top four priorities involved pesticides. The EPA is 
not worried about the risk of accidental death from pesticides (although they 
did express concern over the safety of workers who manufacture and apply 
them). Indeed, they concluded, that pesticides rank relatively low in cancer 
and noncancer health risks. They are concerned that pesticides carry high 
“ecological” and “welfare” risks stemming from point and nonpoint sources 
of surface water pollution and physical alteration of aquatic habitats 
(including estuaries and wetlands).106 
The EPA’s survey confirms the judgment of the insurance industry, 
that legal liability for deaths from pesticide poisoning are highly unlikely for 
most of us. Most college students and women voters probably should not fear 
this if they do. 
But, again, we must look closely. Fears about sublethal, chronic 
health problems associated with pesticide residues in or on foods, and about 
environmental despoilation from pesticide pollution, may be justified. 
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The qualifications appropriate to interpreting this information are not 
only not provided but are actually buried under misleading talk about “actual 
risk.” It is extremely difficult to figure out what is the “actual” level of the 
risk of your dying accidentally. The risk of sustaining a fatal injury while 
engaged in some activity is assessed with a significant range of error and 
refers to the dangers of a certain class (not individual) whose members 
typically engage in certain forms of behavior while restraining from others. 
The risk is assessed by a specific group for some purpose. The probable 
levels of accidental death for a US citizen who does not farm or work on a 
farm or chemical plant as assessed by the insurance industry for the purpose 
of establishing actuarial tables will be different from the probable levels of 
accidental death of a migrant California farm laborer.  
If you are an airline pilot, the “actual” level of risk of your dying 
from “Commercial Aviation” is much higher because you fly often. If you 
have never flown and never will, the actual risk of your dying from 
commercial aviation is much lower. Risks, therefore, should not be described 
as “real” or “not real.” They should be described as probabilities in the 
context of some specific web of human purposes, contexts, needs, and 
responsibilities.  
But even if we granted all of these qualifications, would not science 
still give us a pretty good estimate of the risks associated with pesticides for 
most Americans? Science can give us a good idea of how the insurance 
industry at a particular moment in history views the chances of its having to 
pay an accidental death claim from pesticide poisoning. But that is a far 
different, and far weaker, claim than the one Potter would have us believe. 
Scientists are not agreed that the risks of pesticide residues on food 
are small.107 It would be easy at this point to discuss at length the views of any 
one of the many ecologists or entomologists who, like Robert van den Bosch, 
have lamented the role of pesticides and the power of its proponents.108 But 
consider instead the views of one of agricultural biotechnology’s staunchest 
defenders. 
In an article which explicitly states as its intention the desire “to 
convince you that biotechnological research” is “essential” and “to put into 
perspective the concerns about [its] safety,” Brill, vice president of the 
biotech firm Agracetus, argues that agricultural biotechnology is needed to 
find replacements for the chemicals now in use.109 And yet Brill is apparently 
not as sanguine about the use of pesticides as Homer LeBaron is. He writes 
that 
Twenty percent of the farmers in Illinois, according to a 
recent study, have consulted a physician at least once with an 
ailment related to the use of pesticides. More and more data 
accumulate that show that pesticides get into the human 
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food supply and . . . that at least some of these pesticides are 
potentially carcinogenic.110 
If as unalarmed a scientist as Brill is concerned about pesticides, how strange 
is it that a fair number of other educated folk are too? What was once 
extraordinary now appears hardly puzzling at all. 
There is an irony here. On the one hand, the chemical industry seems 
to want to assure us that there is little to worry about. On the other hand, it 
tells us that its biotech research wings are pursuing this line in order to find a 
new generation of safe chemicals. But which is it? Is the present generation 
safe or not? If it is safe, then we should not need yet another “new” 
generation. If it is not safe, then the industry should not be giving 
presentations that implicitly ridicule those who are concerned about its safety. 
Even the industry seems to have a divided mind on the matter of the safety of 
agricultural chemicals. Is it any wonder that the populace at large is 
confused?  
Slide 3, quoting Wilson, stressed the importance of carefully 
qualifying risk assessments. But, in a passage LeBaron chose not to comment 
upon, Wilson further wrote that the way we compare risks is very important 
because it is so easy to mislead an audience. Risks “appear to be very 
different when expressed in different ways.” One could argue, for example, 
that the Chernobyl disaster would produce as many as one hundred and thirty 
one additional cancers in the population of those in the plant’s immediate 
vicinity, thus justifying the judgment that Chernobyl was indeed a “disaster.” 
But using the same data and dividing the 131 cancers “by the approximately 
5,000 cancer deaths expected in that population from other causes,” you 
could also argue that Chernobyl would “only [produce] a 2.6 percent 
increase” in cancer cases, perhaps not a disaster at all. 
Shift the context again and include all of the 75 million people in the 
Byelorussia and Ukrainian regions around Chernobyl and the result would be 
a rise in cancers of less than 0.005 percent, clearly an insignificant--if not 
negligible--increase.111 On this calculation, Chernobyl is hardly worth 
thinking about. Wilson insists on the point. Failing to specify the frame of 
reference used in comparing risks or blurring the differences between 
competing frames of reference may lead to unwarranted conclusions and 
mislead one’s audience. 
These methodological points in Wilson’s study are as important as 
the more specific conclusions listed in the slide LeBaron presented, but 
LeBaron chose not to mention them, focusing instead on Wilson’s claim that 
there is little evidence to support the assumption that carcinogenic tests on 
animals tell us about the carcinogenic effects on people. Let’s turn our 
attention to this claim.  
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Recall that the effect was to undermine one’s confidence in the 
reliability of those studies which showed some ag chemicals to cause cancer 
in rats. Now, it is unclear whether LeBaron was directly quoting Wilson or 
merely summarizing his views. I do not find LeBaron’s claim in Wilson’s 
article. What I find in Wilson is this: “the comparison of carcinogenic 
potency in animal and man . . . require(s) a certain amount of theory.”112 
Consequently, the step of extrapolating from animals to humans, Wilson 
admits, is “controversial.” Nonetheless, he writes, such comparisons are 
useful. For example, animal studies showing that chloroform in drinking 
water is 20 times as likely to cause cancer in rats and mice as 
trichloroethylene seems a reasonable basis upon which to conclude that 
“although neither [chemical] is known to cause cancer in people, we might 
expect that chloroform would do so about 20 times as readily” as 
trichloroethylene. Wilson’s position on the use of animal studies in risk 
assessment seems to me significantly different from the one imputed to him 
by LeBaron. Unfortunately, I doubt that many in LeBaron’s audience will 
look up and read the actual studies to which LeBaron referred. 
The slides based on the article by Bruce Ames et al. came from a 
study published in the same issue of Science as Wilson’s. Ames’ piece is 
titled “Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards,” and its second paragraph 
begins with this sentence: “Animal bioassays and in vitro studies are also 
providing clues as to which carcinogens and mutagens might be contributing 
to human cancer.”113 Ames and coauthors go on to add that extrapolating from 
animal carcinogenicity tests to humans is a “difficult” procedure and that 
“there is little sound scientific basis for (it).” But they immediately add, 
Nevertheless, to be prudent in regulatory policy, and in the 
absence of good human data (almost always the case), some 
reliance on animal cancer tests is unavoidable. The best use 
of them should be made, even though few, if any, of the main 
avoidable causes of human cancer have typically been the 
types of man-made chemicals that are being tested in 
animals.114 
Ames’ actual claims shed a different light on LeBaron’s implication that 
animal carcinogenic studies cannot be trusted to tell us about pesticide safety. 
Consider last the frame in which LeBaron’s plea for balance reaches 
its climax. How extraordinary that the most rich, long lived, well protected 
people on earth are becoming the most frightened! The rhetorical structure of 
Wildavsky’s exclamation in this slide begins with two words all in upper case 
letters followed by an exclamation mark. The viewer is told in unmistakable 
terms that the message to follow is of grave importance.  
Wildavsky’s sentence is an example of what classical rhetoricians 
called “asyndeton,” the deliberate omission of conjunctions between a 
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series of related clauses: “The richest, longest lived, best protected, most 
resourceful . . .” Aristotle, master analyst of rhetoric, noted that the use of 
asyndeton is: 
especially appropriate for the conclusion of a discourse, because 
there, perhaps more than in any other place . . . [the rhetorician 
wants] to produce the emotional reaction that can be stirred by . . 
. rhythm.115 
Scientists stirring emotional reactions? It is difficult to imagine an 
attentive audience member in Utah not feeling attracted to LeBaron’s side. 
The effect of the Wildavsky slide must have been emotional, even hyperbolic. 
And hyperbole it is, since Wildavsky exaggerates the achievements of our 
civilization, “the richest,” “best protected,” etc., for the purpose of emphasis. 
When strung together and presented before the antithetical climax, the series 
of exagerations heightens the drama. The concluding clause juxtaposes the 
opening clauses of the asyndeton with an idea that is their exact inverse: We 
pampered people are, ironically, also the world’s most frightened! 
Imagine the effect of seeing this slide in life-size proportions in a 
darkened room at the end of the previous series of slides. Few must have 
come away feeling frightened about pesticides. But is the rhetorical use to 
which science is being put here a good one? We need not think that all 
herbicides are as carcinogenic, teratogenic, or ontogenic as 2,4,5-T or 
alachlor to see the problems with LeBaron’s presentation. Few if any of the 
herbicides currently in use carry significant risks of accidental death for those 
who do not handle them directly. But as we have seen, there is a great deal we 
do not know about the risks associated with the chronic or environmental 
effects of these chemicals working by themselves and in relationship with 
other chemicals. According to the EPA, we know “little about complex 
chemical transformations involving pollutants in the atmosphere or 
groundwater,” and “little about the reactions of entire ecosystems (as opposed 
to single species) to environmental pollution.”116 
Even if Wildavsky and LeBaron are right that we are an overly 
frightened civilization, that supposed fact about us should not appear 
“extraordinary.” The magnitude of the problems we face, including but not 
limited to nuclear holocaust, the greenhouse effect, ozone depletion, species 
extinction, and tropical rainforest despoilation, is justifiably frightening. The 
problem with LeBaron’s presentation is the same as we saw in Mary Potter’s. 
Both think that society in general has an unbalanced view of pesticides and 
that we are not using common sense. And yet whereas “common sense” refers 
to the sense of a community, wisdom invested in a large consensus of the 
people, there is no “common” sense among Americans in general or scientists 
in particular about the safety of pesticides. Both communities are sharply 
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divided over the issue. So the problem cannot be settled by appealing to 
common sense. 
The position recommended by Potter, President of the Connecticut 
Farm Bureau, and by the vice-president of Ciba-Geigy may be morally 
defensible, but not on the grounds of common sense or “science.” It is the 
view of a specific group of farmers and scientists, a group whose own 
interests are not, as Potter admits, unrelated to the judgment asserted. While 
Potter and LeBaron make strong rhetorical appeals for “balance” and 
“objectivity,” their own positions are marked by a clear bias; views matching 
theirs are called “scientific,” or “balanced,” or “common sensical” while 
those not matching theirs are subtly alleged to be impractical, “fads,” 
“extraordinary.” 
QE is not utterly indefensible by my environmentalist lights, but it 
fails to make the case that current expenditures of public funds on genetically 
engineered herbicide resistant crops are necessary or that the economic and 
environmental benefits expected from GEHR crops outweigh the risks. Those 
who hold QE may indeed have environmentalist leanings. But when they 
argue for GEHR research they should not appeal to abstractions such as logic 
or science, nor assume they have a corner on common sense and objectivity.  
 
5.4.  Qualified Opposition (QO) 
 
In light of the extensive discussion of the case for qualified 
endorsement of GEHR crops, the case for qualified opposition can be stated 
succinctly. There are several reasons of a consequentialist sort why GEHR 
technology does not seem likely to help us develop an agriculture consonant 
with the moral principles I have espoused. Those reasons include the 
likelihood that GEHR crops will lead to: a diminution in the diversity, 
integrity, and beauty of farm ecosystems; an impoverished rather than 
enhanced form of farm life; an ever more tightly linked and concentrated 
agricultural economy with even higher entry barriers; an increase in the use 
of herbicides; and an increased concentration of land, wealth, and power in 
the farm supply and food processing industries.117 
These judgments must all be made tentatively and, for reasons 
suggested above, ought not to be asserted without acknowledging a large 
probability of error. Some environmental risks, for example, might be offset 
by other environmental benefits; other environmental risks might be 
outweighed by economic gains. Suppose that GEHR crops should prove to be 
the only way to keep up with the world’s growing demand for food. Would 
we then want to oppose it? The potential economic benefits of this 
technology should not be weighed lightly. Might GEHR crops contribute to 
slightly lower food prices for consumers--a distinct benefit to the poor 
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and disadvantaged? Might they lead to an improvement in the efficiency with 
which land and labor are used in farming? It seems likely that they would 
force some farmers out of business, but the dislocations are not expected to 
happen as quickly or traumatically as is expected with bGH. And do we want 
to deny the gains from improved profit margins to stakeholders in 
multinational companies successfully marketing the seeds and chemicals? 
From my perspective, there are genuine benefits that may accompany 
GEHR crops, so blanket condemnation of the technology is unwarranted. But 
we must weigh the importance of a growing economy against other factors. 
One way to do this is to ask how urgently farmers need the new seeds and 
chemicals. Might farming be a sustainable and profitable business without 
GEHR crops? There are alternative methods of weed control. Intensively 
managed fields may be rotated so as to reduce the severity of weed 
infestations that plague monocultures; fields may be cultivated when needed 
and weeds killed mechanically; as a last resort, present generation chemicals 
may be handsprayed on specific spots when rotation and cultivation fail to 
offer sufficient control.118 Each strategy widely employed would slow the 
speed with which herbicide resistant weed species are appearing. Each 
strategy is not only consistent with our three moral principles but with the 
agroecological advice of biologists Levins and Lewontin: 
An attempt to control pests should begin with an examination 
of the whole ecosystem in its heterogeneity, complexity, and 
change. This runs counter to the usual paradigm, reinforced 
by the division of labor in applied science, of isolating the 
smallest parts of problems and changing things one at a 
time.119 
Why examine the whole ecosystem? Why oppose GEHR crops as one 
step in trying to change more than one thing at a time? Because we do not 
know the effects such crops will have on us or the environment twenty or 
thirty years hence just as no one knew the effects of the arsenicals or London 
purple or 2,4,5-T or parathion or atrazine or alachlor when they were 
introduced. But even if we did know that GEHR crops would have no ill-side 
effect for any sentient creatures, the herbicide treadmill would still be 
unsustainable.  
As Susan George argues, if we were to try to feed the world “an 
American diet, using U. S. agricultural production technologies (assuming oil 
were the only energy source) all petroleum reserves would be exhausted 
within eleven years.”120 GEHR crops will probably increase the productivity 
of each unit of labor in agriculture, but will not necessarily increase the 
productivity of each unit of land. This is because GEHR crops will favor the 
large scale, capital-intensive, style of agriculture, a style which often is not as 
productive per acre as smaller scale, more management-intensive farms. 
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But would smaller scale, labor-intensive, farms be profitable? In 
some circumstances, where the climactic and soil conditions were favorable, 
perhaps. In other circumstances, probably not. Since we are envisioning an 
agriculture that cuts down not only on pesticides but on purchased nitrogen 
inputs as well, we must ask whether a farm that got its weed control from less 
chemical intensive strategies could also get its nitrogen needs from legumes 
and animal wastes rather than synthesized ureas. 
Worldwide, legumes might be able to provide even more fertilizer for 
farmers now dependent on manufactured versions. They would have to make 
several changes at once, however, changing from grain monocultures to 
mixed animal-and-grain farming. Such changes are never easy, and probably 
would require that many farmers work longer and harder hours. Few are 
likely to make such dramatic changes unless they see some profit in it.  
In mixed farming, farmers must know where the weeds grow and how 
quickly they are likely to spread. Some weeds “may be restricted to wet or 
dry soils, sandy or clay, rich or poor soils, grasslands or cultivated lands, 
open fields or shady places, acid, netural, or somewhat alkaline soils.”121 And 
then the farmer must decide not only what the weed problem is, where it is 
likely to go, when it is likely to go there, and how harmful it is likely to be. 
The farmer must also decide how to deal with it: prevent it, block its spread, 
eradicate it chemically, or reduce it merely to the level of economic injury?122 
As this discussion suggests, traditional farmers require a broad range 
of very specific and localized knowledge. They must make judgments of a 
practical sort, combining the wisdom of past seasons with predictions about 
the likely course of the future. If such judgments were not already very 
difficult to make, they are compounded by the fact that pests may be 
invulnerable to pesticide treatments during different stages of their lives. The 
alfalfa weevil consumes most alfalfa while it is a fourth-instar larva, but other 
insects do it as adults. So conducting integrated pest management well 
requires that mixed farmers know not only pest and weed densities, but the 
age distribution of the pest population, densities of beneficial insect and weed 
populations, condition of the crop, and expected changes in temperature and 
moisture.123  
There are good reasons to encourage more of our farmers to develop 
and hone local knowledge, and the reasons are of an agroecological as well as 
anthropological sort. To those who would object that moving toward 
rotations and mechanical cultivation is trying to turn back the clock, we might 
reply as G. K. Chesterton replied in another context: 
There is one metaphor of which the moderns are very fond: 
they are always saying, “You can’t put the clock back.” The 
simple and obvious answer is “You can.” A clock, being a 
piece of human construction, can be restored by the 
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human finger to any figure or hour. In the same way society, 
being a piece of human construction, can be reconstructed 
upon any plan that has ever existed.”124 
The wager here is that the goal of getting off the herbicide treadmill is worth 
“putting the clock back” a bit. We might find that in doing so we have not 
gone backward but forward, to a new farm, which values properly the 
wisdom invested in local knowledge of the land. 
Another reason for qualified opposition has to do with our relations 
with the Third World. When we continue to market chemicals in developing 
countries banned in our own, we show little moral reciprocity. In 1978, 
Imperial Chemicals (ICI) exported paraquat to Costa Rica while BASF (as 
previously mentioned) was sending 2,4,5-T and Dow was sending 2,4-D. In 
1979, 2,4-D was sold to Colombia by BASF, Celamerck, Ciba-Geigy, Dow, 
and Shell. These chemicals were either banned or restricted for sale in the 
United States at the time.125 GEHR crops and chemicals are sure to be 
advertised in overseas markets, markets in which farmers may not always 
know what the experts know about the risks of the chemicals. To the response 
that such farmers are free not to buy the chemicals, we must ask whether this 
is so. Free choices are only free to the degree that they are informed.126 At 
least one farmworker quoted above testifies that workers usually do not know 
the risks. If this is true, can farmers lacking such information be said to be 
“free” to choose such products? 
This issue raises questions about the rights of the most vulnerable 
discussed in chapter two. As Henry Shue writes,  
What about minorities that are vulnerable because of some 
reason other than lack of information? What about the badly 
informed, the badly educated, the children, the infants, and the 
unborn? These groups cannot protect themselves by reading 
labels.127  
For those whose moral perspective makes the most vulnerable humans “the 
measure of all things,” so to speak, the preference of a farmer to choose 
GEHR crops will not weigh very heavily if it turns out that the herbicides 
used with those crops endanger the safety of children.128 
There are also questions about the environmental suitability of 
technologies such as GEHR crops. How compatible with the changing cycles 
of nature and human trade will this technology be? As Levins and Lewontin 
put it: 
The high-technology monocultures [typical of chemical 
agriculture] increase the vulnerability of production to 
natural and economic fluctuations. The plant varieties 
developed for the green revolution give superior yields under 
optimal conditions of fertilizers, water, and pest 
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management. They have been selected to put most of their 
energy into grain rather than vegetative parts, and the 
resulting stout dwarf stems make it easier for weeds to 
outgrow them, making herbicide use mandatory. The reduced 
root growth increases the plant’s sensitivity to a shortage of 
water. Irrigation buffers the crop against the vagaries of 
rainfall but increases the farmers’ sensitivity to the price of 
fuel. High-nitrogen fertilizers and the growth-stimulating 
effects of herbicides make the plants more vulnerable and 
attractive to insects . . . And monoculture removes diversity 
as one of the traditional hedges against uncertainty.129 
To worries that the tightly-linked international system of export 
agriculture has been unfair to developing countries, some reply that green 
revolution technologies have provided struggling nations with a wide variety 
of jobs and businesses.130 
A free market system is, all other things be equal, a good thing, as is 
a diverse array of businesses. But not all countries have been able to adapt to 
export agriculture as well as others. Where changes have been cataclysmic a 
“wide array” of agribusinesses may never have started, or the mechanisms for 
feeding people may not have been in place during the transition from a 
subsistence to a cash economy. The result may have been that the beginnings 
of an agribusiness system may have done little more than turn subsistence 
peasants into unemployed city dwellers and induce the remaining farmers to 
raze forests and plow up hillsides.131  
Should all countries be encouraged or induced to jump headfirst into 
relying on cash crops as the way to sustain their economies or will doing so 
lead to uneven development and environmental disaster?132 Have we really 
been fair with our trading partners when we “erect high barriers to imports of 
temperate-zone products from developing countries and then subsidize [our] 
own exports”?133 Is it fair that world markets for ten major Third World 
exports are shared monopolies controlled by three to six multinational 
corporations?134 By the standards of autonomy and reciprocity, we must be 
careful not to exercise more power than is warranted in our relations with 
farmers in less developed countries.135 
For all of these reasons, those who share my economic, 
environmental, and communal principles will have a difficult time being 
convinced to approve of GEHR research. Public funds can be spent in much 
better ways: increased research on low input sustainable agriculture; attempts 
to map the carrying capacity of various geographic areas and determine the 
optimum pasture and crop land uses; more funds for extension and education 
of farmers trying to control weeds through cultural practices; economic 
studies of ways to encourage smaller farms on which labor (e.g., hand 
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weeding and mechanical cultivation) may be more easily substituted for 
capital inputs such as herbicides; more research on biomass as an alternative 
source of energy and chemical feedstocks; better programs at universities in 
environmental studies, ecology, animal behavior, wildlife management, and 
evolutionary biology. 136 
The difficulties involved in studying these last areas make it all the 
more urgent that we attend to them. Sir Humphrey Davy once wrote “The 
larger the light, the larger the circle of darkness around it.” Botanist G. 
Clifford Evans introduced his study of the problem of specialization in 
scientific knowledge by reminding us of Davy’s vivid metaphor. “As our 
knowledge has grown,” Evans explained, “so have the number and 
complexity of the unsolved problems, and many need highly specialized 
knowledge and techniques for their solution.”137 But even more require an 
interdisciplinary skill. Here, Evans repeated a comment of A. S. Watt’s: 
Clearly it is one thing to study the plant [cell or even the] 
community and assess the effect of factors which obviously 
and directly influence it, and another to study the 
interrelations of all the components of the ecosystem with an 
equal equipment in all branches of knowledge concerned.138 
Research efforts in environmental studies, ecology, and evolutionary biology 
may not be “ag biotech” projects according to our strict definition. But they 
are, from my perspective, projects more deserving of scarce public funds than 
GEHR research. 
But even if one could change only the allocation of biotech funds 
within the area of molecular biology, other projects would seem to outrank 
the herbicide resistance. More important areas might include research to 
devise vetches and cover crops to blanket bare Illinois fields in winter, and 
crops such as Kentucky fescue that can inhibit the growth of weeds (such as 
trefoil) through allelochemical effects;139 research to introduce chemical 
molecules into crops that may inhibit the growth of weeds by the release of 
toxins;140 research to find cornplants that can fix their own nitrogen, thus 
reducing our reliance on purchased fertilizer inputs, or with their own internal 
defenses against the European cornborer;141 beans, tomato, and cotton plants 
resistant to lepidopteran insects;142 species that protect each other through 
allelopathic effects so as to inhibit the growth of pests and weeds through 
biological means; and so on. 
Are GEHR crops compatible with sustainble agriculture? A very 
modest research effort in this area might be justified to the extent that it 
would help us to understand basic plant and herbicidal mechanisms, and to 
the extent that it might help weed scientists to keep up with changes in the 
makeup of the weed flora. But where net economic returns could justify 
cutting back on pesticide usage--on many farms in the corn belt and in the 
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semiarid northwest, for example--we should encourage this strategy.143 
Alternatives to GEHR crops are available. With an infusion of low cost labor 
resources or governmental subsidies for low input agriculture, present yields 
might be sustained not only without GEHR crops and chemicals but even, 
perhaps, without any of the current herbicide mixtures. In other areas and in 
other crops, herbicides and fertilizers are, without a doubt, necessary in the 
short run to insure a stable supply of efficiently produced food without 
increasing the amount of environmentally sensitive land used in production. 
Chemical pesticides are by no means uniformly bad from my perspective.144 
But we have seen good reasons to try to lessen our dependence on them. 
From my perspective, GEHR research using public funds is 
impermissible until it can be shown that the research will not lead to 
products, practices, or attitudes that conflict with environmental goals.  
A word about the status of my judgment. I do not believe my 
preference for QO over QE can be justified by appeal to transhistorical 
standards. The judgment is justified by concrete historical considerations 
such as the particular memories and aspirations of historical communities. In 
my assessment of GEHR research, I have in mind what might be called a 
traditional ideal of what constitutes good farming, an ideal dependent upon 
the agricultural communities where it is still practiced. I believe that the web 
of relationships required to make GEHR crops successful is inconsistent with 
the narrative tradition my aunt and uncle strive to embody. More than any 
scientific or theoretical considerations, this particular, historically 
conditioned, judgment inclines me to QO. 
But particular ideals of farming should not automatically bind 
everyone, because they depend on cultural norms and even religious 
convictions not universally shared. At least one community, mass American 
consumer society, seems to value a way of life that apparently requires large 
scale tightly knit agriculture. The ideal of good farming for that community 
may be antithetical to my aunt and uncle’s ideal. How would we resolve a 
dispute between the American consumer’s wishes about farms and my 
extended family’s ideal? 
It is impossible to appeal to yet a third ideal of farming in order to 
argue that one of the two ideals is superior to the other. There is no 
ahistorical Universal Ideal of Good Farming to tell us whose ideal of farming 
is the true one. We need not expect everyone to be bound by one person’s 
notion of good farming. Nonetheless, we should realize the historically 
conditioned nature of all ideals of good farming, including the ideal of tightly 
linked modern agriculture. 
It is from the perspective of my own interests and purposes that I 
offer the historically conditioned and qualified judgment that GEHR research 
is morally inappropriate. 
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- - - - - - - - - - 
 
In his short story, “The Birthmark,” Nathaniel Hawthorne tells of a 
scientist named Alymer whose deep love for his young bride, Georgiana, is 
matched only by a strange obsession to remove a birthmark from her cheek. 
There is no reason for Alymer’s research because the woman is beautiful 
even with the supposed imperfection. And Alymer’s quest requires that she 
be put through a series of painful experiments, the chronic effects of which 
are unknown. The tragedy is heightened when the narrator informs us that 
Georgiana’s mark is not unlike those that “Nature, in one shape or another, 
stamps ineffaceably on all her productions.”145 
 Nevertheless, Alymer is soon working night and day in his lab trying 
to find the chemical liquid that will perfect Georgiana’s complexion. When 
he finds it at last, he gives it to her. Obedient to the end, 
She drinks it, and her birthmark disappears; she is perfect; 
but she no longer belongs to nature. She calls to her husband: 
“you have rejected the best thing the earth could offer. 
Alymer, dearest Alymer, I am dying.”146 
The moral of this story for ag biotech as been admirably drawn by 
Mark Sagoff: 
In [Alymer’s] passion to make [Georgiana] perfect, he lost 
sight of the value of what he already possessed. We, too, are 
likely to succeed at many of the purposes to which we put 
recombinant DNA technology. But we must proceed with 
reflection and caution lest, in our passion for power and 
profits, we lose more than we gain by our success.147 
Hawthorne’s story anticipates Greg Brown’s message in “Walkin’ the 
Beans.” Our obsession with how something looks may set us tasks we can 
never ever get done. With weeds, looks can be deceiving. Perhaps we need to 
retrain our eyes to see the beauty of selected weeds between rows of corn, 
and to see the beauty of wholistic approaches to weeds and farming. 
If we cannot do this, we may lose more than we gain by our success 
in the ag biotech lab. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Against Transgenic Animals (1992) 
 
 
It is not by mere chance that Virtue . . . dwells in greatest 
proportions precisely upon that same span of soil where hogs 
thrive in greatest abundance. In Iowa, where people . . . read 
the Bible in the bathtub, there is approximately a full litter of 
pigs . . . for every single citizen. 
 
     -William Hedgepeth 1 
 
When I wrote “The Case Against bGH” in the late 1980s, I enjoyed 
eating meat, enjoyed serving it to my family, and believed one could 
simultaneously defend traditional family farms and the welfare of animals.   
Shortly after finishing that article, I read again, and more carefully, Tom 
Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights.2 Regan’s arguments challenged my 
presuppositions. 
After rethinking my position, I wrote a trio of essays on ethics and 
farm animals. Taken together, they tell the story of how I came to give up 
important background beliefs, and how my new beliefs affected my views 
about the propriety of making transgenic animals. The first essay, “Pigs and 
Piety: A Theocentric Perspective on Food Animals,” explains why I 
surrendered deep-seated religious convictions. The second, “The Moral 
Irrelevance of Autonomy,” responds to the most common objection to the 
idea of animal rights, the objection that while humans are moral agents, 
animals are not. The third essay, “Should We Genetically Engineer Hogs?” 
applies the theory of animal rights to transgenic food animals, animals into 
which humans have inserted foreign genes. 
 
1.  Pigs and Piety:  A Theocentric Perspective on Food 
 Animals 
 
 I live in Story County, Iowa, where the most sustainable way to farm 
is called family, or mixed, farming. Family farms raise grains in summer and 
feed them to livestock in winter. Farmers use manure from the animals to 
supply nitrogen fertilizer to pastures and fields, and they sell the pigs and 
cows at auction for cash. On mixed farms, the rearing and selling of livestock 
is the raison d’être of the operation, and the operation is, in the current 
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jargon, sustainable, ecologically balanced, and consistent with principles of 
good stewardship. 
 Now, I am not a farmer. And I can tell you that Iowans in general are 
not as virtuous as William Hedgepeth’s paean at the beginning of this chapter 
suggests. But Hedgepeth is right; there are eight times as many pigs in my 
state as people, and the economic health of grain farms as well as pig farms 
rests on the practice of raising and slaughtering animals. In the summer, uncle 
Harold raises corn, soybeans, and hay. All chickens are gone from the farm; 
the handful of hogs and cattle that remain are little more than Jason’s last 4-H 
project before going off to college. The corn crop is a money maker because 
it winds up in front of animals at hog confinement, cattle feedlot, or broiler 
hen operations. Indeed, upwards of eighty percent of my uncle’s grain is 
destined to be fed to pigs, cows, and chickens awaiting slaughter. 
Can one question the practice of meat-eating without questioning the 
institution of the family farm? As I began to reflect on the arguments of the 
defenders of animal rights, I wondered whether rejecting meat would be 
equivalent to rejecting the history and identity of the Pippert family. I 
purposely put the idea out of my mind. It seemed morally insensitive even to 
envision defending the rights of pigs when economic pressures on farmers 
were so severe. The playing field was so biased against smaller farmers, and 
smaller farmers’ problems produced so much anxiety, that I found myself 
wondering what sort of person would ask questions about the well-being of 
farm hogs when the well-being of farm children was at stake. How could 
someone who loved family farms reject the central practice on which they are 
based? 
 I found, however, that the arguments for vegetarianism are powerful. 
 
1.1  How I Became a Vegetarian  
 
 First, I had to decide whether pigs experience pleasure and pain, 
whether they have emotions, desires, wishes, preferences, a family life. This 
was not a difficult decision. That pigs are sentient seemed evident to me from 
watching the pigs on my uncle’s farm. Pigs are not, as common knowledge 
has it, dirty, dumb, or solitary animals. If given a sufficient amount of room, 
pigs will invariably defecate in the same area, teach their young to keep away 
from this area, and establish the area at a considerable remove from the 
sleeping area. Contrary to popular belief, pigs prefer to wallow in clean 
water, not mud, and will not play with toys soiled by feces.3 Pigs are 
intelligent, affectionate, and social animals. The only thing they seem to love 
more than having their stomachs and ears rubbed is lying next to their 
neighbors after having run playfully in circles around them, squealing and 
barking all the while. 
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 What is it like to be a pig? No one can get inside a pig’s mind, of 
course, but we can think carefully about how they appear. Here is William 
Hedgepeth’s perspective on his day spent in a pig pasture: 
  Idling hogs amble and squat. Some root. One sneezes. 
The sleeping hog beside me wags his ear a twitch or two and 
otherwise remains removed from the milieu. A Hampshire bites 
a Yorkshire’s ear. A Poland China bites my foot. A white hog 
with a black face and black spot on his side executes a galloping 
gleeful leap into the vacant pond. A wandering rooter pussyfoots 
up the hill and sneezes right into the face of the one asleep, who 
responds merely with another quick ear-wag and continues his 
snooze (p. 125). 
  . . . A hog [taking a] siesta on the hilltop has just jumped 
up to bump an intruding rooter down the slope, somersaulting to 
the bottom with a tumbling eruption of high-pitched squeals. 
Most of the hogs are up now, moseying about, perfectly 
unhurried: gambol and squat awhile, browse in the dried mud, 
drift in bulky serenity among the stumps and stubble and birds, 
call a sudden halt to it all every so often to look up at a sound or 
nudge another in the loin. Probe, poke, trot, root. Ah, hogs! They 
have unquenchably inquiring minds, each with a vast capacity 
for sustained wonder (p. 128). 
 Aristotle believed each animal has a telos or purpose to which it is 
directed, a “that for the sake of which” it exists. If Hedgepeth is right, the 
telos of a hog is the will to root, to find his food at least three inches 
underground, and to get his snout into every tractor tire, hole, and crevice 
within reach. Not forgetting sleeping and investigating and eating and mating 
and playing, rooting must be one thing for the sake of which God made hogs. 
 The daily activities of hogs clearly suggest that they possess desires, 
preferences, pleasures, pains, and social lives. You may also now have some 
idea of what the telos of this higher mammal may be. The hog: Kingdom, 
Animalia; Phylum, Chordata; Class, Mammalia; Order, Artiodactyla; Family, 
Suidae; Genus, Sus; Species, Sus scrofa; Subspecies: S.s. scrofa (the Central 
European wild boar), S.s. leucomystax (Japanese wild boar), S.s. vittatus 
(Southeast Asian pig), and S.s. domestica (domestic). These are some of the 
facts about hogs, but facts alone, no matter how many, would never add up to 
the moral judgment that it is wrong to kill and eat Sus scrofa domestica. For 
that, we need a general moral principle and an argument. 
 Here is the argument that changed my mind. 
 
a.  We may call individuals who are capable of desiring and 
 learning, “individuals with futures.” 
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b.  All individuals with futures, such as adolescents, adults, 
 and elderly humans, have a moral right not to be 
 killed for trivial reasons. 
 c.   Most farm animals are capable of desiring and learning; 
 d.   Most farm animals are, therefore, individuals with futures. 
e.   As humans in developed countries generally do not need  
 to eat meat, meat-eating is a trivial reason to kill an animal; 
f.   Therefore, combining (b) and (e), animals have a moral right not 
to be killed for meat by people in developed countries.  
 
 When I first started thinking seriously about the one and a quarter 
inch thick Iowa chops I so loved to barbecue, I thought I had to decide 
whether pigs had moral rights, and whether I was depriving them of that most 
basic right, the right to life, by paying other people to carve them up for me. I 
was impressed by arguments like Joel Feinberg’s and Michael Tooley’s that it 
is impossible for an entity to have a right to life unless that entity has interests 
in the sense of “able to have an interest in x. “4 Clearly, it is in the pig’s 
interest to be able to sleep, eat, and root. But this is a different, weaker, sense 
of “interest” than the one required. For there are things that have interests that 
cannot take an interest in anything. It is in a hay baler’s interest to be kept full 
of baling twine, but the machine does not possess the conscious awareness 
necessary to take an interest in seeing that it does not run out of twine in the 
middle of a row. Having things that are in its interest, and even having things 
that are good for it, does not make a hay baler a bearer of moral rights. The 
machine does not have the right to be well maintained. In order to have moral 
rights, something must at least potentially be conscious of what is good for it. 
The most rigorous philosophical argument for recognizing the moral 
rights of animals is Regan’s Case.  Regan argues that insofar as humans have 
basic moral rights because they have desires, are sentient, and have futures, 
then at least certain animals must have similar rights as well. 
Humans have rights because we have intrinsic value; we are subjects 
of a life, with memories, hopes, goals, social lives, and so on. Insofar as we 
desire to pursue the interests that make our lives worth living, we have at 
least a prima facie moral right not to be interfered with as we pursue those 
interests. The most basic moral right is the right of an innocent individual not 
to be seriously harmed so that others may benefit. Regan, in sum, rejects 
utilitarian justifications of harm. Now, the fact that many animals have 
memories, desires, sentience, social lives, and so on, entails for Regan that 
they are also subjects of a life. Because they are subjects of a life, they have 
intrinsic value. And because they have intrinsic value, they have moral rights, 
including the basic one mentioned above. Animals, in short, may not be 
harmed in order to bring benefits to humans. 
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Regan puts this argument in different ways, sometimes emphasizing 
the notion that animals have interests. As we have already noted, interests 
come in two distinct varieties. Welfare-interests are interests of any and every 
living individual. Plants, for example, have welfare-interests in obtaining 
sufficient water and sunlight. The second kind of interests, preference-
interests, are restricted to conscious individuals. The paradigm of a conscious 
individual is a normal adult human with the ability to form and modify 
desires. Now, individuals with welfare-interests do not necessarily have 
moral rights. If they did, then we would have to grant moral rights to plants, 
bacteria, and the strep virus. That is counterintuitive. Every human, on the 
other hand--or at least every human with the ability to form and modify 
desires--has preference-interests. These interests are critical to our identity 
and, assuming that our desires are peaceful and involve no harm, we have at 
least a prima facie moral right to pursue them. When Regan formulates the 
animal rights theory in terms of interests, he is building on the idea that, all 
other things being equal, an individual with a preference-interest in doing x 
has at least a prima facie right to do x, so long as doing x harms no one.  
Adult mammals have preference-interests and many of these 
preference-interests are non-maleficent (that is, their satisfaction involves 
doing no harm to any sentient being). Insofar as animals have basic peaceful 
desires--to acquire food, water, shelter, companionship--then, according to 
the principle of fairness, these animals must have the analogous prima facie 
basic moral right that any human has in the human pursuit of these goods. 
Insofar as we recognize moral rights for humans on the basis of our being 
subjects of a life, having intrinsic value, or possessing preference-interests, 
we must also recognize moral rights for every individual who is the subject of 
a life, has intrinsic value, or possesses preference-interests. 
Regan believes that the consequences of the animal rights theory 
(AR) are radical, and he demands the end of the practice of raising and 
slaughtering of animals for meat, the end of hunting, of rodeos, and of zoos. 
Writing that “you don’t change unjust institutions by tidying them up,” he 
extends the implications of the theory to “the total abolition of the use of 
animals in science. “5 
To my mind, the strongest argument against Regan’s position is that 
of R. G. Frey.  Frey claims that animals cannot have moral rights because 
rights require interests, interests require language, and language requires 
concepts.  Frey denies that animals have concepts; therefore, animals cannot 
have language, interests, or moral rights. According to Frey, an individual 
must possess concepts in order to possess interests in the relevant sense 
because if one lacks concepts, one cannot represent anything to oneself. And 
if we cannnot represent anything to ourselves, how could we possibly take an 
interest in anything? Without concepts and language in which to formulate 
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them, we would have no conceptual tools by which to formulate, much less 
pursue, interests. 
Do pigs lack desires, concepts and language? When my uncle’s 
barrows and gilts lift the lids on their feeder bins, there is hardly a simpler or 
more efficient way of interpreting their behavior than to say that they desire 
to eat. When Hedgepeth’s piglets chase each other around the pasture, there is 
no better explanation than, “the pigs want to play.” The conceptual scheme of 
beliefs and desires is as apt an explanatory scheme for animal behavior as for 
human behavior. 
Assuming that pigs have beliefs and desires, the next question is 
whether they have concepts. If they believe that there is food under the lid, or 
that by hiding behind the tire they will surprise their buddies, then it would 
seem that they must possess concepts, because beliefs are made of concepts 
such as “food” and “over there.” If animals have concepts, then they may be 
capable of taking an interest in their activities. And if they can take an 
interest, they are at least potential bearers of something like a prima facie 
moral right to pursue their interests, assuming that they are not harming any 
other beings by so doing. 
  Frey is convinced that animals do not have concepts or language 
because they are not capable of making assertions or lying. It follows, 
according to Frey, that painless slaughter does not violate a pig’s right to 
continued existence because pigs, lacking concepts, cannot have language; 
lacking language, cannot have interests; and, lacking interests, cannot have 
moral rights. 
 This line of argument, if sound, would constitute a powerful 
philosophical justification for the historical practice of domesticating and 
eating pigs, and would buttress agrarian positions that emphasize ecological 
harmony and stewardship of nature. But there are two questions here: Must a 
being have language to have concepts? And, Do animals indeed lack 
language? 
 Consider the second question. As far we know, pigs do not have “the 
ability to make or entertain declarative sentences,” Frey’s way of interpreting 
what it means to have language. But pigs communicate with each other, and 
they can communicate with us in limited, distinctive, ways.6 Pigs, moreover, 
appear to many observers to reflect in a self-conscious way about their 
environment. Some, including me, think they have seen pigs trying to deceive 
each other.  Here is a reason for thinking that some vertebrates, at a 
minimum, have language. 
 But suppose that we are wrong in this judgment.  Suppose that pigs 
lack language; even so, they may still possess concepts. Here is an argument, 
suggested to me by my colleague Bill Robinson, showing that individuals use 
concepts even in the absence of language. 
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 To use a concept is to classify something, to represent a difference to 
yourself. One sign of the ability to represent a difference to yourself is the 
ability to exhibit reliable differences in your disposition to behave, reliable 
differences in behavior that are correlated with (other) differences in your 
environment. There are empirical ways to determine whether individuals 
without language are nonetheless capable of exhibiting reliable differences in 
their disposition to behave correlated with differences in the environment. To 
determine whether individuals lacking language are capable of exhibiting 
reliable differences in their disposition to behave correlated with differences 
in the environment we must observe their behavior and its correlation to the 
environment. Then we must determine whether differential dispositions to 
behave are correlated with differences in the individual’s environment. 
 Start with the human case. Assume that an otherwise typical adult, 
Jim, cannot talk about his behavior, not even to himself. Nonetheless, we 
notice that Jim sometimes waves his arms and points to his mouth and 
sometimes he does not. Upon examination, it becomes clear that when Jim is 
waving his arms and pointing to his mouth, he has not eaten for two hours or 
more. Anytime that he has eaten within two hours, he does not point to his 
mouth. 
 We can correlate Jim’s differential disposition to behave (waving or 
not waving) with a difference in his environment (having eaten or not having 
eaten). Differential behaviors we observe must be reliable differences as 
ascertained in a proper scientific way, for example, observed under the strict 
conditions of double blind observer experiments. That is, there must be no 
problem in telling that there is a difference in the individual’s behaviors.  
Lacking language, Jim nonetheless uses concepts to represent his hunger to 
himself and others. 
 We would not deny Jim basic moral rights, such as the right not to be 
deprived of food when he is hungry and there is plenty of food to give him. 
Why should we not apply this same analysis to animals that may lack 
language? There is ample empirical evidence that animals exhibit reliable 
differences in their dispositions to behave, and that these differential 
dispositions to behave are correlated with differences in their environment. 
Therefore, animals are capable of exhibiting reliable differences in their 
disposition to behave that are correlated with differences in the environment. 
It follows that animals are capable of representing differences to themselves. 
And it follows that animals are capable of using concepts, even if they lack 
language. 
 The upshot of this argument is that even if we grant Frey’s claim that 
animals lack language, it is still the case that they have the capacity to use 
concepts. And, as concepts are constituents of beliefs, and beliefs are 
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constituents of moral rights, then animals have the capacities needed to be 
bearers of moral rights. 
 If my claims about pigs’ mental states are correct; and if the moral 
principle that it is wrong to deprive a being of its right to life is defensible; 
and if I have made no mistakes in reasoning to the conclusion, then it may be 
wrong to deprive a pig of its right to life for a trivial reason. But how does 
respect for individual animals fit with an overall theory of environmental 
ethics? 
 
1.2  Animal Rights or Environmental Ethics? 
 
 Paul Taylor makes the attitude of respect for nature the basis of all 
moral reflection about the environment, and identifies four dimensions of that 
attitude. Two of them are relevant here. The first is the valuational 
dimension, “the disposition to regard all wild living things in the Earth’s 
natural ecosystems as possessing inherent worth.”7 The second is the 
affective dimension, “the disposition . . . to feel pleased about any occurrence 
that is expected to maintain in existence the Earth’s wild communities of life, 
their constituent species-populations, or their individual members.”8 
 Taylor believes we owe the attitude of respect toward wild living 
things. He avoids the language of animal rights, but he insists we follow the 
principles of proportionality and minimum wrong.  
 The first principle means that we should never act disproportionately, 
for example, violating an elephant’s basic interest in life simply to satisfy our 
nonbasic interest in having ivory carvings on our mantlepiece. “Greater 
weight is to be given to basic than to nonbasic interests, no matter what 
species, human or other, the competing claims arise from. Nonbasic interests 
are prohibited from overriding basic interests.”9  
 The second principle states that “the actions of humans must be such 
that no alternative ways of achieving their ends would produce fewer wrongs 
to wild living things.”10 From these two principles you may see how 
protective Taylor is of wildlife. His attitude toward domestic animals is less 
than clear, however. The reason is that Taylor is impressed by the fact that 
pets and food animals have been purposefully bred to serve a human purpose. 
Unlike wild animals whose existence does not depend on their fulfilling our 
needs, domestic animals exist only because we have exercised dominance 
over them and their environment.  
 Taylor puts the matter forcefully.  The practice of rearing food 
animals depends, first, he writes: 
 on total human dominance over nonhuman living things and 
their environment. Second, [it involves] treating nonhuman 
living things as means to human ends . . . The social 
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institutions and practices of the bioculture are, first and 
foremost, exercises of absolute, unconditioned power . . . When 
we humans create the bioculture and engage in its practices we 
enter upon a special relationship with animals and plants. We 
hold them completely within our power. They must serve us or 
be destroyed. For some practices their being killed by us is the 
very thing necessary to further our ends. Instances are 
slaughtering animals for food, cutting timber for lumber, and 
causing laboratory animals to die by giving them lethal dosages 
of toxic chemicals.11 
While Taylor does not explicitly draw the conclusion that it is morally 
permissible to continue to subdue nature in this way, this conclusion is 
implied in his remarks. Other environmental philosophers, including Callicott 
and Midgley, have a similarly bifurcated attitude toward animals.12 Wild 
animals should, other things being equal, be allowed to live unless they are 
being hunted for food.  Domestic food animals, on the other hand, are 
intended for slaughter. 
 
1.3  Have We Created the Domestic Hog? 
 
 It began to look as if my evaluation of Taylor’s environmental 
philosophy might cause me to overturn my decision against meat eating. If 
there is an absolute difference between wild and domestic animals, and if this 
difference means that wild animals have intrinsic value while domestic 
animals have only instrumental value for humans, then it might be 
permissible to raise and slay hogs and yet impermissible to kill wild wart 
hogs. To decide whether the difference between tamed and untamed was 
really this decisive, I had to read some animal science. Just how different are 
Minnesota Number Threes from wild boars? 
 I immediately ran into a problem. To my knowledge, there are no 
scientific studies comparing the physical or behavioral traits of specific 
domestic pigs with wild pigs. Nonetheless, on the basis of certain 
generalizations scientists have proffered in the literature on swine production, 
some observations about the difference can be offered tentatively.13 
 Wild pigs tend to have aggressive dispositions. They often live in 
herds of four to twenty foraging animals consisting of one or more adult 
females and their young. Boars range freely in forest settings throughout the 
year, staying close to the herd during the reproductive season, when they 
become territorial and protective. Omnivorous and voracious eaters, sows and 
boars alike spend the majority of their waking hours walking, rooting, and 
eating. The courtship of an oestrus female by a wild boar lasts several days, 
with the male grunting a soft rhythmic mating song and having to overcome a 
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last minute rebuttal from her when she wheels and faces him just before he 
tries to mount her. The wild sow may spend days making a nest for her 
young. The boar seems to enjoy the presence of piglets, tolerating them as 
they wiggle on top of him as he rests. 
 Domestic swine tend to be larger, less fatty, more docile toward 
humans and less agonistic toward each other. As you might guess, we have 
little information about how large a “domestic herd” might be because pigs in 
confinement are not allowed to form natural social groups. Boars are kept 
away from the sows, feeder pigs are thrown together according to age, and 
sows are kept in maternity pens before parturition and during nursing. Even 
though they are usually denied the space and freedom to form natural 
relations with other pigs, domestic pigs are still known to adapt rapidly to 
new conditions. They exhibit a high degree of intelligence and have, for 
example, been trained to hunt truffles and indicate targets like Pointer dogs. 
 The sexual relationships of confined pigs are noticeably different 
from their wild counterparts. When a sow in heat is presented to a boar, 
copulation occurs quickly. There is very little behavior corresponding to the 
long courtship of wild sows and boars, as domestic sows usually allow boars 
to mount immediately, and boars are selected, in part, for their virility and 
promiscuity. Boars kept away from sows sometimes form stable homosexual 
relationships. Their behavior toward young piglets is hard to observe for 
reasons noted above. 
 There are, in sum, significant differences between the physical, 
psychological, and social characteristics of domestic and wild pigs. Wild pigs 
tend to be smaller, fattier, more romantic, less promiscuous, and more 
ferocious. Domestic pigs tend to be larger, leaner, less romantic, eager to 
mate in season or out of season, and more docile. The differences stem from 
the influence of human intervention as farmers have consciously selected 
individual pigs for the traits now possessed by sows and boars. Breeders have 
weakened the pig’s natural defenses, and rendered them dumber, less agile, 
and more meaty, than their wild relatives. Differences are undeniable. And 
yet we may ask, how great are the similarities? Are the differences significant 
enough to justify claims that we have exercised “absolute power” over the 
domestic animals? 
 The differences in physical appearance of African bush pigs and 
Duroc hogs are noticeable, but both look more like the other than they look 
like other species. Both adapt quickly to changed environmental conditions. 
Both exhibit tremendous behavioral plasticity in the face of fluctuations in 
weather, diet, and physical threats. Both exhibit attitudes of defiance, pride, 
and affection. Both are extremely social. Both prefer not to leave the 
company of others, except for the case of older males, who sometimes prefer 
occasional solitude. Both like to root in soil and water, to wallow in 
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pools. Both exhibit distinctive territorial behavior, keep separate areas for 
elimination of urine and feces, and train their young to do the same. Both are 
curious about new objects, and will sniff and nibble any protrusion or hole. 
Both have a complex range of vocal snorts and whoofs for communicating a 
variety of emotions, signals, and alarms. Both have nearly identical olfactory 
and auditory capacities. Neither is able to regulate body temperature for at 
least two days after birth. Neither is receptive to newcomers to the herd. Both 
are gregarious animals, huddling together against cold weather and enjoying 
warm weather in close proximity.  
 The list could go on, but the point has been made; the differences 
between domestic and wild pigs pale in light of their similarities. May we 
then continue to believe that we have exercised “unconditioned” power over 
the being of the production hog? The scientific evidence fails to support the 
claim because the identity of the production hog is as much a product of 
natural forces as it is of human intervention. 
 May we at least claim responsibility for the distinctive features for 
which we have selected in our hogs? For example, domestic pigs are diurnal 
creatures whereas wild pigs sleep during the day and are active at night. Is 
this trait a human mark stamped on the pig? It may be, just as the sexual 
promiscuity, docility, and physical size of the domestic hog may be marks of 
human intervention. Still, we must ask whether these traits are really of our 
doing or whether they are not responses that may be equally attributed to the 
hog. Consider that domestic hogs tend to be diurnal creatures whereas wild 
hogs tend to be nocturnal (hunting is easier in the evening hours.) Did 
humans cause this difference? I doubt it. Hogs are highly adaptable creatures, 
and there is not much stimulation in hog pens at night. The domestic hog’s 
preference for daylight activity may be a tribute to their own plasticity of 
behavior, a trait caused as much by the pig’s own initiative as by the 
breeder’s selections. Being diurnal, in short, may be a learned response to 
environmental conditions, and it may be a characteristic pigs would abandon 
if turned out of their pens or if stimulated at night. This suggests that certain 
behavioral differences between domestic and wild species may not only not 
be permanent but may be reversible.14 
 Based on a review of the empirical differences between 
undomesticated and domesticated hogs, Taylor’s claim that we have created 
these animals seems weak, as does the implication that they are human 
artifacts we may regard as our tools.15 Today’s breeds are expressions of 
human power and control over nature, the result of invasive, repeated, and 
sustained manipulations of generations of animals. The Durocs and 
Hampshires and Yorkshires now on Mennonite family farms would almost 
certainly not be here were it not for humans. Hogs are part of our moral 
community in a way wild animals never have been because their evolution is 
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intricately connected with our own. They depend on us for their existence. 
But it does not follow that we are justified in continuing to intervene in their 
histories by encouraging them to inbreed, and by slaughtering their young. 
 If Taylor’s views about food animals are not entirely clear, other 
environmental philosophers’ views are clear. Midgley and Callicott seem to 
condone meat eating as part of the long history of relations between humans 
and domesticated animals. The view gains credence in light of the fact that 
the history of a being is relevant to deciding what that being is and what our 
natural duties are toward it. Consider Midgley’s view. She approaches ethics 
from a biosocial perspective, and points out that we are members of nested 
communities, each of which has a different structure. According to our 
various roles in the various communities, we have various duties. The central 
community for many of us is an immediate family. We have duties not only to 
feed, clothe, and shelter our children, but to bestow affection on them. 
Bestowing similar affection on our neighbors’ children is not similarly 
required of us, however. Not only is it not our duty, but, as Callicott observes, 
“it would be considered anything from odd to criminal” were we to behave 
toward neighborhood children the way we behave toward our own.16 At the 
next level, we have “obligations to [our] neighbors which [we] do not have to 
[our] less proximate fellow citizens--to watch their houses while they are on 
vacation, for example, or to go to the grocery for them when they are sick or 
disabled.” And then we have obligations to those in our state “which we do 
not have toward human beings in general, and we have obligations to human 
beings in general which we do not have toward animals in general.”17 
 These subtly shaded social-moral relationships are complex and 
overlapping. Thinking of animals, Midgley argues that pets are surrogate 
family members and merit treatment not owed either to less intimately related 
animals, for example, to barnyard animals, or to less intimately related human 
beings. Following Midgley’s biosocial line of thinking, the narrative history 
of each animal defines its identity. Since hogs have been bred to play a 
certain role in our community, our duties toward them derive from 
understanding what their role naturally is. 
 Like Midgley, Callicott argues that the welfare ethic of the mixed 
community enjoins us to leave wild or “willed” animals alone, while caring 
humanely for domestic species. This means that we are justified in using 
domestic animals in the ways they have been bred to be used. It is not 
inhumane to use a Belgian draft horse to pull a wagon, as long as you do not 
abuse her in the process. It is not inhumane to kill pigs and chickens and 
steers for food as long as you care for them in a way that does not violate the 
unspoken social contract we have evolved between human and beast.18 
 Reading environmental philosophy made me wonder whether my 
decision not to eat meat had been divorced from narratives, history, and 
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common sense, in the worst way. If the history and social role of a being 
plays a decisive role in determining what that thing is, and if today’s pigs 
would not be here if it were not for the long history of human intervention in 
the mating patterns of hogs, then the raising and slaughtering of pigs is the 
very practice necessary for Durocs, Hampshires, and Minnesota Number 
Twos to exist at all. Who was I to condemn these creatures?  
 Callicott seemed to press the point on me. Those who condemn meat 
eating thereby condemn the “very being” of the animals they are trying to 
defend. For without the long historical practice of meat eating, Callicott 
writes, these particular animals would not exist.  
 But must we condemn someone’s existence if we disapprove of the 
lifestyle they are forced by others to lead? To condemn the way someone is 
treated is not to condemn them. We condemn a life of forced prostitution 
without thereby condemning the prostitute. In the interest of the good of the 
prostitute, we condemn the power relationship that has come to restrict her 
freedom. Analogously, we can condemn the practice of domesticating and 
slaughtering pigs without thereby devaluing the existence of the pigs. 
 Having answered Callicott’s challenge, I went back to Taylor’s rigid 
differentiation between the respect owed wild animals and his quasi-
instrumentalist view of domestic animals. I discovered on second reading 
that, despite his dismissive attitute to food animals, he insists nonetheless on 
vegetarianism.19 His reason has nothing to do with the individual animal’s 
worth or rights, however.  It is based instead on an environmental principle of 
fairness, captured in the metaphor of sharing the earth.  Taylor draws 
attention to 
the amount of arable land needed for raising grain and other 
plants as food for those animals that are in turn to be eaten by 
humans when compared with the amount of land needed for 
raising grain and other plants for direct human consumption . . . 
In order to produce one pound of protein for human 
consumption, a steer must be fed 21 pounds of protein . . . [a pig 
must be fed] 8.3 pounds . . . [and a chicken] 5.5 pounds.20 
Taylor would have us return the land now in cultivation to grow grains for 
cows and pigs to wildlife refuge. 
 Taylor argues for vegetarianism on ecological grounds, lamenting the 
fact that humans have taken over much more than their fair share of the 
temperate regions of the globe. To return land to wild animals we should 
cultivate less ground, shrink our farms’ size, and concentrate them in local 
regions so as to leave larger tracts of wilderness. Thus, even though they are 
not grounded in the theory of animal rights, environmentalist reasons are 
offered by Taylor for abolishing the practice of meat eating. 
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1.4  Animal Rights as an Environmental Ethic 
 
 I still had two questions: Would it be wrong, if we pulled in our 
plows and chemical sprays and shared the earth equitably with other species, 
to eat an occasional future pig raised on a small nonfactory farm? And if in 
that ideal world some of us revert to hunting and gathering as a permanent 
lifestyle, would it be wrong for us to kill and eat one of the millions of wild 
pigs? 
 To answer this question, I went back to Taylor’s five priority 
principles. When the requirements of human ethics compete with those of 
environmental ethics, Taylor tells us to follow principles exhibiting the 
attitude of respect for nature. The fundamental criterion is fairness, read as 
species-impartiality. According to Taylor, both plants and animals deserve 
respect, even though neither one is a primary moral rights holder. The first 
priority principle is the principle of self-defense. 
 It is permissible for moral agents to protect themselves against 
dangerous or harmful organisms by destroying them (p. 264-
265). 
This principle “condones killing the attacker only if that is only way to 
protect the self.” We must “choose means that will do the least possible harm 
(pp. 265). 
 The second principle is the principle of proportionality, and it deals 
with conflicts “between basic interests [for example, food, water, and 
continued existence] of animals/plants and nonbasic interests [for example, 
air conditioned offices] of humans.” 
 Greater weight is to be given to basic than to nonbasic interests, 
no matter what species, human or other, the competing claims 
arise from. Nonbasic interests are prohibited from overriding 
basic interests (p. 278). 
This principle prohibits such practices as 
- Slaughtering elephants so the ivory of their tusks can be 
used to carve items for the tourist trade. 
- Killing rhinoceros so that their horns can be used as dagger 
handles. 
- Hunting and killing rare wild mammals, such as leopards 
and jaguars, for the luxury fur trade. 
- All sport hunting and recreational fishing (p. 274). 
 The third principle is the principle of minimum wrong. Like the 
second principle, it concerns conflicts “between basic interests of 
animals/plants and nonbasic interests of humans.” 
 The actions of humans must be such that no alternative ways of 
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achieving their ends would produce fewer wrongs to wild living 
things (p. 283). 
Plants and animals and humans have equal inherent worth, in Taylor’s 
estimation, but he recognizes that rational people may decide to engage in 
activities involving harm to wild living things. As long as these people are 
“rational, informed, and autonomous persons who have adopted the attitude 
of respect for nature,” then “it is permissible for them to pursue [their] values 
only so long as doing so involves fewer wrongs (violations of duties) than 
any alternative way of pursuing those values” (pp. 282-283). 
 Taylor’s fourth principle is the principle of distributive justice, and 
applies to “conflicts between basic interests, in which nonhumans are not 
harming us.” The cases in question, then, are cases where the principles of 
self-defense, proportionality, and minimum wrong do not apply. 
 When the interests of parties are all basic ones and there exists 
a natural source of good that can be used for the benefit of any 
of the parties, each party must be allotted an equal, or fair, 
share (p. 292). 
 The fifth principle is the principle of restitutive justice: 
 When harm is done to humans, animals, or plants that are 
harmless, some form of reparation or compensation is called 
for. The greater the harm done, the greater the reparation 
required (p. 304). 
Using these principles, I was able to answer my two questions. 
 Consider the second question first. If I lived in a place or a time 
where I could not survive without hunting wild goats and sheep, or fishing for 
tuna and whales, then it would be permissible for me to kill and eat those 
animals. Why? Because the first principle enjoins self-defense and, per 
hypothesis, the only way to protect myself from death under the 
circumstances would be to hunt or fish. As long as I kill in a way that respects 
the principles of fairness, minimum wrong, and proportionality, I will be 
justified in my carnivorous behavior. There is, Taylor sagely points out, no 
principle requiring me to sacrifice my life for the sake of animals. 
 Consider now the first question, whether raising and slaughtering 
animals would not be permissible in the ideal world, in the world where the 
number of humans and farms is dramatically reduced. If there were, say, only 
500 million of us instead of 5 billion, and only 50,000 small farms instead of 
half a million corporate farms, then other species might flourish. Under those 
conditions, couldn’t rational autonomous persons who have adopted the 
principle of respect for nature decide to raise pigs in such a way that the 
animals were allowed maximal freedoms and long unhurried lives? And 
wouldn’t it then be the case that those animals would be better off living that 
lifestyle than never having the opportunity to be born at all? 
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 This question is more difficult, but it seems to me that we should 
answer it negatively. The principle of self defense could not be enjoined to 
sanction such activity, because slaughtering the pigs in question, even toward 
the end of their lives, would not serve any basic interest of ours; we can get 
our protein elsewhere. The principle of proportionality also offers little 
support, because our nonbasic interest in enjoying a good set of barbecued 
back ribs is prohibited from overriding the pig’s basic interest in continued 
existence. The principle of minimum wrong would also argue against even a 
low level of meat eating, since there are alternative ways of achieving our 
interest in experiencing robust gustatory pleasures.  
 Careful consideration of the natural relations of all things and 
rigorous adoption of the attitude of respect for nature inclines strongly toward 
moral vegetarianism. And thus was I moved, against my personal convictions 
about the virtues of family farms, to think some higher mammals have mental 
lives roughly analogous to ours; that killing them for food, even in a painless 
fashion, does harm to them; and that I should stop having bacon for breakfast. 
 
1.5  Meat-eating as a mutual covenant 
 
 I want to say something against three arguments for meat eating.  The 
first two arguments can be dealt with briefly, but the third will call for 
extended discussion. 
 The first argument has been admirably formulated by Midgley and 
Callicott, among others, who claim that the domestication of animals is a 
mutual covenant evolved between animals and us. Our obligations to animals 
are therefore determined by our evolved relation with them. The idea here is 
that animals do not simply serve us; we have a contract to provide them with 
food, water, shelter, care, and comfortable lives. Some animals, such as our 
pets, are close to us, and we owe them more than we owe more distant 
animals. 
 But what is the responsibility of so-called food animals in this nested 
hierarchy of evolved relationships? To pay us back with their lives at an early 
age simply to satisfy our pleasure in eating their carcasses. The contract 
seems a bit one-sided. The argument would make more sense if it was 
generally understood to mean “Let the animals live in their natural social 
groupings, provide them with conditions under which they can pursue their 
interests, and let them live until a ripe old age before slaughtering them.”  
 But that is not the way the alleged covenant is generally understood. 
We squeeze hogs together into pens not large enough for them to establish 
their own area for defecating, we throw them together into new social 
groupings every few weeks, we control their reproductive cycles with 
manufactured drugs, and we kill them before they are six months old. If 
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the terms of the agreement were to support hogs into comfortable retirement 
and then take the carcasses of animals dying of natural causes for sausage, the 
covenant argument would be more persuasive.  
 
1.6  Killing as a spiritual practice 
 
 The second argument is that killing animals is permissible as long as 
we do it in the right way. Native Americans kill the buffalo with a tragic 
sense for the loss of its life, and they kill only the number they need. They 
either eat or use the entire animal, and they do all of this with a humble and 
grateful spirit, demonstrating respect for the harmony and balances of nature. 
 Is it permissible to kill and eat animals this way? Here Taylor’s 
response seems appropriate.  If it is a question of survival, if it comes down to 
my life or the buffalo, then the principle of self-defense justifies the killing. 
However, few people reading this book face such dire circumstances. 
  The third argument is that humans are morally superior to animals 
because we have a key characteristic animals lack: free will. This objection is 
powerful. 
 
2.  The Moral Irrelevance of Autonomy 
 
 Frey has argued that the possession of “moral rights” is not the line 
separating us from nonhuman animals. His reason is not that some animals 
are inside this line (he denies that any are), nor that some humans are outside 
it (he affirms that many are), but rather that the line itself is too fuzzy.21 Talk 
about moral rights, Frey explains, is unsupported by good arguments and is 
more successful as rhetoric than as philosophy.22 Frey is a utilitarian who puts 
little stock in general in the Kantian picture of morality. Consequently, he 
rejects the idea that any beings have moral rights. 
 In an article titled “Autonomy and the Value of Animal Life,” 
however, he argues that nonhumans lack moral standing not because they 
lack what no one possesses (moral rights).23 Rather, animals lack moral 
standing because they lack what all “normal adult humans” possess: 
autonomy, the ability to control or make something out of our lives.24 
 Why should Frey want to shift the burden of the case against animals 
onto the back of a concept traditionally associated in the most intimate way 
with that of moral rights? Because he finds it a far less ambiguous notion, not 
to mention a less controversial one. In the first sentence of the article he 
claims that autonomy has had “great stress” placed upon it: “in Anglo-
American society, [by] virtually every moral theory of any note.”25 Because it 
has received such stress by so many other theorists dealing with so many 
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other kinds of ethical issues, he believes that it may serve as the limiting 
concept for all inquiries into our moral duties toward animals. 
 Frey is not alone in focusing attention on this line; Regan’s case for 
animal rights puts as much weight on autonomy as Frey’s case against animal 
rights. Regan’s strategy is to try to show that adult higher mammals are 
autonomous in an important sense. Thus, Regan makes each of the following 
claims: that many animals “have preferences and have the ability to initiate 
action with a view to satisfying them;” that this constitutes “preference 
autonomy;” and that many animals, possessing such autonomy, must 
therefore be granted moral considerability.26 Regan does not agree with Frey 
as to where the line should be drawn, but he does agree that autonomy should 
play a crucial role in determining moral standing. 
 Frey is convinced that “the way is . . . open” to killing and eating 
beings that are not autonomous.27 Is he right? 
 Frey’s definition of autonomy is narrower than Regan’s 
understanding of autonomy as “preference autonomy.” It has three elements, 
the first of which is the freedom to act on our own behalf. Autonomy is “our 
desire to achieve things for ourselves,” to make “something of our lives,” the 
way a fledgling philosopher might want to succeed on her own rather than 
trying to ride on her famous husband’s coattails. To illustrate the point Frey 
tells of an academic acquaintance who was concerned that his untenured wife 
might not be promoted. The husband suggested that he write some 
publishable papers which she could take and revise and then submit to 
journals as her own. The woman was rightly insulted by the idea because she 
did not want to make something of herself by deceitfully using her husband’s 
work. She wanted to make something of herself by relying on her own talents 
and powers. She wanted to make something of herself. By rebuffing her 
husband’s attempt to intrude, the woman showed that she was not subject to 
control by paternalistic outside forces. She was free “of the coercive 
interference of others. “28 
 The second requirement is freedom from internal coercion. In order 
to pursue the ends we most cherish we must not only gain independence from 
the desires of outsiders but we must master our own desires as well. “A 
certain ordering” of life is necessary if an untenured professor is to “put 
herself in a position to be able to produce serious academic work.”29 If she 
does not control her minor impulses she will be pulled in so many directions 
that she will not be able to devote herself to the desire she desires most. Self-
government means that we are able to forego certain lower-order preferences 
(e.g., playing in a city basketball league) in order to pursue higher-order 
desires (e.g., making associate professor). Freyan autonomy requires 
“internal” as well as “external” freedom, the ability to make higher-order 
decisions about the relative importance of lower-order desires. 
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 The third requirement is to decide for oneself about the kind of life 
one wants to lead. The professor who successfully resists the intrusions of her 
husband and who successfully controls her less desirable desires may still be 
doing something she has not chosen. Suppose that she is working to be 
associate professor for no other reason than that her mother was a professor 
before her and her grandmother before that and she feels, for religious 
reasons drummed into her as a child, that she ought to do what her family 
wants. Frey would not call this woman autonomous because she is not 
pursuing a career she has chosen for herself. She is pursuing a plan of life 
that has been imposed upon her. Notice that she has all of the equipment 
needed to survey a range of possible plans and to select one for herself but 
simply has not used it. Instead, she has settled for doing the best she can in 
what she considers “the family’s” line of work. Freyan autonomy requires 
that we think rationally about the variety of conceptions of the good life, 
deliberately choose one, and consistently pursue it. 
 Being in control is central to Frey’s theory, as his example of a 
nonautonomous person shows. Imagine a successful businessman who longs 
to be a painter and yet continues to spend his energies perfecting his father’s 
business. Frey’s opinion of such a man is harsh, and he thinks many of us will 
“doubtless” be struck by how “weak” the man is. Frey puts the matter 
straightforwardly: “the real charge against this man is servility; he has 
allowed, for whatever reason, others to impose their conception of the good 
life upon him.”30 Here we see how much weight Frey attaches to the third 
requirement. You are not autonomous: if you have not selected a plan of life 
from a range of options; if you have not made up your mind about what you 
think the good life is; and, if you have not taken decisive action to pursue 
your conception of the good life. 
 Those who are not autonomous, Frey believes, are morally inferior to 
those that are autonomous. Denying that all humans have equal moral value, 
he asserts that the value of someone’s life is directly related to its quality.31 
Since he thinks that the quality of the moral life of a nonautonomous person 
is less than the quality of an autonomous person, Frey must also think that we 
would all be better persons morally speaking if we seized control of our lives, 
took matters into our own hands, and changed careers to pursue the one we 
most desire. 
 Frey does not address himself to some of the knottier questions raised 
by his analysis. Is autonomy intrinsically good or good as a means to another 
end? Frey seems to think that it is good in itself. But can’t we develop our 
autonomy at the expense of others? Couldn’t we strive to become more 
autonomous in order better to exploit others sexually or coerce them into 
unearned business favors? Nor does Frey tell us what to think about moral 
theories in which autonomy has not been heavily accented. Such theories may 
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not be part of something called “the” tradition of Anglo-American moral 
theory but they are undeniably part of the moral practices of many followers 
of the Land Ethic and other forms of moral environmentalism; Natural Law, 
Divine Command, and other religiously based theories; feminist and 
pragmatist perspectives; and aretaic theories. 
 Nor does Frey address in this article the most troubling question of 
all: Even if autonomy were demonstrated to be the line separating us from 
animals, would that justify cementing baboon heads into steel sleds and 
slamming them against walls? May we so treat any and every being that lacks 
autonomy? 
 However urgent these questions may be, they are not ones Frey sets 
out to answer in the present essay, and I will not pursue them here. Rather, 
the central claim of his paper is that autonomy is a property of the “normal 
adult human” and a necessary feature of the good life. It is this claim I wish 
to contest. Frey could mean it in one of two ways. He could intend it as a 
descriptive claim, that all “normal adult humans” just are autonomous. This 
would be an empirical judgment about the kinds of lives led by most people 
in the world. If this were Frey’s intent we would have to do some social-
scientific work to find out whether he was right. Lacking the results of such a 
study and basing my response only on my own experiences with what appear 
to me to be “normal adult humans,” I must nevertheless say that I find this 
view fantastic. The majority of “normal adult humans” I know are far from 
autonomous in Frey’s sense, and shortly I will try to describe a 
nonautonomous, morally valuable, person.32 
 But Frey might intend his claim, on the other hand, as a normative 
judgment--that all normal adults should be autonomous. This is more properly 
a philosophical judgment, and one with which I disagree. I do not believe that 
autonomous people necessarily live lives of higher moral quality than less 
autonomous folk and the person I will describe below will serve to show why 
I hold this view as well. 
 Assume that autonomy is, on the whole and all things considered, a 
good of one sort or another. In the absence of other considerations, it is better 
to have control over your life than not to do; better to have a life plan than not 
to have one; better to be internally free than to be tied up by your lesser 
desires; better to be externally free than to be hamstrung by others’ plans for 
you.33 Assume further that “the value of life is a function of its quality, its 
quality a function of its richness, and its richness a function of its scope or 
potentiality for enrichment.” And assume too “that many humans lead lives of 
a very much lower quality than ordinary normal lives, lives which lack 
enrichment and where the potentialities for enrichment are severely truncated 
or absent.”34 From these premises it does not follow, as Frey seems to assume, 
that beings who are not fully autonomous are beings who either lack 
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moral standing altogether or who would have a higher quality of life if they 
exercised more control over it. 
 To see the fallacy of the conclusion consider a normal adult human 
who lives a life of high moral quality but has never formulated a plan of life. 
George is a fifty-seven year old father of six who not only can “read, do 
higher mathematics, build a bookcase, [and] make baba ghanoush,” but who 
has driven a truck across country for twenty five years.35 Graced with superior 
counselling skills, George is an excellent conflict mediator, known for quietly 
but effectively intervening between tired colleagues in diners from coast to 
coast. He is adept at smoothing out the edges of a difficult way of life in ways 
that are no less significant for being nigh imperceptible. 
 George likes his job and is good at it. But he did not choose his 
career. While he finds some measure of fulfillment in being a driver, he 
would rather play golf semi-professionally and volunteer his time delivering 
meals to elderly folk around town. He hesitates to quit his job, however, 
because he fears losing seniority, a very good income, a measure of self-
fulfillment, and reasonably happy working conditions. Moreover, he does not 
really know how he would go about “changing careers” at this point, and he 
believes (almost certainly in error) that his wife and teen-aged children are 
not in a position to afford him that luxury. Above all else, George wants his 
children to be happy and his wife satisfied. His perception of their needs is 
more important to him than his other career desires. 
 Being a father is the activity that gives George the most satisfaction. 
But is this a deliberately chosen higher-order preference? Surely it is for 
some men, but this does not seem to be the right way to describe George. 
George is a reflective and skilled person who has shaped the lives of others in 
profound ways. But, as he says himself, his satisfaction in parenting is more 
instinctual than chosen. Raised in a rural area by conservative Catholic 
parents, George’s conception of the good life is more an inherited one than 
one he has deliberatively chosen from a menu. He never remembers having 
thought about, much less deliberately chosen, a “plan” of life. 
 Not only does George fail Frey’s three-fold criteria for being in the 
autonomy circle, but he does not want to try to get in. George has paid careful 
attention to the cultural conditions in which his children were raised and he is 
not at all certain that he approves. He has known for a long time how strongly 
they were encouraged from kindergarten on up to “find themselves,” to 
exhibit independence of thought, to formulate a rational life plan, to seek 
equality with others, to pursue their own happiness. Sometimes he finds this 
amusing because when he was growing up “you didn’t have all this agonizing 
over who you were and where your ‘relationships’ were going--you just 
found a woman, fell in love, and got married.” But other times he is 
profoundly disturbed by it. He fears that his children have been coerced by 
114                                                                           Gary L. Comstock  
  
their consumeristic culture into placing an overweening importance on their 
own successes, their own achievements. Being happy is their bottom line. 
When George was growing up, that was not the bottom line; it was caring for 
others. By allowing his children to chase autonomy has he also let them lose 
sight of the value most cherished by his father? 
 George is a full moral agent with immense talents in the areas of care, 
compassion, hospitality, fairness, discernment, responsibility, loyalty, and 
love. He exhibits, in short, an extremely high quality of moral life. Notice that 
he is by no means a “less” rather than “more” normal human, much less a 
marginal one. George is as normal a human as you can find. If he has any 
distinction, it is only that he is such a good person. Nevertheless, he has not 
selected a plan of life from a range of options; he has not made up his own 
mind about what the good life is; and he has not taken decisive action to 
pursue his conception of the good life. 
 George is a reflective, nonautonomous, saint. He does not have 
control over his life and, moreover, he is incapable of exercising control over 
his life. And yet the quality of his life is extremely high. Here is a man who 
falls outside of Frey’s circle. 
 To get a clearer picture of the type of individual I have in mind, 
consider four different types of saints.36 A saint is anyone who lives a self-
sacrificial life. A self-sacrificial life is one that consistently promotes the 
legitimate interests of others while, on occasion, acting contrary to legitimate 
interests of the self. Strongly autonomous saints act self-sacrificially because 
they want to act self-sacrificially. Mother Teresa of Calcutta not only has the 
ability to reflect critically on her desires but the freedom of will to change her 
way of life if she decides, one morning, to leave the poor and get into 
advertising. Weakly autonomous saints act self-sacrificially because they 
want to act self-sacrificially. Unlike the strong autonomous saint who 
energetically affirms and reaffirms her way of life, however, this saint is 
attracted to other conceptions of the good life. She is unable to switch 
directions because she lacks the willpower to act on her other desires. She 
continues to act self-sacrificially, but this is as much because of weakness of 
will as anything else. Both of these saints fit Frey’s depiction of what he calls 
normal adult humans. Both are autonomous. And the weakly autonomous 
saint would be better off if she were to take more control over her life. 
 Now consider two nonautonomous saints. The strongly 
nonautonomous saint acts wantonly in a self-sacrificial way. Like Felicité in 
Flaubert’s short story, “Un Simple Coêur,” this saint’s operative desire is 
always to relieve the suffering of others, but the desire to relieve suffering is 
not a desire she has chosen. What is more, this is not a desire she could 
choose, because nature and nurture have conspired against her to produce a 
person who lacks freedom of will. In Harry Frankfurt’s apt expression, 
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she “neither has the [will she] wants nor has a will that differs from the will 
[she] wants. “37 Driven by psychological and sociological forces beyond her 
control, Felicité just happens to be a saint rather than a sinner. 
 Weakly nonautonomous saints, like strongly nonautonomous saints, 
do not have the power to choose their self-sacrificial way of life. Their 
operative desires are out of their control, determined by powerful forces of 
behaviorial make-up, habit, and socialization. Unlike the strongly 
nonautonomous saints, however, these persons are conscious of the forces 
shaping their lives and are capable of reflecting on their desires. They are 
sometimes disposed, like George, to want a different way of life. 
Unfortunately, they lack the willpower to act on these desires. Like the 
weakly autonomous saint, the weakly nonautonomous saint is not always 
happy with the fact that he is a truck-driving saint instead of a golf pro. 
 George is a reflective, weakly nonautonomous, saint. His will is not 
free, and yet he is a powerful man, having shaped the lives of those around 
him in profound and lasting ways. His children, his students, his wife, his 
brothers and sisters, his colleagues on the road--all will tell you how dramatic 
George’s influence has been. George may be nonautonomous, but he 
nevertheless exercises tremendous power over others, and he does it for their 
good. 
 I want to make it clear that when I deny that women like Felicité and 
men like George have autonomy I am not asserting that they are inferior. To 
lack autonomy constitutes no reason to downgrade a person’s value. The 
problem here is that we are trained to interpret “nonautonomy” as a negative 
judgment about someone’s character when autonomy, in this context, should 
be a descriptive rather than a normative term. No one would accept a 
definition of autonomy according to which they did not qualify as 
autonomous. But if in principle no one can fall outside our definition, then 
the concept is useless. In order to presume that most adults are autonomous, 
we must be at least willing to grant that some are not autonomous. 
 So, George is weakly nonautonomous. But if Frey is right that the 
way is open to killing and eating nonautonomous beings, then we would be 
justified in killing and eating George. That seems wildly counterintuitive. 
 Frey might try to save his thesis by denying one of two things about 
George. He might try to deny that he is a normal adult human. By putting him 
in the class of severely brain damaged infants--and cows--he could simply 
assert that I have not chosen a typical human being as my example. This 
response is very weak. If George is not a normal adult human then I do not 
know one. We may safely assume that Frey will not try this route of escape. 
 More plausibly, Frey could try to deny that George lives a life of high 
moral quality. Such an argument might go as follows. While George has 
many wonderful qualities and is certainly a normal human, his life would 
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nonetheless be better, morally speaking, if he were to exercise more of his 
free will. By leaving his job and becoming a golfer he could continue to 
exercise his fathering and nurturing skills but in an environment he had 
chosen for himself. On this interpretation, George would not qualify as a 
counterexample to Frey’s view at all. Instead, he would serve to reinforce the 
importance of autonomy as a measure of morality, being one more example 
of the truth of the claim that a life with less autonomy is of lower quality than 
a life with more of it. 
 But this response begs the question. We could only determine that 
George’s life was inferior because nonautonomous if we already knew that a 
nonautonomous life was by definition inferior. Whether one can have moral 
standing and be nonautonomous is precisely the question we have set out to 
answer.  We cannot justifiably answer it by reformulating it as an assertion. 
 Both of these descriptions are true: 
 (1) George has moral standing. 
and 
 (2) George is nonautonomous. 
Because (2) is true, George falls below the line Frey has drawn. That shows 
the irrelevance of autonomy as the line for deciding whether or not the way is 
open to killing and eating beings who do not measure up to it.  
 Let us now apply this view of animals to the case of transgenics. 
 
3.  Should we genetically engineer hogs? 
 
Transgenic animals are animals into whose DNA humans have 
inserted a foreign gene, a gene from a source other than the animal’s natural 
parents. The first transgenic mammal was produced by Palmiter in 1982, who 
injected a growth hormone gene from a rat into the chromosome of a mouse.38 
The resultant animal expressed the rat gene and quickly grew to twice its 
parents’ size.39 Mice have served as the transgenic mammalian species of 
choice. By introducing an activated oncogene sequence taken from humans, 
for example, scientists have produced transgenic mice with an increased 
propensity for developing neoplasms. The resultant mouse is a scientific 
model of human disease, fit for experimental inquiry. Mice are chosen 
because they are extensively studied warm blooded mammals with extensive 
physiological and genetic similarities to humans; because they reproduce 
quickly; because they are relatively inexpensive and easier to handle than 
larger animals; and because there is little public resistance to using them in 
research. 
Scientists are becoming adept at manipulating mice molecular 
structures. The oncomouse, genetically modified so as to develop malignant 
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tumors, is not atypical. Labs around the world possess a variety of mice that 
possess susceptibility to diseases of scientific interest. The mice have been 
produced either through natural or chemically induced mutation, or through 
genetic engineering. Life magazine presented photographs of some of them in 
a 1995 issue.40 
 
C3HeB/FeJ, “known as the shiverer, has a condition similar to MS 
[multiple sclerosis]. A genetically caused deficiency in the myelin 
protein that sheathes nerve cells makes the mouse tremble whenever 
it tries to move. “ 
 
NOR2/LtDn is “blind from a defect in its optic nerve” and “is used to 
hunt for the genes causing cataracts, glaucoma and retinitis 
pigmentosa. “ 
  
c57BL/6J, “called a tubby . . . has an abnormal fat-triggering gene. 
Recently, scientists ... found that the gene makes a hormone called 
leptin, which may cause excessive weight gain, America’s most 
common disease. “ 
 
WLHR/Le “begins to lose its coat 10 days after birth. Scientists hope 
studying [the mouse] may yield clues to rare forms of hair loss in 
humans. “ 
 
 Mice and rats are the preferred species for genetic research and 
testing because they are small, easy to handle, breed, and house.  Mice grow 
and mature rapidly, and a female mouse will produce a dozen baby mice 
every three months.  The natural life-span of a mouse is only three years, 
making it relatively easy to study the course of a disease from start to finish. 
And the physiological system of the mouse is massively similar to that of the 
human.41  
In addition to using rodents, researchers are exploring the 
possibilities of using larger mammals to produce food and pharmaceuticals, 
and, in a procedure known as xenotransplantation, spare organs for humans. 
Transgenic farm animals (TFAs) are animals used for food, fiber, 
pharmaceuticals or organs into whose DNA humans have inserted a foreign 
gene. Scientists have produced at least one transgenic animal in each of the 
following species: cattle, sheep, chickens, rabbits, fish, and goats.  
The most famous TFAs are doubtless the Beltsville hogs, produced 
by Dr. Vernon Pursel and colleagues at the U. S. Department of Agriculture 
Research Station at Beltsville, Maryland, in 1985.42 Nineteen transgenic 
swine with human growth hormones lived through birth and into maturity. 
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Experimenters successfully microinjected the piece of DNA encoding the 
production of human somatotropin into the nucleus of a fertilized pig egg. 
The extracted embryo was reimplanted into a sow’s uterus, the pregnant 
animal came to term, and the first piglet in history with a human gene was 
born. 
The Beltsville research program was not aimed at producing hogs 
twice the size of their parents but at producing more cost effective swine, pigs 
that would convert grain into lean meat faster than their parents while eating 
proportionately less grain. Such animals would be a boon to certain sectors of 
the agricultural economy, including most of the pork industry, some hog 
farmers, and many meat consumers. The industry might cut costs by 
slaughtering fewer animals per pound of meat; farmers might reduce 
expenditures on feedgrains while continuing to sell the same amount of pork; 
and consumers might benefit from industry and farm savings passed on to 
them at the meat counter. 
Nineteen transgenic swine lived through birth and into maturity. 
Several expressed elevated levels of the growth gene, but none grew more 
quickly or to greater size than their counterparts in the control group.43 
However, many suffered from “deleterious pleiotropic effects,” medical 
problems not afflicting the controls.44 Those animals developed abnormally 
and exhibited deformed bodies and skulls. Some had swollen legs; others had 
ulcers, crossed eyes, renal disease, or arthritis.45 Of 29 founder pigs, 19 
expressed either human growth hormone or bovine growth hormone. Among 
those exhibiting long-term elevated levels of bGH, health was generally poor. 
Many seemed to suffer from decreased immune function and were susceptible 
to pneumonia. All were sterile. Later, Pursel would write that “the pigs had a 
high incidence of gastric ulcers, arthritis, cardiomegaly, dermatitis, and renal 
disease,” concluding that if transgenic swine were to be produced as 
successfully as transgenic mice, “better control of transgene expression, a 
different genetic background, or a modified husbandry regimen” would be 
required.46 
These TAs and TFAs have obviously been caused to suffer, and those 
who believe in animal rights may feel a special sense of outrage at the 
experiments. When showing slides of these mice and hogs to audiences, I 
have discovered that even those who do not believe in animals rights are 
unsettled by the lengths to which we have now gone in treating animals like 
computer desktops, molded to suit our interests. 
Are we justified in producing transgenic animals? Our answer will 
probably turn on our answer to three related questions. Do individual adult 
nonhuman mammals have interests, in a morally relevant sense? If so, is it 
prima facie wrong, in the same way if not to the same degree, to deprive an 
animal of living conditions in which its basic biological needs can be 
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met, just as it is prima facie wrong to deprive humans of living conditions in 
which their basic biological needs can be met? And, how important to society 
is efficient production of livestock? 
Take the last question first. New and more efficient techniques for 
the production of market hogs could have substantial economic benefits, 
including, a national hog population bred to convert feed into meat with great 
efficiency; hog breeders, farrowers, finishers, and consumers reaping 
financial benefits from the animals’ efficient digestive tracts; and, 
comparative economic advantages for American farmers facing competition 
from other countries. Notice that the gain in social utility here is not simply a 
gain in productivity, but a gain in the efficiency of the use of resources, 
including human and plant resources as well as animal resources. Depending 
upon how heavily we weigh such gains, we might believe the gains will 
outweigh the costs associated with the suffering of the nineteen transgenic 
swine. 
But will they? How do we decide how much weight to assign to the 
animals’ pain? 
Start with an easier case. Suppose the experimental animals in 
question were human beings. Imagine that the only way to achieve the 
financial gains was to transfer swine growth hormone genes into fertilized 
human embryos, implant the embryos in women, bring the embryos to term, 
raise the resultant nineteen children to maturity, and then transfer the 
children’s somatotropin genes back into the swine. Suppose further that the 
children in question had sickly malformed bodies analogous to the bodies of 
the Beltsville hogs. Clearly, the social benefits in this case, even if they were 
dramatic and sustained, could not be permitted to outweigh the costs. Any 
who would entertain the possibility that the pain and suffering of children 
may be justified by gains in economic efficiency of pork production is 
morally callous, or worse. We should not bring children into the world to use 
as means to economic ends, so experimenting on human embryos, without 
knowing what effects the procedures will have on the children the embryos 
will become, is at least irresponsible. 
We should not approve a line of reasoning that would justify the 
production of Beltsville humans because of economic gains in agricultural 
production efficiency. Of course, you may object, the experimental animals 
are hogs, not humans, and it is not apparent that we owe hogs what we owe 
humans, namely, the duty not to be treated as economic pawns. By way of 
response to this objection, I start with the obvious fact that all living things 
have basic biological needs (BBNs). BBNs vary by species and, perhaps, 
even by individual. But in all cases, BBNs are needs that must be met if an 
individual’s welfare is not to be thwarted. 
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What are some typical human BBNs? To be able to ingest sufficient 
amounts of uncontaminated protein and water without undue pain; to be able 
to eliminate bodily wastes without wasting half the day doing it; to be able to 
maintain sufficient psychological equilibrium that we are able to fall asleep at 
night; to have access to sufficient open space that we can accelerate our heart 
rates to one hundred odd beats per minute for half an hour three times a week; 
to possess a backbone and neck muscles strong enough that our heads do not 
need external support; to have an immune system not vulnerable to common 
air borne viruses. 
If we are born with a medical condition that deprives us of the ability 
to have one of our basic needs met, we are the worse-off for it, but we cannot 
necessarily say someone has harmed us. If, on the other hand, our unfortunate 
condition is the result of someone’s having injured or deprived us, or having 
injured the fertilized egg we once were, then the offending person has harmed 
us, done us a moral wrong. 
Call this principle (1): 
 
(1) It is (morally) wrong to deprive an individual, S, of 
something they must have if their BBNs are to be met. 
 
Notice that it is S who is wronged by the offending action, and not someone 
or something else. This means that the principle can only apply to beings 
with a welfare that may be promoted or harmed. There are, of course, many 
things in the world without welfares, and such things cannot be directly 
harmed. Examples include natural objects like mountains and piles of sand, 
and human artifacts like bridges and computer printers. You might harm the 
owner or user of these things by mishandling the object, but you cannot harm 
the object, because natural objects and artifacts do not have a good of their 
own. So (1) does not apply to things, because things are not individuals, do 
not have biological needs, lack intrinsic value, and have no good or welfare 
of their own. 
Individuals are animated beings, beings that exhibit goal-directed 
behavior in which the goal or principle of movement is internal to the being. 
Humans are individuals, but fingers are not; hogs are individuals, but a serum 
with hog growth hormone in it is not; tomato plants are individuals, but their 
fruit is not.  
Here an obvious problem with (1) surfaces. If the principle were true, 
we could not justifiably sever the head of a cabbage from its root in order to 
eat it. So doing would deprive an individual S, the cabbage, of something S 
needs in order to have its basic biological needs met.47 I trust our common 
intuition here, that killing cabbages in order to feed ourselves is morally 
permissible and, more generally, that there are many individuals, 
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including all onions and cabbages, toward which we do not possess even a 
prima facie duty not to deprive them of things they need to have their BBNs 
met. 
What distinguishes individuals that may be killed from individuals 
who may not be killed? Previous arguments in this chapter point toward this 
answer: having a future, meaning the capacity to take an interest in, and to 
accomplish, things yet undone. I understand “the capacity to take an interest” 
in the way many others have: S has the capacity to take an interest in X if and 
only if S has feelings of well-being that may be affected by X.48 Obviously, 
cabbages are not conscious in this sense, because they lack feelings. 
Cabbages lack feelings because they lack the hardware necessary to have 
feelings, namely, a brain, central nervous system and sensory receptors. 
Lacking feelings, they lack the capacity to take an interest in things in their 
future, or even to have a future.  
Thus, individual A in the plant kingdom may justifiably be deprived 
of something it must have if its BBNs are to be met because, even though that 
individual has BBNs, it does not have consciousness. Having no future, it 
cannot be harmed by depriving it of a future.49 
We must amend (1), therefore, to accommodate the claim that it is 
not always prima facie morally wrong to kill individuals. I offer, then, (2): 
 
(2) It is prima facie (morally) wrong to deprive a conscious 
individual with a future of the things it must have if its BBNs are 
to be met. 
 
Combining (2) with 
 
(3) The Beltsville experiments deprived individual hogs of things 
they need to have their BBNs met, 
 
and (2) and (3) with (4): 
 
(4) Hogs are conscious individuals with futures, 
 
we arrive at this conclusion (5): 
 
(5) It was prima facie (morally) wrong to deprive the Beltsville 
hogs of the things they needed to have their BBNs met. 
 
Some will want to contest (4), and argue that pigs either are not 
conscious, or do not have a future, or both. If pigs are more like computer 
desktops or bridges than they are like children, then we can no more harm a 
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pig by unintentionally breeding it to have a bad body than we can harm a 
bridge by unintentionally designing it to lack earthquake sustaining power.  
But pigs are clearly different from bridges, not only because they can 
move themselves around, experience pain and pleasure, and lead social lives, 
but because there are things pigs must have in order to have their BBNs met. 
If a pig’s bone structure is unable to bear its weight; if its sensory systems are 
unable to give it reliable information; if its immune functions fail to protect it 
from common diseases; then the pig will lead a deprived life, unable to 
engage in the goal directed behaviors characteristic of its species. It will, 
variously, not be able to eat or mate or root or play with or care for its young 
or establish a social order or investigate its environment. The pig itself will 
fare poorly if it does not have the things it needs to have its BBNs met. If 
scientists engineer pig embryos that develop into individuals with deformed 
bodies or poorly developed brains, they have harmed the pig. Whether they 
do this intentionally or unintentionally should bear on how much culpability 
we assign to the scientists, but it should not affect the question of whether the 
pigs themselves have been harmed. So this objection to (4) fails. 
Again, one might grant that pigs are individuals and have BBNs, but 
insist that pigs are unable to take an interest in anything that may affect their 
future well-being. If so, then they, like cabbages, are not conscious 
individuals, and so cannot have a right not to be deprived of things they need 
to have their BBNs met. I believe this criticism is wrong, and I will argue that 
pigs are able to take an interest in some things. But I want to avoid the 
language of animal rights, because the tradition of rights talk is inimical to 
the sort of moral attitudes I wish to encourage. Rights talk encourages us to 
think of the moral sphere as an arena of atomistic units warring with each 
other to defend turf against invaders. I want to encourage views of the moral 
sphere in which individuals are construed more interdependently, engaged in 
projects that are more cooperative than competitive. 
I have a difficult problem in avoiding the individualism of rights 
language without tearing down the legal and philosophical fence around 
individuals which rights language has so admirably erected. I think the way to 
do this is to try to show that the notion that “it is wrong to deprive a being 
that can take an interest in having its BBNs met of the things it needs to have 
its BBNs met” is a primitive notion. That is, while you can give examples of 
the wrong that obtains when an individual is deprived, you can do nothing 
more by the way of giving reasons that it is wrong than telling stories. There 
is no further justification that can be offered for why it is wrong to deprive an 
individual but, fortunately, there is no further justification needed. 
Ethical reflection means giving reasons for our judgments. When we 
say some action is wrong, others are justified in asking us why we think that. 
When we give a reason, that reason may be formulated as a general 
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moral principle. But our partners may want to know why that principle is 
true, and may justifiably ask us to ground our reasons for our decisions in 
some more basic, ultimately vindicating, reason. The work of ethics proceeds 
this way, with claims being grounded in reasons, and reasons in principles, 
and principles in theories. 
But the dialectic of ethics does not go on forever; at some point we 
reach the ultimately vindicating ground of our reasoning. When we reach this 
ground, others will ask us why we rest on that ground, and we may be 
tempted to try to provide a reason. We should resist this temptation, because, 
if we have truly reached bedrock, there is nothing further for us to say. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein once remarked that the most difficult part of 
justification in philosophy is to recognize a justification as a justification, 
and to stop. 
 Actions which are properly categorized as wanton destruction of 
innocent humans for trivial reasons is such a stopping place. Assuming that 
we have a true case of such heinousness, we need not think we must offer 
further justification for why we believe a heinous action to be a stopping 
place.  Here is a true case:  riddling my nephew with bullets merely to try out 
the recalibrated sight on my automatic weapon.  Such actions are always and 
irredeemably evil, and we need not consider the arguments of someone who 
wants to try to argue that this act is morally justifiable. 
 We must, of course, listen to arguments that try to justify the killing 
of humans for non-trivial reasons, such as in cases of self-defense, war, and 
the punishment of criminals. If I am shooting my nephew out of self-defense, 
that is another case than the one described above and open, perhaps, for 
potential justification.  But we need not try to reason with the person who, 
simply for the sake of argument, wants in bad faith to defend truly wanton 
cruelty. 
 The question before us is whether the killing of animals for food 
qualifies as a stopping place.  Clearly not.  We must take seriously the 
arguments of those who think we are justified in eating animals. My point is 
only this. As we reason about vegetarianism, we need not reason about the 
justification of trivial killing of humans. 
 My claim is not that the obligation not to kill animals for food is 
unarguable and on all fours with the obligation not to kill innocent humans 
for trivial reasons.  My claim is that this obligation may be overridden by 
other obligations, but it may not be lightly overridden. A preference-interest 
for the taste of meat when other sources of nutrition are easily and cheaply 
available, is not in my judgment a weighty preference-interest. 
 Some hold that killing for trivial reasons is not wrong if it involves 
killing a being that has only brief, short-term, desires. Ruth Cigman, for 
example, holds that killing is wrong only insofar as the victim is capable of 
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having what she calls “categorical desires,” desires in which the victim is not 
“blindly clinging on to life,” but in which it also “possesses the related 
concepts of long-term future possibilities, of life itself as an object of value, 
of consciousness, agency and their annihilation, and of tragedy and similar 
misfortunes. “50 Humans are able to have these sophisticated concepts and 
desires, and death harms them by depriving them of their categorical desires. 
 I have argued that the mere having of desires is sufficient to establish 
a moral right not to be blocked for trivial reasons from pursuing those desires. 
It does not matter whether the desires in question are long-term, categorical, 
desires, such as wanting to see one’s daughter graduate, or short-term, humble 
desires, such as wanting to continue stroking a baby’s hair as she falls asleep. 
We have a basic moral right not to have others interfere with our preference-
interests, basic or trivial, so long as their satisfaction does not conflict with 
the welfare of another desiring creature.  
 We can now articulate more carefully the wrongness in killing a cow 
to eat it when our basic interests do not depend on it. In killing a cow, we 
deprive it of the ability to pursue whatever is its current preference-interest.  
We deprive it of the ability to do what it wants to do in the future, say, to 
finish chewing its cud or to cross to the other side of the pasture to drink. In 
killing mammals, we deprive them of their future, of their ability to finish 
doing whatever they now want to do, say, stroking their offspring’s hair as 
she falls asleep. 
 The reason the Beltsville hogs were tampered with at the embryonic 
stage was to produce brave new pigs that would grow more quickly to 
slaughter weight, and the purpose of much TFA research is to produce 
animals to be killed for meat. What is wrong with this research is not that it 
involves gene splicing but, rather, that it is aimed at morally objectionable 
goals. 
 I can tell you why I think hogs are individuals, and I can tell you why 
I think harming innocent individual humans by depriving them of the basic 
things they need is morally wrong, and I can give you examples of cases I 
think involve wanton harm to humans and I can tell you why I think hogs are 
innocent in ways analogous to humans. But I cannot tell you why I think 
harming innocent humans for trivial reasons is morally wrong. If you tell me 
that you see no moral wrong in wantonly harming humans, I have three 
responses open to me. I can first ask you if you are serious, and try to decide 
whether I think you are speaking in good faith. If I decide you are serious, I 
can, second, tell you stories of deprivation. If after several rounds of stories, 
told in increasingly graphic detail, I decide that you are still serious, then 
what option do I have other than to worry that you may not have been brought 
up in the right way, and that you may be dangerous? 
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My claim is that the following idea is a primitive notion, which 
reasonable persons, once they understand it, must accept it: “To harm an 
individual human by depriving it of things it needs to have its BBNs met is 
prima facie morally wrong.” If I am correct, then we can use the idea of 
primitive notions in place of rights talk. That is, wherever philosophers have 
justifiably ascribed a basic “right” to r of some individual, I want to say that 
reasonable persons brought up correctly, who understand what it would mean 
to deprive the individual of r, also understand and accept the primitive notion 
that “depriving the individual of r is prima facie morally wrong.” And that is 
all we can say, or need to say, about the matter. 
 
 
If the argument about primitive notions works, we can offer strong 
protections for individuals without recourse to rights talk. And that would 
allow us to show why we have strong duties not to deprive conscious beings 
of things they need to have their BBNs met. As Tooley has shown, you 
cannot have a right to something unless you are capable of taking an interest 
in it.51 You cannot take an interest in something unless you are conscious. 
Thus, only conscious beings, a subset of the class of all individuals, are 
candidates for the strong protections traditionally formulated in rights 
language. So it remains to say why we should extend this primitive moral 
notion to other vertebrates.  
My reason for thinking hogs can take an interest in something is the 
same as my reason for thinking my four-month old daughter can take an 
interest in something. In my daughter’s case, my belief is based on inferences 
drawn from observations of her behavior. I remember watching Krista’s eyes 
follow a mobile slowly turning over her crib. Her lids would open slowly 
after her nap, wander around the room, and then fix on the motions above her. 
I surmised she was “taking an interest” in the mobile because her eyes would 
sometimes stray toward me, but she would shut out the distraction, even as I 
strained to get her attention, focusing once again on the revolving colors. 
In the hog’s case, my belief is based on similar inferences. I say to 
my uncle, an Iowa farmer, “That old sow really took an interest in the tire we 
threw in there.” When I say “took an interest,” I mean it in exactly the same 
sense as when I apply it to my daughter. Consider the behavioral signals each 
gives; the level of visual and mental focusing going on; and the kinds and 
grounds of inferences I make on the basis of those signals. All of these things 
are identical in the two cases. I see the hog’s eyes open as the tire sails in; I 
see the animal slowly rise to face the foreign object; I watch as he cautiously 
approaches it, snorting and backing at irregular intervals. I surmise, as I watch 
him spend the rest of the morning intently nosing the tire treads, oblivious to 
me and to his pen mates, that his attention has been captured by the tire. What 
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more simple or elegant or efficient explanation is there than to say, “the pig 
has taken an interest in” the object? 
 Being the crux of the argument, this point bears underscoring with 
other examples. Boars can take a monogamous interest in a single gilt coming 
into heat; in a knot hole knocked through a pine board; in the bristles of 
another pig’s back. They can take an interest in people, and they can, if the 
Hollywood animal trainer Frank Inn is to be believed, take an interest in 
ignoring people. Inn reportedly said: 
You can force a dog, a chimp or a horse to do something, but a 
pig, no. Pigs won’t take punishment. Reprimanding will work 
with a dog, but with a pig, never. If you reprimand a pig he 
won’t like you, won’t respond to you and won’t even take food 
from you. You can see temper in pigs. If I scold them, they scold 
right back.52 
 If an individual has the capacity to take an interest in something, it 
must be capable of losing interest in something, too. We usually lose interest 
when we become bored, when the thing occupying our attention no longer 
intrigues us. That happens when something that once intrigued us no longer 
presents new opportunities or facets to our imagination. Our imaginations, of 
course, are not infinitely plastic, and the things that will continue to engage 
our fancy over a long period of time fall within limits drawn by our genetic 
background, social upbringing, and professional training. 
 Pigs can lose interest in things. In one experiment, hogs were trained 
to carry coins from one end of their pen to the other and to deposit them in a 
bank. Researchers found that the animals quickly progressed to a stage where 
the animals would carry four or five coins before needing reinforcement. As 
they put it, “pigs condition very rapidly” or, as we might more accurately put 
it, pigs have a tremendous capacity for becoming interested in things. 
 Being intelligent, pigs also have a high threshold of boredom. Unless 
a new object or behaviorial stimulus has some relationship to the basic wants 
and drives of the animal, we might predict that the pig’s interest will wane. In 
a development that could only have surprised scientists committed to a 
behaviorist paradigm, that is what happened in this case. After a period of 
several weeks, the experimental animals stopped performing the chore they 
had been “conditioned” to do. 
This particular problem behavior developed in pig after pig, 
usually after a period of weeks or months, getting worse every 
day. At first the pig would eagerly pick up one dollar, carry it to 
the bank, run back, get another, carry it rapidly and neatly, and 
so on, until the ratio was complete. Thereafter, over a period of 
weeks the behavior would become slower and slower. He might 
run over eagerly for each dollar, but on the way back, 
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instead of carrying the dollar and depositing it simply and 
cleanly, he would repeatedly drop it, root it, drop it again, root it 
along the way, pick it up, toss it up in the air, drop it, root it 
some more, and so on.53 
The researchers described the pig’s actions as “problem behavior” resulting 
from a breakdown in “conditioning.” We might describe it more accurately by 
calling it a natural loss of interest in objects and stimuli not consistent with 
the pig’s basic biological needs and wants. The pigs, being pigs, were more 
interested in rooting the coins than in putting them in the bank.  
 The behaviorists’ conclusion bears citing: 
We thought this behavior might simply be the dilly-dallying of 
an animal on a low drive. However, the behavior persisted and 
gained in strength in spite of a severely increased drive--he 
finally went through the ratios so slowly that he did not get 
enough to eat in the course of a day. Finally it would take the pig 
about 10 minutes to transport four coins a distance of about 6 
feet. This problem behavior developed repeatedly in successive 
pigs . . . (We concluded] that these particular behaviors to which 
 the animals  
drift are clear-cut examples of instinctive behaviors having to do 
with the natural food getting behaviors of the particular 
species.54 
To call the pigs’ behavior “instinctive” begs the question whether the animals 
are beings with mental powers comparable to those of, say, a human two-year 
old. An alternative explanation is that the hogs’ behaviors were clear-cut 
examples of this species’ ability to take an interest in, and then to lose interest 
in, novel environmental conditions. In saying this, we can use the phrase, 
“take and lose interest in,” in exactly the same sense as when we apply it to 
very young children. 
My two-year old “has a future” because she takes an interest in things 
and can interact with her world so as to shape it to her desires.  She can learn. 
She can figure out how to get things she wants. Pigs can similarly take an 
interest in things, interact with their world so as to shape it to their desires, 
learn, and figure out how to get things they want. A pig, in sum, has a future. 
They not only have BBNs; they also have welfare, goods of their own that 
may be promoted or thwarted. It is a primitive notion that it would be morally 
wrong to harm a human infant by depriving it of the things it needs to have its 
BBNs met. Is it not also a primitive notion that it is morally wrong to harm a 
pig by depriving it of things it needs to have its BBNs met? 
 There is a difference between killing an animal for a trivial reason 
and killing it for a good reason. Suppose that a scientist wanted to do research 
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that would produce transgenic animals in order to save human lives. Should 
we allow such an experiment? 
 Let us once again begin with an easier case.  Suppose a scientist 
wanted to produce transgenic humans.  How would we respond? 
 Imagine that a woman’s genetic heritage makes her a high risk to 
develop cancer at an early age. Her husband is also a high risk. Knowing full 
well that any children they bring into the world will almost certainly be 
saddled with a genetic predisposition to develop malignant tumors early in 
life, the couple still cannot overcome their desire to have a child of their own. 
Now suppose that science has progressed to the point that medical researchers 
feel confident that they can insert a gene into the woman’s ova that will 
dramatically reduce the risks of cancer for the child. Suppose further that, due 
to a combination of regulatory hurdles and technological shortcomings, the 
researchers can only access the gene from another species, say, the ape. The 
baby we are now envisioning is the first transgenic human. What 
responsibilities would scientists have to her? What moral rules ought to guide 
us as we take the first tentative steps down the path of human germ cell 
therapy? 
 I will not try to develop a complete list of rules and regulations about 
this complex subject here. The medical community is now beginning to think 
about the more fundamental question, whether to allow the insertion of 
foreign genes into human sex cells at all and, as Paul Thompson points out, 
there presently seems to be “a widely shared conviction that human eugenics 
is morally wrong.”55 But if the consensus on that issue turns out the way it has 
with regard to the insertion of foreign genes into animal sex cells, then we 
shall soon have to begin devising such guidelines, because the option of 
foregoing all germ cell therapy will not be a live one. Presuming that, one 
day, we will have transgenic human production, what basic rules ought to 
bind us? 
 
 (a) No harvest THs. 
 
 Harvest animals are animals intentionally bred and raised for the 
purpose of being killed at a young age. In our culture, harvest animals fall 
largely into one of two groups. First, there are experimental animals, 
primarily mice and rats, which are killed so that researchers may do autopsies 
and learn scientific information. Second, there are farm animals, primarily 
chickens, cows, and hogs, which are slaughtered for their meat. Harvest 
transgenic humans would be transgenic humans intentionally bred and raised 
for the purpose of being harvested at a young age. I cannot imagine anyone 
proposing to raise humans for meat, but it is not implausible to imagine 
someone in the future proposing to bring a handful of injected human ova 
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to term in order to discover whether the injected genotypic change will be 
expressed phenotypically. The argument, of course, would be that hundreds 
of thousands of humans would eventually benefit from the harvest THs. But I 
have great trust in our intuition here, that we should not allow the production 
of experimental humans-for-slaughter, no matter how many other humans 
might be saved. 
 Doctors and scientists should protect the basic interests of all human 
subjects used experimentally, but a special obligation exists to protect 
innocents. Not all writers are as uncompromising on this point as Hans Jonas, 
but the vast majority would agree with the spirit of his remark on the morality 
of using an unconscious or subconscious patient in research: 
Drafting him for non-therapeutic experiments is simply and 
unqualifiedly impermissible; progress or not, he must never be 
used, on the inflexible principle that utter helplessness demands 
utter protection.56 
 Suppose that the happy parents of the low cancer risk TH infant agree 
to let their doctors conduct a certain number of nontherapeutic tests on their 
child. They understand that the baby will not be harmed by these tests and, 
indeed, the youngster grows up to be healthy and content. After fifteen years, 
however, the adolescent decides that enough is enough, and makes her wish 
known that the tests end. Her refusal to grant consent should be treated the 
same as anyone’s refusal to grant consent, just as any informed choice of a 
TH should be treated in the same way that we would treat the informed choice 
of a non-TH. The classic legal principle of informed consent was stated by 
Chief Judge Cardozo: 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon 
who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, 
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.57 
 The TH I have been imagining is one that is well positioned to give 
consent. But if we want to protect her, how much more we should want to 
protect a TH who turns out not to be so well positioned. Suppose the 
experiment, tragically, went awry, and the resultant child never developed the 
mental capacities required to give informed consent. I believe we should not 
run any nontherapeutic tests on such a misfortunate, simply because people 
who are least prepared to give informed consent, or who are utterly unable to 
give informed consent, should be most protected against experiments and 
tests that are not undertaken for their well being. 
 Which THs would we ideally use as experimental subjects? Those 
best able to understand and bear the risks to which they would be submitting 
themselves, and who would be most disposed and prepared to care for their 
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TH offspring in the event that something went wrong. Jonas’ way of talking 
about informed consent is apt. Samuel Gorovitz summarizes it as follows: 
Morally permissible use of human beings in medical 
experimentation requires that they be those persons with a 
maximum of identification, understanding, and spontaneity--the 
most highly motivated, the most highly educated, and the least 
‘captive’ members of the community.58 
 Notice that nothing I have said prohibits the production of transgenic 
humans. If a transgenic procedure would make a future human being better 
off (by, say, removing a gene for cystic fibrosis), and if science could benefit 
from studying the future individual, I see no obvious reason why that person 
might not also be the subject of future testing, providing that certain 
conditions were met. One condition would be that the testing itself would not 
harm the person. Another would be that the person’s informed consent would 
be required. If, for example, scientists simply wanted to observe the TH to 
find out if the targeted gene had actually been deleted, and if they could make 
their observations without harming the subject or infringing on her informed 
consent, then doing so would not be impermissible according to (a). 
 
 (b) No worse-off THs. 
 
 It would also be objectionable to experiment on THs, even with the 
informed consent of the TH, if the experiment would seriously undermine the 
well being of the TH. Claude Bernard, a leading nineteenth century physician, 
wrote that the very foundation of medical morality is “never to carry out on a 
human being an experiment that cannot but be injurious to him to some 
degree, even if the outcome could be of great interest to science, that is to say, 
the health of other human beings.”59 Following Bernard’s principle, we should 
not inject foreign genes into human ova if we have good reasons to suspect 
that the life of the prospective TH will be worse-off than it would have been 
had it not been tampered with at the embryonic stage. 
 There are many things you can do to me without making me worse-
off, because my well being is not measured by a single criterion, such as the 
absence of physical disease. As welfare is a composite measure of many 
different variables including one’s own feelings, a slight setback in one area 
may sometimes be overcome by gains in another. For example, a patient 
dying of lung cancer might feel better off than an overworked single mother, 
depending upon how each person feels about her situation. If the single 
mother is under financial and emotional stress and constantly battles 
depression, she may have lower feelings of well being than the elderly woman 
who has spiritually and enthusiastically embraced her fate. Assessing welfare 
is a difficult chore. 
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 But not an impossible one. There are many things I can do to you that 
will clearly make you worse-off, and there are many things you can do to me 
that will clearly may sometimes make me better off. To distinguish clear 
harms and benefits from the vast grey areas that lie in-between them, it is 
important to draw attention to our fundamental interests, to things we must 
have. 
 Some activities are pleasant, but we are not entitled to them. I would 
be worse-off without income sufficient to pay for violin lessons; without 
leisure time to spend with my brother-in-laws at the movies; without an 
indoor basketball court in which to practice my fifteen-footer. I take an 
interest in these activities, and they are good for me, but if my violin money, 
movie time, and gym privileges were taken away, I could flourish nonetheless 
by substituting different interests. Things in which we take an interest but to 
which we have no moral right, are nonbasic interests (NBIs). 
 A public policy that deprives me of one of my NBIs, say, the ability 
to play the violin, will not necessarily make me worse-off. What will 
necessarily make me worse-off is a transgenic procedure that deprives me of 
one of my basic interests (BIs), such as, my ability to make or hear sounds.   
 I have argued previously for two rules regarding the production of 
transgenic humans. Given the strength of the animal rights theory, the 
applicability of these two rules to the production of transgenic animals is 
straightforward.  
 
The rules governing the production of transgenic humans  
should govern the production of transgenic animals. 
 
No worse-off transgenic animals. 
No harvest transgenic animals. 
According to these rules, we have already gone too far in making 
transgenic animals, and we should not allow further experiments such as 
those that produced the Beltsville hogs and hairless mice. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Against Ag Biotech (1994) 
 
 
 The secret workings of nature do not reveal themselves to one 
who simply contemplates the natural flow of events. It is when 
nature is tormented by art, when man interferes with nature, 
vexes nature, tries to make her do what he wants, not what she 
wants, that he begins to understand how she works and may 
hope to learn how to control her. . . . It is my intention to bind, 
and place at your command, nature . . . 
 
                                    -  Francis Bacon (according to Farrington) 1 
 
 
 Humanity cannot afford to acknowledge all of the blood that it 
spills and the destruction it inflicts on the world in its effort to 
perpetuate itself . . . [and to place nature] under our control . . . 
 
                       -  Jeremy Rifkin 2 
 
 
 When Francis Bacon declared his intent to torment and interfere with 
nature, he probably did not envision sickly experimental hogs with human 
genes. But the Baconian desire to understand nature and place “her” at our 
command has entrenched itself in our collective psyche, and the 
bioengineering epoch has enabled us to impose our desires in ways Bacon 
could not have imagined. In so doing, have we stepped over the bounds of 
decency? 
 Many think not. According to traditional morality, animal suffering 
may be justified if the results are likely to benefit humans. In the case of 
transgenic animals, knowledge gained from such experiments were 
instrumental in discovering ways to improve medicine. For example, 
pharmaceutical proteins, including human factor IX, blood clotting factor, 
and alpha-1 antitrypsin, are now secreted in the milk of transgenic sheep, 
producing a purer and cheaper source of these proteins. To bring a higher 
quality of life for some humans is impossible without the use of animals in 
scientific research. Andrew Scott praises the level of creative effort involved 
in such efforts, asserting that gene-splicing has lifted us into the pantheon: 
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 Mankind is undoubtedly the pinnacle of evolution’s 
achievements so far . . . As molecular biology unlocks the 
secrets of how life manages to live . . . [this period] could 
well be remembered as the one in which life on earth began 
to be completely transformed by the effects of mankind--the 
new Creator.3 
Robert Sinsheimer sounds similar themes, wondering, too, whether we are 
not approaching the level of the gods. Sinsheimer takes the metaphor one 
more step, imagining humans as authors of their own divinity: 
 For the first time in all time a living creature understands its 
origin and can undertake to design its future. . . . We are an 
historic innovation. We can be the agent of transition to a 
wholly new path of evolution. This is a cosmic event.4 
 But others wonder about the price we have paid. Citing bGH, the 
Beltsville hogs, GEHR crops and other technologies, global critics such as 
Martha Crouch, Wes Jackson, Kirkpatrick Sale, Michael W. Fox, Vandana 
Shiva, Jeremy Rifkin, John Fagan, Mae-Wan Ho, and Jack Kloppenburg tell a 
different story. While none of them has yet set out in a systematic way the 
global case against ag biotech, each has contributed important arguments to 
it.  
 Here is the case in brief. Ag biotech will not help us to pursue our 
best ideals of farming because it will not increase food security or equitable 
distribution of food; it will not help us to stabilize rural communities, become 
local to our geographical places, or pursue an environmentally friendly form 
of agriculture; it will spell disaster for women and children in developing 
countries; and it displays a technophilic hubris we should renounce. To 
oversimplify, the basic argument goes like this: 
1. Ag biotech is an inseparable part of modern agriculture (MA). 
2. Every inseparable part of MA vexes nature. 
3. Therefore, ag biotech vexes nature. 
The purpose of this chapter is to defend this argument.  
 
1.  Ag biotech is an inseparable part of modern  
 agriculture. 
  
 What is modern agriculture? When Bacon encouraged efforts to gain 
control over nature at the turn of the 17th century, farmers around the world 
were barely able to grow enough crops to support themselves and their 
families. Today, at the turn of the 21st century, modern farmers in the 
developed world boast the most productive agriculture ever known. 
Enthusiasts may overwork the aphorism, “Never before have so few fed so 
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many,” but the claim is true nonetheless. In 1850, a farmer in the United 
States could feed roughly 7 people. In 1990, according to the American Farm 
Bureau Federation, a farmer could feed 128 people: 94 in the United States 
and 34 in other countries.5 Ag scientists have learned how nature works, and 
farmers have learned how to “bind her,” producing unprecedented yields of 
corn, soybeans, wheat and oats. 
 MA means increased efficiency of production, and increased 
efficiency means increased food security, less manual labor, and more 
disposable income. These benefits are acquired through a technique called 
rationalizing production, which means growing only those crops suited to a 
particular climate and region, specializing in one or two crops, using 
synthetic fertilizers and pesticides to control weeds and pests, and increasing 
yields in order to reduce costs to the consumer. 
 The result is that farms in the United States no longer fit the popular 
image of mixed farms, on which mother raises children and chickens while 
daddy raises rotations of oats, beans, corn, wheat, hay, and pasture for his 
dairy cows, beef cows, pigs, horses, geese, and sheep. In general, farms in the 
US are economic firms specializing in one or two commodities, producing 
goods with synthetic chemical inputs for off-farm consumption on the 
national and international markets. Often, farms use natural resources without 
having to internalize the environmental costs, as when growers irrigate corn 
with free water and ranchers graze cows on public lands. 
 Why does ag biotech require MA? Richard Lyng, former Secretary of 
the US Department of Agriculture, provides the answer. Ag biotech, he 
writes, is a strategy to improve farmers’ profits. Defending government-
sponsored agricultural research in this area, Lyng noted that new technologies 
will result in more private sector jobs. New technology will “improve the 
quality of life by developing new uses and new markets for farm products, 
improving farm efficiency, and strengthening farmer profitability.” Lyng 
claims that the basic impetus of all government-sponsored ag research “is not 
simply to increase production,” but rather “to find answers to . . . challenges,” 
adding that a “current challenge in agriculture is to remain competitive in the 
world market.”6 
 Ag biotech requires the practices and institutions of MA because 
agriculture is competitive, competition requires innovation, innovation 
requires research, and research is expensive. Without the chance for 
significant returns on their investments, private companies cannot afford to 
invest in the basic research needed to identify and sequence genes and, 
whereas the potential long term returns on ag biotech research are huge, 
immediate returns are nearly negligible. Only groups with very deep pockets 
can afford to pursue ag biotech. These groups are transnational corporations 
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and nation-states, countries with highly developed science infrastructures and 
tax bases. 
 Countries with subsistence forms of agriculture and limited capital 
cannot afford to do the research needed to develop the technology. As Crouch 
explains, ag biotech depends on the “large, complex industrial 
infrastructure(s)” of developed countries. 
 Purified enzymes require rapid, refrigerated transport; 
information about genes is stored and manipulated in 
computer networks; chemicals and machines used in isolating 
DNA and maintaining constant temperatures for tissue 
growth rely on chemical companies, centralized and 
inexpensive energy sources, and efficient marketing.7 
 Government and industry officials who praise ag biotech as the next 
step in the march of progress agree with their critics on this point: ag biotech 
is married to MA. When proponents defend investment on the grounds that ag 
biotech will strengthen the competitive position of MA’s high volume low 
cost producers, it comes as no surprise to learn that the first ag 
biotechnologies to have reached the market are bGH and herbicide resistant 
crops, technologies that favor larger over smaller farms. Nor is it surprising 
that ag biotech research is oriented to solve problems such as viral resistance 
to head smut in field corn and pseudorabies in hogs, agricultural problems not 
found outside MA’s monocultural intensive animal confinement system. Ag 
biotech cannot be decoupled from MA because ag biotech is designed to 
solve MA’s problems. 
 
2. Modern agriculture vexes nature 
 
 While MA’s benefits are obvious, its costs were largely hidden until 
1962 when Rachel Carson’s book, Silent Spring exposed the environmental 
consequences of synthetic chemical use in agriculture.8 William Kittredge’s 
family lived through the transformation from traditional to modern 
agriculture on a 7000 acre ranch in southeastern Oregon. His 
autobiographical account describes the changes MA brought to their modest 
hay and cattle operation: 
 For so many years, through endless efforts, we had proceeded in 
good faith, and it turned out we had wrecked all we had not left 
untouched. The beloved migratory rafts of waterbirds, the green-
headed mallards and the redheads and canvasbacks, the 
cinnamon teal and the great Canadian honkers, were mostly 
gone along with their swampland habitat. . . . 
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  We could not endure the boredom of our mechanical 
work, and couldn’t hire anyone who cared enough to do it right. 
We baited the coyotes with 1080, and rodents destroyed our 
alfalfa; we sprayed weeds with 2-4-D Ethyl and Malathion, and 
Parathion for clover mite, and we shortened our own lives. 
  In quite an actual way we had come to victory in the 
artistry of our playground warfare against all that was naturally 
alive in our native home. We had reinvented our valley 
according to the most persuasive ideal given us by our culture, 
and we ended with a landscape organized like a machine for 
growing crops and fattening cattle, a machine that creaked a 
little louder each year, a dreamland gone wrong.9 
Agriculture is an organic whole, and all of us are implicated. When we 
change part of our food production system, we change part of ourselves. 
Commenting on Kittredge’s passage, the novelist Jane Smiley insists that one 
take Kittredge’s “we” personally, 
 for whether we know it or not, as long as we eat, we are 
involved in agriculture, and through it, we are making our 
world, like Kittredge’s valley, “a blank perfection of 
fields.”10 
 
2.1 MA and ag biotech vex ecosystems 
 
 MA vexes nature in many ways. Consider the, admittedly low-level, 
risk of widespread catastrophy resulting from the escape of a single virulent 
organism. If a genetically modified organism (GMO) were to escape into the 
environment and compete successfully with naturally evolved species, the 
results might be horrifying. Jackson compares the potential damage to the 
damage caused by chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), introduced to serve useful 
purposes, including the cooling and preservation of food. Released into the 
atmosphere, however, CFCs attack the ozone layer and have produced a hole 
over Antarctica.11 Jackson notes that it took the synthetic chemical industry 
less than a hundred years “before they were finally able to come up with a 
substance that would destroy the ozone.” We might wonder with him how 
long it will take the ag biotech industry to engineer a product with similar 
global repercussions. 
 The risk of catastrophe from a single GMO is probably much lower 
than the risk of releasing CFCs, but the lesson of the CFC story is that we 
cannot foresee the magnitude of all of the risks. As Kristin Shrader-Frechette 
and Paul Thompson remind us, risk means different things to scientists and 
consumers. For scientists, risk is associated with a variable number and is 
based on calculated probabilities. For consumers, risk is more qualitative than 
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quantitative, as seen in the difference in the language we use to distinguish 
“risky” from “safe” behavior.12 If the successes of MA lead us to think that 
we have conquered nature and learned how to make our technological 
interventions “safe,” we may be overstepping the boundaries of our 
knowledge. It would be prudent to remind ourselves of the awesome power of 
nature for, as Norman Maclean writes in his account of forest fire, “the terror 
of the universe has not yet fossilized and the universe has not run out of 
blowups.”13 
 If a single catastrophic event from ag biotech is not highly likely, 
however, the longer-term accumulated risks of ag biotech’s marriage with 
MA are worrisome. Here the risks are not from a single chemical or organism 
but from years of lower level, seemingly unrelated, events the synergetic 
effects of which may be massively destructive over time. The Environmental 
Release Committee of the Council for Responsible Genetics holds that “large 
scale releases of genetically engineered microorganisms into the environment 
pose risks that cannot be evaluated at this time with the current state of 
scientific knowledge.”14 
 Can we sustain MA into the future? Not in Crouch’s opinion. 
 Soil erosion and compaction by machinery is resulting in loss 
of substrate nutrients and structure; water is being used at 
rates that cannot be replenished; chemicals with various 
short- and long-term effects are being applied to the agro-
ecosystem in large quantities; balances of both beneficial and 
harmful non-crop organisms (mycorrhyzae, pathogens, and so 
on) are being disrupted by monoculture methods, expansion 
into and interference with adjacent native ecosystems, use of 
chemicals, etc.; and nonrenewable fossil fuels are required to 
make fertilizers and to run machinery.15 
There are numerous ways in which ag biotech will perpetuate this kind of 
food system and so prolong the trajectories in which MA is already vexing 
nature. MA’s tractors run on fossil fuels; its cooling systems for food 
transportation and preservation require CFCs; and its feedlots emit methane, 
a gas implicated in the problems of global warming.  
 MA vexes trees. We have denuded some forty percent of the Earth’s 
tropical closed rainforests.16 Two millenia ago, our classical forebears cut 
down all the trees that once covered mountains in Greece; two centuries ago, 
our American forebears cut down virtually all of the trees in the northeastern 
US, and our remaining oldgrowth forests are under attack. Tropical 
rainforests are being razed with chain saws at the annual rate of an area the 
size of West Virginia in order to raise crops or food animals. The loss of 
tropical rainforests is troubling for many reasons, not the least of which is 
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that they help to extract carbon dioxide from the air, and photosynethically to 
release oxygen and store carbon. As E. O. Wilson puts it, these forests 
 cover only 7 percent of the Earth’s land surface, [but] they 
contain more than half the species in the entire world biota. . . . 
[They] are being destroyed so rapidly that they will mostly 
disappear within the next century. . . 17 [perhaps by the year 
2035], close to the date (2050) that the World Bank has 
estimated the human population will plateau at 11 billion 
people.18 
Madagascar, “possesser of one of the most distinctive floras and faunas in the 
world, has already lost 93 percent of its forest cover,” and the coastal forest 
of Brazil is 99 percent gone.  
 The motive in cutting down forests is to raise crops for subsistence, 
but Wilson observes that the forest soil is not well-suited to agriculture. 
When rainforests are cut and burned, the resulting ash and decomposing 
vegetation release a flush of nutrients adequate to support new herbaceous 
and shrubby growth for two to three years. Crops usually grow well at first, 
but soil fertility declines within three years, quickly reaching levels that are 
lower than those needed to support crops without artificial supplements.19 
 According to one observer, biotechnology will have its greatest 
impact on forests as fast-growing, high-yielding varieties of genefactured 
trees are raised to meet the demand for wood products.20 Varieties may be 
designed to grow in tropical climates, providing new trees for replanting in 
cleared forests as an economic resource for landowners. How desirable is this 
technology? As Daniel Janzen opines, if biotechnologists develop 
economically valuable plants or trees that thrive best in cleared rainforest, “it 
is `goodbye, rainforest.”’21 Ag biotech seems likely to prop up the practices 
and institutions of modern forestry, thereby contributing to the destruction of 
previously undomesticated ecosystems. 
 With rainforests being destroyed at the annual rate of between 17 and 
50 million acres per year, some predict that the planet’s average temperature 
will rise 3 to 9 degrees Fahrenheit by the year 2050.22 A global warming trend 
would have profound consequences for farmers. In the United States, farmers 
in the southwestern states of Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas might be the 
biggest losers because they rely on expensive water supplies to raise crops in 
desert-like conditions; a rise in temperature would end most forms of 
agriculture there. The Corn Belt might also be hard hit by higher 
temperatures, sending the lucrative corn-growing industry further north, into 
the Dakotas, Minnesota, and Canada. Massive adjustments in international 
trade and corresponding political power would probably accompany global 
warming. 
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 MA vexes land and what lies beneath it. It took geological processes 
millions of years to create the fossil fuel reserves that lay untouched until a 
century ago. Within the last century we have used up approximately eighty 
percent of all of the fossil-fuel oil reserves discovered to date in North 
America.  
 The two principal actors in the drama of oil consumption are the 
automobile and agriculture. Agriculture has not always been a major drain on 
our oil reserves for, as Lester Brown points out, at the beginning of the 20th 
century, “the world’s farmers were almost entirely energy self-sufficient. The 
sun provided energy for crops to grow, livestock provided fertilizer and 
animal power [provided energy] for tillage.” To produce a ton of grain at the 
beginning of this century required virtually no consumption of fossil fuels 
and added little pollution to the atmosphere. Today the situation is different: 
“On the average, the world’s farmers [now] use the equivalent of more than a 
barrel of oil to produce a ton of grain. Each year it takes more.”23 Burning 
fossil fuels produces carbon dioxide, a pollutant. Our use of fossil fuels in 
agriculture is not diminishing: North America produces one-fifth of all the 
world’s grain but, to capture that market, we have increased our use of fossil 
fuels six times since 1950 alone.24 At current rates, we will exhaust known 
reserves by the end of the 21st century. MA spends the earth’s capital at a 
rate greater than the earth can replenish it. 
 Paul Ehrlich is pessimistic about our capacity to heal the earth. His 
doubts arise from an analysis of the human exploitation of what Ehrlich calls 
“net primary production” (NPP). NPP is a measure of “the energy that green 
plants bind into organic molecules in the process of photosynthesis.” All 
living organisms need organic molecules to survive. When one species begins 
to capture more than its share of NPP, other species are denied the resources 
they need. According to Ehrlich’s estimates, 
 The human share of the unreduced potential NPP reaches 
almost 40 percent. There is no way that the co-option by one 
species [out of a total of 1.4 million species] of almost two-
fifths of the Earth’s annual terrestrial food production could 
be considered reasonable, in the sense of maintaining the 
stability of life on this planet. . . . (If, as expected, we double 
our population by 2050, we will need to commandeer a total 
of 80 percent of terrestrial NPP,) a preposterous notion to 
ecologists who already see the deadly impacts of today’s 
level of human activities.25 
Ehrlich’s image for what is happening is striking; “Earth’s habitats are being 
nickeled and dimed to death . . .”  
 MA vexes water. Using center-pivot irrigation systems, modern 
farmers are pumping dry the Oglalla aquifer, a huge reservoir lying under 
Against Ag Biotech                                                                                                  145 
  
Nebraska. Farmers on the Great Plains, according to Donald Worster, 
annually extract an amount of water from the aquifer that is “more than the 
entire [annual] flow of the Colorado River. That resource, left over from 
Pleistocene times, once the largest natural storage system of its kind 
anywhere, now has a life expectancy of about 40 years.”26 According to 
Jackson’s calculations, producing one pound of feedlot beef in Nebraska and 
Colorado requires eight thousand pounds of fossil water spread over crops, 
and sucked up from aquifers “many, many times faster than the aquifers can 
be replenished.”27 In the western United States, agriculture accounts for 80 
percent of water usage.28 In southern California, the United States’ most 
important agribusiness region, farmers are having an increasingly difficult 
time finding water to irrigate their desert crops. Salt residues in the soil 
resulting from current irrigation is also a major problem.29 Across the United 
States, pollution from nitrogen fertilizer and pesticides has been found in 
areas relying on groundwater as the main source of drinking water.30 Then 
there is the problem of soil and farm chemicals runoff into major estuaries, 
sources of fish for human consumption.31 
 MA vexes soils. Glaciers took hundreds of thousands of years to 
deposit the soils of Iowa that lay virtually untouched until a mere 150 years 
ago, and they left behind a huge checking account. In the mid-nineteenth 
century when my relations broke prairie sod, Iowa had on average some six 
feet of topsoil, some of the most fertile in the world. Now, after four 
generations of withdrawals from the glacial deposit, there are on average but 
three feet of topsoil left. Using conventional tillage systems to raise 
monocultures of corn, we have managed to squander half of a precious 
natural resource.32 How? 
 Industry scientists set out to develop a genetically hybrid corn seed 
that would improve yield. They were successful, but at the price of sacrificing 
the corn’s ability to reproduce itself. Modern varieties (MVs) must be bred by 
seed companies and then sold to farmers. The development of the MVs went 
hand in hand with the development of the seedcorn industry. Simultaneously, 
discoveries in inorganic chemistry led to the development of the fertilizer 
industry, meaning that farmers no longer had to pay attention to the fertility 
of their soil. Rather than rotating corn with legumes that would fix the 
nitrogen sapped from the soil by the corn, farmers could keep corn yields up 
by applying higher rates of anhydrous ammonia. The fertilizer stimulated the 
growth of weeds as well as corn, however, creating a rich environment for 
insects and pests. Consequently, farmers needed herbicides to kill the weeds 
and pesticides to kill the bugs. The pesticides wash down into the 
groundwater and soil is either compacted by the machinery running over it or 
eroded into rivers. Meanwhile, farmers are buying more and more petroleum-
based products as the price of oil escalates. 
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 In the Cornbelt, the monoculture method entails a loss by wind, rain, 
and sheet erosion of 20 tons per acre of soil, or 2.3 bushels of black dirt for 
every bushel of corn harvested.33 Erosion of 5 tons per acre is considered an 
acceptable, because naturally replaceable, loss. It is difficult to put an 
economic figure on the 20 ton figure, but some agricultural economists have 
estimated it at $4 per ton.34 Hans Jenny illustrates how extractive these 
farming methods are: 
 Under average farming conditions, over one-third (35 
percent) of the nitrogen and carbon content [of previously 
undisturbed American soils] had been eliminated in the first 
fifty years [of plow agriculture]. In a prairie soil in Missouri, 
the actual loss in humus amounted to thirty one tons per 
hectare.35 
Estimates of the overall economic value of the loss of soil command 
attention. One estimate of losses in the United States put the figure at $7 
billion from cropland soil running off and forming silt in “navigation 
waterways, water storage facilities, drainage ditches, and irrigation canals, 
and interference with water-based recreational opportunities.”36 According to 
a more recent estimate that includes costs to human health and infrastructure 
by David Pimentel in Science, the figure is $44 billion.37 
 If MA is using up fossil fuels, waters, and soils, it is also, in what is 
the most curious irony of the story, using up plants. By introducing 
domesticated varieties of crops, MA erodes plant germplasm diversity. 
Substituting a small handful of crops for human or animal consumption spells 
the end both of wild and native varieties. “In Sri Lanka,” writes Robert 
Rhoades,  
where farmers grew some 2,000 traditional varieties of rice 
as recently as 1959, only five principal varieties are grown 
today. In India, which once had 30,000 varieties of rice, more 
than 75 percent of total production comes from fewer than 
ten varieties.38 
How will we retain biodiversity in the face of the homogenizing forces of 
MA? 
 
 
 
 
2.2 MA and ag biotech vex animals 
 
 As food animal production became industrialized and concentrated 
over the past five decades, the interests of agri-industry became dominated by 
fewer and fewer large corporations interested in short term profits. At the 
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same time, consumer tastes became standardized while McDonald’s 
hamburger stands went up in every town. The result was increasing pressure 
on agriculture to standardize its genetic stock. 
 Animal scientists responded by breeding increasingly specialized 
animals. In the dairy and swine industries the number of breeds has narrowed 
dramatically. Where once there were a dozen or more dairy breeds, today the 
Holstein dairy cow has virtually eclipsed the others. Where once hogs were as 
diverse as farmers and markets, today’s standardized consumer preferences 
have dictated a correspondingly standardized swine gene pool. In the 1920s, a 
promotional booklet called the single-toed Mulefoot hog, “the most hardy, 
prolific, prepotent, early maturing, easy feeding . . . greatest money-maker of 
any breed.”39 By 1990, however, there was only one Mulefoot herd in 
existence.40 One of the most popular breeds, the old-type Berkshire, standard 
in the United States before it was crossbred to the Poland China some thirty 
years ago, is hard to find today.  In Great Britain, experts estimate that there 
are less than two hundred individuals of each of three traditional breeds: the 
Large Black, Red Wattle and Saddleback. 
 We have not retained diversity in farm animal breeds, and the reasons 
are not difficult to find. One reason is that producers rely on a decreasing 
number of influential companies for their stock. Another reason is that US 
milk pricing policy rewards high productivity with few rewards for high fat 
content. Public policies give comparative advantages to farmers able to 
purchase concentrated feeds more cheaply than farmers relying on grass 
forages.41 
 As argued in the previous chapter, industrial agriculture seems to 
conspire against animals. Before the gene era began, selective breeders had 
already produced experimental, domestic, and food animals unintentionally 
bred with characteristics that caused them lives of pain and suffering, and 
levels of intelligence below the levels of their ancestors. Genetic engineering 
increases the speed and power with which we can design such animals.  
 We have also previously noted the ways in which ag biotech entails 
suffering for domestic animals such as TAs and TFAs. MA vexes wild 
animals, too, for when we farm we convert diverse natural ecosystems such 
as grasslands, wetlands, and forests into more homogeneous agroecosystems: 
corn, wheat, and cotton fields. The expansion of agricultural lands over 
virtually every square mile of the globe’s temperate regions has destroyed 
habitat necessary for species to survive. The result is that the number and 
diversity of wild animal habitat has declined dramatically with a consequent 
loss in the number and diversity of species. According to Wilson, the current 
rate of species loss is the largest it has been in the last 65 million years. He 
adds that,  
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If present levels of forest removal continue, the stage will be 
set within a century for the inevitable loss of 12 percent of 
the 704 bird species in the Amazon basin and 15 percent of 
the 92,000 plant species in South and Central America.”42 
These percentages are especially troubling in light of the fact 
that even a slight reduction in a species’ numbers often 
results in a disproportionate loss of genetic variation.43 
 Loss of wild animal, bird, and fish species is not, of course, confined 
to rainforests in developing countries. Since 1800, for example, Dorset 
County, England, has lost 80 percent of its heathlands and 68 percent of its 
chalk downland. Correspondingly, the number and distribution of the 
common blue butterfly has fallen precipitously in the same areas; the 
numbers of silver spotted skipper butterfly have declined 66 percent.44 In this 
regard, MA is different from traditional farming. One study found that on 
farms in England where hedgerows have remained in place, fields have 
remained smaller, chemical use has been minimal, and pastures have 
remained permanent or semi-permanent, the average number of mammalian 
species is 20. On such farms there are on average 37 bird species and 17 
butterfly species. On modernized chemical farms, the respective averages 
drop to 6 mammalian species; 9 bird species; and 8 butterfly species.45 
 MA is not hospitable to many species that claimed our bioregions 
before us. In the continental US, passenger pigeons, bear, bison, and other 
species no longer have the wilderness acreage necessary to live without 
human management. Other species survive only in zoos or game parks, with 
the consequence that their gene pools become increasingly homogeneous and 
successive generations more and more susceptible to disease. Individuals in 
populations of wild species not in danger face a very uncertain future when 
subject to the management of humans, because our mismanagement often 
leads to suffering, malnutrition and death by starvation.46 In Wilson’s words, 
species extinctions present us with a “great natural catastrophe” on the order 
of the catastrophes that brought the Paleozoic and Mesozoic eras to a close. 
 Wilson estimates that the relative rate of species extinctions “with 
humans on the globe is 1,000 to 10,000 times as great as it was before 
humans.”47 Since the beginning of agriculture, domesticated animals and 
humans enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship. Humans benefited from 
companionship, and animals benefited from humane care. But the 
relationship changed in this century when we intensified the pressure to select 
for desirable cosmetic and economic traits. As MA increasingly required a 
standardized product, breeders became unconcerned with the interests of the 
animals except insofar as those interests coincided with the breeder’s 
interests. The breeders’ interests were almost exclusively economic, with the 
result that wild sheep, capable of producing about 1 kg of thick rough wool 
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each year as protective insulation have been made over into virtual wool 
machines, producing some 20 kg of fine downy wool for sweaters each year. 
 What happened to the animal in the process? Whereas sheep 
naturally shed almost all of their wool each spring during their seasonal 
moulting period, intensively bred animals have lost most of their biorhythms 
and do not moult with seasonal regularity; they must be shorn by humans.48 
Wild cattle that once produced a few hundred millilitres of milk each year 
have now been made over into virtual milk machines capable of producing 
15,000 litres.49 We now breed food animals that cannot perform the biological 
functions characteristic of their species, such as turkeys that cannot fly and 
cows that will not care for their calves. MA has gone so far in changing the 
genomes and phenotypes of our food animals that philosophers assert, 
somewhat grandiosely, that we have created these “artifacts,” that the 
animals are more like machines than like wild animals.50 
 As happens with inbreeding among humans, narrowing gene pools 
often brings unintended results. When companion animals are back crossed 
for anatomical features consumers consider desirable, the animals often suffer 
problems, such as respiratory difficulties, anatomical abnormalities, or 
sensory deprivation. The dog has perhaps been treated worst of all as we have 
selected for traits that render some dogs virtually blind, lame, or incapable of 
breathing. We have bred dogs that seem to loathe themselves as much as they 
hate others. 
 The story does not end with breeding, however. Because the 
rationalization of agriculture requires low cost and high volume, we sought 
methods by which to house food animals in closer and closer confinement. 
Raising the number of animals per space increases the numbers a farmer can 
take to market. There are obvious limits. When animals are crowded together, 
living conditions may become so stressful that pigs bite off each others’ tails 
whereas chickens resort to cannibalism and self-destructive pecking.  
Confined to small spaces, veal calves suffer muscle atrophy and anemia. 
 If the breeding principles of poultry biotech continue, what will the 
future of farming be like? 
 Picture yourself fifty years from now standing in the middle of a huge 
antiseptic warehouse staring at rows of tan colored objects that look 
something like footballs. Shiny stainless steel pipes descend from the ceiling 
and disappear into mouth-like orifices on top of each object. Black rubber 
tubes are attached by suction cups to the bottoms. The only attendant in the 
building tells you that the pipes bring water and rations to what he calls “the 
birds,” while the rubber tubes carry excrement and urine to a sewer beneath 
the floor. Every twelve hours each bird drops a no cholesterol egg onto a 
conveyor belt. 
 “Regular as clockwork,” he adds with a wink. 
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 You are staring at thousands of living egg machines, transgenic 
animals genetically engineered to convert feed and water into eggs more 
efficiently than any of their evolutionary ancestors, layer hens. The science 
fiction objects I am asking you to imagine are biologically descended from 
the germplasm of many species unrelated in nature, including humans, 
turkeys, and today’s chickens, so the worker is not speaking in mere 
metaphor when he calls the objects “birds.” But unlike today’s poultry 
varieties, which are only treated as machines, these brave new birds really 
seem to be more machine than animal. For, in coming up with the new birds, 
poultry scientists have not only selected for the trait of efficient conversion of 
feed into eggs; they have also selected for lack of responsiveness to the 
environment. The result is not a bird that is dumb or stupid, but an organism 
wholly lacking the ability to move or behave in dumb or stupid ways. 
Scientific research shows that the egg machine’s complete lack of any 
externally observable behaviors is paralleled by its lack of physiological 
equipment necessary to support behaviorial activity. The brain of the bird is 
adept at controlling the digestive and reproductive tracts, but the areas of the 
brain required to receive and process sensory input and initiate muscular 
movement have been selected against, bred away. The new bird not only has 
no eyes, no ears, no nose, and no nerve endings in its skin; it has no ability to 
perceive or respond to any information it might receive if it had eyes, ears, or 
a nose. 
 The scene, inspired by a remark of Bernard Rollin’s, is fantasy. To 
my knowledge, no poultry biotechnologists are aiming at an industry of 
unconscious bird-like egg machines.51 But why not? Is there any reason to 
think that such birds are not the logical culmination of MA’s breeding 
principles?  
 
2.3 Ag biotech and MA vex humans 
 
 Which humans face potential harm from ag biotech and MA? 
 
 
2.3.1 Family farmers in developed countries 
 
 Secretary Lyng argued that ag biotech will improve the quality of 
rural life by improving productivity and efficiency. He meant, presumably, 
that ag biotech will produce new jobs and raise personal income, capital 
accumulation, and entrepreneurial activity. But the picture of modern rural 
life reflects the reality of a few large specialized crop or dairy farms, 
suggesting a different prospect for the quality of life of many rural residents.  
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 Quality of life is not measured only by financial indices. Other 
factors include availability and cost of health-care, life expectancy, infant 
mortality, disease incidence, work loss due to health reasons, level and type 
of education, school dropout rates, achievement scores, college attendance 
rates, participation in adult education and retraining, crime rate, incidence of 
alcoholism, drug use, domestic violence, suicide rate, proportion of 
population receiving public assistance, voter turnout, citizen involvement in 
government affairs, vitality of volunteer organizations.  Many Americans 
move to or stay in rural areas not to improve household income but to pursue 
a lifestyle. For our agricultural officials to imply that economic development 
should be the primary goal of ag research is for them to overlook many of the 
features of farm and rural life that make it attractive. 
 When we consider urban and suburban sprawl and the demise of 
smaller farms over the last century, many will think initially that a Berry-like 
vision of a nation with more farms is deeply unrealistic. Nonetheless, we 
must ask ourselves about our moral principles and cultural vision, and 
whether our nation would be better off with lots of small farms than with a 
few large ones. 
  A classic study by the sociologist Walter Goldschmidt gives several 
reasons to prefer the populist vision. Goldschmidt studied two rural areas in 
California, Arvin and Denuba.52 Arvin was surrounded by a few large 
corporately owned farm firms, Denuba by lots of traditional family farms. 
Goldschmidt found that Denuba had twice as many small businesses as 
Arvin; 60 percent more retail businesses; a higher level of per capita income; 
more self-employed people; more civic and voluntary organizations; more 
schools and more churches; and more citizen involvement in the schools and 
churches. By every standard of measurement Goldschmidt could think of, the 
family farm community had a higher quality of life than the large-scale 
agriculture community. Goldschmidt’s work confirms the view that as farms 
became larger in California, the overall quality of life for residents declined. 
 In 1781, Thomas Jefferson wrote that “those who labour in the earth 
are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people.”53 In 1832, 
Andrew Jackson suggested that “The wealth and strength of a country are its 
population, and the best part of that population are cultivators of the soil. 
Independent farmers are everywhere the basis of society and the true friends 
of liberty.”54 In 1844, a letter to the editor of a journal wrote that  
“the farmer is the main support of human existence. He is the 
lifeblood of the body politic, in peace and war, . . . freedom, 
patriotism and virtue, after being driven from the degeneracy 
and corruption of the cities, will find their last resting place 
in the bosom of the agriculturalist.”55 
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 Popular mythology holds that farmers are harder workers, more 
honest, happier and live more stable lives than city folk. Is there any truth to 
it? A recent study by economists Renee Drury and Luther Tweeten, reviewing 
nineteen years of data from surveys conducted by the National Opinion 
Research Center at the University of Chicago, suggests that the answer may 
be affirmative. Farmers, they conclude, 
 are less likely than others to agree that money is the most 
important thing in life next to health, . . . are among the least 
pessimistic, alienated, and fatalistic of all groups. . . . 
(C)ompared to the general population, the farm family is 
more stable and the typical farmer is more religious, 
politically more conservative, and happier and more satisfied 
with some aspects of life.56 
 Farmers are happier on average than city people, but not, according 
to Drury and Tweeten, happier than nonfarm or suburban residents.  Nor does 
the study justify the claim that farmers have a higher overall quality of life 
than city dwellers. But farmers do appear to belong to an older paradigm of 
human culture and values that need not pass away.  
 Ag biotech also represents risks for women.57 Bacon described the 
domination of nature by humans in gendered language, suggesting that 
humans are males who must harness a female companion. The image directs 
attention to the place of women in history. Women’s labor has typically been 
undervalued in the US.  From at least the nineteenth century on, farm chores 
have been divided by gender, with men tending cash crops and women 
tending crops for family consumption. 
 In the antebellum South, African American women and children 
worked as slaves on plantations.  In the North, women and children 
contributed their labor without compensation. The marks of patriarchy and 
colonialism are evident in such systems because, as Carolyn Sachs points out, 
“although women’s subsistence labor was economically essential for the 
survival of the farm, women’s subistence work was undervalued because it 
was generally nonmarket activity.”58 
 Women continue to work under the disadvantages of an imbalance of 
power. As Heidi Hartmann argues, a “set of social relations [with] a material 
base . . . [enabling men] to control women,” is preserved in today’s farm 
economy through job segregation by sex: 
 Low wages keep women dependent on men because they 
encourage women to marry. Married women must perform 
domestic chores for their husbands. Men benefit, then from 
both higher wages and the domestic division of labor. This 
domestic division of labor, in turn, acts to weaken women’s 
position in the labor market. Thus, the hierarchical domestic 
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division of labor is perpetuated by the labor market, and vice 
versa.59 
 Agricultural research as a profession exhibits the same division of 
labor. A poll by Busch and Lacy shows that far fewer women go into 
agricultural research than do men, and the sexual division of labor tends to 
mirror the historical division of labor on farms. Men take up disciplines such 
as animal science and agronomy related to production; women take up 
research related to domestic activities: nutrition, textiles, and home 
economics.  
 Can biotechnology help us to redress the patriarchal stratification of 
ag research and production? Sachs’ answer to a related question is not 
encouraging when its implications for ag biotech research are considered: 
 As long as the hierarchical sexual division of labor in agricultural 
science keeps women in disciplines that focus on the consumer, the 
distance between production agriculture and nutrition will only 
widen.60 
 Most of the world’s farmers are women. They do not participate in 
MA; they live on subsistence farms in developing countries. 
 
2.3.2 Subsistence farmers in developing countries 
 
 Farmers in developing countries often live on the edge of food 
security, but they are more likely to be able to meet their family’s food needs 
when they rely on local gardens, the plots of their own households and those 
of their neighbors. When a developing country begins to rely on world 
markets to meet its citizens’ nutritional needs, however, the country exposes 
its people to risk by encouraging them to enlarge their operations. To expand, 
farmers must stop growing subsistence crops eaten locally, like beans and 
rice, and begin to grow high volume grain crops, or crops for export not 
meant for human consumption at all, such as animal feed or rubber. Crops 
once grown to sustain the indigenous population are replaced by money crops 
that reward successful farmers but may make it more difficult for the general 
populace to eat. 
 In an attempt to develop their own economies, Third World countries 
may rely on large infusions of capital from international lending agencies, 
such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. Money makes it 
possible for the governments of developing countries to help smaller farmers 
to expand. Angus Wright attributes the switch to MA in developing countries 
to deliberate policies followed by development agencies and state 
governments.61 As a few successful capital-intensive, modernized, farms get 
larger in the Third World, however, former landowning peasants are 
displaced from the fields of their ancestors. If they then elect to stay in their 
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home rural areas, they may be forced to accept wages below the cost of 
living.62 If they move to urban areas, they may be unable to find employment 
at all. In an article titled “Biotechnology Is Not Compatible with Sustainable 
Agriculture,” Crouch concludes that “poor people are generally better off 
nutritionally when they are able to grow at least some of their own food,” 
because only then are they not at the mercy of volatile markets.63 
 Studies seem to confirm Crouch’s opinion. Summarizing the findings 
of Ferroni, 1980, Kathryn Dewey agrees that MA has had negative effects on 
poor families in Peru: 
 Ferroni’s central finding was that dietary adequacy was 
strongly positively related to the proportion of home-
produced foods in the family calorie budget. Thus, families 
with greater independence from the market economy were 
nutritionally better off.64 
Or consider Brazil where the underclass might be expected to gain from ag 
biotech. Brazil has between 5 and 7 million pre-teenage adolescents who live 
in poverty and eat by sifting through garbage.65 Meanwhile, the annual 
inflation rate in Brazil is 800 percent. Biotechnology surely cannot solve all 
of these problems, nor is it realistic to expect it to do so. But before the green 
revolution, most of the 500 million acres of arable land in Campo Cerrado 
were pastureland. With the use of fertilizers, however, the land became very 
productive, so that by 1985 roughly 2 million metric tons of soybeans were 
being grown there.66 Soybeans are grown for several reasons, including their 
agronomic value in fixing nitrogen in the soil and their economic value as 
export commodities. 
 As production of export soybeans grew, however, production of black 
beans for indigenous consumption was displaced. The result was a lack of the 
principal food stuff traditionally grown and consumed by the campesinos. 
Riots resulted.67 The technology of the green revolution seems to have led to a 
concentration of land in the hands of a few large farms producing crops for 
export, displacing peasants from farms and apparently decreasing the 
availability of low cost food. The resultant socioeconomic problems are not 
simply the result of technical changes in agriculture; they result from a very 
complex interaction of domestic and international economic policy decisions, 
cultural attitudes, and historical trends. Without addressing these wider 
problems, we cannot lay the entire blame for Brazil’s problems at the door of 
MA and MVs. But we may ask whether women and children on farms in Peru 
and Brazil today would have been better off had their countries pursued a 
different path in rural development. 
 There are other examples of MA vexing farmers. In Egypt, the 
modernization of agriculture has translated into more landless farmers.68 In 
the Philippines, commercial interests are depleting the stock of fish on which 
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indigenous people depend.69 And in various places in Asia, forests “with 
multiple uses are turned into pulp plantations of eucalyptus which support 
very little life other than their own.”70 
 How will ag biotech affect this picture? Ghana, Togo and Brazil all 
depend heavily on cocoa butter to bring in money which they use in turn to 
service their debt to the World Bank.71 Recent advances in tissue culture, 
however, may permit major candy manufacturers in the developed world to 
produce a cocoa butter substitute far more cheaply than real cocoa can be 
produced in tropical regions of the world. The fear is that such a development 
would bring swift ruin to countries depending on cocoa as an export crop and 
already stressed by heavy debt loads. As Crouch argues, ag biotech turns 
farming into a business concerned primarily with profits, with potentially 
harmful effects on ecosystems and people: 
 By turning everything it touches into commodities, 
biotechnology also has the effect of making products and 
processes that fit more easily into the global market. For 
example, seeds that used to be saved by the farmer now must 
be purchased every year. Genotypes that used to be specific 
to a slope, soil type, and rainfall amount in a particular valley 
are replaced with a genotype that will grow in a whole 
region. Markets that respond to short term increases in 
production replace subsistence or local markets that respond 
to the need for a secure food supply in unpredictable 
conditions.72 
Crouch notes that successful subsistence farming still exists in many 
developing countries, including Mexico, Jamaica, India, Sierra Leone, Kenya, 
and the Philippines.73 But ag biotech threatens these proven modes of 
farming. 
 In 1986, the United States decided to subsidize substantially its rice 
exports, allowing its  rice producers to undercut competitors. Without 
financial reserves to help its growers through 1986 and 1987, Thailand’s farm 
families were devastated by the steep drop of world market prices for rice.   
As Don  Reeves points out, the consequence of the US decision to  dump 
government-held rice onto the world market meant that rice prices were cut in 
half. 
 The US government made up the difference to its 19,000 rice 
growers. Thailand could not make up the difference to its 4 
million farmers, most of whom grow rice.74 
 Sudden changes in the global economy are difficult for US farmers 
but they can be life-threatening for smaller countries.  Consider another 
example, sugar. 
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 Over the past dozen years, half the US sugar market has been 
taken over by high fructose corn sweetener because of a 
combination of high sugar support prices and low corn 
prices. To protect its growers, the United States repeatedly 
has reduced its sugar import quotas, wiping out tens of 
thousands of sugar-worker jobs in the Philippines and the 
Caribbean.75 
 The action of the United States government is understandable. When 
it raised interest rates in 1979 to control inflation, the price of US agricultural 
goods on the world market went up dramatically. This cut into the level of 
goods we were able to export, and European nations, driven by the same 
spirit of competition, moved in to capture markets.  Since 1979, the Reagan, 
Bush, and Clinton farm policies have been directed toward recovering those 
lost markets. 
 Larger export markets help, in a way, to support the US family farmer 
or, at least, the agricultural status quo in the US. But the effect of the forces 
of globalization on other exporting nations can be extreme. The physical 
health of a people can rapidly decline if their economy fails. Productive and 
steady employment may disappear, and the result can be a dispirited and 
resentful populace.  As Lacy et al. point out, the forces of globalization and 
agricultural research seem to be conspiring yet again against small peasant 
farmers.  Corporations are actively looking for ways to produce in vitro 
substitutes for rice, sugar, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cotton, and tea.  If found, 
these high-tech goods will be massed produced and sold at prices below those 
of farmers in developing countries, further adding to the problems of nations 
“struggling to work their way out from under mountainous burdens of debt 
and handicaps of malnutrition and illiteracy.”76 
 There is also the problem of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the 
affluent North profiting from germplasm taken, sometimes illegitimately, 
from the poor South. The Rural Advancement Foundation International 
(RAFI) and Calestous Juma have done much to bring this problem to light.77 
For several years, RAFI has sounded the alarm about bioprospecting and 
biopiracy conducted by corporations. 
  Northern-based institutions seek access to tropical 
biodiversity for the primary purpose of developing profitable 
products. No matter how convincing the rhetoric, 
conservation and equity are secondary issues. Once 
indigenous peoples share information or genetic material they 
effectively lose control over those resources, regardless of 
whether or not they are compensated. if genetic material 
derived from plants, animals or microorganisms is eventually 
patented, access to this material can be legally restricted by 
Against Ag Biotech                                                                                                  157 
  
monopoly patents. No matter what the circumstances, 
indigenous communities must have the right to say “no” to 
bio-pirates or legitimate bio-prospectors. 
  Some people believe that current levels of 
technology will allow Northern-based institutions to 
undermine the importance of traditional medicine and respect 
for indigenous knowledge.78 
The RAFI paper suggests in its headline that such arrangements reflect and 
perpetuate the “commodification of the sacred” and show disrespect for 
indigenous knowledge. 
 Ag biotech seems likely to devalue local knowledge; alienate 
indigenous peoples from their native cultures; widen the gap between haves 
and have-nots; separate those who generate knowledge from those who use it; 
divide those who produce food from those who consume it; and increase the 
differential in power between developed and developing countries. The 
present political and economic system on which ag biotech relies seems to 
engender unfair comparative economic advantages for well capitalized 
farmers in the North while disadvantaging less capitalized peasant farmers in 
the South. 
 
2.3.3 Scientists and taxpayers 
 
 Transnational corporations (TNC) are calling on university scientists 
to help them answer basic questions in molecular biology. In 1984, for 
example, they gave grants of  $120 million for university research in this 
area.79 Of all funds spent on biotech at the US State Agricultural Experiment 
Stations in 1987, some twenty percent came from private companies. 
Compare this figure to the national average of university research monies that 
come from commercial interests, three to five percent, and you see how cozy 
the alliances have grown between commercial firms and universities. 
 However, not all universities engaged in biotech research will 
prosper from their involvement, because benefits are likely to be concentrated 
at a relatively small number of institutions. In 1987, thirty-three of the fifty 
US states were actively engaged in promotion of biotech research and 
development.  Yet three states accounted for more than fifty percent of the 
$145 million invested that year.80   
 What kind of science is the well-funded university pursuing? Science 
that tries to solve problems by breaking problems down into simpler, more 
manageable, components and then trying to find technological fixes for these 
simplified problems. Ag biotech is reductionistic science based on the 
principle that component parts must be held constant while others are 
manipulated. The manipulations allow the scientist to determine functions by 
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comparing the variable parts with the controls.  Ag biotech, writes Crouch, 
must, by its very nature,  
 be planned in advance in a linear step-wise series of 
procedures, which flows from the model of gene expression. 
The molecule carrying the genetic code, DNA, is transcribed 
into an intermediary, RNA, following the template in the 
DNA. RNA is then translated, also in a linear sequence, into 
a string of amino acids in a protein. In order to engineer a 
gene, the arrangement and sequence of elements in the DNA 
must be ascertained, and manipulated. Thus the investigator 
conceives of the project in a fairly precise, directed way. If 
the project cannot be designed in a sequence of well-
characterized steps, the engineering project will not be 
feasible. . . . In concept, both the problem and the solution 
must be simple. Only one problem can be addressed at a 
time. . . .81 
 While the achievements of such science are undeniable, not all 
scientists are sanguine about its usefulness in solving world hunger and 
environmental degradation, because it unnecessarily confines attention to one 
problem at a time. For example, consider the problem of lysine deficiency in 
an area in Asia where children are malnourished. The problem comes largely 
from children lacking access to a variety of foods, and getting almost all of 
their protein from rice, which has very little of the essential amino acid. 
Crouch writes that she received a letter from a graduate student suggesting 
that ag biotech research could “insert a gene into rice that codes for a protein 
high in lysine, thus balancing the protein.”82 The student added that the 
research could be done in an international non-profit laboratory, and seed 
could be given away to the poor. Is this not an example of ag biotech using its 
reductionistic science to solve an important issue? 
 Crouch responds that the narrow way in which the problem is 
approached subverts the legitimacy of alternative, holistic, solutions. 
Consider alternatives to genetic engineering for solving the lysine-deficiency 
problem. In areas where rice has been grown for thousands of years, the diet 
has traditionally been supplemented with legumes, which lack methionine but 
are sufficient in lysine. Thus dietary protein was made complete by 
complementation.  
 Perhaps a system-level research program could be used to solve the 
problem of lysine-deficiency. In this kind of science researchers would ask 
questions such as, What happened in the agricultural system in this part of 
Asia to disrupt the balance between rice and legume consumption? Were crop  
rotations abandoned because of a shift from subsistence to export farming?  
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Did the loss of lysine in the diet result from rice monocultures displacing 
mixed farms of rice, legumes, and vegetable cropping patterns? 
 By examining the agricultural system as a whole, we may be able to 
relieve lysine deficiency in a traditional way by assisting farmers in returning 
to older ways of farming. A system-level approach would try to solve many 
problems at once. An increase in legume production in rice areas could 
improve soil fertility, disrupt pest and pathogen cycles, provide more 
employment for rural people, and solve the problem of lysine-deficiency.83 
 Ag biotech is not the answer to the problems of developing countries, 
and alternatives are available. The alternatives are better, because they offer 
holistic ways of resolving several problems at once whereas ag biotech can 
address but one problem at a time.84  
 
2.3.4 Future generations 
 
 Given all of the premises defended so far, the problem concerning the 
risks of ag biotech to future generations may be stated succinctly. Assume 
that MA is a human and environmental failure; that ag biotech requires MA; 
and that ag biotech will exacerbate the worst features of MA. It follows that if 
we continue to follow the high technology monocultural path of MA we will 
so ruin the diversity, resilience and productivity of our agroecosystems that 
future generations will be unable to grow sufficient food. 
 What is the connection between environmental degradation, 
biodiversity, and the food needs of future generations? Garrison Wilkes, a 
professor of biology at the University of Massachussetts, makes the tie 
explicit. When a farmer changes from planting ten or twelve crop varieties in 
an area to one or two, the diversity of local land varieties is quickly lost. 
Wilkes writes that “at present rates of extinction, as many as 60,000 plant 
species--one-fourth of the world’s total--may be lost or endangered within the 
next 50 years. Meanwhile there are more mouths to feed than ever.” 85  
 Robert Rhoades puts the problem of feeding future generations in 
historical context. When agriculture began ten thousand years ago, he writes, 
there were roughly four million people on earth. 
 Today that many people are born every ten days. If the trend 
continues beyond the year 2000, we will have to grow as 
much food in the first two decades of the new century as was 
produced over the past 10,000 years.86 
If the key to meet the monumental demand of future generations for food is 
wild plants then future generations may lack the resources they need to feed 
themselves: a diverse basis of plant and animal germplasm, adequate soils, 
and clean air and water. 
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3.  Therefore, ag biotech vexes nature 
 
 I have been advancing the argument that ag biotech, being an 
inseparable part of MA, will vex nature. This argument is predicated on the 
consequences of ag biotech being of a certain sort.  But there is another kind 
of argument against ag biotech altogether:  That ag biotech is objectionable 
even if its consequences do not turn out to be objectionable.  It is 
objectionable intrinsically, simply for the kind of activity it is. 
 
4.  Ag biotech is intrinsically objectionable 
 
 The Greeks referred to concerns about our moral and spiritual 
character as concerns about “arete,” or concerns about our excellences, 
powers, and virtues. Aretaic concerns are concerns about the kind of people 
we are and are becoming. Does ag biotech threaten to form us into a kind of 
people we ought not to become? Does it bring us powers and ideals we ought 
not to desire? When we begin to tamper with an animal’s genes, do we 
disrespect the animals’ intrinsic value, trying to play God with another living 
being? Gene splicing techniques bring scientific powers we have not 
possessed heretofore, allowing us to mix and match species.  
 The first to articulate the intrinsic objection to biotechnology may 
have been Jeremy Rifkin in his book, Algeny. “Algeny” is Rifkin’s term for 
the biotechnologists’ form of modern alchemy, a kind of mystical science that 
transforms living things into things they are not. Biotech, based on the theory 
of evolution, reduces living beings to lifeless pieces of information. As Rifkin 
puts it, for the gene splicing age, 
 Living things are no longer perceived as carrots and peas, 
foxes and hens, but as bundles of information. All living 
things are drained of their aliveness and turned into abstract 
messages. Life becomes a code to be deciphered. There is no 
longer any question of sacredness or inviolability. How could 
there be when there are no longer any recognizable 
boundaries to respect?87 
 Rifkin decries the biological— and spiritual— boundary crossing that 
gene-splicing admits. As algenists, scientists want to “help nature in its 
struggle to “perfect itself,” trying to upgrade “existing organisms . . . with the 
intent of `perfecting’ their performance.”88 
 For the algenist, species boundaries are just convenient labels 
for identifying a familiar biological condition or relationship, 
but are in no way regarded as impenetrable walls separating 
various plants and animals.89 
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When we begin to regard plants and animals as nothing more than bits of 
information we have lost the idea that these life forms are sacred. To engage 
in ag biotech is not only to cross species boundaries, but also to erode the 
foundations of our view that human beings are sacred, that we have a purpose 
or telos toward which we are oriented. Biotechnology participates in a 
worldview in which we ourselves are desacralized, turned with all living 
things from which we have evolved into automata, machine-like units. The 
Beltsville hog is just one particularly graphic illustration of how ag biotech 
enthusiasts regard other living creatures as mere bundles of information to be 
manipulated. 
 In Rifkin’s view, the practice of algeny is not confined to scientific 
laboratories; it has extended itself into all corners of our lives, taking over our 
view of ourselves and our world. Whereas once we regarded nature as sacred 
and ourselves as its caretakers, now we see it as a profane machine with us as 
its engineers. 
 In all of humanity’s past experience, living things enjoyed a 
separate, unique, and identifiable place in the order of nature. 
There were always rabbits and robins, oaks and ostriches, 
and while human beings could tinker with the surface of 
each, they couldn’t penetrate to the interior of any. Now, . . . 
the redesign of existing organisms and the engineering of 
wholly new ones mark a qualitative break with humanity’s 
entire past relationship to the living world. . . ..90 
 To design life by engaging in ag biotech is to commodify it. 
In ag biotech, everything has a price, and everything becomes 
a fit object for buying and selling.  
Rifkin goes so far as to suggest that it offends God to cross plants with weeds 
when the two species cannot be crossed by natural means of reproduction.91 
Should we violate species boundaries set up by “natural law?” This question 
may appear extreme to some plant geneticists and breeders, but it deserves 
the careful attention of anyone genuinely interested in the future of 
agriculture. 
 If Rifkin is right, we have come to regard life as nothing more than “a 
base biological material, DNA, which can be extracted, manipulated, 
organized, combined, and programmed into an infinite number of 
combinations by a series of elaborate laboratory procedures.”92 The 
implications of this worldview are alarming, because it allows us and our 
children to think we can 
tear into everything around us, devouring our fellow 
creatures and the earth’s treasures, all in the name of doing 
good, of ridding the world of evil. What we are really ridding 
the world of is its aliveness . . .93 
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 Wes Jackson echoes some of Rifkin’s themes and attributes our 
willingness to allow our agriculture to run the kinds of risks to animals, 
ecosystems, and humans enumerated above not to a conspiracy of industry 
and government nor to ag businesses simply wanting to sell their products 
and make money. He thinks the fault lies in our ready complicity with the 
experiment of modern agriculture, a belief system or paradigm that makes us 
think that ag chemicals are inevitable. What Jackson calls the Cartesian 
“knowledge-as-adequate world view” supplies the beliefs, values, and ideals 
of what he and Wendell Berry call “the modern industrial mind.” Jackson, 
therefore, is less concerned about what he calls the Beltsville “hog monster,” 
than about the human monster, created by our culture, the 
monster who sees nothing wrong with creating such a hog. . . 
. The modern industrial mind is predicated on the Cartesian 
knowledge-as-adequate world view, [the view that humans 
can attain knowledge of whatever subject they desire and 
therefore adequately control whatever they desire,] and what 
has it produced? Acid rain, perhaps global warming, 
chemical contamination of the countryside we have no 
evolutionary experience with, Three Mile Island and 
Chernobyl. . . . When we spread atrazine all over Iowa and 
Illinois, we presume to know!94 
The ideology of MA, writes Jackson, is founded on three key assumptions:  
 (a) Nature is to be subdued or ignored, 
 (b) The purpose of agricultural research and farming is to 
  increase production, and 
 (c) Agriculture is to serve as an instrument for the 
  advancement of industry.95 
These assumptions destroy local agrarian ways of life.  
The policy of growing crops for cash for export instead of for 
local consumption may buy radios, but it will buy radios at 
the expense of soil erosion and chemical contamination of 
land and water. But that is to be considered progress [given 
these modern assumptions]. Progressive fundamentalism is as 
bad as religious fundamentalism, for fundamentalism takes 
over where thought leaves off.96 
Jackson elaborates on the ideology that underlies this disrespectful attitude 
toward nature, tracing it to the French philosopher Rene Descartes and to the 
attitude that humans can know everything they need to know in order to 
control nature. He may just as well have traced it to Francis Bacon. 
 According to this view, biotechnology is an outward manifestation of 
an inner spiritual sickness at Michael W. Fox calls “technocracy.” 97 Fox 
believes we need nothing short of a complete change in our worldview, a new 
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paradigm that is “planetary and holistic” in which each of us realizes “the 
inherent wisdom of self-control in relation to the ecological whole (or unified 
field of being) and recognition of the intrinsic value of other beings.”98 Fox 
insists that his view is not anti-science and anti-technology, but fears 
nonetheless, that we have only two options. 
 We can choose to engineer the life of the planet, creating a 
second nature in our image, or we can choose to participate with 
the rest of the living kingdom.99 
 
5.  What do global critics want? 
 
 Global critics want to replace MA with a paradigm whose beliefs, 
rituals, and ideals promote good farming. To change the practices and 
institutions of MA we need to change the beliefs and values that legitimate it. 
Critics of ag biotech think it will be no use as we try to change our attitudes. 
 What will be of use?  New stories, borrowed in part from our oldest 
stories, to re-energize us with visions of the good life.  
 In his novel, Remembering, Wendell Berry describes young Andy 
Catlett, a reporter for Scientific Farming magazine and former farm boy 
assigned to write a feature article about Bill Meikelberger, the magazine’s 
Premier Farmer of the year.100 Meikelberger is a graduate of the College of 
Agriculture at Ohio State University, and owner of two thousand acres south 
of Columbus, Ohio, where farms average less than four hundred acres. Andy 
has heard of Meikelberger, and is excited at having such an important 
assignment. When he gets to the farm, he takes a quick look around and can 
see right off that Meikelberger’s farm must have been  
 the fulfillment of the dreams of his more progressive 
professors. On all the two thousand acres there was not a 
fence, not an animal, not a woodlot, not a tree, not a garden. 
The whole place was planted in corn, right up to the walls of 
the two or three unused barns that were still standing. 
Meikelberger owned a herd of machines. His grain bins 
covered acres. He had an office like a bank president’s, . . . 
[and a house] with ten rooms and a garage, each room a page 
from House Beautiful, and it was deserted. 
 Having grown up on a much more modest farm, Andy had only seen 
pictures of farms like Meikelberger’s. When the two of them go into the 
living room, Andy asks Meikelberger about his family. The farmer replies 
that he is all alone; his wife is in town at work, and his children all moved 
away. No need for them on the farm. When Andy questions him about his 
wife’s work, Meikelberger grins and says “Every little bit helps.” 
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 Later, Andy sees him taking pills with his meal, and Meikelberger 
informs him that he has an ulcer. Leaving the farm, Andy reflects on  
Meikelberger’s ambition, noting that this hero of modern agriculture, 
 allowed nothing, simply nothing at all . . . to stand in his way: 
not a neighbor or a tree or even his own body. 
Meikelberger’s ambition had made common cause with a 
technical power that proposed no limit to itself, that was, in 
fact, destroying Meikelberger, as it had already destroyed 
nearly all that was natural or human around him (pp. 73-76). 
 The problems of MA are not unconnected to humans. An agriculture 
that turns our valleys into blank perfections of fields cannot do so without at 
the same time impoverishing us. Berry’s story, however also suggests an 
alternative road, a vision in which rural families, neighborhoods, and 
communities flourish. 
 In another scene, Andy is listening to his father, Wheeler Catlett, 
describe how Wheeler chose to farm. Years before Andy was born, Mr. 
Catlett had gone to Washington D.C. to attend law school and to work as a 
Congressional aid. As Wheeler approached graduation, he was offered a job 
with a large packing house in Chicago. But did he really want to work as an 
attorney in Chicago in the middle of tons of concrete and thousands of 
pigeons? 
 Wheeler decided to return to his hometown to farm. Years later, 
when it comes time for Andy to decide on his career, Wheeler takes him out 
to the pasture. He tells him to look at the cattle, gathering in the walnut grove 
to drink.   
The cattle crowd in to the little stone basin, hardly bigger 
than a washtub, that has never been dry, even in the terrible 
drought of 1930; they drink in great slow swallows, their 
breath riffling the surface of the water, and then drift back 
out under the trees. Andy and Wheeler can hear the grass 
tearing as they graze (pp. 67-69). 
Wheeler shows Andy the excellences of animal life, the virtues of the life of 
caring for animals, ideals best communicated not in arguments, facts, and 
figures, but in images, stories, and experience.  A warm July night in the 
machine shed.  A turn at the end of a field just planted.  The cold air of a 
February high school basketball night in north-central Iowa.  The sight of 
steam rising off a steer on a chilly May morning in Nathrop, Colorado. 
 Andy is supposed to travel to Pittsburgh that night, but as he leaves 
Meikelberger’s award-winning farm, he enters another county, full of hills. 
He determines to take the back roads through wooded Amish country. The 
fields, he notices, are much smaller than Meikelberger’s fields, and the farms 
more numerous. He meets one Isaac Troyer, who farms eighty acres with his 
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wife, five children, and father and mother. Troyer invites Andy to dinner, but 
not before first inviting Andy to plow a few rows with Troyer’s team. 
 As he drives back to Pittsburgh to write his story, Andy begins to 
wonder just which of the two farmers is the most progressive. He decides he 
will write about Isaac’s “Premier Farm” rather than Meikelberger’s. As he is 
driving something else suddenly dawns on him: 
 Twenty-five families like Isaac Troyer’s could have farmed 
and thrived--could have made a healthy, comely, independent 
community--on the two thousand acres where Bill 
Meikelberger lived virtually alone with his ulcer, the best 
friend that the bank and the farm machinery business and the 
fertilizer business and the oil companies and the chemical 
companies ever had. 
Twenty-five and thriving on the ground now occupied by a single farm. 
Twenty five families, twenty five martin boxes, twenty five barns, twenty five 
orchards, twenty five stallions, fifty black mares, 75 children, and 375 
guernsey cows, all flying and singing and eating and dying on ground now 
occupied by one man and his herd of machines.  
 This is what the global critics want. 
 Defenders of MA will reply that the idea of reviving small farms is 
attractive and quaint but highly unrealistic and politically naive. But our 
imaginations are powerful things, and stories can change the world. An 
alternative story that was at once powerful, true, and widely accepted could 
change our agricultural paradigm.101 Such a story would not be widely 
accepted if it required us to sacrifice efficiency and productivity or if it 
required giving up food security. Nor should it, in my mind, require us to 
retreat from the quest for freer trade between the world’s nations, or 
sophisticated large-scale communication and transportation technologies. Nor 
should it saddle farmers with acreage limitations, backward technologies, or a 
mentality that pits them against the conveniences and luxuries of 
contemporary society. Such a story must present an attractive vision of a new 
agricultural paradigm consisting of diverse small farms owned and operated 
by well-educated families connected up by computers and satellites in an 
international market system. 
 Berry points us somewhat in the direction of such a story by painting 
a fictional scene teeming with small farms. But his vision is not mere fiction, 
for Lancaster County in Pennsylvania boasts more than 5,000 farms, each 
farm averaging 84 acres. Seventy-five percent of those acres are under 
cultivation, in a rotation of corn, wheat, barley, oats, and hay. Eighty percent 
of the farms are owner-operated. In a recent year, each farm averaged 
$136,000 in gross annual sales.  
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 Amish farms are not backward or inefficient. If efficiency is 
measured by the amount of energy consumed to the amount of calories 
produced, the Amish farm is more efficient than the Meikelberger farm with 
its heavy reliance on fossil fuel resources for energy. The farmers are 
relatively young, with an average age of 44, and they are, on the whole, quite 
content, because there is much good work to do on their farms, and because 
there is a future on their farms for their children.102   
 The Amish are not our only examples of good farming, and Berry 
recommends that we look for a diversity of approaches to good farming.  He 
commends all farmers who practice non-degradatory agriculture.  He salutes 
the 200-acre grass farms of Kentucky on which “less than 10 percent of the 
farm would be planted to crops that require disturbance and exposure of the 
soil,” and slightly larger farms in the Cornbelt where “the cropping pattern is 
varied and complex.”   
 There are several alternatives to modern agriculture.  Our challenge is 
to tell their stories, and to devise public policies to help the stories continue. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
 The ag biotechnologies now on the market may be part of a huge and 
expensive technocratic food system, an undemocratic social and cultural 
nexus controlled by a scientific and engineering elite unconcerned with the 
interests of most of the world’s plain citizens and farmers. In this essay, I 
have presented considerations that lean, in the style typical of academics who 
hedge every assertion with ten qualifications, in the direction of 
unconditional opposition. But now I lean toward declaring out right, that I 
globally oppose ag biotech.  
 At the beginning of this chapter, I quoted Benjamin Farrington’s 
gloss on Francis Bacon’s determination to vex nature. Science and 
technology have given us the skills to make nature “do what we want, not 
what she wants” and, since Bacon’s death, agriculture, more than any other 
single field, has benefited from the richness of the metaphor of nature as a 
machine. With it, we have straightened rivers and irrigated hayfields, 
hybridized corn and tripled rice yields, invented engines, powered tractors, 
synthesized chemicals and killed pests.103 The result has been an astonishing 
array of technologies making the lives of millions longer, better, and easier. 
But in the future, our deepest problems may not yield to solutions predicated 
on constantly finding new technological fixes.   
 Our challenge is to create a morally justifiable vision we can live by, 
a story based on a holistic, environmental, ethic. A story in which small 
family farms flourish; in which people seek the good of family and 
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community before the good of individuals and corporations; in which 
children are taught to work hard, to honor those who have gone before them, 
and to be native to their places. We must compose together a story that 
encourages respect for animal life. We must learn that we are part of a larger 
pattern, a pattern, Jackson observes, “not of our making.” 104 It is unclear at 
best whether any of the products of genetic engineering will help us to learn 
this lesson. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
 
1. The quotation is a gloss of Benjamin Farrington’s on section 98 of Francis Bacon’s Novum 
Organum. See Farrington, Francis Bacon: Philosopher of Industrial Science (NY: Henry 
Schumann, 1949): 109-110. Here is Bacon’s text: “ . . . as in ordinary life every person’s 
disposition . . . is most drawn out when they are disturbed--so the secrets of nature betray 
themselves more readily when tormented by art than when left to their own course.” For Bacon, 
see Advancement of Learning and Novum Organum (NY: P.F. Collier and Son, 1900): 351. 
The last sentence in the passage from Bacon’s “The Masculine Birth of Time,” The Works of 
Francis Bacon, Vol. III (Philadelphia: A. Hart, 1853): 534. 
2. Jeremy Rifkin, Algeny (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), pp. 50-51. 
3. Andrew Scott, The Creation of Life: Past, Future, Alien (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986): 
190, 201. 
4. Robert Sinsheimer, “The Prospect of Designed Genetic Change,” Engineering and Science 
Magazine, California Institute of Technology, April 1969. Quoted in Leon Kass, Toward a 
More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs (NY: Free Press, 1985): 77. Kass adds in a 
footnote that “Dr. Sinsheimer has since had a chance of heart, and has become one of the 
advocates of caution and sobriety” (p. 351). 
5. “Our comitment to providing safe and abundant foods,” American Farm Bureau Federation 
flyer, 1990. 
6. These statements by Lyng and Bentley are found in the USDA’s “Yearbook” for 1986, a 
comprehensive review of the Department’s scientific program. The book is widely circulated, 
and is regarded as a representative statement not only the USDA’s research efforts, but of its 
spirit as well.  
7. Martha Crouch, “Is Biotechnology Compatible with Sustainable Agriculture? No,” Ag 
Bioethics Forum 4 (June 1992): 6. 
8. Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962). 
 
168                                                                           Gary L. Comstock  
 
 
9. William Kittredge, an essay. Quoted by Jane Smiley in her lecture, “A Thousand Acres: How 
Much is Enough?” Iowa Humanities Board, winter 1991, manuscript, p. 25. 
10. Jane Smiley, “A Thousand Acres,” p. 25. 
11. G. E. Fogg and David Smith, The Explorations of Antarctica: The Last Unspoilt Continent 
(London: Cassell, 1990), pp. 179-180. 
12. Cf. Paul Thompson on risk optimization in his Food Biotechnology in Ethical Perspective 
(London:  Blackie, 1997), pp. 68-70, and Kristin Shrader-Frechette on rational risk evaluation, 
in her Risk and Rationality:  Philosophical Foundations for Populist Reforms (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1991), pp.  66-77 and 169-217. 
13. Norman Maclean, Young Men and Fire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
14 “Risk Posed by Large Scale Releases?” at http://nbiap.biochem.vt.edu/articles/apr9313.htm. 
15. Crouch, “Very Structure,” 151-158.  
16. Wilson, “Current State,” (1988), 10. 
17. Wilson, p. 8. 
18. Wilson, p. 10. 
19. Wilson, p. 9. 
20. T. M. Powledge, “Biotechnology Touches the Forest,” Bio/Technology 2 (September 1984): 
763-772; cited in Mark Sagoff, “Biotechnology and the Environment: What is at Risk?” 
Agriculture and Human Values 5 (Summer 1988): 28. 
21. William Allen, “Penn Prof Views Biotechnology as a Potential Threat to Tropical Forests,” 
Genetic Engineering News 7 (Nov-Dec 1987): 10. Quoted in Mark Sagoff, AHV, Summer 
1988, p. 27. 
22. Gail Wells, “Taking the Heat,” The Oregon Stater (December 1988): 9-10. 
23. “Official Sees Need to Ease Farms’ Oil Use,” Des Moines Register, 24 April 1988, quoting 
from World Watch magazine. 
24. “Official sees need to ease farms’ oil use,” Des Moines Register 24 April 1988. 
25. Paul Ehrlich, “The Loss of Diversity: Causes and Consequences,” in E. O. Wilson, “The 
Current State of Biological Diversity,” in Wilson, ed., Biodiversity (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy Press, 1988), p. 23. 
26. Don Worster, Meeting the Expectations, p. 61. 
27. Wes Jackson, quoted in J. Tevere MacFadyen in “Wes Jackson: Taking on the Agricultural 
Establishment,” Country Journal, July 1983, p. 74. 
28. Pierre Crosson, “Sustainable food production: Interactions among natural resources, 
technology and institutions,” Food Policy (May 1986): 143-156, citation at p. 150. 
29. Robert A. Young, and Gerald L. Horner, “Irrigated Agriculture and Mineralized Water,” in 
T. T. Phipps, P. R. Crosson, and K. A. Price, eds., Agriculture and the Environment 
(Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1986). Quoted in Reichelderfer, May 1989, p. 2. 
30. Sandra S. Batie, “Agriculture as the Problem: New Agendas and New Opportunities,” 
Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics 20 (1988): 1-12. Quoted in Reichelderfer, May 
1989, p. 2. 
31. Stephen R. Crutchfield, “Controlling Farm Pollution of Coastal Waters,” USDA, Economic 
Research Service, Agricultural Outlook, AO-136, November 1987, pp. 24-25. Quoted in 
Reichelderfer, May 1989, p. 2. 
32. In the Corn Belt, monoculture methods of raising corn entail a loss by wind, rain, and sheet 
erosion of 20 tons per acre of soil, or 2.3 bushels of black dirt for every bushel of corn 
harvested. Amory B. Lovins, L. Hunter Lovins, and Marty Bender, “Energy and Agriculture,” 
in Jackson, Meeting, p. 81. 
33. Lovins (1984), p. 81. 
34. Cf. Steve Cain, “The Wisdom of Solomon,” Soybean Digest (Mid-February 1991): 37. 
 
Against Ag Biotech                                                                                                  169 
  
 
35. Hans Jenny, “The Making and Unmaking of a Fertile Soil,” in Jackson, Meeting, p. 49. 
36. Katherine Reichelderfer, “Environmental Protection and Agricultural Support: Are Trade-
offs Necessary?” National Center for Food and Agricultural Policy, Discussion Paper Series, 
FAP89-03, May, 1989, Resources for the Future, p. 2, citing Marc O. Ribaudo, “Reducing Soil 
Erosion: Offsite Benefits,” USDA, Economic Research Service, Agricultural Economics 
Report No. 561, Washington, DC, September, 1986. 
37. Pimentel, Science 267 (27 February 1995). 
38. Robert E. Rhoades, “The World’s Food Supply at Risk,” National Geographic 178 (April 
1991): 83. 
39. Jerry Perkins, “A toehold on existence,” Des Moines Sunday Register, December 3, 1995, 
Section J, p. 2. 
40. Hans Peter Jorgensen, “An in situ model for preserving domestic animal diversity,” The 
Institute for Agricultural Biodiversity’s Preservation Breeder’s Network,” Luther College, 
Decorah, IA. Jorgensen cites Bixby, et al., Taking Stock: The north American Livestock Census 
(McDonald and Woodward, 1994).  
41. “Preserving Herd’s Diversity,” Des Moines Register 26 April 1992. 
42. Wilson, pp. 11-12. 
43. Wilson, p. 11. 
44. Goude, pp. 80-82. 
45. Goude, p. 83. 
46. We mismanage existent populations of wild animals by killing off predators. Sven Erik 
Jorgensen and William J. Mitsch, “Ecological Engineering Principles,” in W. J. Mitsch and S. 
E. Jorgensen, Ecological Engineering: An Introduction to Ecotechnology (NY: John Wiley and 
Sons, 1989), p. 29. 
47. Wilson, p. 13. 
48. Goude, p. 67. 
49.Andrew Goude, The Human Impact: Man’s role in Environmental Change (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1981), p. 67. 
50. Cf. claims to this effect by Paul Taylor and Baird Callicott. 
51. See Bernard Rollin, Between the Species 2 (1986): 88-89. 
52. Walter Goldschmidt, As You Sow (?) supply reference  
53. Quoted in Gilbert Fite, p. 1. 
54. Jackson, fourth annual message to Congress, quoted in Fite, p. 4. 
55. Letter to the editor of the Southern Cultivator, in July 1844. Quoted in Fite, p. 4. 
56. Renee Drury and Luther Tweeten, “Have Farmers Lost Their Uniqueness?” Anderson 
Report ESO 2237, Department of Agricultural Economics, The Ohio State University, 2120 
Fyffe Rd., Columbus, OH 43210, 1995, p. i. 
57. For an argument that feminists must oppose all forms of genetic engineering, see Linda 
Bullard, “Killing Us Softly: Toward a Feminist Analysis of Genetic Engineering,” in Patricia 
Spallone and Deborah Steinberg, eds., Made to Order: The Myth of Reproductive and Genetic 
Progress (New York: Teachers College Press, 1987). 
58. Carolyn E. Sachs, The Invisible Farmers: Women in Agricultural Production (Totowa: 
Rowman & Allanheld, 1983), pp. 4-5. Sachs cites Bengt Ankarloo, “Agriculture and Women’s 
Work: Directions of Change in the West, 1700-1900,” Journal of Family History 4 (1979): 
111-120. 
59. Heidi Hartmann, “Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation by Sex,” Signs 1 (1976): 137-
169. Quoted in Sachs, p. 72. 
60. Sachs, Invisible Farmers, p. 63. 
 
170                                                                           Gary L. Comstock  
 
 
61. Angus Wright, The Death of Ramon Gonzalez: The Modern Agricultural Dilemma (Austin, 
TX: University of Texas Press, 1990). 
62. See, for example, Wright (1990), and Susan George, Food for Beginners (New York: 
Writers and Readers Publishing, 1982). 
63. Crouch, “Biotechnology Is Not Compatible with Sustainable Agriculture,” Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 8 (1995): 98-111, citation at 102 and 103. 
64. Kathryn G. Dewey, “Nutrition and Agricultural Change,” in Agroecology, ed. by C. Ronald 
Caroll, John H. Vandermeeer and Peter Rosset (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990); citation to 
Ferroni at p. 464. Dewey is summarizing M. A. Ferroni, “The Urban Bias of Peruvian Food 
Policy: Consequences and Alternatives,” Cornell University Ph.D. dissertation, 1980. 
65. Raymond E. Crist, “Export Agriculture and the Expansion of Urban Slum Areas,” American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology 48 (April 1989): 144. 
66. P. H. Abelson, James W. Rowe, “A New Agricultural Frontier,” Science 235 (20 March 
1987). Cited in Crist, p. 145. 
67. Abelson, Rowe. Cited in Crist, p. 145. 
68. Edward Goldsmith, Nicholas Hildyard, Peter Bunyard, and Patrick McCully, “Whose 
Common Future? A Special Issue,” The Ecologist 22 (July/August 1992): 144. 
69. Crouch cites Kurien, 1991. 
70. Crouch cites Lohmann, 1990.  
71. Kloppenburg, “Defining the Challenges,” p. 9. 
72. Crouch, Forum, p. 6. 
73 Crouch, “Very Structure,” pp. 151, 156-157. 
74. Don Reeves, “Linking US Agricultural Trade Policies and Third World Development,” 
Bread for the World Background Paper No. 110, March 1989, p. 1. 
75. Reeves, “Linking,” p. 1. 
76. Lacy et al., (1988): 6. 
77. See Calestous Juma, The Gene Hunters: Biotechnology and the Scramble for Seeds 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), especially pp. 149-169, and 228-237. RAFI, a 
research organization in Pittsboro, North Carolina, publishes the newsletter, “RAFI 
Communique.”  
78. For ideas used in this analysis, [RAFI writes], RAFI acknowledges the contribution of Jose 
Souza Silva, and his paper: Silva, Jose de Souza, “From Medicinal Plants to Natural 
Pharmaceuticals: The Commodification of Nature,” presented at the Pan American Health 
Organization--InterAmerican Institute for Cooperation in agriculture, Symposium on 
Biodiversity, Biotechnology, and Sustainable Development, April 12-14, 1994, San Jose, Costa 
Rica. 
79. Lacy, Lacy, and Busch, p. 7. 
80. OTA, 1988, quoted in Lacy, Lacy, and Busch, p. 8. 
81. Crouch, “Very Structure,” p. 156. 
82. Crouch, “Very Structure,” p. 156. 
83. Crouch, “Very Structure,” pp. 151, 156-157. 
84. Cf. Wendell Berry, “Whose Head Is the Farmer Using? Whose Head Is Using the Farmer?” 
in Jackson, Meeting (1984), p. 24. 
85. Wilkes, quoted in Robert Rhoades, National Geographic, 1991, p. 83. 
86. Robert E. Rhoades, “The World’s Food Supply at Risk,” National Geographic 178 (April 
1991): 83. 
87. Jeremy Rifkin, “The New Cosmic Mirror” in Algeny, reprinted as “A Heretic’s View on the 
New Bioethics,” in Laurence Behrens and Leonard J. Rosen, eds. Writing and Reading Across 
the Curriculum 5th ed. (NY: HarperCollins, 1994). 
 
Against Ag Biotech                                                                                                  171 
  
 
88. Rifkin, Algeny, 17. 
89. Rifkin, p. 17. 
90. Rifkin, p. 19. 
91. Rifkin continues: “ . . . By draining the aliveness out of things, we can pretend that our 
control and manipulation are of little consequence. . . . Our respect and reverence for nature 
diminishes as we gain greater control over it.” Algeny, pp. 50-51. 
92. Rifkin, p. 17. 
93. Rifkin, p. 56. 
94. Wes Jackson, “Our Vision for the Agricultural Sciences Need Not Include Biotechnology,” 
The Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 4 (1991): 207-215, citation at pp. 207-
8. 
95. Jackson, “Vision,” p. 208. 
96. Jackson, p. 209. 
97 Fox links the spiritual sickness of technocracy to an exploding world population, fearing that 
ag biotech will only make that problem worse. He notes that Molecular Genetics, Inc., an ag 
biotech company in Minnesota, recently won a $2 million grant from the US Army to 
genefacture a vaccine for Rift Valley fever virus, “a disease of cattle and humans prevalent in 
the Middle East and Africa.” Fox is concerned not that the company will fail to produce the 
vaccine, or that it will produce it at too high a price, but rather that it will produce a cheap 
vaccine that is effective and useful. The result, he notes, will be an increase in the population 
levels of cattle and humans: 
 This is a Catch 22 situation, since the increase in human population of a Rift 
Valley fever vaccine would create the need for an expanded livestock 
population to sustain the people. A vicious circle will develop without rigorous 
birth-control programs and the adoption of alternative agricultural and food 
habits. 
Michael W. Fox, “On the Genetic Manipulation of Animals: A Response to Evelyn Pluhar,” 
Between the Species 1 (1985): 52. 
98. Fox, p. 52. 
99. Rifkin, p. 252. 
100. Wendell Berry, Remembering (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1988). 
101. Cf. Berry’s essay “Does Community Have a Value,” in Home Economics (San Francisco: 
North Point Press, 1987) esp. pp. 189-192.  
102. “Lancaster County: Farm Facts,” brochure produced by Agricultural Committee, Lancaster 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Cf. Berry, “Whose Head?” pp. 25-26. 
103. Cf. Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
104. Jackson, “Our Vision,” p. 214. 
  
 
Chapter 5 
 
Problems for the Case Against Ag Biotech, 
         Part I: Intrinsic Objections 
 
 
[I]t is important to see that the mere logical possibility of 
disaster is not sufficient to establish that the knowledge at issue 
ought not to be acquired. [For, were it so], we would quickly 
reach the absurd conclusion that [the research] both ought and 
ought not to be pursued. For just as it is logically possible that 
pursuing DNA research will lead to an unthinkable catastrophe, 
so it is logically possible that failing to pursue recombinant 
DNA research will lead to an unthinkable catastrophe. 
 
 -  Stephen Stich1 
 
 I worked for many years constructing my version of the global case 
but, as I continued to try to strengthen it, I slowly began to lose confidence. 
My unease began with several personal experiences. One of our children had 
a common but annoying physical ailment, for which our pediatrician 
prescribed a very expensive nasal spray. When I inquired about its cost, the 
pharmacist informed me that it was a new, genetically engineered, product. 
The spray worked, and Karen and I never batted an eye. 
Shortly thereafter, two of my diabetic friends independently disclosed 
that they were using a new, genetically modified, source of insulin. Each was 
satisfied with the product because it was cheaper and caused fewer side-
effects, and was reportedly purer, than what they had previously used. I 
nodded approvingly. 
How could I so readily accept medical biotechnologies while 
continuing to oppose ag biotechnologies? 
I also met scientists who seemed to be counterexamples to the global 
case, researchers committed to using ag biotech for ends in which I believed. 
In 1991, I assumed the role of Coordinator of the Bioethics Program at my 
university. My responsibilities included the privilege of chairing a committee 
to plan a faculty development workshop intended to introduce discussions of 
ethical issues into life science courses.  The workshop brought to campus 
various lecturers on ethical topics associated with ag biotech, including 
Martha Crouch and Wes Jackson.  Both laid out formidable defenses of 
something like the global case. It seemed clear to those of us on the 
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committee that these views demanded a response, and we looked for 
scientists to defend ag biotech. We first found Donald Duvick, retired chief 
plant breeder at Pioneer Hi-Bred, a private seed company in Iowa.2 
 Duvick delivered a paper in 1991 arguing that ag biotech would in 
the long run assist the cause of sustainable agriculture by providing diverse 
alternative crops genetically modified to suit the bioregions of different 
farmers.3 His arguments planted seeds of doubt in my mind about two pillars 
of the global case:  that ag biotech is environmentally unfriendly, and that it 
requires the paradigm of modern agriculture. Might we be able to decouple ag 
biotech from MA after all, and turn ag biotech to acceptable environmental 
and social goals?  
Roger Beachy, a plant molecular biologist then at the Scripps Lab in 
La Jolla, California, also discussed his research with us. Beachy aims to help 
capital-poor subsistence farmers in developing countries by breeding new 
varieties of native crops capable of withstanding attacks by plant viruses. 
Beachy is working, for example, to bioengineer viral resistance into cassava. 
There is no world market for cassava, and yet cassava is an essential source 
of food for billions of people in the developing world.  
Beachy pointed out that the techniques and implements of ag biotech 
become more affordable every day. He described a group of scientists in 
Vietnam using jerry-rigged equipment and tissue culture techniques to 
produce disease-free potatoes. And another group in Zimbabwe, who had 
constructed a bare-bones lab to genetically engineer virus-free fruit. Might it 
be possible to decouple ag biotech from the high-technology, monocultural, 
export-driven system of contemporary farming and integrate it into the local 
economies of less advantaged nations? 
 I continued to work at strengthening my global argument throughout 
the mid-1990s, but I was never sure that I had good answers for the questions 
raised by defenders of ag biotech. Personal experiences with medical biotech 
and two individual genetic engineers pursuing agricultural research goals in 
which I believed might not count for much for those approaching ethics with 
an abstract calculus. But, as I explained in the Introduction, first-hand 
experiences are significant, and offer pragmatic resources for solving 
problems.  
 Anecdotal experience, however, was not decisive in the end. 
Scientific and, alas, abstractly philosophical weaknesses in the global case 
were ultimately the factors leading me to change my mind. 
Logically, my difficulties began with the observation by Stephen 
Stich that at least two uses can be made of the claim that biotechnology may 
have disastrous future consequences. One may use this claim to argue against 
the technology, or one may use it to argue for the technology.  The problem 
can be put most clearly by considering the precautionary principle. 
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 Many opponents of GM crops, and especially those in Europe, appeal 
to a particular philosophical principle to support their views. As formulated 
in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 
precautionary principle (PP) states that  
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation. 
PP implies that we should not go forward with a new technology unless we 
are certain that it will be safe for humans and the environment.  The principle 
is a clear expression of our natural risk-aversion and is so intuitively 
appealing that is has been codified into international law.  Indeed, the 
European Union (EU) has invoked PP to justify its current moratorium on 
GM crops.4  
The EU is correct that an implication of PP is to halt ag biotech.5 But 
is this its only implication?  
 Suppose global warming intensifies and comes, as some now darkly 
predict, to interfere dramatically with food production and distribution. As 
we noted in ch. 2, massive dislocations in international trade and 
corresponding political power would follow global food shortages, affecting 
all regions and nations. In desperate attempts to feed themselves, billions 
would begin to pillage game animals, clear-cut forests to plant crops, and 
cultivate previously non-productive lands. Those with access to fertilizers and 
pesticides would begin to apply them at higher than recommended rates. The 
less fortunate would be forced to hunt animals of endangered species. 
Previously non-endangered species would be put at risk of extermination by 
marauding bands of humans.  The human population would, as Michael W. 
Fox fears in ch. 4, launch a massive assault on what Leopold calls the land. 
 Perhaps not a likely scenario, but not entirely implausible, either. GM 
crops could help to prevent it, by providing hardier versions of traditional 
lines capable of growing in drought conditions, or in saline soils, or under 
unusual climactic stresses in previously temperate zones, or in zones in which 
we have no prior agronomic experience. 
 On the supposition that we might need the tools of genetic 
engineering to avert future episodes of crushing human attacks on the 
environment, PP requires that we go forward, full speed, with GM crops. 
Yes, we lack full scientific certainty that developing GM crops will prevent 
environmental degradation. True, we do not know what the full financial cost 
of GM research and development will be. But if GM technology helps to save 
the land, few will not deem that price cost-effective. So, according to the 
terms of PP, lack of full scientific certainty that GM crops will prevent 
environmental degradation shall not be used as a reason for postponing this 
potentially cost-effective measure. 
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 Logical analysis shows that the precautionary principle commits us to 
each of the following propositions:  
(i) We must not develop GM crops.  
 (ii) We must develop GM crops. 
Yet (i) and (ii) are plainly contradictory, obliging us to perform two 
incompatible actions. The policy implications of the precautionary principle, 
therefore, are incoherent. 
 As a result of thinking about the relevance of Stich’s argument to 
innovations in farming, I grew increasingly skeptical about objections to ag 
biotech based on unspecified claims about future disasters that ag biotech 
might cause. And I began to wonder whether I would have to change my mind 
about ag biotech the way I had changed my mind about animal rights. 
 What of family farms?  What of the vision of a countryside teeming 
with barns, bats, birds and boys? 
 I continue to believe that ag biotech will vex small and medium sized 
farms.  But this worry no longer carries the significance for me that it once 
did.  An extended explanation of this point is in order.  
 New technologies are adopted because they use resources more 
efficiently. If the resource being used more efficiently is labor, then 
efficacious new technologies inevitably reduce the need for labor in the long 
run.  This process happens in every industry, from the production of salt 
shakers to software.  
 Every new ag technology also harms some farmer or other because it 
eventually contributes to what economists call the rationalization of the 
industry. As efficiency of production goes up and more and more goods are 
produced more and more cheaply, the price the consumer must pay for the 
goods goes down. Consequently, fewer and fewer farmers can remain in the 
industry because they must have more and more land over which to spread 
their costs. Yes, ag biotech will almost certainly play a role in the demise of 
family farming because it increases efficiency of production.  How could I, so 
committed to family farms, even consider accepting this consequence? 
 First, because it seems a fait accompli if the US has already lost its 
family farms.  In the fifty years following 1940, before any ag biotech 
products had come onto the market Iowa, for example, had lost three-quarters 
of its farms.6 Future historians will not place the blame for the loss of the 
family farm on ag biotech; they will place it on fertilizers, tractors, pesticides, 
international markets, and high yielding varieties,  all of which came along 
before bGH and transgenic animals. 
 Second, because it may be impossible to do otherwise. Which new 
technology would favor all and only family farms? By definition, advances in 
technology bring comparative advantages for some and not others, with 
greatest advantages enjoyed by those who first use the technique. The 
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principle holds true for all sizes of farmers. Just as first adopters of advances 
in MA enjoy comparative advantages over other MA farmers, so first 
adopters of advances in organic, sustainable, or permaculture farming enjoy 
comparative advantages over other organic, sustainable, or permaculture 
farmers. The dislocating effects of technical change are not confined to MA.  
Technical changes in every farm sector and farm size category work against 
someone, even if the change has been designed to assist a targeted class.  
 The point bears underscoring. Imagine a technology specifically 
intended to bring advantages to smaller over larger farmers, say, a small fuel-
efficient tractor or a new easy-to-use, hand-applied, natural insecticide. To 
the extent that the technology succeeds, it will bring advantages to some 
small farmers.  But not to all small farmers: only to those who adopt first.  
 It seems there is no middle ground here. Either we stop technological 
innovation altogether, or we accept the fact that it will inevitably displace 
some. As a result, we have two choices. Either we adopt the neo-Luddite line 
and oppose all ag technologies on the grounds that they will eventually drive 
some farmers out of business. Or, we bite the bullet, acknowledge that every 
new ag technology will inevitably harm many farmers, and set to work to 
devise cultural strategies to help displaced farmers find other lines of work.  
Not surprisingly, the second strategy is practiced by farm families throughout 
history, including the Amish, who know that, try as they might, they cannot 
place all of their children in farming. 
 Few of us are prepared categorically to oppose all technology, since 
that position quickly reduces to self-contradiction for anyone interested in 
using the telephone, fax, or email. We must accept not unregulated 
technological change, but some form of technological change nonetheless. As 
we do so, we ought to find ways to provide effective social mechanisms by 
which we can alert farmers to the inherent dangers of business in a 
technologically “progressive” world, mechanisms that can assist them in 
making adjustments and transitions. But it seems unfair to single out ag 
biotech for condemnation. 
 I have, alas, come to believe that we have already lost the family 
farm; that ag biotech played no role in its loss; and that no new technologies 
can be counted on to revive it. 
 Consider again the first point:  While family farmers have continued 
to go out of business in the last two decades, the losses cannot be pinned on 
ag biotech. In my 1988 essay, I interpreted Kalter’s data as predicting that 
bGH would drive fifteen to twenty-five percent of all dairy farmers out of 
business. But dairy farmers were driven out of the dairy business in 
comparable numbers by market and regulatory forces long before bGH was 
available for commercial use. Magrath and Tauer predicted in 1986 that as 
many as 5400 dairy farms in New York would fail in a three year period if 
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dairy price supports were reduced or removed. The Magrath/Tauer prediction 
came true before 1990. During the relevant period, however, bGH was hung 
up in regulatory safety tests and not available for use until 1992. In sum, 
thousands of New York dairy farmers went out of business between 1986 and 
1992. However, bGH, not being on the market, played no role in their 
decisions. 
 Is it fair then to criticize bGH, as I did in ch.1, on the grounds that it 
will lead to future injustices?  
 I have been making negative arguments against the claim that ag 
biotech will bankrupt family farmers.  There are also positive arguments to be 
made on behalf of bGH. Let us return to the argument mentioned in ch. 1. If 
lower milk production costs lead in turn to lower food prices, lower food 
prices will benefit most those at the bottom of the ladder. 
 Luther Tweeten, an agricultural economist at Ohio State University, 
argues that the important point about bGH is not that the technology increases 
the amount of milk each cow produces but, rather, that it increases the 
efficiency with which each cow produces. Increased efficiency at the animal 
level leads to lower milk production costs at the farm level, and lower 
production costs on the farm translate in turn to lower milk prices at the 
supermarket level. Milk is a staple food, meaning that poor people must 
consume an amount of it roughly equal to that consumed by a rich person. 
 But are savings at the farm level actually passed on to consumers? 
Relying on comprehensive empirical data from a study by Kinnucan and 
Forker, Tweeten argues that decreases in farm dairy product prices are 
eventually enjoyed as savings by food consumers. To make the case, Tweeten 
reviews the literature on different dairy policy scenarios, adoption rates, 
likely consumer acceptance percentages, and bGH scale neutrality. He 
suggests that the data shows that lesser well-off American consumers benefit 
more from bGH than well-off Americans. According to Tweeten’s 
calculations, American families grossing over $40,000 a year will save some 
$13 a year in milk and dairy product purchases if bGH is implemented. Poor 
Americans, those making less than $10,000 will save some $7 per year. On 
the face of it, this hardly seems to be an equitable result, with the rich 
receiving twice as great a savings from bGH as the poor. 
 However, the numbers must be adjusted for family size and marginal 
utility of income because rich and poor families typically differ in size and, 
while both kinds of families consume roughly the same amount of dairy 
products per person per year, the value of the respective dairy savings varies 
between rich and poor. For someone making over $40,000 per year, an extra 
$13 in the pocket means comparatively less than an extra $7 in the pocket for 
someone making less than $10,000. Because the demand for milk and dairy 
products is steady and inelastic, the bGH savings as a percentage of the rich 
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family’s income is estimated at 0.02, whereas for the poor family, it is 0.2. In 
other words, the poor family’s saving of $7 per year is 10 times more 
important to them as the rich family’s saving of $13. Tweeten concludes that 
“the net benefits from bGH would be distributed more equitably in relation to 
consumers’ income than [any other] farm . . . technologies.” 
 If bGH were not to be used, writes Tweeten, we would in effect be 
charging poor families a “milk tax” of $7 per year.7 It seems difficult to think 
of a justification to ask the poor to pay a milk tax of $7 per year. To save 
family farms? But slightly higher milk prices will not be sufficient to save 
family farms. 
Progressively lower milk prices, combined with progressively lower 
prices on other food items, are positive benefits to consumers, but especially 
to the least advantaged. Lower prices come from increased efficiency of 
production. In the US, yields of corn and soybeans tripled during the present 
century.8 In 1900, Americans spent about forty percent of their income on 
food, whereas, in 2000, the figure has been cut to about fifteen percent. 
Increased efficiency of production has also enlarged the food choices of 
consumers in developed countries. In 1941, there were on average some 
fifteen hundred food items in grocery stores; today the figure is closer to 
fifteen thousand.9 Taken as a whole, MA also brings benefits to those farmers 
with comparative advantages.  They have lower input and labor costs overall, 
and must spend fewer hours in the field making passes over the crops. In 
1910, the number of hours of labor required to produce a bushel of corn was 
fifty times as great as it is today. Consequently, farmers who are rapid 
adopters and good managers have more hours available to spend, say, with 
family members. 
 These positive arguments on behalf of ag biotech have been 
accompanied in my own experience by a renewed understanding of the 
realities of the farm I care most about. The Pippert farm continues to be 
owned and operated by a family, but it is no longer the family’s sole source of 
income and it is now incorporated.  The traditional family farmer rotated 
many different crops, integrated animals into the recycling of nutrients, 
received very little income from off-farm activities or government subsidies, 
produced most of the food consumed on the farm, and was not incorporated.  
The Pipperts no longer employ these strategies. 
 As my aunt and uncle have helped me to understand, their farm is not 
the farm celebrated in the children’s song, “Old McDonald.” Nor was it in 
1988. Uncle Harold and Jason successfully raise corn and soybeans as cash 
crops in a two-year rotation, using the best available techniques of modern 
agriculture. Paying off college loans, they cannot afford to make a living 
raising a few chickens, hogs, and sheep. Now that Misty has died and her 
paddock and stall are empty, there are few animals on the farm other than the 
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German shepherd, Kulo. Aunt Sandy, an accomplished teacher whose work in 
the community is widely respected, contributes substantial off-farm income to 
the household and has a wondrous garden. But she buys most of her groceries 
at the Hy-Vee. 
 I provide this information in the interest of a more accurate view of a 
typical Midwestern farm, and to explain my diminished confidence in the 
propriety of using tax monies to support commodity prices as a way to save 
the traditional mixed farm of decades past. Given a level playing field, some 
farmers will find innovative strategies to stay on the land. The Pipperts have 
remained in farming in part by renting and buying additional land, in part by 
diversifying their operation. Harold contracts with a local pudding producer 
to haul away milk left-over in the factory’s pipes after a day of production. 
He incorporates the organic slurry into his soil, building up its fertility and 
contributing cash income to the farm operation. If it is wrong-headed to use 
taxpayers’ dollars to support commodities (tax dollars that provide the largest 
benefits to the largest farmers), or to ban new technologies, it is not wrong-
headed to expect that many Midwestern family-owned and family-operated 
mid-sized farms will find ways to survive on their own. 
 As my hope for mixed, smallish family farms diminished, my 
strongest objection to ag biotech lost its hold. At the same time, my worries 
about potential future environmental GMO catastrophes were outweighed by 
my belief that environmental damage might actually be more likely without 
GMOs. And the idea that ag biotech was an inseparable part of MA was 
undercut by the projects of scientists using genetic engineering for crops in 
developing countries.  
 I did not give up easily on the global case.  Knowing that it has many 
facets, I determined to consider each on its own merits.  
 
Fourteen intrinsic arguments 
 
 The global case against GMOs consists of two kinds of arguments, 
extrinsic and intrinsic.10  
Extrinsic objections focus on the allegedly harmful consequences of 
GMOs, and argue that ag biotech should not be pursued because of its 
anticipated results. Briefly stated, the extrinsic objections go as follows. 
GMOs may have disastrous effects on animals, ecosystems, and humans. 
Possible harms to humans include perpetuation of social inequities in modern 
agriculture, decreased food security for women and children on subsistence 
farms in developing countries, a growing gap between well capitalized 
economies in the Northern hemisphere and less capitalized peasant 
economies in the South, risks to the food security of future generations, and 
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the promotion of reductionistic and exploitative science. Potential harms to 
ecosystems include possible environmental catastrophe, inevitable narrowing 
of germplasm diversity, and irreversible loss or degradation of air, soils, and 
waters. Potential harms to animals include unjustified pain to individuals 
used in research and production. 
Intrinsic objections to GMOs maintain that the process of making 
GMOs is objectionable in itself. This belief is defended in several ways, but 
almost all of the formulations are related to one central claim, the 
unnaturalness objection: 
It is unnatural to genetically engineer plants, animals, and 
foods (UE). 
If UE is true, then scientists ought not to be engaged in bioengineering, 
however unfortunate may be the consequences of halting the technology.  
Of the two sorts of arguments, intrinsic objections are the more 
powerful because if they are legitimate, then we should not develop GMOs, 
full stop. If society comes to accept UE as the conclusion of a sound 
argument, then much agricultural research must be terminated immediately 
and potentially significant benefits from the fledgling industry sacrificed. A 
great deal is at stake. 
There are at least fourteen ways to defend UE. 
 
(1) To engage in ag biotech is to do what finite beings cannot do: 
transfer genes from one species to another. 
(2) To engage in ag biotech is to play God. 
(3) To engage in ag biotech is to invent new technology, an activity 
that should be reserved to God alone. 
(4) To engage in ag biotech is to invent world-changing technology, an 
activity that should be reserved to God alone. 
(5) To engage in ag biotech is to arrogate historically unprecedented 
power to ourselves. 
(6) To engage in ag biotech is to exhibit arrogance, hubris, and 
disaffection. 
(7) To engage in ag biotech is unnatural because it is to transfer the 
essence of one living being into another. 
(8) To engage in ag biotech is unnatural because it is to change the 
telos, or end, of an individual. 
(9) To engage in ag biotech is illegitimately to cross species 
boundaries. 
(10) To engage in ag biotech is unnatural because it is to use 
nonsexual means to reproduce. 
182                                                                           Gary L. Comstock  
 
(11) To engage in ag biotech is unnatural because it causes harm to 
sentient beings. 
(12) To engage in ag biotech is to commodify life. 
(13) To engage in ag biotech is to disrespect life by patenting it. 
(14) To engage in ag biotech is unnatural because it disrupts the 
integrity, beauty, and balance of creation. 
 
Consider each claim in turn. 
 
(1) To engage in ag biotech is to do what finite beings cannot do: transfer 
genes from one species to another.  
 
Were we to assert this claim at any time in history prior to 1981, we 
would be on firm ground, if we meant that we lacked the power to transfer 
genes across species lines via microinjection. But during the last two decades 
the ground has shifted, and the facts now give the lie to this premise. These 
days, scientists transfer genes from one species to another on an hourly basis. 
So (1) is a straightforward empirical claim. And it is false. 
The unnaturalness objection is not usually intended as an empirical 
claim, however. Rather it is often formulated as a normative claim, as 
follows. 
 
(2) To engage in ag biotech is to play God. 
 
In a western theological framework, humans are creatures, subjects of 
the Lord of the Universe, and it would be impious for them to arrogate to 
themselves roles and powers appropriate only for the Creator. God created 
plants and we ought not to think that plants were put here for us to exploit. 
Shifting genes around between individuals and species is taking on a task not 
appropriate for us, subordinate beings. Therefore, to engage in bioengineering 
is to play God. 
There are several problems with this argument. First, there are 
different interpretations of God. Absent the guidance of any specific religious 
tradition, it is logically possible that God could be a Being who wants to turn 
over to us all divine prerogatives; or explicitly wants to turn over to us at 
least the prerogative of engineering plants; or who doesn’t care what we do. 
If God is any of these beings, then the argument fails because playing God in 
this instance is not a bad thing. 
The argument seems to assume, however, that God is not like any of 
the gods just described. Assume that the orthodox Jewish and Christian view 
of God is correct, that God is the only personal, perfect, necessarily existing, 
all-loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful being. On this traditional western 
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theistic view, finite humans should not aspire to infinite knowledge and 
power. To the extent that bioengineering is an attempt to control nature itself, 
the argument would go, bioengineering would be an unacceptable attempt to 
usurp God’s dominion. So what’s wrong with this argument? Simply that not 
all traditional Jews and Christians think that this God would rule out genetic 
engineering. Here the problem is the plurality of views, not between very 
different religious communities, but within a single, relatively homogeneous, 
religious community. Traditional theists disagree with each other about God’s 
character and the scope of things God does not want humans doing. Consider 
Judaism. In the mystical traditions of the Kabbalah, God is understood as One 
who expects humans to be co-creators, technicians working with God to 
improve the world. At least one Jewish philosopher, Baruch Brody, has 
suggested that biotechnology may be a vehicle ordained by God for the 
perfection of nature.11 
And why not? If humans are made in the divine image, and if God 
desires that we exercise the spark of divinity within us, then it should be no 
surprise that inquisitiveness in science is part of our nature. Creative impulses 
are not found only in the literary, musical, and plastic arts. They are part of 
molecular biology, cellular theory, and evolutionary genetics, too. It is 
unclear why the desire to investigate and manipulate the chemical bases of 
life should not be considered as much a manifestation of our god-like nature 
as the writing of poetry and the playing of sonatas should be. As a way of 
providing theological content for UE, then, argument (2) is unsatisfactory 
because ambiguous and contentious. There are two more theological 
interpretations of UE. 
 
(3) To engage in ag biotech is to invent new technology, an activity that 
should be reserved to God alone. 
 
Some of the literature attacking bioengineering takes a neo-Luddite 
line, suggesting that any new technology is suspect, that technology itself is 
the problem. These attacks typically are written on personal computers, 
printed on recycled paper and, often, disseminated through email across the 
internet. The difficulty here should be obvious. To oppose all technology is to 
deny our talents, presumably God-given. It seems counterintuitive 
theologically to commit oneself to a view that entails the conclusion that 
writing itself is unnatural. One need hardly note that the Scriptures 
themselves would not exist were it not for the technology of writing. 
But perhaps we are selling this argument short. Here is a stronger 
version: 
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(4) To engage in ag biotech is to invent world-changing technology, an 
activity that should be reserved to God alone. 
 
Let us consider (4) in conjunction with the next objection.  
 
(5) To engage in ag biotech is to arrogate historically unprecedented power 
to ourselves. 
 
 The argument here is not the strong one, that biotech gives us divine 
power, but the more modest one, that it gives us a power we have not had 
previously. Given the astonishing practices of transgenesis, such as the 
movement of genes between fish and tomatoes, humans and hogs, one claim 
is obviously true: Ag biotech gives us power we have not previously 
possessed. But it would be counterintuitive to judge an action wrong simply 
because it has never been performed. On this view, it would have been wrong 
to do any of the following for the first time: prescribe a new herbal remedy 
for menstrual cramps; invent a new, more efficient, route for one’s irrigation 
ditch; perform a Caesarean section; administer an anaesthetic; use a ballpoint 
pen. Much more is needed to call historically unprecedented actions morally 
wrong. What is needed is to know to what extent our new powers will 
transform society, whether we have witnessed prior transformations of this 
sort, and whether those transitions are morally acceptable. 
 We do not know how extensive the ag biotech revolution will be, but 
let us assume that it will be as dramatic as its greatest proponents assert. Have 
we ever witnessed comparable transitions? Probably. The change from 
hunting and gathering to agriculture was an astonishing transformation. Until 
ten thousand or so years ago (and in various locations yet today), people did 
not practice soil cultivation or animal domestication. Instead, they spent 
between 30 and 40 percent of their waking hours insuring that they would 
have enough food to eat and clothes to wear. They spent the balance of their 
time, several hours every day, dancing, playing drums, enjoying their 
children, going into trances, and telling stories.12 Hunters and gatherers 
regarded the earth with religious devotion, and told sacred myths of a great 
Mother Goddess who blessed and cared for all animals; who required 
respectful treatment of her flora and fauna; and who blessed with food those 
who treated her with respect while withholding food from those who treated 
her with disrespect. 
 Eight or so thousand years ago, ancient brewers in Sumer and 
Babylon began making beer out of barley and hops while turning water into 
wine using grapes and vats. No one back then would have explained their 
actions this way, but they employed fermentation techniques on cereal grains, 
encouraging yeast cell organisms to swallow the grain and produce nutrients. 
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Yeast grows by ingesting feedstuffs and giving off by-products, such as 
alcohol. Liquids shunned by the Women’s Christian Temperance Union were 
not the only products of early bioprocessing, however. When the Hebraic 
tribes made their exodus from Egypt without leavened bread three thousand 
years ago they were temporarily doing without a fermented staple of their diet 
which their Egyptian hosts had already been making themselves for a 
thousand years.13 
 Around five thousand years ago, farmers in the Middle East raised 
grain using only human muscles, hoes, and digging sticks. When they began 
to capture, feed, and slaughter animals, they increased their food security. As 
they domesticated sheep, goats, and cattle, and worked to invent the plow, 
they figured out how to hitch cattle to the implement, were able to grow more 
grain than they could eat, and allowed the growth of cities. The kind of power 
that arose from the domestication of animals and the use of the plow can 
scarcely be overestimated. As William McNeill puts it, “That was how 
civilization arose--on the backs of the farmers.”14  
 The historically unprecedented nature of the dawn of agricultural 
technology can be seen in the way the carrying capacity of the earth expanded 
in a relatively short period of time. Seventy five thousand years ago, world 
population stood at around five million. The population level remained nearly 
constant for more than 50,000 years and, about 10,000 years ago, population 
was still at five million. As the transition to agriculture provided huge 
increases in the amount of available food, however, population expanded 
dramatically. Within a period of four or five thousand years, population went 
from its plateau at five million to more than one hundred million. Along with 
this increase in the sheer number of humans on the globe came a rise in the 
amount and complexity of cultural activity. Writing, philosophy, music, the 
arts, politics, and architecture all got their start during this time. So what sort 
of power did people arrogate to themselves when they moved from hunting 
and gathering to agriculture? It is not hyperbole to answer: the power of 
civilization itself. 
 Some new technologies bring radically novel ways of perceiving and 
structuring the world. A new horse expands the horizons by tripling the 
distance one can cover in a day; a new plow doubles the amount of wheat I 
can produce in one year. Producing more wheat means finding ways to use or 
sell more of it. Selling surplus wheat means finding markets and seeking 
mechanisms to protect oneself from the vicissitudes of changing market 
prices. Changes in the kinds of animals and plants bred, eaten, and used by a 
people bring changes in the people, too. The traditional culture of the Plains 
Indians in the United States, for example, became much more mobile, 
aggressive, and well-fed when these native Americans began to capture and 
tame wild bands of horses drifting north out of what we now know as 
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Mexico. When the Nez Perce nation began to breed horses selectively for 
agility and compactness, that nation not only introduced the Appaloosa to the 
world, but dramatically improved its own skills in hunting and warring.15 
 It is probably true that ag biotech brings us historically 
unprecedented powers. But this in itself is not an argument against ag 
biotech. On at least one prior occasion we have arrogated to ourselves 
historically unprecedented powers, and we are none the worse for it. 
 The objections stated in (4) and (5) are weak for two reasons. First, 
there is nothing intrinsically wrong with discovering and exercising new 
powers. Second, unless one thinks improved diet and food security are bad 
things and is prepared to object to agriculture itself, one cannot consistently 
object to ag biotech on the mere grounds that the transition introduces an 
unprecedented, world-changing, epoch. 
 
(6) To engage in ag biotech is to exhibit arrogance, hubris, and 
disaffection.  
 
 It is certainly true that certain practices can dull one’s sensibilities to 
pain and suffering. Many surgical students have an initial visceral reaction 
against cutting into human flesh, and the lengthy process of practicing 
surgery in residency is in part intended to help overcome the budding 
surgeon’s aversion to the procedure. Some students in veterinary schools 
report a similar effect, that dissection in biology labs and junior surgery 
classes in vet school seem to make them less sensitive to animal suffering and 
pain. Thus it is possible that animal biotech as a practice might render some 
less sensitive to the well-being of research animals in particular and, perhaps, 
all animals in general. 
 But it hardly seems that the process of desensitization is necessarily a 
part of animal biotech, and there are certainly animal as well as plant 
biotechnologists who have not been rendered insensitive by their labwork. 
Stephen Jay Gould does not disagree with Jeremy Rifkin’s concern that we 
respect “the integrity of evolutionary lineages.” And, as he points out, 
 It would be a bleak world indeed that treated living things as 
no more than separable sequences of information, available 
for disarticulation and recombination in any order that 
pleased human whim.  
And yet Gould is unconvinced that engaging in biotechnology will 
lead to a debased attitude toward life. 
 I do not see why we should reject all of genetic engineering 
because its technology might, one day, permit such a 
perversion of decency in the hands of some latter-day Hitler.  
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You may as well outlaw printing because the same machine 
that composes Shakespeare can also set Mein Kampf.16 
 Gould concludes that “the domino theory does not apply to all human 
achievements,” therein identifying the problem with Rifkin’s argument. (6) 
requires that we follow a slippery slope from relatively benign genetic 
engineering of plants and animals to starkly horrific genetic engineering of 
humans. But the slide down the slope is not inevitable, and can be blocked. 
There are counterexamples, including plant biologists using genetic 
engineering only to assist in the production of staple crops for the world’s 
neediest people.  
 
(7) To engage in ag biotech is unnatural because it is to transfer the 
essence of one living being into another. 
 
This objection deserves extended discussion because it raises the following 
questions.  When we transfer a gene from, say, a fish into a squash, 
are we conveying more than working base pairs? Are we 
conveying essence, somehow? Are we gaining not just genes 
in a new place, but also “ness”? -- fishness? Squashness? 
Human-ness? Will scientific explanations alone suffice to 
clarify this possibility? How do we account for our quizzical 
feelings that genes convey, something, somehow?17 
The questions were originally put to me in a letter from Steven Burke inviting 
me to give a paper at a conference on ethics and genetic engineering. The 
questions are provocative because they suggest that the issue is moral rather 
than scientific. The question is not only, Are we transferring essences in 
genetic engineering? But also, If we reach the point where we are capable of 
transferring essences, should we do so?  
 First, we should not think that in transferring a gene we are 
transferring anything like an essence because in transferring chemical base 
pairs we may not change the organism. Imagine a petrie dish filled with 
bacteria.  Into one of these bacterium we insert a single, inoperative, gene. It 
would seem odd to say that we have changed the bacteria, in any significant 
sense of the word changed, because the degree of change we have introduced 
could well be within the normal pattern of variation for this bacterial strain. 
Every strain of bacteria has a certain degree of variance, a family of typical 
chemicals that distinguishes the strain from other strains.  But, all the while, a 
large number of other atypical chemicals come and go. Each bacterium 
regularly ingests foreign DNA sequences through insertions, mutations, and 
recombinations, or deletes existing DNA sequences. These changes often 
have no effect on the bacteria’s functions. The bacteria is regularly changing, 
in a trivial sense, by taking on a variety of new chemicals in each generation. 
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But to claim that the essence of the bacterium changes every time a stray 
chemical enters would make it impossible to identify any continuing essence 
for the bacterium. 
 The bacterial change just discussed provides a reason for believing 
that the action of inserting, say, a gene from a fruitfly encoding a protein 
responsible for the production of rosey color in the fruitfly’s eyes into a 
bacterium is to change the bacterium only in the most trivial sense. It 
certainly is not to transfer the essence of the fruitfly into the bacterium. The 
moral: Transferring a fruit fly gene into a bacterium, even if it changes the 
bacteria’s chemical structure, does not necessarily add any function or trait of 
the fruit fly to the bacteria. It certainly does not transfer `fruit flyness.’   
 But larger-scale changes to a bacterium’s chromosomes certainly 
could change some of its functions.  Might gross substitutions of genes 
change something’s essence? 
 Suppose things have essences, that is, sets of properties that make 
them what they are: the intrinsic and indispensable conceptual characteristics 
of things. To transgenically transfer an essence via genetic engineering from 
organism A to organism B would be to move the essence of A into B where A 
and B were unrelated in nature, that is, could not recombine genes through 
natural means of reproduction. 
 There are at least two different ways of looking at nature. 
Essentialism thinks that the differences between, say, tomatoes and fish are 
grounded in two different sets of properties: the “essences” or “ideas” of the 
tomato and the fish. Essentialists are committed, as Elliot Sober explains to 
“there being some property which all and only the members of [a] species 
possess . . . some characteristic unique to and shared by all members of [the 
species] which explains why they are the way they are.”18 For essentialists, 
the essence of a tomato is fixed and unchanging. Applying this view to ethics, 
natural law essentialists would hold that it is immoral to tamper with the 
natural essences of things. 
 But the problem is that tomatoes are not fixed and unchanging. Just 
as there is tremendous variability within bacterial species, so there is 
tremendous variability within tomato species. Tomato genotypes vary within 
a single generation, and between generations. Modern evolutionary biology 
offers little hope for justifying the claim that there is a single essence 
identifying all tomatoes. 
 An example: Consider a single trait of the cherry tomato genotype, 
the height of the mature plant. We might ask, “What height is the `natural’ 
height of this genotype?” If we are looking for the essence of the cherry 
tomato, the essential cherry tomato plant will surely have an ideal or 
`essential’ height. But population genetics informs us that there is no answer 
to this question. You can take exactly the same cherry tomato genes and grow 
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them under different environmental conditions and the height of the resulting 
identical plants will vary widely depending on the amount of sunlight, rain, 
and nutrients each receives. Conclusion: Not only are organisms constantly 
evolving and changing, but there is no “natural state” for any organism 
independent of the environment in which it lives. Rather, there is a wide 
range of phenotypes, which geneticists call the “norm of reaction,” which 
identifies all of the individuals of a single species. 
 In sum, (7) fails for several reasons. We can transfer genes without 
transferring essences; it is impossible to identify the essence of a thing simply 
by describing its genome without describing its environment; and, in any 
case, it is unclear at best whether things have essences at all. Rather than 
worrying about changing something’s essence, perhaps we ought to worry 
about interfering with their interests, causing them pain, harming them. 
 
(8) To engage in ag biotech is unnatural because it is to change the telos, 
or end, of an individual.  
 
 Bernard Rollin has raised this matter forcefully in arguing that every 
animal has an end to which it is directed. He holds, with Aristotle, that each 
animal has a nature, “genetically based, physically and psychologically 
expressed,” which determines “how they live in their environments.”19 
Assuming that animals have a telos, genetic engineering might change an 
animal’s telos. It may even be morally impermissible to change the animals’ 
telos in some cases. But nothing follows from this argument to support the 
global case because there are a multitude of bioengineering transgenic animal 
projects that do not change the animal’s telos. All such projects would be, all 
other things being equal, morally permissible, even under the telos 
assumption. 
 Consider a rather different version, consequentialist, version of this 
concern: To engage in ag biotech is immoral if it changes the telos, or end, of 
an individual. Rollin poses the problem this way: 
 It is not inconceivable that as agriculture becomes more 
responsive to social pressure regarding confinement of 
animals, it will seize upon genetic engineering as a strategy 
for better fitting animals to their environments in order to 
reduce suffering. . . .20 
 Rollin comments that he does not consider such a strategy likely “in 
the foreseeable future,” but at least one project has been going on for more 
than a decade. For fourteen years poultry breeders at Purdue University have 
aimed their research program at selecting birds that exhibit less stress in 
battery cages. And with success; the scientists have reduced mortality in 
cages from fifty percent to less than nine percent. The chickens have 
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improved feather condition and no longer needed to be beak trimmed to avoid 
the birds killing each other.21 
 It may be that breeders have succeeded in changing the telos of the 
chickens, assuming that chickens have a telos.  Is this a morally justifiable 
pool?  Given only two choices, it would seem better for the birds to be 
incapable of being frustrated by conditions their ancestors would have found 
intolerable.  
If [Rollin writes] there were only two choices--either leave 
the animals as they are now, to live under conditions that do 
not meet their needs, or change their needs so they no longer 
suffer from the frustration of their fundamental urges--it 
seems clear that changing the animals is the lesser of the two 
evils.22 
As Rollin is quick to point out, we do not have only two choices, and may 
leave the birds the way they are while changing the environments in which 
they are raised. Nonetheless, if we have only two choices, it would seem 
preferable, from the bird’s perspective, to change its telos, if it has a telos.  
 In short, I fail to find any defensible interpretation of (1) through (8), 
be it theological or secular, that provides good reasons to judge ag biotech so 
unnatural as to be intrinsically immoral. 
 There are other intrinsic objections to consider. 
 
 
 
 
 
(9) To engage in ag biotech is illegitimately to cross species boundaries. 
 
This is an interesting argument because it captures our intuition that 
something is wrong in putting firefly genes into tobacco plants. But the 
problems here are both theological and scientific. 
It is difficult to see how (9) could be defended on theological 
grounds. None of the scriptural writings of the western religions proscribe 
genetic engineering, of course, because genetic engineering was undreamt of 
at the time the holy books were written. Now, one might argue that such a 
proscription may be derived from Jewish or Christian traditions of scriptural 
interpretation. Talmudic laws against mixing “kinds,” for example, might be 
taken to ground a general prohibition against inserting genes from “unclean” 
species into clean species. Here’s one way the argument might go: For an 
observant Jew to do what scripture proscribes is morally wrong; Jewish oral 
and written law proscribe the mixing of kinds (e.g., eating milk and meat 
from the same plate; yoking donkeys and oxen together); bioengineering is 
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the mixing of kinds; therefore, for a Jew to engage in bioengineering is 
morally wrong. 
Let us assume that the basic principle is valid; it is wrong for 
observant Jews to mix kinds. The argument still fails to show that 
bioengineering is intrinsically objectionable in all of its forms for everyone. 
The argument prohibits Jews from engaging in certain kinds of biotechnical 
activity but not all; it would not prohibit, for example, the transferring of 
genes within a species, nor, apparently, the transfer of genes from one clean 
species to another clean species. To take a gene from a soybean plant and 
insert it into the chromosome of another soybean plant of the same variety is 
to engage in genetic engineering but it is not, apparently, to “illegitimately 
cross species boundaries” in the Orthodox Jewish view. 
It is also worth pointing out that the Orthodox community seems to 
have accepted transgenesis in its food supply. Cheese is now routinely 
produced using a genetically engineered product, chymosin, and such cheese 
has been accepted as kosher, I am told, by Orthodox rabbis.23 
There is another problem, which we can call the confessional 
problem. The confessional problem is the problem of trying to apply rules 
specific to a particular religious community, the confessing community, to the 
public at large. The confessional problem appears here in the following way. 
Some Talmudic laws are not meant to apply to non-Jews. Because it derives 
from the Jewish Oral tradition and not the Noahide Law, the law against 
mixing kinds constitutes a proscription to be observed by Jews, but not a law 
binding on those outside the Jewish community. In short, the law is a 
communal law of Jewish ritual not a universal law of ethics. It will, of course, 
be up to the Orthodox Jewish community to decide its attitude about genetic 
engineering. But the confessional problem will in any case block the ritual 
law against mixing kinds from serving as a basis for public policy. 
Consequently, the confessional problem will block the argument against 
mixing kinds from serving as support for the argument that bioengineering is 
intrinsically objectionable. 
Consider another religious argument, that God established an 
internally connected self-organizing system with its own natural divisions. 
These divisions, including species boundaries, have a certain teleology, or 
end, and they are not to be conflated. Individual animals within one species 
can mate with others and so reproduce their kind, but God did not want 
individuals mating across the divisions. Humans, therefore, should not 
interfere with the natural directedness of the system by producing new 
species from two species unrelated in nature. 
The problem with this argument was identified in ch. 2 (see 
discussion in “Unqualified Opposition”): species are not rigidly separated in 
the way implied, and species as a concept is context-specific. Members of 
192                                                                           Gary L. Comstock  
 
different species give rise to members of a new species (mules). Differences 
between members of one species (dogs) can be greater than differences 
between members of different species (dogs and wolves).24 Since nature gives 
ample evidence of generally fluid boundaries between species, proscribing 
the crossing of species borders seems ultimately to depend on religious 
assumptions. Without telling us what those assumptions are, however, we 
have no way of assessing whether we want to accept them. 
Now, someone might respond to the mule counter example by 
arguing as follows. There are two kinds of species boundaries: one boundary 
between species close enough to be crossed through natural sexual 
reproduction, and another boundary distant enough not to be crossed through 
natural means. While the former boundaries, such as those between horses 
and donkeys, may be crossed, the latter should not be. Mules can be created 
by natural sexual means, but you cannot insert human genes into hogs by 
crossing a man with a sow. 
The problem here is that species transmogrify themselves to produce 
new species. The story of evolution is the story of novel individuals; with 
each act of sexual reproduction, genes recombine to produce a unique 
phenotype. In addition to recombination, there is the additional possibility of 
gene mutation, migration, and incorporation, resulting in an individual which, 
if adaptively fit to its ecosystem niche, may be the founder of a species 
previously unknown in history. Considered as a process spanning billions of 
years, evolution presents countless instances of apparently unlike, unrelated, 
species which are in fact linked together. The problem with trying to 
distinguish two kinds of species boundaries, and then permitting the crossing 
of only those closely related, is that the argument assumes that species 
boundaries are distinct, rigid and unchanging. In fact, species are messy, 
plastic and mutable. 
It is worth pointing out that even if the two kinds of boundaries 
argument worked, it still would lend no support to the view that 
bioengineering is intrinsically wrong because it would permit use of genetic 
engineering to transfer genes within a given species. 
  Yet another avenue of defense is available, however. One might 
claim that it is not the mixing of species that is objectionable, but rather the 
use of nonsexual means. This leads to: 
 
(10)  To engage in ag biotech is unnatural because it is to use nonsexual 
means to reproduce. 
 
Some religious groups reject certain medical practices in the 
treatment of infertility on these grounds. For these groups, the following 
therapeutic regimes are forbidden: stimulation of ovaries to produce eggs, 
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gamete intrafallopian transfer techniques, in vitro fertilization, and so on. If 
one rejects on theological grounds all nonsexual means of human 
reproduction, then one has a consistent position on which to oppose all plant 
and animal transgenesis. 
There are two problems. First, much plant propagation is done 
asexually, from the child’s scientific experiment of placing plant cuttings in 
glasses of water to the expert grafting of hybrid fruit trees. I am unaware of 
any ethical objections to these activities. Those who hold that asexual 
reproduction is morally wrong for humans typically do not object to it in the 
plant kingdom. Therefore, this objection would only apply to animal 
transgenesis; plant transgenesis would not be affected. 
Second, the confessional problem raises its head if one tries to extend the 
objection to cover not only human but animal engineering. To ban animal 
bioengineering on the grounds that nonsexual means of reproduction is 
immoral outside the plant kingdom commits one to having to ban many 
commonly accepted infertility treatments for humans.  Religious objections to 
the use of technology in assisting asexual intraspecific human reproduction 
may consistently be used to object to bioengineering as unnatural. But the 
conclusion will come at too high a price for all those not willing to concede 
medical procedures that have helped many infertile couples to conceive.  
 
  
 
(11) To engage in ag biotech is unnatural because it causes harm to 
sentient beings. 
 
Bioengineering may cause harm to sentient beings, such as humans 
and animals, if the plants it produces are toxic or mutagenic. But 
bioengineering does not inevitably cause harm. First, bioengineering benefits 
farmers and consumers who buy and sell its products. Second, plants are not 
sentient, so they cannot themselves feel pain as the result of being genetically 
engineered. As stated, therefore, argument (11) is false. 
Suppose we changed the objection to: Bioengineering is unnatural 
because it sometimes causes harm to sentient beings. This claim may be true, 
but it does not provide an argument for objecting to all bioengineering, or 
even to bioengineering that causes harm. We often cause harm to sentient 
beings. Nurses cause children pain when they inoculate them, and professors 
cause students pain when they give them failing grades. Failing students may 
complain about their grades, and they may have a variety of objections to the 
grade, but it would be unusual for them to complain that it is unnatural for a 
professor to give such a grade. 
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I do not wish to be clever about this point, because some small scale 
farmers almost certainly will be made worse off by plant genetic engineering. 
If plant genetic engineering favors specialized farmers who can produce large 
quantities of low cost grains for export, then plant genetic engineering will 
harm peasants and mixed farmers by depressing the price of their products. 
This possibility rightly concerns us. My point is only that we do not clarify 
our intuitions here by adding to the concern about the suffering of farmers the 
idea that such suffering is unnatural. 
 
(12)  To engage in ag biotech is to commodify life. 
 
 The argument here is that genetic engineering treats life in a 
reductionistic manner, reducing living organisms to little more than 
machines. Along with Jeremy Rifkin, the United Methodist Church has made 
this argument, claiming that life is sacred and not to be treated as a good of 
commercial value only, to be bought and sold to the highest bidder. 
 Do those who object to ag biotech on these grounds apply the 
principle uniformly? Do they, for example, object to the commodification of 
cows, pigs, and chickens when farmers own and sell them on the market? One 
question we must ask is where we draw the line.  If one accepts commercial 
trafficking in food animals, then it is hard to see why those animals should 
not be further commodified by genetic engineering. If one accepts the 
commodification of vaccines, to be bought and sold to treat disease, then one 
has committed oneself to accepting the commodification of thousands of 
species of animals, namely, all those at the microorganismic level. Why 
should it be unnatural to treat DNA the way individual food animals, plants, 
and microorganisms are treated? 
 “Life” is an ambiguous term covering a multitude of uses. It is wrong 
to commodify individual human lives, to buy and sell people. But is it wrong 
to sell organic parts of people? Perhaps we should avoid trafficking in scarce 
human organs and blood, and we ought to find a rational way to allocate 
livers, kidneys, corneas and such. But would it be wrong everywhere for 
anyone to traffic in human parts? Consider a mother contemplating selling 
her hair to make toupees. Would it be wrong for her to do so? Let us assume 
that she is very poor, lives in a developing country, and faces the prospect of 
her ten year old daughter entering the sex trade in order to provide food. In 
such a situation, it seems far better morally to sell pieces of one’s hair than to 
force another to sell their body. We have good reasons to protect individual 
humans from being commodified. But there is much room to argue that, given 
careful legal fencing and scrupulous protection of the innocent, parts of 
humans might very well be fit objects to be treated the way we commonly 
treat corn, squash, eggplant, pigs, cows, and chickens. It is not irrational to 
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regard pieces of DNA more on the order of pieces of cheese or hair, parts of 
human bodies, than to see them as individual lives, persons worthy of moral 
standing.25 
 For these reasons, I have come to believe that while (12) may be true, 
it probably is not a major concern. But there is a related issue: 
 
(13)  To engage in ag biotech is to disrespect life by patenting it. 
 
 There are two distinct arguments here. 
 
(13.1) To patent the products of plant ag biotech is to devalue 
nonhuman life.  
 
 This argument has little to recommend it. The system of patent 
protection was extended to living matter in 1873 when the U.S. government 
awarded a patent to Louis Pasteur on a disease-free yeast he had 
manufactured. In 1930, patent protection was extended to asexually 
reproduced plants in the Plant Patent Act. In 1980, the Supreme Court ruled 
in Chakrabarty v. Diamond that a “man-made” microorganism, namely, a 
bacterium engineered to breakdown crude oil, was patentable. This last 
decision seemed to many to reverse the view held until Chakrabarty, that 
living matter was not itself patentable. Plants were considered patentable only 
because of the explicit act of Congress in 1930.26  
 Whether we are morally justified in patenting novel plant species 
seems to me no more debatable in the 1990s than whether we are justified in 
killing weeds. When a group objects to the patenting of the plant products of 
ag biotech because doing so devalues life, we must ask why this is so. Unless 
the objector also objects to the Plant Patent Act of 1930, the principle is 
being applied unfairly. To approve the patenting of hybrid corn seeds but not 
the patenting of transgenic soybean seeds is to be guilty of inconsistency. 
(13.1) proves too much. 
 
(13.2) To patent the products of animal ag biotech is to devalue 
nonhuman life. 
 
 The patenting question does not seem compelling in the area of plant 
life, but it is a different matter when we cross into the animal kingdom. 
Sentient beings who can experience pain and emotion have interests which 
may well be thwarted if they are the product of two species unrelated in 
nature. In 1980, living things other than plants became eligible for patenting. 
The first animal patent was granted in April 1988 to Harvard University for 
the so-called oncomouse, a mouse genefactured for susceptibility to cancer. 
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To accept the patenting of plants while rejecting the patenting of animals 
seems to be a plausible position, but it too has problems. To know that we are 
devaluing animal life by patenting it we must know how much value 
nonhuman animal life has. But animal life seems to have little value beyond 
its economic value for most people in developed countries where millions of 
animals are slaughtered daily for food. It is difficult to see how the mere act 
of patenting an animal devalues its life any more than the currently accepted 
practices of owning, artificially breeding, confining, and killing food animals 
at a young age, or caging research animals to conduct experiments upon 
them. Unless one takes a strong animal rights position in which it is morally 
wrong even to own animals, (13.2) assumes too much. 
 I conclude that we have not yet found a good reason to believe either 
of the variants of (13). 
 
(14) To engage in ag biotech is unnatural because it disrupts the 
integrity, beauty, and balance of creation. 
 
There are two ways to understand this claim. 
 
 
 
(14.1) To engage in ag biotech is impermissible insofar it will 
have the consequence of disrupting the integrity, beauty, and 
balance of creation. 
 
The more we learn about ecology, the more we understand how little 
we know and how much less we can control as massive and complex a system 
as a biome. It has taken nature millions of years to evolve the diverse species 
currently in existence, and species lines seem to have a coherence of their 
own. Since ecosystems exist in such a delicate balance, for us to think that we 
can manage them in a way that will preserve their ancient wisdom and beauty 
may be hubris. At the Vancouver Assembly of the World Council of 
Churches in 1983, the Council claimed that creation has integrity, which Jay 
McDaniel later would define as “the value of all creatures in themselves, for 
one another, and for God, and their interconnectedness in a diverse whole that 
has unique value for God.”27 This value is neither one created by humans nor 
one that humans ought to try to control. But doesn’t bioengineering presume 
that we can control the future direction of evolution? 
This objection has much to commend it, but I think it is not usually 
understood as an intrinsic objection. To argue that bioengineering will disrupt 
the integrity of creation is an objection to the possible effects of 
bioengineering. Interpreted as (14.1), argument (14) is not a variant of the 
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unnatural line of argumentation but a variant of the extrinsic objection to 
bioengineering’s potentially adverse environmental consequences. Note, then, 
that argument (14.1) does not lend support to UE. 
 But there is a second way to understand (14). 
 
(14.2) To engage in ag biotech is to vex nature, to disrespect its 
intrinsic value; therefore, ag biotech is impermissible.  
  
 Here we have an argument based on the metaphor found in 
Farrington’s gloss on Bacon at the beginning of Chapter 4, and from which I 
have taken my title for this book, that ag biotech vexes nature.  But what 
would it mean to “vex nature?” 
 To vex a person is to trouble, distress, annoy, irritate, or disturb them. 
I vex my third grade son Drew when I tease him about unknown girlfriends, 
deny him his request for his allowance, or punish him for straying into the 
street. To vex someone may be morally objectionable, and then again, it may 
not. Everything seems to turn on the circumstances. I am probably in the 
wrong when I tease him about girls, but in the right when I instruct him about 
the dangers of speeding cars. To vex persons is not necessarily to fail to 
respect them. 
 To vex an animal is to trouble, distress, annoy, irritate or disturb it. 
Morally permissible? Again, it depends. I am morally in the wrong when I 
vex Charlie, the wild horse at Honey Rock Camp, by hitting him in the head 
with a stick. But I may well be morally in the right to put a hackamore gently 
on his head. Both actions distress him, but one of the actions does not 
necessarily to fail to respect him. To vex an animal is not necessarily to act 
immorally toward it. 
 As the previous examples suggest, we can make sense of the idea of 
vexing individual sentient beings. To vex is to interfere with the individual’s 
preferences, their goals. But can we make sense of the idea of vexing nature, 
which seems, after all, not to be an individual so much as a group of 
individuals, animate and inanimate? We may reply positively if we can show 
that nature has the kind of things individuals have: preferences and goals. Can 
we show this?  
 Many ecologists and environmental philosophers think so, and their 
affirmative answer should appeal intuitively to all who love flora and fauna. 
The major themes of an ethic in which nature is so construed were first 
sounded in contemporary America by the Midwestern conservationist Aldo 
Leopold in 1933.28 Forty years later a professional philosopher named 
Richard Sylvan, his last name at the time was Routley, made an attack on 
agriculture the cornerstone of his environmental ethic, beginning his seminal 
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1973 essay, “Do We Need a New, an Environmental, Ethic?” with these 
words: 
It is increasingly said that . . . Western civilization . . . stands 
in need of a new ethic . . . setting out people’s relations to the 
natural environment, in Leopold’s words “an ethic dealing 
with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants 
which grow upon it.”29 It is not of course that old and 
prevailing ethics do not deal with man’s relation to nature; 
they do, . . . man is free to deal with nature as he pleases . . . 
(M)en do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a 
wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever 
it will yield, and then move on. . . . Under what we shall call 
an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible 
conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer 
subject to proper moral criticism.30 
 In 1974, there was no recognizable philosophical school of 
environmental ethics but, twenty years after Sylvan’s essay, a diverse array of 
extensively discussed positions has developed. Ecofeminists have an ethic 
based on the conviction that the historical subjugation of nature by humans is 
inextricably connected with the subjugation of women by men. For 
ecofeminists, we cannot address the issue of environmental abuse by modern 
agriculturalists without also addressing the issue of the abuse of women by 
modern patriarchalists.31  
 Biocentrists have an ethic based on the conviction that all living 
individuals, plant as well as animal, are owed respect and that one cannot 
exclude individuals from the circle of moral standing just because they are 
not sentient.32 For biocentrists, individual human life is not necessarily 
superior to animal or plant life. For them, the received anthropocentric ethic 
is based on unjustifiable moral principles because it does not grant moral 
standing to living things outside the circle of individual homo sapiens. 
 Ecofeminism and biocentrism deserve consideration. However, I will 
focus my attention on a third group, containing direct descendants of Leopold 
and Sylvan, because it is arguably the most influential. Ecocentrists have 
developed the land ethic into an important philosophical theory that tries to 
bring considered judgments, moral principles, and background scientific 
theories into reflective equilibrium around the core notion that humans should 
not be free to deal with nature as they please. Rather, we should recognize 
intrinsic value in conscious and nonconscious wild living beings and 
nonliving natural objects such as rocks and soil. 
 John Rodman, for example, believes that “thistles, oak trees, and 
wombats, as well as rain forests and chaparral communities” have intrinsic 
value. Forests, he asserts, “have their own characteristic structures and 
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potentialities to unfold,” and thus ought to have a prima facie right not to be 
interfered with.33 If Rodman is correct, then the rights of forests must be 
considered along with the rights of humans. The old anthropocentric principle 
must be revised, so that the intrinsic value of the environment can be weighed 
equally with the intrinsic value of human beings. 
 Ecocentrism holds that humans have historically conceived of 
themselves as the rulers and endpoints of nature and consequently have all 
but ruined it.34 We must change our self image from that of rulers or even 
stewards and caretakers to that of beneficiaries or, as Leopold put it, “plain 
citizens” of the biotic community. We must no longer treat soil, water, and 
wildlife as valuable only for the instrumental use we can make of them 
because nonhuman life is intrinsically valuable. The way to effect this change 
is to shift our attention away from individuals to biotic communities. The new 
locus of intrinsic value must be biological wholes, including ecosystems such 
as deserts, prairies, and pine forests, and natural entities and processes such 
as the hydrologic cycle.35 
 The basic principle of Leopold’s Land Ethic is that “a thing is right 
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”36 For Leopold, moral 
guidance comes first from nature, not from norms guarding the rights of 
rational agents. Ethics as a discipline, therefore, must be refashioned, based 
on scientific knowledge about how nature invents and preserves itself.37 J. 
Baird Callicott is ecocentrism’s ablest proponent. He describes the essential 
features of the theory here:38 
Its conceptual elements are a Copernican cosmology, a 
Darwinian protosociobiological natural history of ethics, 
Darwinian ties of kinship among all forms of life on Earth, 
and an Eltonian model of the structure of biocenoses all 
overlaid on a Humean-Smithian moral psychology. Its logic 
is that natural selection has endowed human beings with an 
affective moral response to perceived bonds of kinship and 
community membership and identity; that today the natural 
environment, the land, is represented as a community, the 
biotic community; and that, therefore, an environmental or 
land ethic is both possible . . . and necessary, since human 
beings have collectively acquired the power to destroy the 
integrity, diversity, and stability of the environing and 
supporting economy of nature.39 
 To represent the natural environment as a “community, the biotic 
community,” is to think of ecosystems as “collective organisms,” a metaphor 
Callicott borrows from Leopold, who in turn borrowed it from the organismic 
ecology of Frederick Clements, a plant successionist in the early part of this 
200                                                                           Gary L. Comstock  
 
century. The model has been developed further by Eugene Odum, who 
stresses the interdependence of all plants and animals within each biotic 
community, describing ecosystems as integrated, stable systems existing in, 
or in the process of attaining the state of, mature equilibrium.  
 Organismic ecologists believe the stability of the mature ecosystem 
state is proportional to the diversity of species, and that the greater the 
number of species, the greater the stability; the fewer the species, the less 
stable the system. As Ned Hettinger and Bill Throop describe it, 
These states may involve some change, such as fluctuations 
in the populations of predators and prey, but such changes 
are regular and predictable (as in the cycling of predator and 
prey according to the Lotka-Volterra equations). Disturbance 
and change are thought to be atypical. When such a system is 
disturbed, it will gradually return to its mature state, a state 
characterized by a balance or harmony between…elements.40 
  According to ecocentrists, the scientific theory just described 
contains criteria for the moral evaluation of human interventions into 
ecosystems. An action is morally right for the land when it promotes the 
health of the ecosystem, when it protects or adds to the diversity of the 
species in the system, or when the action in some other way protects or adds 
either to the integrity and stability of the whole or toward the system’s 
progress toward its goal. Because ecosystems have an endpoint, a good or 
welfare such as stability, then what is morally good or bad for the ecosystem, 
and what actions are morally right or wrong for us to take toward it, follow 
from understanding each ecosystem’s mature equilibrium state. In general it 
will be morally right for us to engage in actions that will leave intact or 
enhance the diversity of flora and fauna present in a biotic community and 
morally wrong to engage in actions that will undermine the stability and 
integrity of the ecosystem’s progress toward its mature equilibrium state. It 
will be morally good for us to leave ecosystems alone, and morally bad for us 
to disrupt them.  
 Because it is the overall equilibrium of the system that matters, and 
not the individual rights of specific organisms within the system, it follows 
that individuals exist for the sake of the whole, not the whole for the sake of 
individuals. Therefore, if the number of individuals of species q becomes so 
large that it overruns and displaces the individuals of species r, then the 
morally required act may be to kill individuals of species q so as to maintain 
stability and biotic diversity. The emphasis in ecocentrism on community and 
holism clearly distinguish it from traditional individualistic and 
anthropocentric ethics. 
 The ecocentrist’s sense that farming vexes nature makes sense in 
light of this background scientific theory. Agriculture inevitably disrupts the 
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equilibrium state of any ecosystem because it requires actions that decrease 
the number and diversity of species. Farmers systematically kill indigenous 
plants that compete with their crops, and exterminate animal species that 
endanger their food animals. But need ecocentrists disapprove of all farming? 
Might there not be some forms of farming that would be ecocentrically 
correct? To answer this question we must return to Sylvan’s essay. 
 Sylvan gives three examples of conduct of which he disapproves. The 
first is a man who drives the Australian dingo to extinction in order to prevent 
the animals from interfering with Australian farm operations. The second is a 
fisher who kills the last remaining blue whale for private profit. The third is a 
farmer who, Sylvan writes, borrowing the words from Leopold, “clears the 
woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its 
rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek.”41 Sylvan’s three examples 
contain two farmers, both of whom he disapproves. 
 Sylvan’s last example, the one taken from Leopold, is also picked up 
by Callicott. In an essay called “Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair,” 
Callicott does not search for reasons that the farmer might have committed as 
dubious an act as clear cutting a steep hillside, nor entertain possible excusing 
conditions such as the possibility that the farmer in an emergency needs the 
pasture to provide essential food for his family. Rather, the ecocentrist 
accuses the farmer of being “morally wanton” because of the effect of his 
action on the good of the whole. 
 “Wanton” means senseless, unprovoked, recklessly or arrogantly 
ignoring justice and decency. To call someone morally wanton is not to praise 
them. The farmer is reckless, according to Callicott, because the farmer who 
turns the 
dairy cows out to pasture in a woodlot situated on a steep 
slope overlooking a trout stream (for the [mere] sake of the 
shady comfort and dietary variety of the cattle) [commits an 
action] with ruinous impact upon the floral and wildlife 
community native to the woods, the fish and benthic 
organisms of the stream, and the microbic life and the 
physiochemical structure of the soil itself.42 
 Many would agree with Callicott that the farmer, excusing conditions 
aside, has done something wrong. But defenders of farmers might suggest a 
very different reason for this conclusion, basing their opinon on the principle 
that clearcutting a steep slope is just bad farming. If you clear cut, you will no 
doubt have a “ruinous impact upon the floral and wildlife community native 
to the woods,” but there will also be disastrous consequences for your farm. 
Loss of soil, erosion damage to the slope, pollution of the stream--all of these 
actions will reduce the productivity, not to mention the beauty, of your place. 
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 Notice how different the agriculturalist’s principle is from the 
ecocentrist’s. Ecocentrists hold that clearing the slope is wrong in and of 
itself because the woodlot ecosystem is morally considerable in itself. To 
harm the ecosystem, even if the harm consists only of harm to “the microbic 
life and the physiochemical structure of the soil itself,” is to do direct harm to 
an intrinsically valuable thing. Farmers therefore are “morally wanton” not 
because they occasionally engage in actions that endanger the land’s 
usefulness to future generations of humans and animals, but rather because 
they habitually and regularly engage in actions that contravene duties they 
have directly to the land itself regardless of any indirect deleterious 
consequences of those actions. Tillage inevitably destroys the integrity, 
stability, and beauty of the microbic life and physiochemical structure of the 
soil. 
  It is important to state explicitly the logical conclusion of the 
ecocentrists’ position. It is not just bad or stupid farmers who are morally 
wanton. To farm at all is to act senselessly, recklessly, and arrogantly, even if 
you farm in the Amish, perennial polyculture, or traditional Tohono O’odham 
desert, way.43 For even sustainable agriculture, inherently an anthropocentric 
notion, is a practice aimed at circumbscribing the extent to which we exploit 
the soil. According to the logic of ecocentrism, farming of whatever sort is 
wanton behavior. 
 The ecocentrist’s science and values are not, of course, the only 
viable candidates for our allegiance, and we have other values we want to 
protect. The received ethical view holds that people have a right not to go 
hungry when food can be made available to them, and it is a widespread 
intuition that land has instrumental value and ought to be put into production 
to help keep people from going hungry. The moral paradigm that attributes 
basic moral rights to individuals is pervasive in the West, and the majority of 
individuals in democratic societies seem to share the intuition that the right to 
be fed when it is possible to provide you with food is one of of these basic 
rights. How, then, should defenders of agriculture who accept the received 
view reply to ecocentrists? 
 One might try to reduce the ecocentrists’ position to absurdity by 
showing, for example, that it leads to unacceptable consequences. If 
ecocentrism were true, no one could plant a garden, much less half a section. 
If ecocentrism were true, no one would be able to survive. But a position that 
leads to that consequence must be absurd. 
 I do not think the reductio strategy will work, however. Ecocentrists 
can simply bite the bullet and admit that their view does lead to something 
like this conclusion. Self-described “bioregionalist neo-Luddites” such as 
Martha Crouch point out that humans apparently lived as hunters and 
gatherers for thousands of years before agriculture got started, and Callicott 
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seems to think  the world would be a better place, because a more wild and 
diverse place, if humans returned to our former feeding habits. We may reply: 
But the earth cannot support its present population level if we return to 
hunting and gathering. Again, the ecocentrist may affirm the conclusion: The 
number of humans on the planet is too high, and  we ought to try to reduce it.  
Ecocentrists need not commit themselves to a reprehensible program of 
genocide and mass starvation; they can argue that we ought to embark on an 
aggressive program of birth control and rational planning so as to reduce the 
human population without killing anyone.  
 I do not think the reductio will work because I do not believe the 
ecocentrist position has counterintuitive results. It is perfectly plausible to 
think of hunting and gathering as an acceptable way of life, a way of life in 
which humans can flourish, and which, were it widely practiced, would lead 
to a much lower danger of species loss. Were there far fewer of us, we would 
be able to do a better job of sharing the earth with other species.  
 A stronger objection is that ecocentrism leads not to genocide, but to 
occasional sanctioning of murder.44 Ecocentrism apparently requires us to 
sacrifice the life of an individual human if so doing is the only way to 
preserve the last remaining example of an endangered nonhuman species. A 
popular presentation of the ecocentric ideal makes this consequence explicit. 
In his novel Desert Solitaire, Edward Abbey, author of The Monkey Wrench 
Gang and noted defender of the deserts of the Southwest, laments the 
oppressive presence of humans in the United States’ southwest Arches 
National Monument park. He opines “ . . . I have personal convictions to 
uphold. Ideals, you might say. I prefer not to kill animals. I’m a humanist; I’d 
rather kill a man than a snake.”45 If confronted with the tragic choice, 
ecocentrists are required by their theory to kill innocent people rather than 
endangered animals. 
 For his part, the early Callicott, who once characterized the present 
number of humans in the world as “a global disaster…,” accepted this 
criticism. While he later revised his opinion, Callicott once wrote that the true 
measure of an environmental ethic is the extent of its misanthropy, adding 
that Abbey “may not be simply depraved.”46 Callicott reasoned that Abbey 
was probably interested in “dramatically making the point” that in the 
imagined case, the choice between a human and a snake, “would be moot.” 
Callicott went on to assert that his 
 biospheric perspective does not exempt Homo Sapiens from 
moral evaluation in relation to the well-being of the 
community of nature taken as a whole. . . . As omnivores, the 
population of human beings should, perhaps, be roughly 
twice that of bears, allowing for differences of size. A global 
population of more than four billion persons and showing no 
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signs of an orderly decline . . . is at present a global disaster 
(the more per capita prosperity, indeed, the more disastrous it 
appears) for the biotic community. . . . The extent of 
misanthropy in modern environmentalism thus may be taken 
as a measure of the degree to which it is biocentric. 47 
 Are the problems presented in ch. 4 so severe that our only recourse 
is to become misanthropic ecocentrists? Or have ecocentrists overreacted? 
Tom Regan has famously charged Abbey and Callicott with being 
environmental fascists.48 But, again, this line of attack begs the question of 
whether the foundations of our morality and civilization are the right ones. 
The premise of ecocentric ethics is the belief that we are on the brink of 
environmental Armageddon, the demise of virtually all higher life forms. If 
the premise is true then it is plausible to believe that we ought to accept the 
unsavory consequences of ecocentrism, such as, that circumstances might 
arise in which an individual snake should be valued more than an individual 
human. Such a consequence may be distasteful to those still concerned about 
individual human rights, but not to those concerned about saving life on the 
planet. And it is the question of whether life on the planet is endangered that 
is at issue.  
 Ecocentrists can escape the charge of begging the question, here, and 
may go on to argue that the long term results of ecocentric practices and 
institutions would be less misanthropic than the long term results of 
continuing along our anthropocentric path of resort building. Ecocentrists 
might argue that anthropocentrism will lead to the death of all life whereas 
ecocentrism will lead merely to a reduction in the human population level. 
For these reasons, I think ecocentrism survives these criticisms. It is still a 
viable, if occasionally brutal, new ethic. 
 Ecocentrism can withstand the criticisms leveled against it so far. But 
there are two further questions to be addressed. (a) Is the scientific foundation 
of ecocentrism reliable? And, (b) Is its ethical method sound? 
 
 (a) Is the science reliable? 
 
 The fundamental principle of organismic ecology was expressed by 
W. A. Allee and coauthors in a text popular in the 1950s.49 They wrote: 
The [ecosystem] community maintains a certain balance, 
establishes a biotic border, and has a certain unity paralleling 
the dynamic equilibrium and organization of other living 
systems. Natural selection operates upon the whole 
interspecies system, resulting in a slow evolution of adaptive 
integration and balance. Division of labor, integration and 
homeostasis characterize the organism.50 
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The emphasis here upon slow evolution toward an organized state of 
integrated equilibrium suggests that ecosystems are large scale organisms 
striving toward a goal. The view that ecosystems are teleological entities with 
goals is essential to ecocentrism because it establishes that the ecosystem has 
a good or welfare we can harm or benefit through our actions. An alpine lake, 
for example, would be teleologically oriented toward the state in which 
natural selection had operated upon its whole interspecies system to produce 
an adapted integrated whole consisting of flora and fauna and 
microorganisms. 
 The teleological character of ecosystems is crucial to ecocentrism 
because things that are not internally directed toward a goal do not possess 
moral standing of their own. Things like tractors, thermostatic heating 
systems, and computer programs engage in movement, but their movement is 
directed by external forces. Therefore, their end states are not determined 
internally, by the things themselves, but rather by agents exerting external 
influence on the things. It follows that the property we are called upon to 
respect when we engage in actions that affect tractors and computer programs 
are the properties, and specifically the interests, of the agents who control the 
things. The things themselves are not intrinsically valuable. 
  Another way to put the point is that whereas humans are internally 
directed, have a good of their own, and therefore are worthy of moral respect 
in and of themselves, things that lack internal directedness are either directed 
toward goals that are externally determined, or exhibit an internal structure 
that appears to be an end of the thing itself but is in reality a byproduct of 
external forces acting on the thing.51 
 If a thing’s endpoint is externally determined, then the thing itself 
does not have intrinsic value. It has instrumental value as the means of some 
agent toward some goal of the agent’s. If a thing exhibits internal structure 
and integrity that is not the result of its own teleology but is rather the 
byproduct of forces acting on it, then the thing itself cannot have moral 
standing because we cannot tell toward what endpoint it tends. Indeed, it does 
not tend toward any endpoint at all, but rather is directed toward some 
endpoint by the forces determining its direction. 
 The paradigmatic case of an internally directed complex system is a 
person. Persons, or individual humans, can be construed as teleological 
systems, the aims or goals of which are determined from within the system 
itself. We call our aims or goals our interests, and because our interests 
matter to us, because we know how it feels to have others frustrate us for 
trivial reasons in the pursuit of our interests, we attribute to others the basic 
rights we want to claim for ourselves, rights such as the right to have others 
refrain from interfering with us, all things being equal, as we pursue our basic 
interests. 
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 If the good of people can be determined from examining their 
particular interests, however, the good of specific parts of the individual 
cannot be similarly determined. The good of a finger or a liver or an eye is 
not determined by finding out toward what endpoint it is internally directed. 
The good of a bodily organ is determined by finding out what function it 
plays within the overall organism. What is good or bad for a finger is 
determined by finding out what hinders or enhances a finger’s fitness to play 
the role fingers are designed to play.  
 Fingers exhibit an internal complexity of structure in which many 
parts--blood vessels, muscles, bones--are harmoniously organized to serve the 
larger organism. But this internal structure must not be mistaken for an end 
state toward which the finger aims because it is a byproduct of many forces, 
internal and external to the finger, operating independently of the finger and 
controlled by overarching forces at the organismic, or individual, level. There 
is no objective feature or internally decided aim of the finger itself by 
reference to which we could decide what the good of the finger is. Therefore, 
whereas individuals are internally directed and have a good of their own, 
parts of individuals are externally directed and are “good” only in virtue of 
their serving as fit instruments for some purpose. 
 Just as parts of individuals have no good of their own, so groups of 
individuals have no good of their own. My family is a group of individuals 
with an internal structure and complexity. We might be tempted to say that 
the group appears to be internally directed toward, perhaps, a mature 
equilibrium state of harmony and convergence of interests. But my children’s 
interests and my wife’s interests do not always converge, nor does there seem 
to be any outside force which acts externally upon us to forge our various 
interests into one. Any convergence of interests seems to result from 
individuals consciously working to sacrifice individual interests that threaten 
to destroy the happiness of other family members. Any harmony of family 
life seems to come from each individual nurturing those interests that serve to 
promote not only their narrow self-interests but the interests of other 
members as well. Any apparent endstate toward which our family seems to be 
internally directed turns out, on examination, to be the byproduct of choices 
and actions of individuals severally pursuing their own good where an 
important part of their own good includes the happiness of others. 
 In the early part of the twentieth century, Arthur G. Tansley criticized 
organismic ecology for construing biotic communities as individuals. Tansley 
argued that ecosystems are no more organisms than collections of organs are 
individuals. A human liver or kidney or heart is not capable of existing 
without the other organs around it. Take a finger off of a human being and it 
will not be able to grow, because its good is dependent on its being connected 
to the rest of the human physiological system. The same is not true of 
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individual plants and animals in ecosystems. Take a typical cactus seedling 
out of its native Arizona ecosystem and try to grow it in inland South 
Carolina, or Iowa, and it will do just fine.  
 Gary Varner explains the problem as follows: 
[W]hile ecosystems are sufficiently analogous to organisms 
to be called “quasi-organisms,” the disanalogies show 
decisively that ecosystems are not organisms in any literal 
sense. In particular, Tansley stressed that, unlike the organs 
of a body, individual organisms from a given ecosystem are 
capable of existing independently of each other. From this 
“general independence” of an ecosystem’s constituent 
organisms follow two other disanalogies between it and an 
organism: ecosystems lack “the physical unity and 
definiteness of outline” characteristic of an organism, and an 
ecosystem’s organisms can “transfer themselves to another 
community and become true members of it,” an ability with 
no significant analog in an organism’s organs.52 
Tansley showed the impropriety of thinking of ecosystems as organisms, an 
impropriety illustrated by the fact that an ecosystem’s constituent parts are 
not always dependent on the ecosystem in order to survive. 
 There is a second problem, the difficulty of identifying the 
boundaries of an ecosystem. In Callicott’s example we can ask, What are the 
boundaries of the hillside ecosystem? We might be tempted to think that this 
marmot is as important an animal as any in the whole, but sometimes it lives 
on the hillside and sometimes it does not. Is it in or out? What about this 
particle of soil? It was not always here, and it may be on the verge of washing 
down into the stream and out of the system. Call this the problem of spatial 
identity. 
 There is also a problem of temporal identity. The species of fish and 
benthic organisms Callicott wants to protect in the hillside stream were not 
always here. Go back a few decades and you find white spruce and limber 
pine growing where maple and oaks now tower. Go back a few hundred 
years, and the hillside is covered with big bluestem grass, not a tree in sight. 
Go back a few thousand years, and the climate is so cold that you find 
nothing but glacial ice scraping over the surface. Go back a hundred thousand 
years and find tortoises and sharks and trilobites swimming over the hillside 
in a shallow warm sea.53 
 Through time, a geographical location exhibits many mature 
equilibrium states, none of which can simultaneously exist with any of the 
others. But which one is the “natural” one we must respect? If we cannot 
answer this question, then we cannot identify the standard by which to judge 
which actions in this geographical location will be morally acceptable. 
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 The general problem indicated by the spatial and temporal fluidity of 
ecosystems is that unless we can say what a thing’s interests are or, at least, 
toward what end or ends it is internally directed, we cannot say what actions 
on the parts of moral agents are morally praiseworthy or blameworthy with 
respect to that thing. If we can say what a thing’s interests or aims are, then 
we can say what actions will promote or thwart that thing’s internal 
directedness. In the case of persons, we can say both what things are good 
and bad for a person, and what a person desires to do, and therefore we can 
say what things are right or wrong for agents to do with respect to that 
person.  
 But does nature have desires, things it wants to do?  Nature knows a 
vast number of processes which seem to be internally directed in one way or 
another, but because nature is so wonderfully complex and because things are 
so intimately interconnected, the appearance of internal directedness may be 
only an appearance. 
 Consider the shape and location of a cloud. We can say that that 
cloud has boundaries, complexity, stability and internal direction, but we also 
know that its stability will be very short lived, its complexity will be very 
fluid, and the direction predicted for it at this moment will probably be quite 
different from the direction predicted for it thirty seconds from now. To 
attribute internal direction to a cloud, then, is to ignore the fact that the 
identity of the cloud is almost completely determined by outside forces. Were 
we called upon by moral law to respect the cloud itself, we would be 
incapable of performing our duty because respecting the cloud would also 
entail respecting an infinite list of things external to the cloud: the 
surrounding high and low pressure zones, wind currents in other states, and 
the geography of landforms beneath it. But if respecting the cloud itself 
entails respecting all of these other things, in what sense can we respect the 
cloud itself? 
 Language confuses us here. What we mean to say is that we must 
respect the larger system of which the cloud is a part. Ecosystems are like 
clouds, their boundaries so plastic and their identities so determined by 
external forces, that it becomes impossible to say how an ecosystem’s own 
identity is distinct from all of the external forces operating on it. 
Consequently, when we say we must respect ecosystems, we mean we must 
respect the larger system of which the ecosystem is a part. 
 Return to agriculture. It is clear that a farmer who clearcuts a slope 
changes its ecosystem, but has the farmer interfered with the natural progress 
of an internally directed system? That is, are ecosystems entered by farmers 
more like human individuals entered by surgeons or more like clouds entered 
by airplanes? This is an empirical question to be answered by specialists 
familiar with diverse ecosystems. But the answer probably lies somewhere 
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between the two extremes, as most ecosystems are less coordinated and 
teleologically structured than human individuals but longer lasting and more 
stable than clouds. However we decide this question, it seems obvious that 
farmers tilling prairies will disrupt the natural habits and tendencies of 
individuals in the ecosystem, and this fact constitutes a reason to be 
concerned about farming.  
 But on the other hand, farming will not completely destroy all life in 
the location. As Hettinger points out in another context, a forest disturbed by 
a farmer may be “gone, true enough, but micro-ecosystems continue to exist, 
fireweed and other sun-loving plants will shoot up in the spring forming new 
biological communities, and in any case, over the long term the forest is 
likely to return.”54 Biotic communities clearly are not as evanescent as clouds, 
but neither are they as tightly organized as human individuals. They are 
complex constantly changing systems. The problem of identity is that the 
boundaries and “natural” equilibrium states of ecosystems are so difficult to 
identify. 
 An organic ecologist might reply that the answer to the identity 
problem is solved just by specifying a time frame. Just as the fact that a 
woman’s identity changes between her preteen years and her late middle age 
years without calling into question the fact that she has an identity today, so 
the fact that an ecosystem’s identity changes over centuries need not call into 
question the fact that it has an identity today. Carefully define a time frame 
and we can identity the equilibrium state toward which a given biological 
whole is tending at that time. Within the equivalent of its own “times of life,” 
each ecosystem exhibits at least a rough stability. 
 The problem with this response is ecosystems have several 
“identities” simultaneously, depending on the criteria used to define them. 
Consider the different ways in which species populations, which are but a 
single component of an ecosystem, can be identified. There are at least three 
ways of understanding community, depending upon whether we focus on 
where things live, what they eat, or how they are biologically related: 
Spatial communities include all of the species within a 
specific habitat or habitat stratum. Trophic communities 
include all of the species at one trophic level, all of the 
species located in a pair of trophic levels, or the “guild” of all 
species using the same resource. Taxonic communities 
include all species of some higher taxon.55 
Communities are only one part of ecosystems, which also contain abiotic 
elements--such as chemicals and rocks--and natural processes--such as the 
hydrologic cycle and evolutionary adaptation of species. The problem of 
definition found with “communities,” applies equally to “abiotic elements” 
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and “natural processes.” Everything depends on how we draw our boundaries, 
and we typically draw our boundaries in order to serve some scientific need.  
 Brian Steverson suggests that the problem is “apparent arbitrariness” 
in ecosystem identities, an arbitrariness that calls into question the very idea 
of there being an ecosystem identity: 
If communities are pure constructs, and nothing more, then 
one can seriously doubt whether they represent any state of 
affairs inherent in and essential to the natural world. The 
notion of “community” might be nothing more than a 
theoretical, heuristic device. If so, then higher levels of 
ecological organization, such as ecosystems and biomes . . . 
are also infected with an inherent meaninglessness.56 
Steverson jumps too quickly from “apparent arbitrariness” to 
“meaninglessness,” but he identifies the problem. Which perspective gives us 
the “real” communities of an ecosystem? And which perspective gives us the 
“real” or “natural” ecosystem? Without an answer to this question, we cannot 
specify which natural state of an ecosystem is the one with which moral 
agents such as farmers are bound not to interfere. 
 The identity problem goes deeper. Organic ecology is based on a 
teleological philosophy of science much like Aristotle’s. For Aristotle, there 
were “natural tendencies” toward which biological individuals and systems 
were aimed, and there were interfering forces that sometimes prevented these 
individuals and systems from reaching their desired state. As Sober puts it, 
Heavy objects in the sublunar sphere have location at the 
center of the earth as their natural state; each tends to go 
there, but is prevented from doing so. . . . [As Aristotle 
writes] “ . . . for any living thing that has reached its normal 
development and which is unmutilated, and whose mode of 
generation is not spontaneous, the most natural act is the 
production of another like itself, an animal producing an 
animal, a plant a plant . . .”57 . . . According to Aristotle, 
mules (sterile hybrids) count as deviations from the natural 
state. In fact, females are monsters as well, since the natural 
tendency of sexual reproduction is for the offspring to 
perfectly resemble the father . . .58 
 Unlike holistic organismic biology, another form of biology, 
individualistic Darwinian biology, rejects the natural state model in favor of a 
model in which variation and mutation is considered the norm. As Sober 
explains, 
It isn’t just that Aristotle was wrong in his detailed claims 
about mules and women; the whole structure of the natural 
state model has been discarded. Population biology is not 
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conceptualized in terms of positing some characteristic that 
all members of a species would have in common, were 
interfering forces absent. Variation is not thought of as a 
deflection from the natural state of uniformity. Rather, 
variation is taken to be a fundamental property in its own 
right.59 
For population biologists, a “norm of reaction” describes the various forms an 
individual plant or animal may take, given its particular genotype: 
The norm of reaction of a genotype within a range of 
environments will describe what phenotype the genotype will 
produce in a given environment. Thus the norm of reaction 
for a corn plant genotype might describe how its height is 
influenced by the amount of moisture in the soil. The norm of 
reaction is entirely silent on which phenotype is the “natural” 
one. 
As with the relationship between plant genotypes and environment, so with 
the relationship between population levels and ecosystems. The norm of 
reaction for a deer population in an ecosystem might describe how the 
number of deer is influenced by the number of predators in the area, but it 
will be entirely silent on which number of deer is the “natural” one. 
 Undermined by scientific observation and theory, organic holistic 
ecology has been largely replaced by a new paradigm characterizing natural 
systems in terms of change and disturbance and natural selection at the 
individual level rather than stability and integrity at the systems level. 
According to the individualistic model, the integrity and stability of 
ecosystems is to be explained not in teleological terms of a goal toward which 
the ecosystem is internally directed but rather in terms of the adaptations of 
individuals and populations within the system. As Robert E. Ricklefs puts it,  
The ability of the community to resist change [is] the sum of 
the individual properties of component populations. . . . 
Relationships between predators and prey, and between 
competitors, can affect the inherent stability of the 
community, but trophic structure does not evolve to enhance 
community stability.60 
 Contemporary population ecologists think of ecosystems not in terms 
of intentional systems aimed at some future ideal state but rather in terms of 
individual organisms interacting in ways that can be described using 
statistical science.61 The idea that an ecosystem has a “natural” balance which 
can be harmed or benefited by outside “interfering forces” is, in Sober’s 
words, “entirely alien to post-Darwinian biology.”62 The natural balance of a 
system is regarded as a byproduct of the many actions of individuals and 
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forces of natural selection, not as the goal toward which a teleological system 
is aiming. 
 While some ecologists continue to work with the organismic model, 
most have largely abandoned it for its tendency to over-emphasize the 
internal stability and self-integration of ecosystems. This fact does not bode 
well for any environmental ethic constructed upon it.63 If individuals in nature 
do not exist for the sake of the whole—if the whole, whatever it is, exists 
primarily as a by-product of the properties and actions of individuals in it—
then the ideal of “living in harmony with nature” becomes an attractive 
metaphor. But a metaphor from which it is virtually impossible to derive any 
specific action-guides. 
 Let us turn our attention from the scientific foundations of 
ecocentrism to its philosophical structure. 
 
(2) Is the ethical method sound? 
 
 According to Norman Daniels, an ethic is a theory we reach via the 
method of wide reflective equilibrium, that is, 
a coherent ordered triple of sets of beliefs held by a particular 
person, namely a set of considered moral judgments (a); a set 
of moral principles, (b); and a set of relevant background 
theories, (c). . . . The agent may work back and forth, revising 
his initial judgments, moral principles, and background 
theories, to arrive at an equilibrium point which consists of 
the triple, (a), (b), and (c).64 
 To reason in this fashion is to begin to form moral principles, such as 
“Always tell the truth,” on the basis of compared intuitions. When we hold to 
such principles we must sometimes revise our intuitions about practical 
matters because our principles, which cover a wide range of similar cases, 
bring all of our considered judgments into equilibrium and may tell us that 
one or another of our original intuitions were wrong. Ethics is about 
reasoning in this way so that we can come to act on principles that preserve 
the greatest number of the considered judgments we deem most central to our 
overall web of values. 
 So far we have considered only moral knowledge. We can go on to 
bring knowledge other than moral principles to bear on our practical 
decisions, knowledge such as that available from ecology, molecular biology, 
sociology, and political theory. When we bring this background scientific 
knowledge into our deliberations we are engaged in the full spectrum of wide 
reflective equilibrium. An ethic, to repeat, is a moral theory in which our (a) 
considered intuitions have been brought into equilibrium with our (b) moral 
principles and (c) scientific knowledge. 
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 Considered moral judgments, moral principles and relevant 
background theories must all be reasonably independent sources of 
information. If we mistake one for the other, our resulting ethic will not be in 
equilibrium. If we mistake one of our aesthetic values, for example, for the 
deliverance of a science, then we will have reasoned in a circular fashion and 
we will not have arrived at a well reasoned position.  
 When I first learned that researchers were injecting bGH into dairy 
cattle, my initial reaction was that it would be morally problematic to inject 
cows with synthetic chemicals foreign to them, and that it might result in 
elevated levels of bGH in the milk children drink. However, I learned that 
scientists, working independently, and using methods that could be replicated 
and verified by others, had proven just the opposite. bGH occurs naturally in 
all cows, and the milk of injected cows does not contain any greater amount 
of bGH than milk from cows not injected with bGH. This scientific 
information was was independent of my initial moral intuition, and helped me 
to see that my initial reaction was dead wrong. 
 Had the scientific community, contrary to fact, declared bGH milk 
unsafe for human consumption on the basis of defective experiments, then my 
original moral intuition would have been in equilibrium with my background 
scientific knowledge. However, if the scientific community, on the basis of 
valid experiments, reversed itself and declared bGH milk safe, then I could 
not continue to hold to my original intution.  In this fanciful thought 
experiment, once I learned of the illegitimacy of the science on which the 
unsafe pronouncement was based, I would be guilty of mistaking my original 
intuition for a deliverance of science were I to continue to maintain my belief 
about the dangers of bGH milk. 
 In ethics we go back and forth between (a), (b), and (c), revising our 
first intuitions in light of other intuitions, general moral principles and 
scientific information; then revising our general principles in light of 
carefully considered intuitions and new scientific information; and revising 
our scientific theory, every so often, when the number of anomolous 
observations become so weighty and troublesome that they cause scientists to 
jettison existing theory in favor of a new one. But there is a danger in moral 
reasoning to which we must be alert: to confuse circular reasoning, an 
unsound method, with the sound method of comparative, back and forth, 
reasoning toward reflective equilibrium.  
 Many of us who came of age after the first Earth Day share the 
intuition that nature is composed of intrinsically valuable biological wholes. 
But ecocentrism seems to conflate this intuition with science. The 
background scientific theory of Callicott’s ecocentrism is evolutionary 
theory, sociobiology, and a naturalistic moral psychology. To quote from a 
passage discussed above, the logic of ecocentrism 
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is that natural selection has endowed human beings with an 
affective moral response to perceived bonds of kinship and 
community membership and identity; that today the natural 
environment, the land, is represented as a community, the 
biotic community; and that, therefore, an environmental or 
land ethic is both possible . . . and necessary . . . 
There are two appeals to science here. The second appeal contends that 
scientists see the land as an organic community. We have already discussed 
reasons for doubting this claim, reasons strong enough to justify us in 
wondering whether the appeal to the communal quality of the land is more a 
presupposition of a certain kind of ecological science than a result of 
experimental inquiry. Callicott’s asserting that land is a biotic community 
seems to beg the question about whether an ecosystem’s mature equilibrium 
state is best considered a goal of a single organism or a byproduct of many 
individuals each severally pursuing their own goals. 
 The first appeal to science contends that science shows that morality 
evolves from natural selection and that our values are based therefore on 
natural affections and emotions. Callicott here gives a Darwinian turn to 
David Hume’s moral theory, arguing that moral sentiments are best explained 
in terms of selective adaptations. But this argument, too, is not the conclusion 
of any scientific investigation but rather a philosophical judgment based on a 
certain view of humans and dependent upon the presuppositions of 
sociobiology. Sociobiology is a social science with strong competitors, 
competitors that insist that an etiological explanation of the history of 
morality is not the same as a philosophical justification of morality.  
 Ecocentrists start from a set of aesthetic values about the integrity, 
stability and beauty of the environment and a sense of moral outrage at the 
degradation inflicted on the land by modern agriculture and human 
overpopulation. They consider and refine these intuitions into moral 
principles, namely, that nature is intrinsically valuable and that farming is 
intrinsically destructive. Background theories such as holistic ecological 
science cohere with these intuitions and principles and lead us to believe that 
our original intuitions are in wide reflective equilibrium with background 
scientific knowledge. 
 On examination, however, the ecocentrist’s chosen moral principles 
do not explain all of our intuitions, particularly the intuition that every human 
being has a right to be fed if there is food enough to go around. To the extent 
that we have any obligations at all to other humans, it would seem to be one 
of our basic duties, commensurate with others’ basic moral rights, that we 
endeavor to feed the hungry. To abandon the arts of cultivation is not to 
endeavor to feed the world’s hungry, of which there are now over two billion. 
The justification of the practice of agriculture, then, is secured by whatever 
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arguments justify the existence of our most basic duties to others. To argue 
that agriculture itself is morally unjustifiable is to assume an onerous burden 
of proof. 
 If the science to which ecocentrism appeals to justify its original 
intuitions converges too neatly with those initial intuitions, then the 
ecocentric arguments offered on behalf of environmentalist intuitions and 
moral principles may be circular. Ecocentrists may be mixing up the results 
of environmental science with their own aesthetic preferences, mistaking 
intuitions about the intrinsic value of nature for the deliverances of ecological 
science.  
 We have spent much time investigating the scientific and 
philosophical foundations of ecocentrism because it is the strongest theory 
available for justifying the attribution of intrinsic value to nature. We have 
seen that there are reasons to doubt the scientific foundations of ecocentrism 
and to be skeptical about its philosophical structure. Therefore, ecocentrism 
does not provide us with the theory we need to justify belief in (14.2). In the 
absence of another theory justifying belief in the thesis that nature is an 
internally-directed individual with goals of its own, the idea that we could 
vex nature no longer seems compelling. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many of the intrinsic objections to ag biotech protest that ag biotech 
is unnatural (UE). As Hume pointed out in the eighteenth century, and as we 
noted in our discussion in ch. 2 of the is/ought fallacy, there are good reasons 
to be cautious when trying to argue moral matters in terms of what is natural. 
It is notoriously difficult to derive valid normative statements from empirical 
claims. The fact that the world is set up in a certain way (a matter to be 
expressed in empirical terms) is not necessarily a good reason to believe that 
it ought to be set up that way (a matter to be expressed in normative terms). 
For it is empirically true that there are racist societies and yet this fact does 
not supply a good reason to believe that there ought to be racist societies. It is 
a fact that some children torture cats. Yet this fact does not supply a good 
reason to believe that children should be cruel to animals. What is the case is 
logically distinct from what ought to be the case. 
We should not ignore the world in arriving at our moral views, but 
we ought to be careful in claiming that Mother Nature gives final guidance. 
What appears to us to be the very essence of nature may be little more than 
our own prejudices read onto nature. 
The point is brought home by considering the mistake Aristotle made 
in his Natural Law theory. When Aristotle looked at nature he did not see 
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great variability, but rather a small number of essences, from which there 
were deviations. As Sober observes, Aristotle distinguished 
between the natural state of a kind of object and those states 
which are not natural. These latter are produced by 
subjecting the object to an interfering force. In the sublunar 
sphere, for a heavy object to be in its natural state is for it to 
be located where the center of the Earth is now (On the 
Heavens, ii, clr, 296b and 310b, 2-5). But, of course, many 
heavy objects fail to be there. The cause for this divergence 
from what is natural is that these objects are acted on by 
interfering forces which prevent them from achieving their 
natural state by frustrating their natural tendency. Variability 
within nature is thus to be accounted for as a deviation from 
what is natural . . . 65 
An essentialist theory, or Natural State model, neither fits contemporary 
scientific observations nor satisfies current moral sensibilities. Others have 
shown its scientific weaknesses.66 For our purposes, we must be aware of its 
powerful tendency to reinforce morally jaundiced views. 
When we think that one instantiation of an organism is the essential 
or natural state of many different organisms, then it is easy to think that 
organisms unlike the favored instantiation are deviant. Aristotle considered 
entire species unnatural because they were unlike what he took to be the 
“normal” state. As he wrote in the Generation of Animals: 
Seals are deformed as a group because they resemble lower 
classes of animals, owing to their lack of ears. Snails, since 
they move like animals with their feet cut off, and lobsters, 
because they use their claws for locomotion, are likewise to 
be counted as monsters (Generation of Animals, 19, 714b, 
18-19; Parts of Animals, iv, 8 684a35).67 
Aristotle also considered some groups of people to be inferior, 
believing that some were by nature fit to be slaves, and that women were not 
owed the kind of regard owed to Greek men. Why? The Natural State model 
appears in the justification: Nature simply had not seen fit to equip non-
Greeks with the virtues of the Greeks, or women with the rational capacities 
of men. Therefore, it would be unnatural for non-Greeks to have the rights of 
civilized peoples, or for women to make decisions in the polis.  
Surely we ought to reject such moral views, however. And we 
similarly ought to be wary of theories that take nature to be the primary 
source of correct moral opinions. To view nature in this fashion is to run the 
risk not only of failing to recognize one’s own moral biases, but to baptize 
them with an honorific title “natural.” In a culture in which natural is good 
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and unnatural is bad, calling an action unnatural may have the effect of 
reinforcing prejudices we ought to have abandoned. 
We have examined fourteen intrinsic objections to ag biotech. None 
of these objections seems sound, save perhaps for (10). But (10) proves too 
much for anyone willing to accept technological intervention in sexual 
reproduction to help childless couples conceive. Henceforth, critics of ag 
biotech must either bring forth other intrinsic objections, or focus on ag 
biotech’s potentially adverse consequences. To which we now turn. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Problems for the Case Against Ag Biotech, 
         Part II: Extrinsic Objections 
 
 
(a)  If there is a substantial risk that a technology will do more harm 
than good to humans, ecosystems, and animals, then it should 
not be developed. 
(b) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm than 
good to humans, ecosystems, and animals. 
(c)  Therefore, ag biotech should not be developed. 
 
 Thus the extrinsic argument against ag biotech. In considering 
whether it is a good argument, I believe we should simply assume that (a) is 
true. Substantially risky technologies, perhaps by definition, should not be 
developed. Seeing no reason to contest (a), therefore, I will focus on (b). 
 
Eight extrinsic arguments 
 
 There are at least eight arguments in support of (b). 
 
(1) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm 
than good to humans, by introducing genetically engineered 
foods carrying unacceptable risks to human health. 
(2) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm 
than good to humans by perpetuating social inequities in 
developed economies where it will lead to advantages for larger 
agribusiness farmers that will be unjustly denied to smaller 
family farmers. 
(3) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm 
than good to subsistence farmers, by perpetuating social and 
economic inequities between developed economies with their 
well capitalized farmers, and developing economies, with their 
under capitalized farmers. 
(4) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm 
than good to scientists and consumers, because scientists must 
increasingly pursue reductionistic, short term, applied science to 
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benefit private corporations, rather than holistic, long term, 
theoretical science to benefit public taxpayers. 
(5) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm 
than good to future generations by foreclosing possibilities for 
them to feed themselves. 
(6) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm 
than good to ecosystems, by leading to environmental 
catastrophe through release into the wild of virulent genetically 
modified organisms, plants, and fish.  
(7) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm 
than good by narrowing plant germplasm diversity, and more 
harm than good to the atmosphere by reducing the quality of 
air, soils, and ground and surface waters. 
(8) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm 
than good to research animals, livestock and wildlife, by causing 
them to suffer or die, or to prevent them from continuing as a 
species. 
 
 These objections require that we assess the potential consequences of 
ag biotech. Unfortunately, we lack much of the data necessary to make these 
assessments and, as Kristin Shrader-Frechette has argued, we have a 
tendency to misjudge risks even when we have full information.1 Humans 
generally are more averse to risks from new technologies than old 
technologies, even when the risks of the novel technologies are demonstrably 
less than the risks of the current ones.2 In the face of risk-aversion and factual 
uncertainty, we must nonetheless do our best to assess extrinsic objections to 
ag biotech. 
 Begin with risks to humans identified in (1) through (5). 
 
(1) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm than 
good to humans, by introducing genetically engineered foods 
carrying unacceptable risks to human health. 
 
 Ten years ago, assessing the truth of this claim would have been very 
difficult because we then had virtually no wide-scale experience eating 
commercially grown GMOs. But in the year 2000, we have in the United 
States more than a dozen years of experience with field trials of GMOs, and 
four years of experience of eating GM foods on a widespread basis. 3 And, as 
the years go by, it seems that the mantra of the biotech industry has proven 
itself to be true: There have to date been no verified reports of virulent GM 
cells, organisms, viruses, or plant or animal foods having harmed any 
consumer.  
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 There have been two near-misses. 
 One: Nuts in soybeans. The largest privately owned seed corn 
company in the world, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, did research in the mid-
1980s to transfer a gene from the Brazil nut into soybeans. They succeeded in 
producing a soybean with higher efficiency and nutritional content for animal 
feed. However, during tests of the new bean product in which the skin of 
individuals known to be allergic to Brazil nut were given skin-pricks, the GM 
soy-nut product caused an allergic reaction. University of Nebraska scientists 
demonstrated that the Brazil nut soybean contained the potential to produce 
deadly reactions in people allergic to nuts.4 
 Had Pioneer produced the bean commercially, it would have been the 
first time a known allergen had been bred into a food that previously did not 
contain the allergen in question. Potentially, at-risk individuals could have 
bought and eaten soy products without knowing that they were also 
consuming nut proteins that could kill them. However, Pioneer shut down the 
research project after learning of the results of the allergenicity study, and did 
not bring the product to market. 
 Two: Tryptophan. During the 1980s, sales of synthetic compounds 
promising effortless sleep and relief from premenstrual syndrome soared. One 
such product contained the chemical l-tryptophan. L-tryptophan is an amino 
acid essential to the human body available only from food sources, such as 
meat and dairy; the body cannot manufacture it by itself. 
 We need tryptophan to help us get to sleep, but foods containing it are 
high in calories and cholesterol. Americans began cutting their intake of such 
foods in the 1970s, and sleep problems became common. By 1989, scientists 
had shown that tryptophan produces a sleep enhancing effect and may also be 
effective in relieving stress and depression. By the end of the decade, health 
food stores were selling more than $100 million per year of tryptophan in a 
non-prescription pill as a nutritional supplement. To meet the new demand, 
Showa Denko, the world’s leading manufacturer based in Japan, ramped up 
its manufacturing process.  The new process involved genetic engineering. 
 Reports of medical problems soon began to appear.  In 1989, a 
connective tissue disorder called eosinophilia-myalgia syndrome (EMS) was 
linked to Show Denko’s product and, in the next two years, at least fifteen 
hundred people became ill.5 Some were partially paralyzed. Thirty-eight died.  
 The company assumed its new GM product was safe because its 
earlier, non-GM, variety was safe.  Was this assumption justified?  Ag 
biotech critic John Fagan thinks not, speculating that 
the genetic manipulations had increased tryptophan 
production so greatly that the concentrations of tryptophan 
within the bacteria had reached very high levels. As a result, 
the tryptophan and its precursors began to react chemically 
226                                                                           Gary L. Comstock  
 
producing unexpected toxic compounds. To date this 
company has paid over $1 billion in damages, and litigation 
is still in progress.6 
Was tryptophan the first genetically engineered disease? Is it only the first of 
many unintended side-effects so many fear from GM foods? 
The answer seems to be no. The poisonous tryptophan was probably 
not rendered lethal by the processes of genetic engineering. The culprit seems 
rather to have been more mundane industrial processes. As Fagan’s own 
book, which appeared in 1995, attests, Showa Denko asked the US Food and 
Drug Administration to test their original batch of GM tryptophan. This batch 
was produced using an organism called Bacillus amyloliquefaciens strain III. 
Strain III tryptophan passed the FDA standards and was approved for sale. No 
EMS cases were traced to this GM variety. 
But, when Showa Denko later revised production procedures, they 
made three changes. First, they began to use another strain of GM Bacillus, 
strain V.7 Second, they cut in half the amount of powdered activated charcoal 
used in one of the filtration steps. Third, they allowed some of the product to 
circumvent altogether another filtration step, called reverse-osmosis-
membrane.8 
One of these three changes was probably responsible for the deaths of 
consumers, all of whom, apparently, were killed by a batch produced with 
strain V. As Raphals notes in a Science article, the deadly contaminant 
probably arose as a result of the company’s cutting corners in the 
manufacturing process.  Raphals speculates that “inadequate filtration might 
have allowed impurities to pass through.” But even if we should blame the 
deaths on the fact that strain V was genetically engineered, this fact in itself 
does not lead to a condemnation of all genetic engineering, since the original, 
strain III, trytophan--also a genetically engineered form--was apparently safe. 
In sum, it is far from clear that tryptophan constitutes a case of food 
genetic engineering harming consumers. 
 Let us attempt to set the risks of eating GM foods in the context of 
the risks associated with eating regular, non-GM foods. Consider sweet corn. 
 Sweet corn can easily acquire molds both before and after harvest. 
Moldy corn can have high levels of toxins called fumonisins if the mold is the 
fungus, Fusarium moniliforme.  These toxins can cause cancer in rats, 
pulmonary edema in swine, equine leukoencephalomalacia in horses, and are 
suspected of causing esophageal cancer in humans.9 These are risks 
associated with eating moldy sweet corn. But some forms of genetically 
modified sweet corn accumulate less fumonisins than other varieties when 
infected by the fungus. 
Bt corn is best known in the popular press because a well-known 
scientific “comment” paper published in the journal Nature suggested that Bt 
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corn pollen kills monarch butterfly larvae. Much attention has been focused 
on potential environmental harms from Bt corn. As the previous paragraph 
suggests, however, there is a comparatively neglected potential health benefit 
of Bt corn.  A study by Gary Monkvold at Iowa State University suggests that 
Bt sweet corn is actually safer for consumers than present non-Bt varieties, 
because the modified corn seems to be less susceptible to mold. Here, then, is 
a GM food that decreases one health risk carried by its non-GM cousin.  
 Consider, too, that some foods contain rather high levels of naturally-
occurring chemicals that genetic modification might be able to reduce. For 
example, solanaceous crops, such as potatoes and green peppers, naturally 
contain rather high levels of chemicals called glycoalkaloids.  These 
glycoalkaloids protect the vegetables from insects in a way similar to the 
modes of action of two classes of manufactured insecticides, carbamates and 
organophosphates.   
The impact of glycoalkaloids, carbamate insecticides, and 
organophosphate insecticides on the nervous system of an insect occurs 
through the chemical’s inhibition of a substance called acetylcholinesterase 
(AC-ase) in the insect’s body.10 Without the production of AC-ase, the insects 
nerves fire willy-nilly, causing the insect to lose control over its nervous 
system. 
 Just as it is a bad thing for an insect to have its AC-ase production 
inhibited by natural insecticides, so is it also a bad thing for humans, because 
our nervous systems function almost identically to insects’ nervous systems.  
Although an insect may eat a large proportion of its body weight from a plant 
containing glycoalkoids in a short period of time, and perhaps be affected by 
it, humans very rarely eat enough of a naturally occurring AC-ase inhibitor in 
a normal foodstuff to be harmed (although humans and animals can be 
harmed by the very high levels in a close relative of potato, the deadly 
nightshade).  Thus, although the US government regulates the allowable 
residues of manufactured insecticides in foods, it does not regulate the 
concentrations of natural glycoalkaloids in foods like potatoes and peppers, 
which have been part of the healthy human diet for centuries. 
 The ability of potatoes to make their own chemicals to resist insects 
does permit an interesting thought experiment, however. Suppose we want to 
develop a new variety of apple, one that will make its own insect-resisting 
chemicals and thus not need to be sprayed as often with manufactured 
insecticides.  We go on a world-wide search for a close relative of cultivated 
apple that is able to produce glycoalkaloids and, in our thought experiment, 
we find it in a rare crabapple.  However, we realize that a breeding program 
to cross the unusual glycoalkaloid-making crabapple with a commercial apple 
variety will take years. 
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 On the other hand, we know that potato makes the same chemical as 
our fanciful crabapple.  We have eaten potatoes safely for centuries, and there 
is no need to regulate potatoes for glycoalkaloid content, even though we 
know that the concentrations of the chemicals can be quite high.  For 
example, a child who eats a large order of French fries from a typical fast-
food restaurant may get many times the maximum dose considered to have no 
effect on rats in lab experiments.11 
 Currently available techniques might allow us to select the gene for 
glycoalkaloid production from potato cells and transfer it to apple cells, and 
subsequently develop a new insect-resistant apple variety years sooner than 
the conventional breeding program would allow.  Moreover, the chemical in 
the apple would be the same chemical that is in our potatoes. 
 Which new apple variety should be considered “safer?”  Should that 
determination be based on how we bred the new trait into the variety? Or 
should it be based on the concentration of glycoalkaloids in the plant material 
to be consumed?  
 In this hypothetical example, the latter considerations would be 
relevant under the current regulatory framework the US government uses for 
agricultural biotechnology (if, as contrary to fact, the government regulated 
natural glycoalkaloids). Under the current regulatory framework, 
consideration of the source of the glycoalkaloid gene and how it was 
incorporated into an existing apple variety would not be considered of 
consequence, assuming all other characteristics of the apple were unchanged. 
This approach to regulating ag biotech reflects a concern with 
producing safe and nutritious foods independent of the method used to 
produce them. To date, this approach has served the public well for, as 
previously noted, there is no verified example of an ag biotech product that 
has worked its way through the regulatory process only to cause harm to 
human health or safety.  This is strong evidence that the process of modifying 
crops with biotech methods is no less safe than the process of plant breeding. 
Why is the safety record clean to this point? The answer probably has 
most to do with the protectionary oversight measures that are in place in the 
US. Changing the physiology or biochemistry of a food introduces the 
possibility of increasing levels of toxic agents in the food. In the United 
States, responsibility for monitoring these changes has fallen to three federal 
agencies: the Food and Drug Administration, the US Department of 
Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency. A word about each 
one is in order. 
 The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has regulatory 
authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) to insure 
the safety and labeling of the nation’s drug and food supply, excluding meat 
and poultry, and including veterinary drugs. GM foods are subject to 
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regulation under FDA provisions that prohibit unsafe adulteration of whole 
foods (e.g., fruits, vegetables, grains), and untested food additives. The FDA 
decided that GM foods chemically indistinguishable from foods generally 
regarded as safe (GRAS) need not be singled out for special testing. 
The FDA must, however, evaluate GM foods whenever the basic 
characteristics of the food have been changed. This rule applies whether the 
change is intended or not, and covers new substances in the food, such as new 
fatty acids, carbohydrates, and proteins. If any known toxicants, important 
nutrients, allergens, or antibiotic resistance selectable markers are introduced 
into, or if any such previously substances in the food are modified, then the 
FDA must conduct testing of the GM food. 
 The USDA is required by existing statutes to regulate certain 
products of agricultural biotechnology. This includes determining the risk 
associated with the approval of releasing a product of agricultural 
biotechnology to the field, either for testing or commercial use.  The USDA’s 
testing requirements, as stated earlier, are based on the characteristics of the 
product rather than its origin as a product of biotechnology.  Like all Federal 
agencies, the USDA must allow public participation in the form of comments 
regarding the rules that are proposed and used to regulate the approval 
process for GMOs.  Furthermore, for petitions to commercialize a GM 
product (i.e., remove it from regulated status), the public is notified and 
invited to comment.   
The USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has 
regulatory authority under Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA), and the Plant 
Quarantine Act.12 APHIS is charged with protecting American agriculture 
against pests and diseases, and anyone wishing to conduct a field test of a 
GM crop, import a GM plant into the US, or move a GM plant from one state 
to another, must obtain a permit from APHIS. 
To obtain a permit to field test a GM crop, one must supply, among 
other things: complete biological information, including descriptions of all 
new genes, products, and their origins; the purpose of the test; details about 
the experimental design; and explanation of the precautions taken to prevent 
escape of pollen, plants, and plant parts. 
The FDA and USDA are not the only agencies responsible for 
assessing the risks of GM crops and foods. In 1986, Congress established the 
“Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology,” and it assigned 
the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory authority under 
three statutes: Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA); the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA); and the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), Section 408.13 EPA is charged with insuring the safe 
use of novel microorganisms and pesticides engineered into crops and with 
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regulating all GM plants producing pesticidal substances not produced by 
their non-GM cousins. 
It is worth noting that the regulatory framework in the US establishes 
an arm’s length between the regulating agencies and the companies being 
regulated. In addition to these agencies, the USDA sponsors a Standing 
Committee on Biotechnology in the National Academy of Sciences, which 
comments to the Secretary of Agriculture on important topics such as the way 
in which long-term monitoring of GM crops should be pursued and potential 
risks that ought to be regulated, as, for example, for new pharmaceuticals and 
antibiotics produced from GM plants. 
While a reasonably trustworthy regulatory framework seems to be in 
place in this country, there are good reasons for continued vigilance and even 
revisitation of some decisions. In 2000, the National Academies of Science 
(NAS) National Research Council sponsored a committee to review the 
issue.14 The committee reported that it was not aware of any evidence 
suggesting foods on the market today are unsafe to eat as a result of genetic 
modification. And it said that no strict distinction exists between the health 
and environmental risks posed by plants genetically engineered through 
modern molecular techniques and those modified by conventional breeding 
practices. 
In the judgment of the chair of the committee, the agencies have 
“generally done a good job.” On the other hand, “given the current level of 
public concern,” entomologist Perry Adkisson wrote that “the agencies must 
bolster the mechanisms they use to protect human health and the 
environment.” In particular, the report questioned the EPA’s decision in 1994 
to exempt viral coat proteins from regulation. Viral coat proteins are protein 
shields manufactured by viruses to protect the virus from invaders. Scientists 
put viral coat proteins into plants and the proteins protect the plants from 
viral infection. There is evidence that these coat protein genes may be taken 
up by unrelated viruses that infect the plant, inducing a kind of accelerated 
evolution which changes the coat structure. Recombination between the 
inserted gene and the unrelated viruses could create an entirely new kind of 
virus with potentially grave consequences for agriculture.15 
These concerns led Lynn Goldman, formerly Assistant Administrator 
of the EPA’s Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances, to 
declare that she was “humbled” by the NAS report, and to offer that some of 
the exemptions allowed by the EPA should not have been allowed, including 
the exemption for viral coat proteins. Goldman further expressed 
dissatisfaction with the ability of the Coordinated Framework to protect 
against all allergens in GM foods. Her reason was that we do not know the 
sequence of most allergens and, therefore, cannot know with certainty 
whether a new allergen has been produced by genetic modification.16 
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There are good reasons for the USDA, EPA, and FDA to continue to 
improve procedures and review the adequacy of current GM safety 
regulations. While the EPA proposed regulations in the late 1980s, the agency 
still has not formally issued the regulations. So, the NAS report might 
provide the political platform needed by the EPA to correct the viral coat 
protein exemption and formally issue the regulations. 
Federal agencies have also been criticized for not making their 
procedures more open to the public, and there is more to be done to maximize 
transparency.17 Perhaps as a step in this direction, the Secretary of Agriculture 
has established an Advisory Committee on Agricultural Biotechnology. The 
Committee is charged with advising the Secretary on policy issues related to 
ag biotech and with maintaining an intensive dialogue to explore the issues 
related to ag biotech. The membership includes scientists with experience in 
rDNA plants, animals, and microbes. It also includes specialists in ecology, 
biodiversity, forest science, fisheries, human medicine, and public health and 
epidemiology. It also includes advocates for small farms, consumers, the 
biotech industry, the public, and an ethicist.  All of its meetings are open to 
the public.  
There is some assurance to be taken, too, from the inherently 
competitive nature of the US political system, a system based on the 
separation of powers.  Congress creates laws; the Executive Branch enforces 
them; and the Judiciary deals with challenges to them. The Administrative 
Procedures Act authorizes the courts to review biotech regulatory agency 
decisions for decisions that are arbitrary and capricious. The Freedom of 
Information Act demands disclosure of the agencies’ deliberations and 
decisions.  
There are other reasons why US consumers may feel protected by the 
US regulatory approach. The agencies select scientific experts not on the 
basis of who they are, or with whom they are affiliated, but on the basis of 
what they know. While the best available scientists are selected for 
conducting and reviewing tests, regulatory decision-making is not limited to 
scientists. Non-scientists provide input through public comment, 
administrative hearings, and even initiation of laws, regulations, and lawsuits. 
Courts that find agencies non-compliant with the law can impose civil or 
criminal penalties. 
The US system of regulated environmental releases appears to have 
worked so far. As noted in the Introduction to this book, more than half of the 
US soybeans and cotton, and nearly a third of the corn, grown in the summer 
of 1999 were genetically engineered.18 Other countries have also approved 
GM crops for commercial production, including Argentina, China, Canada, 
and Japan.  
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 But the global case asserts, even if no human health risks have 
emerged so far, it is equally true that ag biotech has not produced any 
products that are clearly in nature’s or humanity’s interest. 
There seem to be a number of counterexamples, as there are 
thousands of foods containing GM products currently on the US market, 
including children's breakfast cereals, such as Kellogg’s Corn Flakes. Indeed, 
most processed foods contain GM products insofar as genetic modification is 
now used to produce food enzymes, amino acids, peptides, flavors, organic 
acids, polysaccharides, vitamins.19  
Recombinant alpha amylase is used in high fructose corn syrup, the 
sweetener in regular Coke and Pepsi and other popular soft drinks. In 1995, 
this GM product was granted GRAS status. For diet soft drinks, GM 
aspartame is used, a recombinant amino acid now found in five thousand 
products on grocery shelves in the US. Monosodium glutamate (MSG), a 
popular flavor enhancer, is also produced using GM techniques, as are these 
GM enzymes: glucoamylase, pullulanase, transferase, maltogenic amylase, 
and sylanase (all starches); xylanase (used in the baking industry); 
decarboxylase (brewing industry); and, in the juice processing industry, 
pectinesterase. 
Consider chymosin and the cheese making industry. Cheese is 
produced using rennet, a product traditionally extracted from the stomachs of 
veal calves and turned into chymosin. Chymosin in turn reacts with a milk 
protein, casein. The end-product of the chymosin-casein reaction is curd, the 
basic substance out of which cheddar, Swiss, and provolone are made. Until 
1994, the only practical sources of rennet were animal carcasses; for every 
ten calf stomachs ground up in salt water, cheese makers could produce a 
gallon of rennet. 
In 1990, the FDA approved a gene-spliced industrial substitute for 
rennet, bioengineered chymosin and, since 1994, this GM product has 
supplied half of the world’s rennet. Some 70 percent of all US cheese is now 
produced using this GM product. I do not know of any critics of GM 
chymosin. 
Consider “golden rice,” rice genetically engineered to contain higher 
levels of beta-carotene, the substance our digestive tracts convert into vitamin 
A. Children whose diets are deficient in vitamin A have poor eyesight, and 
are at increased risk for blindness and susceptibility to diseases such as 
measles. The World Health Organization estimates that some 230 million 
children worldwide fall into this category. According to the United Nations, 
at least one million children under age five die each year from diseases 
related to vitamin A deficiency. 20 
Golden rice (GR) was produced by Ingo Potrykus and others at the 
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. They combined two genes from 
Problems, Part II                                                                                                  233 
  
daffodils with one from bacteria, and inserted them into rice.   Potrykus’s 
work was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the European 
Commmunity Biotech Programme. The International Rice Research Institute 
in the Phillipines is working to breed the new rice into the rice varieties 
currently being grown in Asia. One serving of GR supplies ten to thirty 
percent of a child's daily vitamin A requirement. 
Notice that the research institutions developing GR are largely 
funded with public monies.21 This fact is significant insofar as it may speak to 
RAFI's fear that ag biotech is only being used by powerful transnational 
corporations to enforce a new bioserfdom on poor smallholders. Once the 
new trait has been stabilized in commercial rice varieties, the Institute will 
distribute the GMO seeds free of charge to peasant farmers around the globe. 
Therefore, the rice seems impervious to criticisms that it will harm children 
and hungry people in developing countries. 
However, global critics might respond with the following objections, 
objections that must be addressed. 
Objection:   GR is a reductionistic strategy that does not address the 
systemic long-range problem:  that rice monocultures years ago 
displaced mixed farms on which green leafy vegetables, carrots, and 
other sources of vitamin A were once grown.  This displacement has 
caused the current problem. 
Response:   True, perhaps, for some areas of rice production, but not 
for all areas. But the relevant point is that GR can address a specific 
short-range problem. The systemic problem of a need for a more 
diverse, democratically-owned agriculture, cannot be solved by new 
technology: only government and economic reform can accomplish 
this task.  It seems unfair to criticize this particular technology for its 
inability to insure such difficult reforms. 
Objection:  There are alternatives, such as providing children with 
vitamin A pills, green leafy vegetables, or carrots. 
Response:  True.  But giving children pill supplements does not help 
their families learn to provide for themselves, and introducing 
vegetables into the agricultural rotation system requires extensive 
economic, political, and agronomic reforms that may take years. GR 
can begin to deliver benefits shortly after its first growing season. 
Objection:  GR will not solve the problem because it requires that 
children eat many bowls of rice a day to get their full dose of vitamin 
A. 
Response:  True again.  GR will not solve the entire problem by 
itself.  But notice that children already eat many bowls of rice a day 
in these areas; it is their staple food.  So GR would not require 
extensive changes in their diet, or special on-going coaching of 
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children to take their pills.  And GR will solve the problem for those 
children currently consuming sixty or seventy percent of the daily 
recommended vitamin intake and needing only the modest boost GR 
provides. 
Objection: GR will harm local subsistence agriculture by 
encouraging rice monocultures to replace current mixed cropping 
patterns. 
Response:   This objection is puzzling in light of the first objection, 
that rice monocultures long ago replaced indigenous rotational 
schemes.  It seems unfair first to criticize GR rice for not addressing a 
long-standing agro-economic problem, and then to criticize it because 
it will introduce that same problem. 
The global critics are right on one important point, that GR is not a 
panacea.  It will need to be combined with sources of other vitamins and 
nutrients in order to provide a balanced diet.  GR is, however, a commendable 
new technology that can assist us in meeting our positive duty to aid the 
needy. 
The team that produced golden rice is also working to engineer 
higher levels of iron into rice. Anemia caused by iron deficient diets is 
widespread in developing countries, and has been called “the world’s worst 
nutrition disorder,” afflicting some two billion people. Might ag biotech soon 
help, in a small but real way, to save children in developing countries from 
the scourges of blindness and anemia? 
 There are other ag biotech products, some with few or no detractors, 
such as the drug to combat pseudorabies in swine, the first genetically 
engineered vaccine to be approved for use by the USDA, allowed on the 
market in 1986.22 Veterinary biotech products such as the pseudrabies vaccine 
brought me right back to my first question:  How do I square global 
opposition to the use of genetic engineering in agriculture with virtual carte 
blanche approval of its use in pharmaceutical production? I did not, and do 
not, for example, know of critics of a GM test to find prostate cancer. 
Approved by the FDA in 1987, prostate-specific antigen (PSA) has enabled 
early successful detection of many tumors during the last dozen years. The 
PSA test scores well by measures of social justice, too, as prostate cancer 
affects a disproportionately large number of African American men.23 
There are now GM drugs not only to diagnosis but to treat cancer, 
and GM medical tests and vaccines to diagnose and treat Hepatitis B.24  In 
patients with multiple sclerosis, a potentially fatal disease, the myelin sheath 
surrounding the nerves is compromised, leading to dizziness, nausea, and an 
inability to control one’s body. In 1996, Biogen began marketing Avonex, a 
genefactured form of interferon beta, and a treatment now used successfully 
by more than fifty thousand people to slow the advance of the symptoms of 
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MS. Gene hunters have shown that single genes are responsible for causing at 
least two diseases: cystic fibrosis and Duchenne muscular dystrophy. With 
the genes identified, it may be possible for researchers to devise strategies to 
overcome the genetic deficiency. 
Nor do I know of opponents of the FDA’s 1988 approval of products 
targeted at diagnosing acute coronary syndrome, breast cancer, and Crohn’s 
disease, and preventing Lyme disease. Since the late 1980s, microorganisms 
have been grown in quantities large enough to produce cheaper and purer 
supplies of drugs to treat dwarfism, diabetes, arthritis, and forms of cancer 
other than prostate and breast cancer. Scientists and physicians readily admit 
that these products are not perfect; the use of interferon to treat cancer, for 
example, is marred by serious side-effects. Yet many of the so-called miracle 
drugs have saved lives. 
Set aside, if you will, the argument that insofar as we accept medical 
biotech we should accept ag biotech.  Ignore the argument that many 
publicly-funded scientists are involved in efforts to produce more diverse, 
nutritive, productive, blight-resistant and efficient strains of staple crops like 
rice, cassava, potatoes, grains, and tubers. There is yet a strong argument to 
reject (1), an argument that does not depend on either of these arguments. It 
takes its bearings from Stich's incoherence argument. 
 Grant the premise of the critics that ag biotech may not solve world 
hunger. It is equally true that not having ag biotech may also not help solve 
world hunger. It does not seem fair to fault those defending the active 
development of ag biotech for not being able to guarantee result x, when it is 
equally true that those defending the active non-development of ag biotech 
are similarly not able to guarantee result x. 
 These were the arguments that finally convinced me to reject (1). 
 
(2)  There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm than 
good to humans, by perpetuating social inequities in developed 
economies where it will lead to advantages for larger agribusiness 
farmers that will be unjustly denied to smaller family farmers. 
 
 Can medium-sized family farms be saved? At the beginning of this 
chapter, I explained why I have given up hope of a positive answer. Ought 
implies can. If there is no way to save family farms, then we cannot have a 
moral obligation to save them. In the conclusion to my earlier edited volume, 
I suggested that we simply assume that there is a good way to save family 
farms and try to figure out what it is. Unfortunately, it appears that there is no 
way to use new technologies to insure that medium-sized farms will be able 
to compete with small hobby farms and large industrial farms. If we cannot 
save family farms, then we cannot have an obligation to save them. 
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 I do not oppose mixed, small- and medium-sized, owner-operated 
farms. I hope, and expect, that many such farmers will find innovative ways 
to stay in business. I hope consumers will patronize them. I oppose only the 
use of public monies for commodity supports that aid primarily our largest 
farmers when those monies might be used in other ways to assist society’s 
truly worst-off. 
 
(3)  There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm than 
good to subsistence farmers, by perpetuating social and economic 
inequities between developed economies with their well capitalized 
farmers, and developing economies, with their under capitalized 
farmers. 
 
 We have previously noted the fact that world markets for ten major 
Third World exports are shared monopolies controlled by a half dozen 
multinational corporations (ch. 2). This a matter for concern because the 
more concentrated an industry is, the more the companies in that industry can 
control, and inflate, prices. But in ch. 2 we did not ask the next question: 
What follows from this fact for ag biotech? 
 First, banning ag biotech will not fix the problem. Even in the 
absence of ag biotech, the food industry will still be a concentrated industry 
with just a few multinationals controlling the markets. Second, singling ag 
biotech companies out for special censure seems unfair in face of the fact that 
nearly half of all industries in the U. S. are also oligopolies.25 It also seems 
like a step directed at the wrong target. For if the problem is oligopoly power, 
we ought to address that problem systematically, not by targeting biotech but 
by addressing every highly concentrated industry sector, such as the computer 
industry, photo equipment, refrigerators, aircraft, tires, and cars. Third, 
allowing ag biotech to proceed could allow less developed countries to 
develop niche-market products, a potential boost to their economies.  
 The central issue may come down to a matter of choice. Some would 
prevent developing countries from using biotech, others would encourage it. 
But who should decide the matter? Relatively well-off and well-fed defenders 
of the environment in developed countries, or relatively poor, ill-fed farmers 
in the developing countries? 
 Michael N. Kibue is a Kikuyu farmer, an African who grows a 
variety of crops and livestock on a two acre plot on the slopes of Mount 
Kenya. Kibue, like many farmers in his community, is dissatisfied with the 
amounts of chemicals necessary to grow cash crops such as coffee and tea, 
and he is part of a Kikuyu movement to restore traditional farming practices 
in Kenya. Nonetheless, he perceives an important role for ag biotech. He 
envisions biotech assisting in the development of more efficient fermentation 
Problems, Part II                                                                                                  237 
  
procedures, so that farmers can diversify the crops they grow for their 
families. He sees “an urgent need to develop appropriate biotechnology tools 
and equipment for use at the small-scale farm level,” including fermentation 
vessels, stirring and separation techniques, and food preservation processes 
(e.g., packaging plants).26 
 Those opposing ag biotech must reckon with Kibue’s position. One 
of the greatest dangers to the well-being of Southern peasants is the fact that 
for most of the year, fruits and vegetables are not in season. In order to have 
access to a steady, safe, supply of fruits and vegetables, therefore, farmers 
must preserve them. The processes for safe canning are not always well 
understood, and decayed or tainted foods threaten serious harms, including 
botulism and salmonella. Refrigeration is one answer, but the amount of 
energy required for refrigeration is not always available in the world’s 
poorest regions. Biotechnology offers the hope of providing drying, 
preservation, and fermentation processes that would expand the length of 
time fruits and vegetables were available to the world’s neediest consumers. 
 Kibue is not an ag biotech enthusiast. He argues most strongly for a 
recovery of traditional patterns of farming and for the reinstitution of 
indigenous agricultural knowledge. But he recognizes that the revival of these 
practices, along with a recovery of the use of herbs in traditional medicine, 
might well benefit from biotechnology. The new biotechniques, he believes, 
will “help our traditional doctors develop better preparations and prescription 
methods.” Small-scale African farmers, Kibue concludes, “will have to take 
risks and innovate. Only then do they stand a chance of bettering their 
lives.”27 
 Economic development implies a growing economy. Agricultural 
history suggests that, in the US, an expanding off-farm economy has provided 
jobs for farm children for whom there would have been little future on the 
farm. The problem, of course, is that developing countries often cannot 
compete with developed economies because their natural resources, 
infrastructure and education are not as high, putting them at a competitive 
disadvantage. Displaced farmers in these countries may have a difficult time 
finding new jobs and recovering their sense of independence and dignity. The 
slums of Mexico City, Sao Paola and Calcutta, and the so-called “bean riots” 
of Brazil in the late 1970s, are examples of the effects on real people of the 
vicissitudes of the world food market. But is the only answer to this problem 
to try to keep the economy an agrarian one? 
 Martha Crouch has argued that poor people in developing countries 
ought to be able to grow some of their own food, without having to compete 
in the international market economy. Kibue would not seem to disagree with 
her on this point. But he seems to disagree with an implication of Crouch’s 
position, that ag biotech threatens the ability of Southern peasants to grow 
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subsistence crops. Assume that we take as a goal that we want to shield 
peasant farmers from the harmful effects of a competitive international 
market economy. Does it follow that ag biotech worldwide must be shut 
down? 
 It seems that the issue comes down to a question of autonomy. Who 
should decide whether small peasant Southern farmers have access to GM 
crops? Policy-makers in developed countries? Philosophers in their 
armchairs? Governmental authorities? Transnational corporations? Or the 
farmers themselves? Banning ag biotech would clearly take the decision out 
of the hands of farmers such as Kibue.  
 
(3.1) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more 
harm than good to women and children in developing countries. 
 
 In ch. 2 we noted serious questions raised independently by Crouch 
and Lipton concerning possible ill effects of MA on the groups named in 
(3.1). And yet the answer of shutting ag biotech down does not seem to 
address the problem. Compare ag biotech to the green revolution. Neither 
Crouch’s nor Lipton’s questions call into doubt that claim that the green 
revolution’s high-yielding seed varieties were in the best interests of people 
in developing countries. Rather, they call into question the integrity of the 
political institutions and cultural practices of some of the countries in which 
the green revolution occurred. Assuming what seems to be true, that the 
political spheres of some developing countries are corrupt, then the problem 
is not with ag biotech but with the infrastructures of the countries in question. 
 Ag biotech may be part of the solution if the countries themselves can 
innovate, develop their own comparative advantages, and increase incomes. 
Partha Dasgupta, an economist at Cambridge University, has shown that 
increasing cash income in a developing country is not always correlated with 
increasing inequities in power, nor in environmental degradation. Dasgupta 
cites World Bank research on sub-Saharan Africa suggesting positive 
correlations among poverty, fertility, and environmental degradation. He cites 
with approval the conclusion reached by the United Nations (UN) Conference 
held in Cairo in 1994. The UN argued that poverty in developing countries is 
best addressed by protecting women’s reproductive rights. By empowering 
women and raising the overall standard of living in poor rural areas, women 
have the freedom and incentive to limit the number of children they bear.28 
 As Dasgupta suggests, it is very difficult to make valid blanket 
statements about the impact of MA on developing countries for, as Pierre 
Crosson also notes, different regions had very different rates of growth. 
Overall, from the period 1951-55 to 1978-82, developing countries increased 
food production by an average of 0.5 percent annually on a per capita basis. 
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But East Asia and Latin America did much better than average, at 1.4 percent 
and 0.9 percent, while Africa did much worse, with food production actually 
decreasing 0.5 percent. 
 Crosson believes it is difficult to say whether the green revolution 
was equitable intragenerationally because the evidence is inconclusive. He 
thinks the evidence suggests, however, that small farmers and landless 
workers typically “shared in the higher income yielded by the new 
technology,” because demand for family and hired labor tended to accompany 
use of the green revolution varieties. 
 The verdict on the green revolution is mixed, depending on the 
geographical area selected. For example, in the Indian Punjab, improved 
varieties of wheat, rice, and potatoes doubled farm incomes within a decade 
of being introduced.  Farmers were encouraged to become innovators in their 
operations as cash rent policies replaced the previous owner-tenant system.  
The non-farm economy also grew, bolstered by an adequate education system 
and a skilled work force.  Displaced farmers were able to find jobs in a region 
where per capita income “has increased 3.0 - 3.5 percent annually for the last 
two decades.”29 
 Yet, the Punjab is not representative of all developing countries.  Its 
population is not as dense as other parts of Asia, a distinct advantage when it 
comes to changing land ownership patterns.  Furthermore, it had already 
instituted irrigation when the green revolution began. Nonetheless, we have 
here a region where the benefits of MA “were widely dispersed among people 
. . .”30 
 Elsewhere, however, the outcome of the green revolution may not 
have been equitable, “because successful adoption . . . [of MVs] generally 
requires irrigation, which most farmers in the developing countries do not 
have access to.” As Crosson notes, farmers in these other areas may actually 
have “suffered diminished income to the extent that the green revolution 
reduced prices of the crops they produce.” 
 That said, the overall picture may on balance be hopeful because the 
availability of water is not currently a limiting factor in most developing 
countries. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, there is 
sufficient water available for developing countries to increase by a third the 
amount of land currently in production. Latin America is currently farming 
only about 15 percent of its arable land; Africa is farming only 25 percent of 
the acres it could farm.31 The limiting factors are the countries’ abilities to 
develop appropriate technologies and the infrastructures required to “assure 
equitable distribution of the resulting income.” According to Crosson: 
 Land tenure systems which concentrate most land in the 
hands of a few farmers or which put in question the year-to-
year tenancy agreements, or which put rentals on a crop share 
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basis, may weaken incentives of both large and small 
farmers, and of both owners and renters to invest in new 
technology. Large landowners . . . [are likely to be induced] 
to adopt land-using, labour-saving technologies appropriate 
to their own resource position but inappropriate where, for 
society as a whole, labour is abundant and land scarce. 
Crosson concludes that “experience with the green revolution strongly 
suggests that technologies can be developed which meet both productivity 
and equity criteria.” 
 The lesson seems to be that developing countries need just 
institutions, honest politicians, land reform, loan forgiveness, and well-
developed educational systems so that peasants can act on more complete 
knowledge, make informed choices, and trust that their institutions will be 
transparent and their decisions will be honored. But they probably do not 
need others to make choices for them about which technologies to use. As 
another Indian writer, R. S. Swaminathan, winner of the World Food Prize, 
writes, agriculturalists in the developing countries, 
must not worship any tool but should use such combinations 
of tools and techniques which can help us to reach our goals 
speedily, economically and surely. In other words, we need a 
blending of what are called traditional and frontier 
technologies. . . . Land is shrinking and biotic and abiotic 
stresses are increasing. . . . Disparities between the rich and 
the poor are growing in every sphere of life. Biotechnology 
offers scope for adding a dimension of resource neutrality to 
scale neutrality in technology development. Let us take 
advantage of this opportunity.32 
 
(3.2) There is a substantial risk that terminator technology will 
do more harm than good to farmers who save seed in developing 
countries. 
 
 Terminator technology is a process engineered into crops by 
multinational corporations intent on protecting intellectual property rights 
(IPR).  The terminator gene insures that the crops will flourish for only one 
year, and then be rendered sterile.  The technology effectively prevents 
farmers from saving their seed and using it from year to year. This clearly is a 
harm to them. But will the multinational corporations develop region-specific 
crop varieties if they cannot profit from doing so? Not to have the assistance 
of major research and development efforts by corporations might also harm 
these farmers. 
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 But suppose terminator technology is an unmitigated harm to 
indigenous seed-savers. Is it the only possible application of ag biotech for 
the developing world? 
 Work to produce perennial food crops that will reproduce asexually 
is underway at the USDA.  A process known as apomixis already allows 
many plants, including crab apple and citrus trees, lawn grasses, and 
blackberries to produce exact genetic copies of themselves, year after year. 
The world’s major food grains--corn, wheat, and rice--all reproduce sexually. 
However, if apomixis can be achieved in these crops, farmers would only 
have to buy seeds once. Thereafter, crops would essentially produce clones of 
themselves, providing continuous annual yields without the cost of buying 
new seed. 
 Here is an example of a potential benefit of ag biotech to farmers 
saving seed in developing countries. However, as Andrew Pollack has 
pointed out, academic scientists working in the field are worried that if a 
large seed company discovers the technology first and patents it, that access 
to the technology could be denied to Southern subsistence farmers. 
Concerned about this possibility, an international meeting of researchers in 
Bellagio, Italy, issued a document that called for “broad and equitable access 
to plant biotechnologies, especially apomixis technology.”33 
 
(3.3) Ag biotech will lead to an increasingly unjust gap 
between the world’s poorest and richest. 
 
The effects of ag biotech on the distribution of wealth remains a 
worrisome concern. The gap between the world’s wealthiest twenty-percent 
and its poorest twenty-percent has widened in past years. This is not a trend 
we should accept. 
But there are many complexities involved in addressing it. The first 
thing to be said is that it will not do to interpret Rawls as holding that 
technologies should be rejected if they do not redress the problem. In my 
article on bGH, I had misinterpreted Rawls’ in just this way. An anonymous 
reviewer’s report from a journal to which I had submitted a version of “The 
Case Against bGH,” helped me to reassess my interpretation by challenging 
my claim that Rawl’s second principle of distributive justice argues against 
adoption of bGH. The reviewer argued that I had made two mistakes. 
 The first mistake was that I ignored Rawls’ principle of liberty, which 
requires that we set up the basic structures of society so that people will be 
maximally free. Rawls introduces his view with a famous thought 
experiment, the “veil of ignorance.” 
 Imagine that you are in a conversation with everyone else in society. 
Your collective task is to set up the fundamental structures of society—the 
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economic system, the political system, the network of social services and 
institutions. And you must set it up in such a way that everyone will be 
satisfied with the structure, even though they do not know ahead of time what 
social station they will have in that system. Rawls believes the just society 
will be the society that results from this conversation. He further believes that 
the outcome of the conversation will be as follows.  
 Since people will not know ahead of time in what station they will 
find themselves, everyone will want to pretend as if they do not know their 
race, age, gender, social or economic class. Coming to the bargaining table 
with the needs of everyone in mind, the parties will not bias the structures of 
society toward any particular group. They will want to arrange things so that 
they would be willing to accept whatever place they received if it were 
determined by a lottery that randomly assigned some individuals to be poor, 
some to be rich, and some to be in the middle. 
 Under these conditions, all bargainers have a strong incentive to 
agree to arrange the basic political and economic structures according to three 
principles. The first principle is equality of rights. There would be no slave 
class to be exploited by others if all of the bargainers faced equal chances of 
ending up in the class themselves. All people should be allowed the freedom 
to engage in actions (and invent and adopt new technologies) that will benefit 
themselves and others as long as so doing does not unduly limit others’ 
liberties. 
 The second principle is true equality of opportunity. In western 
society, we have formal equal opportunity, a policy that states that all 
applicants will be given equal consideration. However, since many people do 
not apply for opportunities, we do not have true equal opportunity. Once the 
prejudicial effects of sexism and racism have been removed from society, 
then true equality of opportunity can occur. 
 The third principle is the difference principle: Whenever a society’s 
goods are unequally distributed, any changes in society must favor those who 
are worst off. The principle entails that no changes in the political or 
economic sphere shall be permitted if the change harms, or forecloses 
opportunities otherwise open to, those at the bottom. One of the implications 
of the difference principle follows. Suppose we have a choice between a 
public policy (p) that will make the poor a little bit better-off, or public policy 
(r) that will make the rich a little better-off. If we can only choose to enact 
one of these policies, we ought always to choose (p). 
 The principle of equality and liberty implies that technological 
innovations are to be highly valued in this society, all other things being 
equal, insofar as they are the result of people exchanging ideas and 
discoveries as free equals. To ban a new technology would be prima facie 
acting contrary to the principle of liberty unless the new technology will 
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clearly limit the liberty of others. I argued in ch. 1 that bGH would unfairly 
limit the liberties of family farmers. Did it? 
 As we have seen, widespread adoption of bGH may have restricted 
the range of some farmers’ choices by foreclosing the choice of continuing to 
run a dairy farm, but it did not change the society in which these farmers’ 
other choices were protected. Nor did it foreclose their ability to choose to 
convert their operation from dairy to, say, a cash grain farm. Nor did it 
foreclose their ability to receive compensation upon the sale of their property. 
So bGH does not seem to run afoul of any of Rawls’ principles. It seems, in 
sum, that one cannot justify banning bGH by appealing to Rawls’ social 
contract theory. That was my first mistake. 
 The second was that I misapplied the difference principle. The way in 
which Rawls’ idea of justice protects those at the bottom of the ladder is not 
by banning specific technologies but rather by banning changes to the 
fundamental structures of political and economic life that would discriminate 
against the poor. As the journal reviewer pointed out, my argument against 
bGH not only ignored Rawls’ liberty principle, but misinterpreted the 
difference principle “as applicable to particular policy areas.” Rawls himself, 
wrote the reviewer, “repeatedly asserts that this is completely unjustified.” 34 
 Distributive justice requires that we set up institutions so as to 
promote fairness and improve the lot of the worst-off. Will ag biotech 
exacerbate inequalities in distribution of wealth? Bryan and Farrell argue that 
the benefits of new technologies will in the long-term reach those at the 
bottom of the world’s poorest countries.35 To the contrary, global critics of ag 
biotech cite figures suggesting that precisely the opposite effect will occur. In 
1960, the ratio of distribution of income between the twenty percent of the 
world’s population that lived in the richest countries compared to the twenty 
percent that lived in the poorest countries was thirty to one. Today that ratio 
has widened, doubling, in fact, to sixty to one.36 Faced with those figures, one 
might conclude that ag biotech is certain to increase injustice in the world. 
 But is such a conclusion inevitable? Perhaps not. First, one might 
argue that new progressive policies could effectively prevent technological 
developments from increasing global inequalities. In the case of 
bioprospecting, for example, we might be able to institute effective 
international regulations requiring standardized profit-sharing contracts 
between international corporations and the indigenous groups that provide 
biologicals. 
 Second, one might argue that the statistics themselves do not prove 
injustice. Granted, globalization has been accompanied by a troubling 
increase in relative income inequality. However, what would have happened 
in the absence of globalization? We do not know the answer.  It is 
conceivable, however, that many of those at the bottom might be even worse-
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off today than they would have been in the absence of the processes of 
globalization. If so, then globalization would measure favorably by Rawls’ 
standard of justice.  
 That said, we must discuss the realities of technology transfer. The 
multinational companies that have developed the first wave of ag 
biotechnologies have protected their intellectual property with patents. In 
order to use these new technologies legally, poorer countries must pay the 
fees that these companies charge. Unfortunately, the poorer countries lack the 
financial resources needed to pay the rents, and lack the human resources 
needed to negotiate the legal intricacies of intellectual property. 
 If a country wants to plant vitamin A rice, it must first complete a 
complex process of negotiation, even though the rice was developed by a 
public agency, IRRI, that wants to provide the rice seed free to the country's 
farmers. The reason is that the basic genetic knowledge and accompanying 
technologies necessary to produce the rice are owned by companies such as 
Monsanto and Du Pont. As C. S. Prakash explains, 
If Vietnam or Liberia wants to distribute golden rice seeds to 
its farmers, it must first negotiate with various companies for 
the gene transfer, gene promoters and selectable marker 
technologies that were used in its development. . . . Thus, 
agricultural biotechnology cannot make inroads into 
developing countries without a ‘freedom to operate’ license 
from the owners of these technologies--major life science 
corporations.37 
Prakash concludes that “industry ‘ownership’ of genes and technologies used 
in the development of such varieties represents a serious obstacle,” adding 
that 
If companies really want to help combat global poverty and 
hunger, they must make their technology available for use by 
developing country farmers on select food crops such as rice, 
cassava and millets on a royalty-free basis. 
 Premise (3.3) clearly identifies an area of concern. Given the political 
obstacles that stand in the way of realizing ag biotech’s promise to feed the 
world’s hungry, one might be tempted to defend the following claim. 
 
(3.4) We should allow publicly-, but not privately-, funded ag 
biotech research and products. 
 
 One might be opposed to allowing the profit motive to enter the 
sphere of genetic manipulation of the environment but in favor of allowing 
genetic engineering for the development of crops in poorer countries. What 
would be wrong with supporting the production of biotechnologies like 
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vitamin A rice with public dollars, and requiring the free distribution of the 
technology, while banning the development of ag biotech in the private 
sector?38 This strategy would allow for a more deliberate development of the 
technology, free of the urgency that accompanies profit-driven technology 
development. 
 It is an interesting argument, but it has two flaws. First, there is the 
problem of fairness. Assuming that both the public technology (e.g., vitamin 
A rice) is safe for consumers and the environment, and that the private 
technology (e.g., chymosin) is similarly safe for consumers and the 
environment, why should public agencies be given a freedom denied to 
private companies? 
 There is a deeper problem. The development of publicly funded ag 
biotech may not be possible without the assistance, financial and intellectual, 
of the private sector. Monsanto helped to develop vitamin A rice. It is an 
open question whether the rice could have reached its current state without 
the assistance of Monsanto. If private companies are contributing essential 
knowledge and monetary resources to public efforts, then the public efforts, 
by definition, would not be possible without the accompanying 
commercialization of products for which wealthier consumers are willing to 
pay. Therefore, (3.4) seems to be neither fair nor practical. 
 
(4) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm than 
good to scientists and consumers, because scientists must increasingly 
pursue reductionistic, short term, applied science to benefit private 
corporations, rather than holistic, long term, theoretical science to 
benefit public taxpayers. 
 
 The problem with this objection is that it suggests that there is a 
single dichotomy between sciences, reductionistic versus holistic, and that the 
first is bad and the second good. In fact, there are many different kinds of 
science, and the goodness or badness of practicing a science is assessed by 
whether the science is practiced according to standards internal to it. 
Consider nuclear physics, inorganic chemistry, and molecular biology. These 
sciences are by their very nature reductionistic, and progress is made in them 
only through very compartmentalized linear thinking and by repeating 
experiments to confirm observations. 
 Other sciences proceed differently. The so-called historical sciences, 
geology, much of evolutionary biology and astronomy, study objects that by 
their nature are not subject to controlled repeatable experiments. Therefore, 
geologists and astronomers must engage in more holistic theorizing in order 
to explain their subjects. 
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 It seems that critics of ag biotech are largely correct: the funds 
currently available to molecular biologists in agriculture overshadow the 
funds available to traditional plant breeders, agroecologists, and 
environmental scientists. But this situation may change as more and more 
genes are identified and the research establishment begins to try to move 
these genes into established crop lines. The current funding situation need not 
suggest either that molecular biology will forever be favored over other 
biological fields, nor that reductionism as a method threatens to overtake all 
of the sciences.  
 In chapter 2, I argued that scientists need to take a more holistic 
approach. But such an approach is not incompatible with reductionistic 
approaches. For reductionistic scientists such as molecular biologists to 
succeed in transferring their results to agriculture, they must partner with 
traditional plant breeders.  For holistic scientists such as traditional plant 
breeder to have access to all of the potential sources of new traits and 
varieties, they must partner with molecular biologists.  
  
(5) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm than 
good to future generations by foreclosing possibilities for them to feed 
themselves. 
 
 This objection is a variant on the objection discussed at the beginning 
of this chapter, where we observed an incoherence in the precautionary 
principle. The Stich argument defeats (5). For while it may be true that the 
development of ag biotech will endanger the future food supply, it is equally 
true that the failure to develop ag biotech may similarly endanger the food 
supply. 
 But formulating our options as strict either/or dichotomies does not 
allow for compromise solutions.  Can we not pursue ag biotech in the context 
of pursuing sustainable agriculture? A sustainable agricultural system would 
be compatible with the environment, and a sustainable system with ag biotech 
in it might make it easier for future generations to feed themselves. 
 What is a sustainable agricultural system? The answer is hotly 
contested, but Pierre Crosson has probably done as much as anyone to work 
out a way to balance conflicts over the rights of present and future human 
generations with respect to the environment. A sustainable system of food 
production, he argues, must satisfy “demands for food into the indefinite 
future while meeting equity conditions in food production both within and 
across generations.”39 Notice that this definition does not argue for preserving 
farmland because of its inherent worth. Crosson argues that it ought to be 
preserved because it will be needed by future generations of humans. But the 
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issue of the inherent value of nature aside, how are we to determine among us 
humans whose needs should receive top priority? 
 The answer of the liberal tradition to this is clear: the poor. Rawls has 
argued most forcefully for the appropriateness of our intuition that those at 
the bottom of the economic and social ladder ought to have their needs 
considered first. Crosson’s definition of “an equitable, therefore sustainable” 
agriculture is consistent with Rawls’ view: 
I define an equitable, therefore sustainable, system of food 
production as one which indefinitely meets rising demands 
for food and fibre without incurring rising economic or 
environmental costs and which distributes income in a way 
regarded as equitable by the least advantaged participants in 
the system. 40 
 Crosson’s definition is attractive because it incorporates criteria of 
both intragenerational and intergenerational equity. The criterion of 
intergenerational equity is that each generation is responsible “to manage its 
agricultural resources so as to pass an unimpaired capacity to produce food 
and fibre to the next generation." The intragenerational equity principle is 
that the food production system 
 must yield significantly rising real income for the poor involved 
in agricultural production. A `significant’ increase in income is 
one sufficient to satisfy the poor that their condition is 
improving and will continue to improve at a rate such that when 
they look back every five years or so they will feel that they are 
distinctly better off in the material things of life. 
By insisting that the disadvantaged be given the right to decide whether they 
are better or worse-off, the definition meets our condition that those at the 
bottom of the socio-political economic spectrum be allowed to speak for 
themselves. 
 Crosson’s definition of sustainability does not insure increasing 
equality in income distribution. “Indeed,” notes Crosson, “it is consistent 
with increasing inequality.” 
 The condition for equity is that the food production system 
generate rising real income for agriculturalists and assure that 
the poor share `significantly’ in the gains. It does not 
necessarily require that they increase or even maintain their 
relative share of total income. As defined, therefore, 
intragenerational equity is in the eyes of the beholders, where 
`the beholders’ are the poor involved in agricultural 
production.41 
Crosson goes on to note that the poor may set “a less exacting standard” if 
they judge the performance of the system by how their present income 
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compares with their past rather than if they compare their income to the 
income of others. But they need not assume a lower standard of comparison; 
the definition allows them to choose their own benchmark. 
 Crosson goes on to note that while his definition incorporates the 
environmentalist concern for “non-rising costs” to nature, “the grounds for 
insisting [on this] is the precept of intergenerational equity, not a commitment 
to maintaining the integrity of the natural system per se.”42 Crosson is 
concerned about nature, but not because he believes it is valuable in itself but 
because it is needed as a resource for future generations. Even though we do 
not now put a price on environmental degradation, he believes, we should do 
learn to do so. We must learn how to figure costs such as 
erosion damage to rivers, lakes, reservoirs and harbours; 
effects of fertilizers carried by eroded soil and runoff in 
stimulating eutrophication of water bodies; human illnesses, 
deaths and damage to ecological systems from use of 
pesticides; loss of valuable plant and animal habitat through 
deforestation and drainage of wetlands; increasing soil and 
water salinity associated with irrigation, and so on.43 
 And why should we be concerned? Wendell Berry has put it 
succinctly: “And so the land is taxed to subsidize an `affluence’ that consists, 
in reality, of health and goods stolen from the unborn.”44 Crosson reasons in 
more economic terms: the external environmental costs “are no less real than 
the economic costs of production” and yet “those bearing the costs have no 
way of exacting payment from those who impose them.” 
For example, those who suffer loss of recreational facilities 
because of sediment-laden waters have no way of collecting 
compensation from the farmers whose fields are the source of 
the damaging sediment.45 
 We do not have very good data about how costly these environmental 
externalities have really been, Crosson confesses. He acknowledges that our 
increasing use of fertilizers has given rise to nitrate concentrations in rivers in 
parts of the midwest and California that “quite often exceed the Public Health 
Service standard of 10 ppm.46 Another estimate put the environmental costs of 
pesticides at more than $800 million each year.47 But Crosson thinks it 
unlikely that these environmental costs would offset the gains made in the 
area of intergenerational equity. He gives several reasons for this judgment: 
Since the Second World War, the real income of farmers and farmworkers has 
more than doubled. From 1960 to 1980, the biggest percentage gains have 
been made by the smallest farmers, those with total gross annual sales of 
under $2500. If we suppose that these are the least advantaged people in the 
agricultural industry, then the criterion of intragenerational equity has been 
satisfied. 
Problems, Part II                                                                                                  249 
  
 Is MA in the United States sustainable by this definition? Crosson 
notes three important facts. First, a quarter to a third of all US food 
production is exported; this food could be retained for domestic use if needed. 
Second, current rates of soil erosion, if continued for another century, would 
reduce crop yields by only 5 percent. Third, the rate of land conversion from 
agriculture to other uses is minimal, around 300,000 hectares per year. 
Crosson concludes that the current system is sustainable, assuming that export 
demand does not increase dramatically. 
 What steps can help to insure that Crosson’s judgment is correct? He 
makes three suggestions. First, we should develop technologies capable of 
increasing yields on smaller parcels of land, while also “satisfying both cost 
and equity criteria for sustainability.” Because fossil fuels are expected to 
become increasingly expensive, these technologies should not be energy-
intensive. Examples of such technologies would be “improved photosynthetic 
efficiency and biological fixation of nitrogen by corn plants.” Second, figure 
out exactly what the environmental effects of herbicide use are with an eye on 
developing alternative means of weed control. Third, insist on more efficient 
use of ground and surface water for irrigation. All three suggestions represent 
goals ag biotech could, in the long term, assist in achieving. 
 Crosson takes all of this as evidence that the modern agricultural 
system has served the interests of equity. Duvick also argues that ag biotech 
should eventually contribute to these goals of sustainable ag: crops able to 
flourish without heavy chemical inputs; diverse and alternative crops for 
multi-cropping rotation practices; varieties with enhanced resistance to 
diseases and insects, and crops adapted to various climates and soils, such as 
cool and wet, or hot and dry, conditions.48 While the genetic linkage maps and 
techniques of genetic transformation necessary to accomplish these ends is 
not yet in place, they are likely to be in the distant future. In that sense, ag 
biotech is compatible with sustainable ag. 
 Interestingly, at least one global critic of ag biotech seems to have 
changed his mind about the compatibility of ag biotech and a more 
sustainable agriculture. In conversation, Wes Jackson has said that he now 
believes the techniques of genetic engineering might have one, very limited, 
purpose in his attempt to build a perennial polyculture for high plains 
farming: helping to develop a cone to hold the seeds of the grassy species 
around which he is developing his system. 
 I have come to believe that I did not give sufficient credit in chapter 2 
to people like Homer LeBaron and Mary Potter. We do indeed need a context 
and sense of balance in our approach. We need to be more skeptical about 
claims that organic foods (e.g., peanuts) are inherently safer than others, and 
we need to be more open to the possibility that GM foods (e.g., golden rice) 
might be beneficial.  
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 I faced an uphill struggle in holding to my global argument that GM 
foods would harm future generations. But what about the risks to the 
environment? 
 
(6)  There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm than 
good to ecosystems, by leading to environmental catastrophe through 
release into the wild of virulent genetically modified organisms, plants, or 
fish.  
 
 The global case asks us to consider the pressures we have put on the 
land itself. Let us distinguish at least four different claims here, and examine 
several variants of some of these claims. 
 
(6.1) We should not have any ag biotechnologies because genetic 
engineering of any sort is a risk to the environment.  
 
 This claim seems false for two reasons. First, much genetic 
engineering is confined to the lab. Ban plant and animal biotech if you will, 
and all genetic engineering of any microbe with the potential to escape into 
the wild. There will remain some forms of GM food processing that uses 
microbes to produce enzymes that may be safely quarantined, along with their 
industrial by-products, in contained vats and closed production systems. To 
the extent that the existence of such GMOs depend for their very being on the 
favorable environments of climate controlled lab conditions, these GMOs 
could not survive outside the lab. By hypothesis, therefore, the processes of 
these food biotechnologies pose no risk to the environment.  
 Second, there are examples of biotech serving environmental 
conservation goals. The bark of the Pacific Yew tree contains taxol which has 
cancer-fighting properties. After this fact was discovered, the monetary value 
of the Yew tree rose, and so did the number of them felled. However, the 
active ingredient of the Yew bark has now been introduced into tissue culture 
lines, and these lines are producing taxol. The reclamation of degraded soils 
on military bases and refineries may also be aided by genetic engineering. 
Modified plants and microbes can be used to concentrate metals, extracting 
these environmental bad actors into the plant tissues. Taxol and contaminant 
cleanup seem to be distinct advantages of ag biotech to the environment. So 
(6.1) fails. 
  
(6.2) It is impossible to know whether GMOs might persist in the 
environment years after release; therefore, it is impermissible to 
use them. 
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 One cannot intelligibly deny that there is a small risk of ag biotech 
producing a product that could bring catastrophic environmental damage. 
However, (6.2) proves too much. For we can be virtually certain that some 
forms of GMOs will not persist in the environment years after their release. 
An example is Bt corn, which, like traditional, high yielding varieties, loses 
vigor after one year. It is, strictly speaking, impossible to know whether a 
given hybrid corn will persist in the environment years after release. But we 
do not, on this account alone and in the absence of other considerations, think 
it is impermissible to plant such corn.  Similarly, it is, strictly speaking, 
impossible to know whether a given non-GM corn will persist in the 
environment years after release. But, by parity of reasoning, we should not, 
on this account alone and in the absence of other considerations, think it is 
impermissible to plant such corn.  
 It will be useful to remind ourselves here of the environmental 
unfitness both of MA’s varieties and of GMOs. As Brill argued in ch. 2, new 
plants must have a variety of favorable traits in order to outcompete other 
plants: their seed must be able to be dispersed widely; the seed must be able 
to survive a long time; the plant must grow more quickly than others around 
it; and so on. Current GM varieties do not seem to have these properties, and 
we could, if we desired, require that all of them contain terminator genes, so 
that they could not persist in the environment. So (6.2) seems unpersuasive. 
 
(6.3) Every GMO persists in the environment years after its release; 
therefore, it is impermissible to use them. 
 
 (6.3) is false. First, some GMOs are born, thrive, and die in industrial 
vats, never being released into the environment. Second, of GMOs that are 
released into the environment, many GMOs do not persist for years. In 1995, 
scientists in the United Kingdom released an innocuous free-living bacteria 
into a wheat field.49 They found that it spread more rapidly than they had been 
led to expect from experimental greenhouse studies, probably because there 
was more rain than usual and water containing the bacteria percolated 
through the soil. Fifty days after spraying a row of plants, the bacterium could 
be found on unsprayed plants in rows next to the treated plants. While the 
GMO had a greater ability than expected to disperse, it nonetheless had 
limited ability to survive. Less than a year after the application, scientists 
were unable to detect the GMO anywhere in the plot. 
 
(6.4) Even if we cannot detect GMOs persisting in the environment 
years after release, it is too dangerous to use them. 
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 (6.4) is too vague to be of any use. We can study risk factors involved 
in deliberate release, such as the effects of gene transfer on: target plant 
growth and vigor; nontarget plants and animals; ecology; dispersal through 
soil and water; changes in pathogenicity and host range; creation of new 
pathogens; etc. And we can design statistical experiments to give us data 
about the relative percentage of change involved in releasing traditionally 
modified and genetically modified organisms. And these statistical results can 
give us an idea of which sorts of changes are within the standard range, and 
which sorts fall outside it. And we can then debate how great a variation in 
results we are willing to accept as “safe.” But (6.4) does not tell us how to 
make such determinations. It declares universally that GMOs are always 
dangerous, without explaining why. We can be virtually certain that Pioneer’s 
hybrid corn will not persist in the environment years after its release, because 
the seed dramatically loses vigor after one year.  We cannot detect hybrid 
corn persisting in the environment years after its release. If we accept (6.4), 
we should deem hybrid seed corn too dangerous to use because we cannot 
detect hybrid seed corn persisting in the environment years after release. By 
substituting “seed corn” for “GMOs” in (6.4) we get a counterintuitive result. 
 
(6.5) Not knowing what the risks are, the public makes decisions in 
an uninformed way; therefore we should not use GM crops. 
 
 The conclusion of (6.5) does not follow from its premises. The fact 
that the public is largely ignorant of the risks of doing x does not justify 
banning x. Indeed, nothing seems to follow from the fact that the public is 
ignorant about something. The public is largely ignorant of the risks of 
driving cars painted red, or of eating shellfish. The public is also ignorant of 
the risks of not proceeding with ag biotech. Does it follow that we should ban 
the driving of red cars and the eating of shellfish? 
 
(6.6) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more 
harm than good to ecosystems, by leading to environmental 
catastrophe through release into the wild of virulent genetically 
modified plants.  
 
 Turning our attention from organisms to plants, there have, of course, 
been cases where ecosystems were overrun with "exotics," new plants 
introduced from other areas.  Examples include the kudzu that chokes 
Southern trees and the hydrilla that clogs Southern waterways.50 But these are 
not cases of mutant plants spreading a new genetic inheritance throughout the 
ecosystem. They are imported plants brought into ecosystems where no 
natural checks were in place to limit their growth. 
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 It will help to remind ourselves here of the problem of gene flow into 
other varieties is a valid concern. Monsanto’s web-page press releases claims 
that “weed resistance to Roundup is much less likely to occur than resistance 
to most other herbicides . . . because Roundup herbicide possesses unique 
traits.” The unique trait is the mode of action of Roundup. Roundup “inhibits 
EPSP synthase.” Furthermore, Roundup is a post-emergent herbicide with no 
residual soil activity — greatly limiting the chance that resistant weeds over 
time could appear in a weed population.”51 
 But Monsanto’s claims notwithstanding, there are specific cases that 
need attention. Danish researchers have shown, for example, that genetically 
engineered herbicide resistant canola is a highly outcrossing plant that can 
pass its herbicide resistant genes to weedy relatives.52  The GM canola also 
tends to volunteer readily. This situation is potentially worrisome because if 
the gene for herbicide tolerance is passed to the weed, then the herbicide will 
no longer be able to kill the weeds. 
 The case deserves a closer look. The first Roundup Ready canola 
crop was field tested in 1991. In 1995, the major regulatory agency in Canda, 
Agriculture and Agrifood Canada, examined the case carefully. Ecological 
risk assessment proceeds by examining two factors. “Exposure” denotes the 
probability of a harmful event. “Hazard” denotes the degree of harm 
involved. Some very harmful hazards (e.g., the creation of an eggplant that 
could eat Chicago) have a very low exposure. Some events carrying a very 
low level of hazard (e.g., the creation of a localized herbicide resistant weed 
that dies out after one generation) have a comparatively high level of 
exposure. Canada was concerned about canola because the GM Monsanto 
canola, Brassica napus var. oleifera, easily interbreeds with two abundant 
weeds, B. rapa and B. juncea. The risk of exposure, therefore, was assessed 
as high. They found, however, that the herbicide resistant genes conferred no 
greater fitness on the weeds. Consequently, “currently accepted weed 
management measures" were deemed sufficient to control the weeds.53 While 
exposure to gene flow in some cases may be high, the hazard may be low. 
 The problem of gene flow into other varieties is a valid concern. The 
problem of a GM variety itself becoming a weed seems not to be a concern. 
 We noted in ch. 2 the concern of potential cross-pollination between 
GM crops and wild varieties. Margaret Mellon and Jane Rissler, have pointed 
out that in North America, not only canola, but also carrots, sunflowers, 
radishes and squash are grown in close proximity to wild relatives.54 There is 
reason to be cautious about gene transfer from certain genetically engineered 
crops crossing through natural means into weeds in or near fields, with the 
consequence of introducing traits such as herbicide resistance into wild 
species. The consequence would be the ruin of the genetically engineered 
technology because the weeds would no longer succumb to the chemicals. 
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 But it is important to be clear about the implications of studies 
showing that certain transgenic plants may cross-breed with wild weed 
species. Other transgenic plants do not present the same possibility because 
they have no weedy relatives. There are, for example, no weedy relatives 
growing near cornfields in Iowa because corn is an imported crop not native 
to this state. Mellon and Rissler, some of ag biotech’s most recognizable 
critics, assess the risk of transgenes flowing from GM corn and soybeans to 
weedy relatives as “nil.”55 
 The outcrossing problem presents us with a good argument for 
careful risk assessment and intensive strategic management of GM crops. We 
need to balance the concerns of the need for increased production, human 
safety, social usefulness, and environmental compatibility. 
 Consider two more decisions that seem to attest to the fundamental 
soundness of the manage-and-regulate strategy. A company intended to 
market carnations genetically modified for extended vase life or altered petal 
color. The GMAC, the Australian governmental body responsible for 
approving commercial releases studied data from small field and 
demonstration trials and decided that the new flower posed “negligible” risk. 
Negligible risk was defined as risk that was no greater than the risk associated 
with the unmodified carnation. “Carnation,” writes Kirsty McLean, “has no 
weedy characteristics and is not closely related to any weed in Australia. 
 The biology of the carnation is such that there are no realistic ways 
for the genetically modified plants to escape from cultivation and become 
established as populations in the wild, or for gene dispersal from the 
genetically modified carnation to occur. The GMAC approved this release. 
 The Australian agency did not approve a second release, involving Bt 
cotton plants expressing the CryIA(c) gene. The new cotton carries a protein 
produced by the CryIA(c) gene that kills the major caterpillars that attack 
cotton. In justifying its decision, the GMAC wrote that important data was 
missing on: “1) the consequences of transfer of the Bt gene to native 
Australian Gossypium species, and 2) appropriate resistance management 
straegies.”56 Instead, GMAC recommended that the release be confined to 
areas of southern Queensland and New South Wales areas, presumably, 
where Gossypium is not abundant. 
 These two cases suggest that regulatory agencies are not rubber 
stamps, and are capable of turning down requests based on environmental and 
agronomic concerns. Will the system work everywhere? It is impossible to 
predict what will happen in developing countries with few resources for 
developing “the system.” But it bears pointing out that it is in the interest of 
developed countries to assist developing countries to establish regulatory 
mechanisms for the safe use of genetically engineered crops. A program at 
Michigan State University, funded by USAID and the USDA/APHIS is 
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dedicated to this task. The project is called the Agricultural Biotechnology 
Support Project (ABSP), and its goal is to help developing countries use and 
manage biotechnology.57 
 Several countries have gone a long way toward developing the 
infrastructure needed to insure safety in the use of genefactured seeds, crops, 
and animals. Egypt has approved national biosafety guidelines, and Indonesia 
and Kenya have guidelines that are awaiting approval. Representatives of all 
three countries participated in a workshop, learning biosafety and risk 
assessment protocols for the handling of GMOs at ABSP.58 
ABSP is also assisting in strengthening biosafety regulations in Latin 
America and the Middle East, and in building biocontainment research 
facilities in Egypt and Indonesia. “However,” concludes Andrea Johanson, 
assistant director of the project, “the lack of institutionalized guidelines 
and/or field testing regimes, coupled with uncertainty in collaborating 
country governments, has made the actual transfer of materials difficult.” 
 Prudence and caution are necessary, and we must redouble our efforts 
to ensure that every country developing ag biotech has adequate safeguards in 
place and that scientific research results are freely and openly shared. But 
banning the technology probably will not help these countries. 
 
(6.7) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more 
harm than good to ecosystems, by leading to environmental 
catastrophe through release into the wild of virulent genetically 
modified fish.  
 
 This is an area of grave concern. Some transgenic fish have been 
shown to be more fit in some wild environments than their wild counterparts, 
meaning that the engineered fish may outcompete and perhaps completely 
replace the wild varieties. Antifreeze polypetide genes have been introduced 
into Atlantic salmon, tilapia, carp, and giant prawn.59 The antifreeze gene 
renders these individuals capable of withstanding colder temperatures than 
their wild relatives. If these species were to be fish farmed in northern 
latitudes where they are not presently found, and if a fish or two were to 
escape from the aquafarm, the exotic species might well colonize large areas, 
potentially driving other species out of existence. Fish, unlike, say, cattle, can 
travel great distances and colonize vast areas of ecosystems. 
 But is this a reason to stop releases altogether? Recognizing the 
dangers, the USDA released “Guidelines for Research Involving the Planned 
Introduction into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms” in 
1992. The Guidelines, developed by the USDA’s Agricultural Biotechnology 
Research Advisory Committee (ABRAC), were necessary to fill gaps in the 
regulatory environment. As previously noted, various US government 
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agencies regulate GM research, but some research has fallen through the 
cracks, including transgenic fish. Notably, the ABRAC’s Guidelines are not 
legally binding.  Here legislative action is necessary to make adherence 
binding rather than voluntary.60 
 There are scientific and theoretical considerations that suggest the 
risk may be acceptable. First, according to Elliot Entis of Aqua Bounty 
Farms, the GM salmon grow faster, and reach commercial size in two years. 
Ordinary salmon take three years. But, contrary to some reports about this 
issue, the GM salmon raised by Entis’ farm at least do not grow larger than 
ordinary salmon. After three years, the GM and non-GM varieties are 
comparable.61 
 Concerning the ability of GM salmon to outcompete wild salmon, 
Entis claims that a study by Wayne Knibb suggests that the GM fish are less 
fit and more likely to be outperformed by wild fish. Entis notes that in one 
study of the behavior of two groups of fish, the GM salmon “had such a 
desire to feed that they did not flee from introduced predators” in the way that 
the non-GM salmon did. 
 Finally, Entis notes that there is a kind of terminator technology 
readily available to GM salmon raisers. By administering shocks to salmon 
eggs after they are fertilized, breeders can induce triploidy, a condition that 
renders the fish sterile. Entis claims that the success rate for this procedure 
“approaches 100% in salmon if done properly.” Requiring the use of triploidy 
in all GM salmon could further reduce the environmental risks of unwanted 
introgression of GM salmon into wild stocks. 
 Strategies are available for reducing the risk that GM salmon will 
mate with wild salmon and thereby reduce the wild salmon’s ecological 
fitness. Nonetheless, our history with non-GM farm-raised salmon suggests 
that the damage done by escaped GM fish could be severe, as super salmon 
might out-compete wild salmon for food, mates, and habitat. It would seem 
wise to delay commercialization of this technology until these issues can be 
effectively addressed. 
 
(7) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm than 
good by narrowing plant germplasm, and more harm than good to the 
atmosphere by reducing the quality of air, soils, and ground and surface 
waters. 
 
 This is also an area of legitimate concern.  Consider water. Across 
the country, over half of all water pollution from non-point sources comes 
from farming.62 One of the worst affected areas is the Chesapeake Bay region 
where, researchers believe, the run-off of Furadan applications to protect corn 
from European borers is responsible for the demise of the Bay’s bald eagles.63 
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 But how do we decide when water quality has been reduced to a level 
we should consider morally unjustifiable? How do we decide at what point 
plant germplasm worldwide has become too narrow? One measure might be: 
whenever water becomes so degraded, or germplasm so narrow, that future 
generations will be unable to feed themselves. This criterion points us to the 
issue of the role of ag biotech in sustainable agriculture, our obligations to 
future generations, and the role of ag biotech. I have previously argued, in 
section (5), that these concerns, while valid, need not rule out ag biotech. 
 Another measure would be: whenever any water quality or plant 
variety is lost. This criterion points us to the issue of the intrinsic value of 
nature and ag biotech’s intrinsic disrespect for that value. I have argued in the 
previous chapter (section (14)), that this construal of the value of nature 
cannot be sustained. 
 While (7) raises important concerns, there are reasons to believe that 
abandoning ag biotech would not help us address the concerns. Rather than 
banning ag biotech, one might make receipt of national farm program crop 
subsidies dependent on compliance with environmental principles of low 
polluting behavior. Along with policy and educational efforts to encourage 
non-polluting modes of farming, we could pursue new genefactured bacteria 
which might biodegrade specific pollutants already in the water. 
 Finally, the argument must be mentioned that MA has been good for 
the environment if we assume that humans are part of the environment and 
have a basic right to be fed. During the twentieth century, the yields of nine 
major crops have increased from two to sevenfold.64 Without industrial 
agriculture, much more land would have to be in production to produce 
equivalent amounts of food. If yields had remained steady after 1960 instead 
of continuing to grow, we would need another 10 to 12 million square miles, 
“roughly the land area of the US, the European Union countries and Brazil 
combined.”65 There are reasons for thinking that ag biotech may do more to 
benefit the environment than to harm it. 
 Let us turn, finally, to the consequences of ag biotech for animals. 
 
(8) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more harm than 
good to research animals, livestock and wildlife, by causing them to suffer 
or die, or to prevent them from continuing as a species. 
 
 Consider wildlife first. Is there a substantial risk that ag biotech will 
do more harm than good to wildlife? 
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(8.1) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more 
harm than good to wildlife, by causing them to suffer or die, or to 
prevent them from continuing as a species. 
 
 We noted in some detail in ch. 4 the threat to wildlife habitat from 
the expansion of MA.  It is important to point out, however, the ways in 
which ag biotech might benefit efforts to conserve wildlife. Currently, wolves 
on Michigan’s Upper Peninsula are failing as the pack becomes inbred. 
Foreign DNA, taken from wolf packs in Alaska, might be implanted into the 
eggs of Michigan wolves, thereby improving the genetic biodiversity of the 
pack and improving its chances for survival. In another example, panda bears 
are an endangered species; there are only about a thousand of them in the 
world. Chinese scientists are making progress in their efforts to clone a giant 
panda, according to the state-run Xinhua News Agency. “Scientists from the 
government-funded Chinese Academy of Sciences grew the embryo by 
introducing cells from a dead female panda into the egg cells of a Japanese 
white rabbit . . . The embryo was nurtured over 10 months, and scientists are 
now trying to implant it in a host animal’s uterus.” 66 Animal biotechnology 
can be a useful tool for wildlife ecologists. 
 It may also be used to increase wildlife habitat. Consider two 
possible scenarios. First, if ag biotech increases productivity, marginal land 
now cultivated might be taken out of production. Farmers in Iowa, for 
example, might decide to restore the land for use by the wild turkeys and 
other wildlife that populated the state a century ago. 
 Second, suppose more of our food were to be “grown” in industrial 
factories using genetically altered plants and bacteria. More of our food could 
come from less of our land. The result might again be a positive one, 
environmentally speaking, as more marginal farmland were taken out of 
production, easing erosion and chemical run-off. 
 Of course, there are no guarantees. The pieces of farmland returned 
to a more “natural” state would, in the absence of public planning, not be 
connected in any integral way. They would be connected only by the 
decisions of individual farmers, and almost certainly in a piecemeal and 
fragmented fashion. Random idling of of selected bits of a farm would not 
necessarily be good for all wildlife species, even though it might be good for 
the small game varieties favored by hunters. So, again, public policy would 
be needed to orchestrate the idling of land so that chunks of land large 
enough for wildlife habitat could be recreated. 
 In order to take up the question of transgenic farm animals, it will 
repay us first to consider animals more generally, and research animals in 
particular. 
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(8.2) There is a substantial risk that ag biotech will do more 
harm than good to research animals, by causing them to suffer or 
die. 
 
It would seem that those with an animal rights theory (AR) must 
oppose the production of all transgenic animals (TA). Given the radical 
implications of the animal rights theory that led me to become a vegetarian, it 
probably sounds odd for me now to suggest that animal rights defenders must 
endorse the production of many transgenic animals. The incongruity of the 
claim is magnified by reviewing some of the more troubling experiments 
which, as recounted in the prior chapter, have resulted in quivering, obese, or 
even headless TAs. 
Contrary to what I wrote in chapter 3, I now believe that the animal 
rights theory permits, even requires, a certain amount of suffering and death 
in research animals, although not usually in so-called food animals. The death 
of a research animal may be permitted in AR if the animal does not have a 
future and if the situation involves a choice between the loss of an ordinary 
human life and the loss of the animal.  
In what follows, I will argue that AR has two very different 
interpretations. According to the abolitionist interpretation of animal rights 
(ARA), all TA research is morally objectionable. However, according to what 
I will call the reformist interpretation (ARR), much TA research is justified. 
Finally, I will present reasons for favoring ARR.  
When writing chapter 1, I did not understand the full implications of 
Regan’s remark that AR not only permits but sometimes requires the sacrifice 
of animals to save human lives. In so-called lifeboat cases, in which four 
humans and a dog are in a lifeboat that can support only four lives total, 
Regan believes we ought always to sacrifice the dog. Indeed, were there a 
hundred dogs on the lifeboat, Regan holds that we ought to sacrifice all of 
them in order to save the four humans. In theory, anyway, no matter how few 
humans we might save, any number of animals should be sacrificed to save 
the humans. 
Let the number of dogs be as large as one likes; suppose they 
number a million; and suppose the lifeboat will support only 
four survivors. Then the rights view still implies that, special 
considerations apart, the million dogs should be thrown 
overboard and the four humans saved.67 
Regan carefully distinguishes his reasoning from utilitarian 
reasoning. He points out that the case is a case of having to decide whether to 
over-ride the rights of the many, or the rights of a few. While everyone has 
the basic right not to be harmed in order to promote the good of others, there 
are cases where we are forced to choose between over-riding many people’s 
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rights, or a few people’s rights. In cases where the harm to be caused to all 
parties is comparable, Regan avers, we ought to apply the Miniride Principle: 
 
Where comparable harms are involved, override the fewest 
individuals’ rights (MP).68 
 
Comparable harms are equivalent harms. Causing Alice to die is 
comparable to causing Betty to die, but it is not comparable to causing Betty 
to have a root canal. MP applies only to cases of the first sort, where we must 
choose to inflict the same harm on one of two individuals. Regan rests the 
justification of MP on the central idea of his theory, the principle of respect, 
which requires that each individual be treated equally with others. 
MP is also applicable to cases involving disparate numbers of 
victims. If we are forced to choose between causing comparable harms to one 
or many, we must choose to harm the fewest. But, again, the reasoning is not 
utilitarian.  To harm the many would grant greater weight to the moral rights 
of each individual in the small group, and lesser weight to the rights of each 
individual in the large group. 
Now, suppose that the death of a mouse is comparable to the death of 
a human. (We will revisit this assumption below; we grant it here only for the 
sake of argument.) Suppose further that a million transgenic mice must be 
produced and killed in order to reap the benefit of the knowledge being 
sought in producing them. Would MP permit this experiment? Would it 
permit the production of the TAs previously mentioned? 
It would not permit the production and slaughter of Beltsville hogs 
because such hogs are produced to gain knowledge that would lead to leaner 
meat carcasses. Providing humans with cheaper pork cutlets will not lead 
demonstrably to the saving of any human life. In general, therefore, MP will 
not justify the genetic engineering of experimental food animals because the 
harm to humans of foregoing the benefits of such research (cheaper meat) is 
trivial compared to the harm done to the animals. Since transgenic food 
animal research does not involve a trade-off of comparable harms, MP would 
not justify such research. 
Neither would it justify the rearing and killing of animals such as the 
hair-loss mouse. The harm of slaughtering such a transgenic mouse is not 
comparable to the harm of failing to save a human the loss of hair. The loss of 
hair is a serious, even life-threatening, harm to a mouse. The loss of hair is a 
matter of mere vanity for many men.  In general, therefore, the production of 
TAs for trivial purposes is not justifiable according to MP, because the harms 
in question are not comparable. 
But, assuming again that the deaths of mice and humans are 
comparable, transgenic research that will demonstrably save the life of a 
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human may be justifiable. Research on the shiverer mouse has identified the 
gene involved in causing the developmental defect of multiple sclerosis. 
Suppose that this research leads in a direct causal chain to saving the life of a 
patient with this disease. If the death of an animal is comparable to the death 
of a human, then MP commits AR theorists to the view that shiverer TA mice 
are justified when we know that producing and killing the mice will 
undoubtedly save the life of a victim of multiple sclerosis.  
We have been operating under the assumption that the deaths of mice 
and humans are comparable. Regan does not grant this assumption, and 
neither should we. Defending the received intuition that the death of an 
ordinary human is always non-comparably worse than the death of an 
ordinary animal, Regan insists that MP does not apply to any of the cases 
under consideration. Another principle applies, the Worse-off Principle: 
 
Where non-comparable harms are involved, avoid harming the 
worse-off individual (WP).69 
 
The justification of this principle follows from the principle of 
respect. Suppose I must choose one of only two options, either causing 
individual N to have a migraine or causing individual M to die. Since the 
harms involved are not comparable, the principle of treating M and N with 
equal respect entails that I choose to cause the lesser harm to N. Surely N 
would want me to make the same choice were the tables reversed, and I was 
contemplating having to cause N to die or M to have a headache. 
Gary Varner illustrates the principle below, in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  The Worse-off Principle, Case 1 
 
Option # 1     Option # 2  
 
-10  -10  -10    -1  
-10  -10  -10    -1  
-10  -10  -10    -1  
-10  -10  -10    -1  
 
Suppose we must either kill twelve humans or give four humans 
migraines. 70 Death is a catastrophic loss to each of the twelve, represented 
here as -10 (Option #1). A migraine is not a catastrophic harm, so it is 
represented here as -1 (Option #2). The Worse-off principle (WP) instructs us 
to choose Option #2. 
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In this case, the option recommended by a rights-theory dovetails 
with the option recommended by a utilitarian theory, because Option #2 has 
the consequence of minimizing overall harm. Whereas Option #1 entails a 
“harm score” of negative 120 (-10 x 12 = -120), Option #2 leads to a harm 
score of negative 4 (-1 x 4 = - 4). Option #2 is clearly the lesser of two evils. 
But Regan insists that we should choose Option #2 not for the 
utilitarian reason but, rather, because it respects the rights of the worse-off.  
Choosing Option #1 would make any one of the twelve people in the left 
column worse-off than any one of the four people in the right column.  
Indeed, Regan argues, we must select Option #2, even if that choice will not 
have the consequence of minimizing overall harm. The reason is that we must 
avoid harming those individuals who will suffer the non-comparable, 
catastrophic, harms. Varner visually presents this consequence as follows: 
 
Table 2: The Worse-off Principle, case 2 
 
           Option # 1   Option # 2 
 
   - 10   - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 
    - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1  
    - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 
    - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 
    - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 
 
 
If we must give migraine headaches to twenty-five people (-1 for 
each of the 25) in order to avoid killing one person (-10), we ought to do so, 
even though we will thereby cause a worse overall harm score of -25 
compared to -10. In Table 2, Option #2 again prevails over Option #1, on the 
rights view, even though it entails causing more overall harm than Option #1. 
Protecting rights trumps the principle of minimizing overall harm. 
To apply WP to animal research we must first review Regan’s 
interpretation of harm. Harm is a diminution in one’s capacity to form and 
satisfy desires. Because different individuals have different capacities to form 
and satisfy desires at different points in their lives, death can harm us to 
different degrees. Regan claims (p. 324) that the death of an ordinary human 
is never comparable to the death of an ordinary dog, but does not provide 
much argument for this claim in his eighth chapter. There are at least three 
reasons we may adduce in behalf of this claim. 
First, the ordinary human exhibits a greater range, complexity, depth 
and sophistication of preference-interests than does the ordinary animal. We 
typically are capable of reflecting on our first-order desires and deciding to 
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select some of them to pursue according to values and principles we have 
come to endorse. Consequently, we are morally free, and can try, for 
example, to adjudicate conflicting interests without the use of force. To the 
best of our knowledge, no other non-primate animals have such a capacity. 
Second, our expected future life is typically longer and richer than 
the ordinary animal’s expected future life. A young mother anticipates the 
adulthood of her child twenty or thirty years into the future; little evidence 
exists that any animals have this rich or extended a temporal horizon as they 
think about their offspring's future. Therefore, as Jeff McMahan has put it, 
death harms individuals in various ways, and: 
The degree of harm an individual suffers by dying is a 
function of the net amount of good that the victim’s life would 
contain if death were not to occur; and this in turn depends 
on the quality and quantity of the future goods the life would 
contain in the absence of death.71 
Notice that it is the quality of the goods lost, and not simply the 
quantity of them, that tells us how bad death is for someone. Killing a two- 
month old human fetus deprives it of more potential experiences than killing 
a twenty-three year old woman, but the death of the woman is a greater harm 
than the death of the fetus. The reason is that the woman possesses 
psychological unity, an individuality derived from her past choices and 
unique aspirations. The fetus lacks all psychological unity because it lacks a 
brain, brain waves, and experiences. As McMahan observes, 
The extent to which an individual is harmed by the loss of 
some future good through death is a function both of the 
magnitude of the good and of the degree to which the person 
at the time of death would have been psychologically related 
to himself at the later time at which the good would have 
occurred within his life.72 
Third. The harm of death is not simply a function of the present or 
future satisfactions of an individual, nor is it a function of the total good an 
individual might realize later in life. It is also a function of the relation 
between the individual at the time they are killed, to the individual they 
would have been at a later point in time had they not been killed. The killing 
of a two year-old is worse than the killing of a two-month fetus because the 
two year-old has a unique psycho-social identity that will stand in a complex 
relation to the man the boy will be in twenty years. The fetus has no psycho-
social identity and stands in nothing more than a physical relationship to the 
man the fetus will be in twenty years. 
We may now apply this view of harm to the use of animals in 
research. As far as we know, mice lack not only moral autonomy, but the kind 
of memory and anticipation needed to give their lives long-term continuity 
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and coherence. The relationship a mouse has to the individual it was a year 
ago is constricted because of its restricted memory, and the relationship the 
mouse has to the individual it will be a year from now is limited because of 
its dim sense of the future. Consequently, the harm that death would be to an 
ordinary mouse is not as bad as the harm that death would be to an ordinary 
young woman. The woman has a keen sense of where she has been and where 
she would like to go. 
Discounting for these three factors need not lead us to conclude that 
death is not a harm to a mouse. Nor, certainly, that the random killing of mice 
is acceptable. It leads instead to Regan’s conclusion: that the death of a 
human is noncomparably worse for a human than death is for a mouse and, 
when forced by circumstances to kill one or the other, we ought always to 
choose to kill the mouse. 
WP will justify many cases of TA production if the experiment will 
save human lives and use animals that are not subjects of a life.  For example, 
it is possible that a series of experiments involving the production and 
slaughter of transgenic mosquitos could provide the knowledge needed to 
achieve a total transmission blockade of the disease between insects.  Were 
we able to introduce the antibody genes coding for anopheline into 
mosquitos, we could in theory express in the mosquito’s midgut a protein 
activated by the mosquito’s blood-sucking behavior that would block the 
transmission of malaria. Such a series of experiments might involve killing 
thousands of transgenic insects. Let us suppose that killing these TAs will 
directly save human lives. Here is an either/or choice: If we do not rear and 
harvest the transgenic mosquitos, we will have to stand idly by as humans die 
of malaria.73 
Represent the harm of death to an ordinary adult human as a harm of 
the magnitude of -10.0. Represent the harm of death to an ordinary adult 
insect as, by comparison, less than -0.001, since insects presumably are not 
subjects of a life. In this case, the worse-off principle permits the sacrifice of 
thousands, or millions, of insects. Indeed, WP not only permits this option; it 
requires us to produce and kill vast numbers of such animals. Otherwise, we 
are not respecting the rights of the malaria victims.  
Now, suppose that the experimental animal in question is not an 
invertebrate mosquito but a mammal with a comparatively highly developed 
brain and central nervous system. The harm of death to, say, a mouse will 
clearly be greater than the harm of death to a mosquito because of the greater 
range, complexity, depth and sophistication of the mouse’s interests. If the 
harm of death to the insect is less than -0.001, and the harm of death to an 
adult human -10.0, then we might, somewhat arbitrarily, assign the harm of 
death to a mouse at -1.0. Because the harm of death to a human is still 
noncomparably worse than the harm of death to a mouse, WP will justify the 
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same results for transgenic mice as for transgenic insects. WP instructs us that 
if the production of millions of transgenic mice will demonstrably save the 
live of one human being, then we ought to produce and kill those animals. 
Admittedly, the consequence, insofar as it involves mammals, does 
not sound like one Tom Regan would endorse. Regan is known for his 
abolitionist stance toward the use of animals in science and, indeed, explicitly 
denies that his theory leads to the conclusion here described.74 But why? Here 
we must distinguish two responses to this question: the response Regan gives 
in his book, and a response he provides later. 
Consider his first response. Regan points out that WP begins with the 
clause “Special considerations aside . . . “ He claims that a special 
consideration obtains in animal research rendering WP inapplicable to the 
case of animal experimentation. The special consideration is that the research 
animals are innocent individuals, and to kill them is to transfer risks to them 
against their consent. Regan believes we are never justified in transferring 
risks to innocent individuals against their will. 
Regan’s first attempt to block the application of the principle to 
animal research seems unconvincing for two reasons. First, the innocence of 
the animals is a difference that may make no difference. In all lifeboat cases, 
each individual is innocent by hypothesis. Were it not the case that all were 
innocent--were one of the individuals guilty of an offense that had caused the 
lifeboat dilemma to arise--then we would not have a lifeboat case. We would 
instead have a case with no dilemma, because the guilty party’s offense 
would provide a good reason for preferring the death of the guilty party to the 
deaths of the innocent parties. Lifeboat cases are not like this. All parties are 
innocent; no individual has had any culpable causal role in the creation of the 
dilemma; and yet we still must choose to transfer the risk of death to 
someone. So, Regan’s first attempt to block the applicability of WP to animal 
research seems to be a nonstarter. 
Second, even if the innocence of the animals was relevant, the claim 
that we should never nonvoluntarily transfer risks to innocents (NTR) is not 
persuasive. As Gary Varner has pointed out in conversation, we often engage 
in NTR. Parents decide not to take a sick child to the clinic because they fear 
they cannot afford the health care.75 The child recovers fully, and we do not 
blame the parents for their decision. Nonetheless, they have transferred risks 
to a child who was forced to accept them nonvoluntarily. Congress conscripts 
young men and women against their will into the army to defend the nation. 
The young people return to resume their careers, the war ends, and we do not 
blame Congress.  A woman decides not to buy an insurance policy, thereby 
transferring to her dependents risks of loss of income that they probably 
would not have chosen to assume. All of these everyday occurrences are 
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justifiable cases of NTR. So, Regan’s second way of blocking the 
applicability of WP to animal research seems unpersuasive. 
There is a third response open to Regan. In a 1985 exchange with 
Peter Singer, he wrote that “it is wrong--categorically wrong--coercively to 
put an animal at risk of harm, when the animal would not otherwise run this 
risk, so that others might benefit; . . . “76 Here Regan appeals to the principle 
of respect, the foundation of the AR view, insisting that animal 
experimentation violates “the animal’s right to be treated with respect by 
reducing the animal to the status of a mere resource, a mere means, a thing.” 
Because mammals used in research are subjects of a life, seizing them against 
their will and conscripting them into painful or lethal research fails to show 
due consideration for their negative right not to have the integrity of their 
bodies and projects violated. Thus, WP is inapplicable to the case of using 
animals in research because one of its conditions is not satisfied: there is, at 
the beginning, no conflict of rights involved. An apparent conflict of rights is 
generated by an agent’s overriding an innocent animal’s rights. 
This response is powerful, and raises an issue of central importance. 
The issue is that there is a fundamental disanalogy between the case of 
animal research and lifeboat cases. As lifeboat cases are much discussed in 
the literature of applied ethics, this disanalogy deserves careful exploration. 
Standard lifeboat cases have the following requirements: 
(1) An agent, A, whose own rights are in danger of being 
  violated, is required to choose between violating 
  her own rights or the rights of one or more others (call 
  these others, “stakeholders”); 
(2) The other stakeholders (B, C, and so on) are  
  determinate; 
(3) None of the stakeholders has been placed in harm’s way 
  by the actions of A. 
(1) requires that the agent facing the lifeboat dilemma must herself be in 
danger of severe harm if no choice is made. (2) requires that the stakeholders 
be definite, neither unknown victims still to be determined or faceless 
representatives of future generations. The stakeholders are persons A, B, and 
C, that is, specific individuals in the lifeboat with A. (3) requires that the 
presence of each stakeholder in the lifeboat is free, that is, none were coerced 
by A to be on the lifeboat.77 
None of these requirements is satisfied in the case of animal research. 
The researchers who decide to use animals in research typically are not 
themselves victims of the disease they are hoping to cure. The animals are not 
determinate individuals; we cannot name the dogs ahead of time that will be 
selected for use. And the dogs do not come naturally, as it were, into the 
experiment; they are forced into it. 
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For these reasons, we ought to abandon the lifeboat metaphor in 
trying to think through the case of animal experimentation. A more apt 
analogy is a version of a trolley-car case. 
The standard trolley-car case describes an individual faced with a 
moral dilemma in which the individual herself will not be faced with serious 
harm if no choice is made. The individual nonetheless must choose between 
an action that will inevitably lead to the killing of a group of innocent 
individuals, or taking no action at all, which will result in the killing of a 
different group of innocent individuals. 
Imagine a trolley-car careening down a hill out of control. It 
approaches a switch between track #20 and track #3, a switch over which you 
have control. On track #20 are twenty innocent humans. On track #3 are three 
innocent humans. If you do nothing, the car will continue on track #20, 
killing twenty humans. The three humans on track #3, of course, will remain 
unharmed. If you flip the switch, however, redirecting the car onto track #3, 
you will directly cause the death of three people, while directly saving the 
lives of twenty people.  
Now, imagine the following permutation on the case. As you look 
down track #3, you do not see three people on the track. You see a large 
carousel carrying hundreds of vacationers. When at rest, the carousel does not 
intersect the path of track #3 and no one on the carousel is at risk. Once 
started, however, the gyrating motion of the carousel intermittently carries 
part of it directly over track #3. At any given moment, the circling carousel 
rotates three passengers into the path of track #3. The three people in the 
fateful location are “indeterminate,” in the sense that a different set of people 
is at risk at each moment. We cannot identify ahead of time just who exactly 
will be put at risk.  The constitution of the risk pool, in other words, changes 
from second to second. 
Imagine, finally, that a faulty wiring job has hooked the carousel’s 
start switch to the trolley-car switch in your hands. You must, therefore, make 
the following choice. Do nothing, and allow the trolley-car to kill twenty 
innocent people on track #20 while not endangering anyone on the carousel. 
Or, flip the switch, redirecting the trolley-car toward the carousel, and saving 
the lives of twenty specific people on track #20 while simultaneously setting 
in motion a process that will kill three, as-yet-undetermined, people-about-to-
be-rotated onto track #3. 
This case has the following features: 
(4) An agent, A, whose own rights are not in danger of being 
  violated, is required to choose between doing nothing, with 
  the result that the rights of many determinate individuals 
  are violated, or doing something, with the result that the 
  rights of a few, other, individuals are violated (call these 
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  individuals the “stakeholders”), 
(5) The identities of the stakeholders in the smaller risk pool are 
  not determinate; 
(6) The stakeholders in the smaller risk pool are directly put into 
  the risk pool by the actions of A. 
Our intuitions seem clear, and reliable, here; we ought to flip the 
switch and kill three rather than twenty. This intuition is justified by Regan’s 
theory, because we have here a case of deciding between comparable harms, 
as the death of one human is comparable to the death of another. Therefore, 
the minimize overriding of rights principle applies, and we ought to choose to 
violate the smallest number of individuals’ rights as possible. 
Is the trolley-car case also analogous to (some) cases of animal 
research? Imagine that the individuals on Track #20 are humans, and the 
individuals on the carousel are animals. The harm of death to a human is non-
comparably worse than the harm of death to an animal, so the mini-ride 
principle will not apply here. But WP will apply, and will justify choosing to 
kill the three animals, if the features of the case really are analogous. Are 
they? 
In animal research, the researcher’s own rights typically are not in 
danger of being violated because researchers usually do not suffer from the 
disease they are trying to cure.  Yet the researcher is required to choose 
between doing nothing, with the result that the rights of many diseased 
innocent humans will be violated, or doing something, namely, killing 
animals. The result of the second choice will be that the rights of other 
innocent individuals, the animals, will be violated. Condition (4) is satisfied. 
The stakeholders in animal research are not determinate. This is 
obvious in the case of pound seizure. When selecting dogs for research from 
stray and abandoned animals, we clearly do not know ahead of time which 
pool of animals will be selected, because we do not know which animals will 
come to be in the pound at any moment. We may not even know which pound 
will be selected. Therefore, we may think of all of the stray and abandoned 
dogs in the US as riders on the carousel. Exactly three of the dogs will be 
selected and harmed, but we have no way to identify at present which three 
they will be. Condition (5) is satisfied in the instance of random selection of 
animals for experimentation. 
Pound seizure is no longer the technique of choice, however, and the 
vast majority of animals used in research are intentionally bred for this 
purpose. Is (5) satisfied when researchers directly set out to bring lab mice 
into existence? 
I think so. Imagine that each mouse has a soul and before it is born, 
God drops its soul into this or that mouse embryo. As a result of this natural 
lottery, some mice are born into laboratories, others into haymows. Those 
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born into labs are unfortunate, and will come inevitably into harms’ way at 
the hands of humans. The others will not; they will have to fend only with 
barn cats. If this thought-experiment is defensible, then condition (5) is 
satisfied even in the case of intentional breeding of lab animals. 
Finally, while animal research does not require that researchers 
initially determine the identities of the animals they are going to use (God 
does that), animal research clearly does require researchers (or their 
delegates) directly to select animals to be put in harm’s way. Someone must 
enter the pound, survey the room of candidates, and then select one animal 
for experimentation while sparing others. Someone must directly oversee the 
selection of individual mice whose sperm and eggs will be combined to 
produce the embryos to be brought to term and then used for experimentation. 
Some stakeholders are put into the risk pool by our actions. Condition (6) is 
also satisfied. 
Unlike abolitionists who oppose all TA production, those who adopt 
ARR must endorse the production of some TAs in order to abide by the 
provisions of WP. Under certain conditions, research may have the direct 
effect of saving the lives of human beings who would be made worse-off in 
the absence of the research. It bears noting that this condition probably 
applies to a small minority of the actual cases of the use of TAs in scientific 
research. Be that as it may, the carousel case suggests that the production of 
TA neoplasmic mice, and even dogs, may be justified according to the worse-
off principle. If we must make a choice, either to do nothing, and so watch as 
a group of humans dies, or produce and kill indeterminate research animals 
with the result that the humans are saved, then we ought to violate the rights 
of the animals. This is true even if: 
 all of the animals are innocent; 
 we do not know exactly which animals will be harmed; and, 
 we must directly select the animals to be put into the risk pool. 
I conclude that an animal rights ethic is not committed to an 
abolitionist approach to the use of animals in research. Let us consider 
another possibility. 
 
ARR: An animal rights ethic must oppose the use of animals in 
research and agriculture whenever the harm to be done to the animal 
is noncomparably greater than the harm that would be done to the 
human were the animal not subjected to harm. 
 
According to ARR, then, the production of hairless mice is not justified, since 
the harm to the animal is noncomparably greater than the harm that would be 
done to the balding man were the hairless mouse not produced.  Nor is the 
production of transgenic pigs to be used for slaughter justified, since the harm 
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that death is to the pig is noncomparably greater than the harm that would be 
done to the consumer were the consumer denied a veal cutlet. 
 What follows from ARR for the propriety of producing transgenic 
farm animals (TFAs)? Five points should be made. 
 First point. ARR does not protect animals that lack preference-
interests. There are, of course, other moral concerns to be considered, 
including the potential ecological consequences of TA production and 
questions about the influence of the work on the character of those doing the 
scientific research. However, in the absence of other moral reasons not to 
genetically modify them, the following phyla are prima facie eligible for 
experimental manipulation: Annelida (earthworms and leeches), 
Echinodermata (starfish, sand dollars, sea urchins, sea cucumbers), Mollusca 
(clams, shrimp, oysters, scallops), and Arthropoda (insects, crustaceans, 
spiders, centipedes).78 If a transgenic animal is incapable of having a future, 
then it is impossible to do direct harm to it by killing it painlessly. 
 Where do we draw the line?  Rights are tied to interests, so animals 
with an interest in not feeling pain have, all other things being equal, a right 
not to be caused pain for a trivial reason.  Animals with a future, have, all 
other things being equal, a right not to be killed for a trivial reason.  It is one 
thing to try to determine whether an animal is sentient. It is another thing to 
try to determine whether an animal has a future. How do we do that? 
 Following pioneering work of Gary Varner, I want to suggest that the 
answer is to look for signs of hypothesis formation and testing.  The reason is 
that “having a future” consists in more than mere reflexive responses to avoid 
adverse stimuli, a “behavior” of which many plants are capable.  Having a 
future means having a desire; being capable of formulating at least one 
hypothesis as a way of satisfying that desire; and subsequently choosing to 
act on one’s hypothesis.79 By formulating and acting on hypotheses, 
individuals can learn; that is, they can assimilate and store knowledge about 
past successes and failures so as to improve their ability to form future 
hypotheses.  Having a future means, in sum, being able to shape one’s future. 
Which animals have the capacity to shape their future? At some point 
in pre-history, the universe witnessed the first animals capable of proto-
reasoning about their desires, and these animals were the first individuals 
with futures. They must have had a sufficiently developed central nervous 
system and brain to support the complex mental operations required for 
hypothesis formation and testing.80 
By hypothesis formation and testing I, like Varner, do not have in 
mind anything very intellectual. I take it that an individual’s behavior can be 
explained in terms of hypothesis formation and testing even when the 
individual is incapable of articulating that they are engaged in forming and 
testing hypotheses. A coyote has to decide to act on one of two competing 
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desires: (a) to attempt to feed its offspring or (b) to sleep. The coyote may 
hypothesize that by searching first for food she will be able to sleep later as 
well, but that if she sleeps first, prey will escape, her offspring will starve, 
and she will have failed to feed them. Her hypothesis, though not of course at 
this level of abstraction, is that by acting on (a) she will also have a good 
chance to act on (b), but by acting initially on (b) she will forego the 
opportunity to act on (a). So she tests the hypothesis by acting on (a) rather 
than (b). The coyote is involved, at least, in proto-reasoning about her desires. 
 The empirical task, then, is to examine the behavioral and the 
physiological evidence for different species, and to try to determine which 
species are capable not simply of movement, which can be attributed to 
instinct and habit, but of the kind of learning involved in hypothesis 
formation and testing. Varner’s review of the available empirical evidence 
leads him to this conclusion: 
 Fish and lower animals almost certainly do not have desires. 
Mammals almost certainly have desires, and in them, the 
practical reasoning characteristic of desire is localized in the 
prefrontal cortex. Birds probably have desires (although the 
case for saying that they do is somewhat weaker than that for 
saying that mammals do), and in birds, practical reasoning is 
localized in the hyperstriatum. Reptiles may have desires 
(although the case for saying that they do is decisively 
weaker than that for saying that birds do), and if reptiles have 
desires, the related practical reasoning is localized 
somewhere in the primitive reptilian cerebrum.81 
 How does this line of reasoning help us with the line-drawing 
problem? The moral obligations scientists have to TAs will depend on the 
level of sentience and consciousness possessed by the animals with which 
they are working. It is wrong to cause pain for trivial reasons to any sentient 
animal, including fish. The reason is simply that pain is bad and 10 units of 
pain are 10 units of pain whether I suffer them, or you suffer them, or a 
rainbow trout suffers them. Here it does not matter that you and I can desire 
for the pain to cease in the future, whereas the trout apparently cannot. Thus, 
all TA research on sentient animals should be bound by the Worse-off rule. 
 But research on animals that lack futures need not be bound by the 
“No harvest TA” rule that I proposed at the end of chapter 3, because these 
animals do not possess the characteristics needed to be entitled to the right 
not to be killed painlessly. 
 Second point. ARR recognizes the right to life of all animals who 
have a future. As noted in ch. 3, the transgenic animal of choice is the mouse, 
a vertebrate with a complex brain and nervous system. The slaughter of a 
research mouse interferes with its capacity to pursue its interests and shape its 
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future. Scientists working with this and other vertebrate species need not 
necessarily call a moratorium on all of their research, but the burden of proof 
is on them to show that their research will directly save human lives. Any 
lesser goal is probably morally unjustifiable. 
 Third point. ARR does not justify the production and slaughter of 
animals for food in developed countries. It is rarely the case in developed 
countries that one must choose between the life of a so-called food animal 
and the life of a human. As Peter Singer puts it, eating meat is a “great 
extravagance.” 
Some 38 per cent of the world’s grain crop is now fed to 
animals, as well as large quantities of soybeans. There are three 
times as many domestic animals on this planet as there are 
human beings. The combined weight of the world’s 1.28 billion 
cattle alone exceeds that of the human population.82 
Like ARA, the more permissive ARR theory of animal rights will not allow 
suffering or slaughter either of research or production TFAs unless the 
research can be directly linked to the saving of lives, perhaps in developing 
countries. But transgenic farm animals would not seem to be the answer to 
the problem of starvation. 
 Fourth point.  To the extent that TFAs are not slaughtered or harmed, 
TFA research may be justified. It seems that much progress in controlling the 
regulator genes has been made since the 1985 Beltsville hog experiments 
with the result that few transgenic research animals seem to suffer as a result 
of physiological problems.83 Indeed, if the reports of those producing TFAs in 
the public sector are to be believed, TFA suffering seems to have been 
virtually eliminated. 84 
 One reason is that embryos with significant defects are not brought to 
term. In producing the first cloned sheep, Ian Wilmut destroyed nearly 300 
embryos before successfully producing Dolly. Unless one holds that embryos 
are capable of suffering, this research, while “wasteful” in one sense, did not 
cause the kind of suffering seen in the Beltsville hogs case. Another reason is 
that inserted genes are now targeted to work in specific organs, such as the 
mammary gland, rather than in central “unregulated” physiological systems, 
such as the growth hormone system. As a result, the vast majority of TFAs 
produced in the last ten years have grown normally with minimal if any side 
effects. One example: dairy researchers today are not inserting genes for 
greater milk production into all of the cow’s cells; they are rather targeting 
genes to work in more local, specific, ways by introducing them directly into 
the cow’s mammary gland. Therefore, only the cells in one of the cow’s 
organs have the foreign gene in them. 
 While there is no hard data on the extent of animal suffering in 
research labs producing TFAs, the judgments of those working in this area 
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appear to be fairly uniform. As the previous footnote attests, the majority of 
researchers seem to believe that there is little suffering among current TFAs. 
 Fifth point. The right target at which to aim when concerned to 
protect sentient animals may be the legal system rather than the research 
system. Protocols have been developed requiring researchers to hold animal 
pain to a minimum. The Beltsville hogs were subjected to unnecessary 
suffering insofar as those running the experiment presumably could have 
given the arthritic hogs an analgesic once the animal’s condition was 
discovered. Or, the scientists could have euthanized the piglets after 
diagnosing their problems. The scientists’ failure to do so was legally 
justified by the fact that farm animals are exempt from the provisions of the 
Animal Welfare Act, and scientifically justified, one presumes, on the basis 
that analgesia might have compromised the reliability of the experimental 
results. Nonetheless, such gaps in the regulations can and should be fixed. 
 Global critics of ag biotech shoot at the wrong target in trying to stop 
all animal biotechnology. It is possible to eliminate most if not all of the 
suffering of transgenic animals by legislating against procedures likely to 
produce it. European laws, for example, require researchers to weigh the 
amount of animal suffering in an experiment against the expected benefits to 
humans.85 While there is ample room in the United States for legislation to 
prohibit experimentation that might cause suffering in animals capable of 
suffering, there is still much to be done in animal law.  The US has large 
loopholes in its legislation, and no single unitary scheme covering all 
animals. 
 In sum, the animal rights view I now hold has very different attitudes 
to the use of animals in agriculture and their use in research.  ARR takes an 
abolitionist approach to agriculture, and a reformist attitude to animal 
experimentation. 
 No slaughter of animals with futures for meat in developed countries. 
 Carefully circumscribed use of animals when research can save 
determinate human lives. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 We began by considering the following proposition. 
  
 If there is a substantial risk that a technology will do more harm 
than good to humans, ecosystems, and animals, then it should not be 
developed. 
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We assumed that this proposition is true, then noted that the strength of the 
extrinsic case against ag biotech hinges on the idea that potential harms to 
humans, land, and animals will be greater than the benefits. 
 We examined eight arguments for this conclusion and found several 
areas in which we must continue to be concerned about the release of GMOs. 
These areas include:  The EPA exemption for viral coat proteins and the 
risks that this policy entails for the appearance of new viral plant diseases 
(1). The difficulties facing developing countries as they try to negotiate the 
legal and financial mazes of intellectual property rights (3.3). The 
environmental risks posed by gene-flow in crops grown near weedy relatives 
(6.6). The possibility that transgenic fish might cross-breed with, or 
outcompete, wild salmon, with the resultant loss of wild species (6.7). The 
use of animals with futures in research aimed at trivial goals, such as 
restoring men's hairlines (8.2). 
 These and other risks are not to be taken lightly. It appears, however, 
that we may be able to minimize them through regulatory action. Overall, 
when weighed against the potential benefits of the new genetics, the risks 
outlined in this chapter do not add up to a vindication of the global case 
against ag biotech. 
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with deleterious phenotypes as a result of transgene integration site are almost always 
discarded, unless the phenotype is of scientific interest in its own right. This has happened 
occasionally in mice but apparently has not been reported in larger animals. And there is little 
point in producing an unhealthy farm animal because only healthy productive farm animals will 
make the farmer any money. 
 b) Cost. Whereas the expense involved in making transgenic mice is relatively low, 
the cost of livestock is high. Most of the work to develop animal models of disease occurs in 
mice because much work involves gene knockout experiments and the stem cell lines needed 
for these experiments are currently only available for mice. TFA researchers, therefore, discard 
large animal embryonic constructs if they know that the constructs are analogous to transgenic 
mouse constructs that have led to problems in mice when brought to term. Farm animals are not 
used as models for specific gene function so many of the conditions that have been seen in 
mice are not likely to be seen in TFAs, and the number of at-risk TFAs is kept to a minimum. 
 c) Frequency of attempts. Government agencies are reticent to fund large animal 
transgenics since the 1985 USDA Beltsville growth hormone in pigs studies gave such bad 
phenotypes. They generally demand the mouse data mentioned in (1) if the large animal 
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A word of caution. Much transgenic animal research is now occurring in private 
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Information about these animals is proprietary and not freely shared. Therefore, there may be 
incidents of transgenic animal suffering that only a few people know about. We simply don’t 
know. 
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Conclusion 
 
When social issues involve questions as momentous as global 
survival, ethicists should do more than analyze arguments and formulate 
principles.  They should help us find stories to put our values into practice. In 
the essays collected here, I have tried to tell my story in the hope that others 
might find it instructive. 
I once nearly believed that we should rule out the use of genetic 
engineering in agriculture.  For reasons detailed in these pages, I changed my 
mind as I became convinced that intrinsic objections to ag biotech are weak, 
and that potentially adverse consequences can be effectively managed 
through government regulation. While continuing to have objections to the 
exploitation of vertebrates by our genetic engineers, I welcome the 
application of these scientists' considerable skills to plants. 
I remain convinced that Wendell Berry offers a good story, and I now 
believe that ag biotech is compatible with it. We should learn to farm and eat 
well, in a way that respects the rights of sentient beings with futures, and does 
as little harm as possible.  We need ethical principles and public policies to 
reform agriculture along humane and sustainable lines, so as to feed every 
child without exploiting people, land, or animals. We need institutions and 
practices that will allow us to leave farm ground in better shape than we 
found it, providing future generations in turn with the resources they will 
need to feed themselves. 
No doubt, there will be a diversity of good stories to guide us, stories 
originating from specific places, enabling local inhabitants to farm in morally 
defensible ways, ways suited to their regions. Stories in which small and 
large farms may flourish, serving different needs.  Stories in which people 
may seek the long-term common good of families and communities, while 
allowing individual stockholders in private corporations to profit from their 
investments. Stories in which animals, living alongside and among us, will 
provide us with various sources of nutrition, which we will take from them 
without compromising their welfare. 
Perhaps, for example, some will find Wes Jackson’s vision of a 
perennial polyculture the best story for those living in the high plains of the 
US. Perhaps, as Jackson himself has suggested, the tools of genetic 
engineering may be carefully integrated into this story so as to produce a 
perennial, genetically modified, high-yielding, grass variety native, more or 
less, to its place. A variety that can provide huge quantities of oil derived 
from its seeds while also helping to reduce the amount of acreage in 
production. So might ag biotech make good on its promise to help restore the 
beauty and integrity of the US’s mid-region. 
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We need stories that show due consideration for animals. I have 
detailed my ongoing struggle with this issue. The animal rights view initially 
struck me as too strict, not capable of making relevant moral discriminations, 
and not allowing us to account for the fact that the mental lives of animals are 
not uniformly intense or complex. On further examination, however, that 
theory provides some supple and common-sense resources, such as the worse-
off principle. On a reformist reading, the animal rights theory requires 
vegetarianism for those in developed countries, but also permits the use of 
many animals in research. Our challenge is to figure out how to do the least 
harm to humans and animals while involving humans and animals in a 
sustainable society. The practice of meat-eating among the world’s well-off 
peoples does not accord with this story.  Neither does the production of 
transgenic farm animals for food.  Neither does the production of massive 
amounts of grain to be fed to animals for the production of meat. On the other 
hand, uses of animals in research that will demonstrably save human lives 
may on occasion be justifiable. 
The production of transgenic plants is another story. It seems difficult 
to find persuasive grounds on which to object to the introduction of crops 
such as rice enhanced with vitamin A and iron. We have a duty to aid the 
needy; virus-free forms of cassava, millet, and wheat seem to be effective 
means of fulfilling this duty. Then again, there are good reasons of an 
environmental sort to object to crops grown in developed countries where the 
possibility exists for gene-flow to sexually compatible plants. 
Coming full circle, we can apply these conclusions to the case with 
which we began. bGH is not, in the end, a technology we should endorse.  It 
is important, however, to be clear about the reasons. 
The rejection of bGH should have nothing to do with the fact that it is 
a product of genetic recombination. Nor that it will drive family farmers out 
of business. I object to bGH only on animal rights grounds; the technology 
represents a harm to dairy cows not justified by the gains to humans. 
Anecdotal reports from dairy farmers suggest that bGH decreases the 
so-called useful lifetime of a cow by one milking cycle. Cows on bGH are put 
under additional stress by the use of the technology. The amount of added 
stress is not lethal to the animal, as the added stress is not life-threatening. 
However, the fact that farmers typically must slaughter bGH cows a year 
earlier than non-bGH cows suggests that the treated animal has a serious 
interest in not being injected with bGH. And the gains to poor consumers in 
lower milk prices achieved by bGH may be achieved by other means, such as 
taxes on the rich to provide free milk to the poor.  Thus, we have strong moral 
reasons to think that bGH is not an ag biotechnology that fits with our 
humane sustainable story. 
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This negative judgment, however, must be set in the broader context 
of modern dairy production. Even dairy cows not on bGH are under 
tremendous physiological stress. They have been selected through traditional 
breeding methods for extraordinarily high productivity.  Non-bGH production 
cows must eat continuously in order to produce the amount of milk their 
systems have been designed to produce.  
Therefore, it is a mistake to focus on bGH.  Our opposition, in truth, 
should not be directed at ag biotech but, rather, at the institution of modern 
dairy farming.  We should oppose the practices of  milking cows three times a 
day rather than twice a day; separating cows and calves at birth rather than 
allowing them to bond; allowing the birth of male calves to be slaughtered at 
a young age for veal; and killing cows when they are worn out from milking 
rather than letting them live out their natural life-spans. 
A reformist animal rights ethic insists on a thorough reshaping of the 
industrial dairy farm. We should use technology to allow only female bovine 
fetuses to come to term. In this way, we will not need to slaughter veal calves.  
We should construct barnyards and pastures so that calves are allowed to 
form natural bonds with their mothers. In this way, we will preserve the 
natural instincts of the animals we are using while permitting them to satisfy 
the desires typical of their species.  We should breed cows so that their 
capacity to produce milk does not threaten their long-term health. And, first 
and foremost, we should devise agronomic and economic husbandry systems 
that will allow cows to live out their natural life spans, not slaughtering them 
until, from the cow’s perspective, the cow’s life is no longer worth living. 
Only in this broader reformist context does opposition to bGH 
assume its proper place in our story. The problem is not agricultural 
biotechnology. The problem is our current way of treating food animals. 
bGH is not an anomaly. It is a symbol of the first wave of ag biotech 
products.  I continue to agree with the global critics on this point, that the first 
wave of ag biotech products are premature and do not address the central 
problems of modern agriculture.  However, the first wave may be justified on 
the grounds that it has provided private industry with revenue-enhancing 
products to pay for the research and development of a second wave of mature, 
ethically-sound, ag biotechnologies. The problematic first technologies may 
not be inseparable from a huge and expensive technocratic food system, an 
undemocratic social and cultural nexus controlled by a scientific and 
engineering elite unconcerned with the interests of most of the world’s plain 
citizens and farmers. But the second wave may indeed be separable from MA, 
as the ability and resources to research, develop, and deploy the technology 
become more widely and democratically distributed. 
There are reasons to continue to be skeptical that we can make the 
story suggested in the previous paragraphs come true. If ag biotech is going to 
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make good on its champions’ claims to feed the world’s hungriest children, 
then several problems must be faced directly. Private corporations are putting 
their efforts, justifiably, into technologies likely to lead to increased profits. 
Herbicide resistance and Bt corn are good technologies for the companies 
that market them and the farmers that use them. But let us be honest. These 
technologies do not provide increased nutrient values in the staple crops of 
developing countries. 
Moreover, developing countries face an uphill battle, in terms of 
legal, financial, and human resources, as they struggle to gain access to the 
products of ag biotech. Therefore, the challenge to those wishing to defend ag 
biotech on moral grounds is real. Corporations profiting from the first wave 
of technologies must make their patented technologies freely available to 
farmers and researchers in the poorest countries. They must share their legal, 
intellectual, and human resources with the neediest.  They must recognize the 
contributions of past and present indigenous farmers who have helped to 
develop the germplasm now being manipulated in their labs. 
Only in this way will local farmers and researchers be able to 
produce new GM strains of Africa’s, Asia’s, and Central America’s basic 
crops. Only in this way will the proponents of ag biotech help us to progress 
beyond a donor mentality.  Only in this way will we move toward a 
cooperative mentality, in which technologies are regarded not as gifts to be 
handed down, but as resources to be handed on.  In a cooperative spirit, the 
poor become researchers and developers of their own, and eventually 
competitors with others. 
By pursuing the right goals, we may indeed be able to compose 
together a story that encourages respect for human life, good farming, the 
feeding of children, and due consideration of nonhuman life. That story need 
not include Beltsville hogs with human genes, crops resistant to herbicides 
being grown only in blank perfections of fields to be fed to livestock for 
slaughter, or dairy cows whose lives are shortened by injections of stress-
inducing proteins. That story should, however, include biotech products that 
will obviate the need to slaughter veal calves; that will reduce the price of 
food for our poorest consumers; that will make the most productive use of our 
arable acres so as to preserve lands for other flora and fauna; and that will 
help to meet the vitamin needs of the world’s sickest children. 
If we pursue these goals vigorously, collectively, and thoughtfully, ag  
biotech may eventually win over even its most confirmed critics.
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